01.17.2013 - Garance Genicot

Suicide and Property Rights in India

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson

IFPRI

January 17,20132

Garance Genicot & Siwan Anderson (GU) Suicide and Property Rights January 17,20132 1 / 49

Motivation


Motivation

Women’s ability to inherit property is restricted in many societies.


Motivation


Evidence that improving women’s asset ownership improves their
bargaining power, female education & expenditures for children.


Motivation



→ frequent justiﬁcation for policies targeting women.


Motivation




In most econ models, ownership of assets matters via outside options
→ aﬀects intra-household bargaining.


Motivation




In most econ models, ownership of assets matters via outside options
→ aﬀects intra-household bargaining.

When wives contribute a greater share of the family wealth they expect,
and are more likely to get, a more equitable sharing of decision power.


However, female empowerment can increase intra-household conﬂict



by challenging traditional roles & more need for negotiation.



by challenging traditional roles & more need for negotiation.

Large sociological literature on female empowerment and suicides:

Durkheim (1897)

Stack (1986) - US labor participation

Pampel (1998) - cross country

Das Gupta et al (2000) - China marriage law (1950)


Conﬂicting information on domestic violence and women’s
empowerment

Panda and Agarwal (2005) - India: lower violence for women with
greater economic resources, such as land or employment.

Eswaran and Malhorta (2010) - India: employed women report violence
more frequently.

Bobonis et al. (2006)- Progresa: less physical but more emotional
abuse for recipient households, and more likely to separate.

Luke and Munshi (2011) - Indian tea plantation: violence increases
with female income.

Hjort and Villanger (2012) – Ethiopia, randomized job oﬀers, 13 % (34
%) increase in physical ( emotional ) violence when women get job.


This paper studies the impact of female property rights on male and
female suicide rates in India.



State level variation in women’s property right generated by

state Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act




state Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act &

state reforms to agricultural land rights.






Better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in the
diﬀerence between female and male suicide rates,







but an increase in both male and female suicides.


These changes have been shown to matter:



Deiniger, Gopal and Nagarajan (2010): amendment increased women’s
likelihood to inherit land, their age at marriage & daughter’s education.




Roy, Sanchari (2010): amendments increase human capital investment
of women in NFHS data.





Besley and Burgess (2002): land reforms decrease poverty.






Stylized facts on suicide points to marital discord as a major cause of
suicides for both gender.






Stylized facts on suicide points to marital discord as a major cause of
suicides for both gender.

→ Suggests intra-household conﬂict as an explanation.


We build a model of intra-household bargaining in which conﬂict is an
intrinsic part of bargaining



Basic framework:

spouses bargain over the allocation of consumptions under the threat of
separation/’separate spheres’.



Basic framework:


add 2 crucial elements:



Basic framework:



asymmetry of information (Bloch & Rao 2003)



Basic framework:




rejecting oﬀer initiates conﬂict.



Basic framework:





At any point, individuals may choose the ultimate exit: suicide



Basic framework:





At any point, individuals may choose the ultimate exit: suicide

Separations and suicides are predicted by the model

(see also Ligon, Hoddinott and Adam (2003))

Not to say that promoting women’s rights is bad:

Deiniger et al (2010), Roy (2010), Rosenblum (2010).


Outline of the Talk.

Inheritance Law

Suicides

Estimation

Results

Model

Other possible explanations

Conclusion


India Inheritance Law



Hindu Succession Act 1956 governs Hindus property rights
applies to Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists & Jains.
applies to all states but J&K



In the absence of will, ’separate’ property is divided equally between sons
and daughters.



and daughters.
But it does NOT apply to:
property stemming from tenancy right



and daughters.
But it does NOT apply to:
property stemming from tenancy right
joint property:
sons are automatic coparceners in joint family property
daughter have rights only to father’s separate property


An Example

Father
1/3

Son 1 Daughter Son 2
1/3 1/3


An Example

Father
1/3

1/3 1/3

Father
deceased

1/3 + 1/3 * 1/3 = 4/9 1/3 * 1/3 = 1/9 1/3 + 1/3 * 1/3 = 4/9


Amendments

Some state amendments for equal inheritance of joint property.


Amendments


Kerela in 1975;
Andhra Pradesh in 1986;
Tamil Nadu in 1989;
Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994


Amendments


Kerela in 1975;
Tamil Nadu in 1989;

The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005:


Amendments


Kerela in 1975;
Tamil Nadu in 1989;


brings all agricultural land on par with other property;


Amendments


Kerela in 1975;
Tamil Nadu in 1989;


brings all agricultural land on par with other property;
includes all daughters, especially married daughters, as coparceners in
joint family property.


Suicides in India
Oﬃcial data from the National Crime Records Bureau


Suicides in India

Average suicide rates 1967-2004: 10 for men & 7 for women
(per 100,000)


Suicides in India

(per 100,000)

70 % of suicides victims are married


Suicides in India

(per 100,000)


main reported cause: ’family problems’ for men & women 15-44


Suicides in India

(per 100,000)



(28%) female 15-29; (33%) female 30-44; (26%) male 15-29 & (30%)
male 0-44


Suicides in India

(per 100,000)



male 0-44

Main means: poison (34.8%) & hanging (23.4%).


Suicides in India

(per 100,000)



male 0-44


Under-reporting but similar pattern in detailed micro-level analysis:


Suicides in India

(per 100,000)



male 0-44


Under-reporting but similar pattern in detailed micro-level analysis:

same female:male ratio, most married, rural background, lower
socio-economic classes & marital disharmony is a main cause (35%)

Annual Suicide Rates by State Rates
.05 .1 .15 .2 .25 Suicides

0 .02 .04 .06

.04.06.08 .1 .12
0 .05 .1 .15 .2

GU
AP

AS

BI
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year year year year
0 .05 .1 .15

0 .05 .1 .15
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
.1 .15 .2 .25 .3

MP
HA

KA

KE
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year year year year
.15

0 .02.04.06.08
.05 .1 .15 .2

.05 .1
MA

OR

PU

RA
.1 .05

0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year year year year
.05 .1 .15 .2 .25

.02.04.06.08 .1

.14 .18.2
.1.12 .16
WB
UP
TN

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year year year

female male


Variable Mean Std dev
Female Suicide Rate 0.07 0.048
Male Suicide Rates 0.104 0.085
Amendment 0.163 0.369
Legal Hindus, pop share 0.827 0.154
Muslims, pop share 0.152 0.173
Schedule Tribes, pop share 0.074 0.074
Schedule Castes, pop share 0.151 0.058
Real State Domestic Product pc (log) 7.144 0.456
Rural food product p.c. 0.307 0.273
Yield 30.283 17.982
Food Shock 0.261 0.439
Flood 0.118 0.323
Drought 0.113 0.317
Rainfall 335.826 256.696
Health Expenditure, rel to State income 0.012 0.005
Development Expenditure, rel to State income 0.109 0.041
Education Expenditure, rel to State income 0.035 0.012
Bank per capita 0.057 0.027
Urban Population Share 0.234 0.083
Seats won by State Parties 0.114 0.232
Seats won by Congress 0.418 0.259

Estimation

OLS

i
Sst = β0 + β1 Xst + β2 Ast + λs + γt + εst (1)

where
i
Sst is the suicide rate of females (i = F ) or males (i = M)

Ast = 1 if state s, in year t, has already passed an Amendment Act.

λs and γt are state and year ﬁxed eﬀects.

Xst are cultural and economic controls.


Table 1 - Suicides and Female Inheritance - OLS
Variable Female Female Female
Amendment 0.03 (0.003)*** 0.02 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.003)

Cultur Ctrls NO YES YES
Econ Ctrls NO NO YES

Observations 603 569 489
2
R 0.91 0.92 0.94

Variable Male Male Male
Amendment 0.06 (0.007)*** 0.05 (0.007)*** 0.03 (0.007)***

Cultur Ctrls NO YES YES
Econ Ctrls NO NO YES

2
R 0.89 0.89 0.92


Table 2 - Relative Suicide Rate and Female Inheritance - OLS
Variable Female-Male Female-Male Female-Male
Amendment -0.03 (0.004)*** -0.03 (0.005)*** -0.02 (0.005)***

Cultural Controls NO YES YES
Economic Controls NO NO YES

2
R 0.85 0.85 0.88
Variable Female/Male Female/Male Female/Male
Amendment -0.09 (0.02)*** -0.08 (0.02)*** -0.05 (0.02)***


2
R 0.54 0.56 0.64


Suicide Rates with Years of Amendment- OLS Estimations

Variable Female Male Female-Male
Years of Amend. 0.002 (0.0002)*** 0.006 (0.0005)*** -0.005 (0.0003)***
Cultural Controls YES YES YES
Economic Controls YES YES YES
2
R 0.94 0.93 0.91


Robustness Check

Exclude Kerala.


Robustness Check

Exclude Kerala.

Exclude Bihar, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.


Robustness Check

Exclude Kerala.


Add state speciﬁc time trends.


Robustness Check

Exclude Kerala.



Placebo test: add dummy Ast−10 which equals to 1 for all years greater
or equal to t − 10, if state s passed the Amendment Act in year t.


Robustness Check

Exclude Kerala.



Placebo test: add dummy Ast−10 which equals to 1 for all years greater
or equal to t − 10, if state s passed the Amendment Act in year t.

Cluster standard errors by state.


Table 3 - Suicides and Female Inheritance - Placebo

Variable Female Suicide Male Suicide Ratio
Amendment 0.01 (0.003)** 0.03 (0.008)*** -0.07 (0.02)***

Amendment -10 years 0.004 (0.003) -0.006 (0.006) -0.02 (0.03)


2
R 0.94 0.92 0.64


Estimation

i
Sst = α0 +α1 Xst +α1 Lst +α1 FLs ∗Lst +α1 Tst +α1 FTs ∗Tst +δs +θt + st (2)

Lst - cumulative state-level landholding reforms, Besley & Burgess 00

FLs - degree to which landholding reforms favored women, Agarwal 95.

FLs = 0 no daughter recognized; FLs = 1 only married daughters
recognized; FLs = 2 all daughters recognized.


Estimation

i
Sst = α0 +α1 Xst +α1 Lst +α1 FLs ∗Lst +α1 Tst +α1 FTs ∗Tst +δs +θt + st (2)

Lst - cumulative state-level landholding reforms, Besley & Burgess 00

FLs - degree to which landholding reforms favored women, Agarwal 95.

FLs = 0 no daughter recognized; FLs = 1 only married daughters
recognized; FLs = 2 all daughters recognized.

Tst - cumulative state-level tenancy reforms, BB 00,

FTs - degree to which tenancy reforms favored women, Agarwal 95.

FTs = 0 only male heirs; FTs = 1 daughters and sisters are recognized but
very low; FTs = 2 personal law applies.

δs & θt are state and year ﬁxed eﬀects.

Table 4 - Suicides and Land Reforms - OLS
Variable Female Female Female
Landholding Acts -0.07 (0.008)*** -0.07 (0.01)*** -0.07 (0.01)***
Tenancy Acts -0.01 (0.005)*** -0.009 (0.005)** -0.01 (0.004)***
Female*Landhld Acts 0.03 (0.004)*** 0.03 (0.005)*** 0.03 (0.005)***
Female*Tenancy Acts 0.007 (0.003)*** 0.005 (0.003)** 0.006 (0.002)***

Cultural Controls NO YES NO
2
R 0.90 0.90 0.93

Variable Male Male Male
Landholding Acts -0.15 (0.02)*** -0.15 (0.02)*** -0.11 (0.02)***
Tenancy Acts -0.03 (0.007)*** -0.03 (0.009)*** -0.02 (0.008)***
Female*Landhld Acts 0.07 (0.01)*** 0.07 (0.01)*** 0.05 (0.01)***
Female*Tenancy Acts 0.02 (0.004)*** 0.02 (0.005)*** 0.01 (0.005)***

2
R 0.91 0.92 0.94

Table 5 - Relative Suicide Rate and Female Reforms - OLS
Variable Female-Male Female-Male Female-Male

Landholding Acts 0.07 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.04 (0.02)***
Tenancy Acts 0.01 (0.005)*** 0.02 (0.006)*** 0.01 (0.006)**
Female*Land Acts -0.03 (0.008)*** -0.04 (0.008)*** -0.02 (0.008)***
Female*Ten Acts -0.009 (0.003)*** -0.01 (0.003)*** -0.008 (0.003)**

Variable Female/Male Female/Male Female/Male
Landholding Acts 0.19 (0.05)*** 0.36 (0.08)*** 0.14 (0.09)
Tenancy Acts 0.20 (0.07)*** 0.22 (0.07)*** 0.13 (0.06)**
Female*Landhold. Acts -0.08 (0.02)*** -0.13 (0.03)*** -0.07 (0.04)*
Female*Tenancy Acts -0.09 (0.04)*** -0.09 (0.04)*** -0.06 (0.03)*


2
R 0.88 0.88 0.92


Estimation

Unobservables could determine both suicides and property legislation.


Estimation


→ Follow BB (2000) & instrument for these legislations using lagged seat
shares


Estimation


→ Follow BB (2000) & instrument for these legislations using lagged seat
shares

Ast = γ0 + γ1 Xst + γ2 Zst−1 + ϕs + ψt + ηst


Table 6 - Suicides and Female Inheritance - IV-2SLS
First-Stage Female Male Female/Male
Vars
Amendment Suicides Suicides Suicides
Amend. 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.10 (0.03)*** -0.45 (0.13)***

Hard Left -0.12 (0.17)
Soft Left -0.67 (0.16)***
State Part 0.33 (0.12)***
Congress 0.13 (0.07)**

Cult Ctls YES YES YES YES
Econ Ctls YES YES YES YES

F-stat 9.76

Obs. 486 485 485 485
2
R 0.68 0.91 0.89 0.62


Estimation
For land and tenancy reforms, need to instrument both cumulative
indexes of reforms: Lst , and Tst and interaction with female oriented
policy indices, FLs ∗ Lst and FTs ∗ Tst .


Estimation
For land and tenancy reforms, need to instrument both cumulative
indexes of reforms: Lst , and Tst and interaction with female oriented
policy indices, FLs ∗ Lst and FTs ∗ Tst .

→ following Angrist and Pischke (2009), ﬁrst estimate :

Lst = δ0 + δ1 Xst + δ2 Zst−1 + πs + σt + µst

then use predicted values, Lst & interaction with female policy index,
FLs ∗ Lst as instruments in 2 ﬁrst-stage estimations of Lst & FLs ∗ Lst in
2SLS procedure:

Lst = λ0 + λ1 Xst + λ2 Lst + λ3 FLs ∗ Lst + τs + χt + ιst

FLs ∗ Lst = ρ0 + ρ1 Xst + ρ2 Lst + ρ3 FLs ∗ Lst + ωs + δt + ζst


Table 7 - Suicides and Female Landholding Acts - IV-2SLS

First-Stage First-Stage First-Stage
Variable
Landholding Landholding Female*Landholding
Hard Left 3.20 (0.65)***
Soft Left -3.03 (0.50)***
State Parties -0.87 (0.18)**
Congress -0.17 (0.11)

Landholding -0.58 (0.18)*** -0.86 (0.45)**
Female*Landholding 0.53 (0.07)*** 0.95 (0.17)***

Cult Ctls YES YES YES
Econ Ctls YES YES YES

F-stat on Instr 30.25 45.7 23.4

2
R 0.92 0.94 0.92

Table 8 - Suicides and Female Landholding Acts - IV-2SLS

Female Male Female/Male
Variable
Suicides Suicides Suicides
Landholding Acts -0.07 (0.04)* -0.19 (0.07)*** 0.72 (0.45)
Female*Landholding Acts 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.10 (0.03)*** -0.27 (0.18)


2
R 0.91 0.91 0.88


Table 9 - Suicides and Female Tenancy Acts- IV-2SLS Estimations

First-Stage First-Stage First-Stage
Variable
Tenancy Tenancy Female*Tenancy
Hard Left 5.35 (0.97)***
Soft Left 1.60 (2.05)
State Parties -0.21 (0.24)

Tenancy 1.82 (0.33)*** 2.76 (0.71)***
Female*Tenancy -0.45 (0.14)*** -0.43 (0.31)


F-stat on Instruments 10.8 17.8 13.6

2
R 0.91 0.92 0.91

Table 10 - Suicides and Female Tenancy Acts - IV-2SLS

Female-Male
Variable Female Suicides Male Suicides
Suicides
Tenancy Acts -0.02 (0.008)*** -0.05 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.008)***
Female*Tenancy Acts 0.01 (0.005)** 0.02 (0.008)*** -0.01 (0.005)**


2
R 0.93 0.93 0.92


Due to Conﬂict?

We can use the suicide rate by ”cause”.


Table 11 - Suicide Rates from Family Conﬂict and Female Inheritance- OLS
Estimations

Variable Female Male
Amendment 0.005 (0.001)*** 0.008 (0.002)***

Cultural Controls YES YES
Economic Controls YES YES

Obs. 439 439
2
R 0.86 0.85


Table 12 - Proportion of Total Suicides from Family Conﬂict and Female
Inheritance- OLS Estimations

Female Male
Variable
(All Suicides) (All Suicides)
Amendment 0.06 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.01)***

Cultural Controls YES YES
Economic Controls YES YES

Observations 438 438
2
R 0.58 0.61


Domestic Violence


Domestic Violence

National Family Health Surveys of India: married women aged 15-49.


Domestic Violence


Two measures:
Yis equals 1 if a given female i (residing in state s) thinks that wife
beating (by her husband) is justiﬁed under any of a number of
circumstances (mean around 0.5)
Yis equals 1 if a given female i (residing in state s) has been beaten by
her husband (mean around 0.25)


Domestic Violence


Two measures:
Yis equals 1 if a given female i (residing in state s) thinks that wife
beating (by her husband) is justiﬁed under any of a number of
circumstances (mean around 0.5)
Yis equals 1 if a given female i (residing in state s) has been beaten by
her husband (mean around 0.25)

estimate
Yis = ψ0 + ψ1 Xis + ψ2 Ais + αs + εis (3)
where Xis include: education, age, occupation of wives & husbands; caste
& religion of wives; rural/urban; and hhd durable good ownership.


Table 13 - Domestic Violence and Female Inheritance (1998 NFHS-2) - Probit
Estimations
Wife Beating Wife
Variable
Justiﬁed Beaten
Years Amendment 0.01 (0.003)*** 0.03 (0.005)**

Individual Controls YES YES
Household Controls YES YES

Clustering at State Level YES YES

2
R 0.12 0.07


Table 14 - Domestic Violence and Female Inheritance (2005 NFHS-3) - Probit
Estimations
Wife Beating Wife
Variable
Justiﬁed Beaten
Years Amendment 0.008 (0.005)* 0.03 (0.004)**

Individual Controls YES YES
Household Controls YES YES

Clustering at State Level YES YES

2
R 0.09 0.07


Main Elements of the Model



Model of Intra-household bargaining.




Surplus generated under cooperation.





Bargain over allocation under threat of separation: ’separate spheres’.






Asymmetry of Information: private satisfaction from the marriage.







→ bargaining failure occurs








Rejecting oﬀers initiate conﬂict.









conﬂict is costly to both spouse, cost uncertain ex-ante.









conﬂict is costly to both spouse, cost uncertain ex-ante.

Suicide is a way out of the pain.



Consistent with the main views in psychology on suicide: Leenars
(1996), Schneidman (1985).



(1996), Schneidman (1985).

suicide often linked to events involving loss or conﬂict in existing
interpersonal relationships.



(1996), Schneidman (1985).


it is not just the stress or pain but the inability to cope



(1996), Schneidman (1985).



unendurable psychological pain is stimulus & person desperately wants
a way out



(1996), Schneidman (1985).



unendurable psychological pain is stimulus & person desperately wants
a way out

cognitive constriction (ie, rigidity in thinking, narrowing of focus, tunnel
vision, etc.) is common.


Preferences
Preferences depend on the status of the marriage.


Preferences

If the marriage is intact

V h (Ih + Iw , x, θh ) & V w (Ih + Iw , x, θw )


Preferences



Ij for j ∈ {h, w } represent the resources of the husband & wife


Preferences



x indicates how pro-wife the division of non public goods are within the
household.


Preferences



household.
θj for j ∈ {h, w } are the husband and wife’s private level of satisfaction
with the marriage, drawn from distribution Gj .


Preferences



household.
θj for j ∈ {h, w } are the husband and wife’s private level of satisfaction
with the marriage, drawn from distribution Gj .

If the husband and wife separate or revert to ”separate spheres”
(Lundberg and Pollak (2003))

U h (Ih ) & U w (Iw ).

Timing


Timing
Personal levels of satisfaction with the marriage are revealed.


Timing

Husband makes an oﬀer x.


Timing


Wife accepts or rejects.


Timing



If she accepts, they enjoy the utilities V h and V w .


Timing




If she refuses, it triggers marital discord or conﬂict within the
household:


Timing




household:

husband and wife incur costs κh and κw drawn from distribution F .


Timing




household:


then they separate and enjoy utilities U h and U w .


Timing




household:


then they separate and enjoy utilities U h and U w .

At any point in this process, individuals may instead choose to exit:
end the pain and commit suicide → get 0.

Decisions


Decisions

Assume that an oﬀer has been rejected


Decisions


Costs of conﬂict κh and κw are realized


Decisions



j stays alive if κj ≤ U j (Ij ) for j ∈ {w , h}


Decisions




this assumes that cost of conﬂict and cost of dealing the spouse’s
suicide are the same, to remove any strategic aspect.


Decisions




this assumes that cost of conﬂict and cost of dealing the spouse’s
suicide are the same, to remove any strategic aspect.

→ E j (Ij ), for j ∈ {w , h}, is j’s expected utility if the wife rejects an oﬀer
U j (Ij )
E j (Ij ) ≡ Fj [U j (Ij )]U j (Ij ) − κdFj (κ)
0


Wife accepts oﬀer x if

V w (I , x, θw ) ≥ E w (Iw )

where I = Iw + Ih .



V w (I , x, θw ) ≥ E w (Iw )

where I = Iw + Ih .

→ threshold θ(x)



V w (I , x, θw ) ≥ E w (Iw )

where I = Iw + Ih .

→ threshold θ(x)

→ Gw [θ(x)] is the probability that an oﬀer x is rejected.



V w (I , x, θw ) ≥ E w (Iw )

where I = Iw + Ih .

→ threshold θ(x)

→ Gw [θ(x)] is the probability that an oﬀer x is rejected.

Husband chooses an oﬀer x that maximizes his expected utility

1 − Gw [θ(x)] V h (I , x, θh ) + Gw [θ(x)] E h (Ih ) .


Pro-women Redistribution



Pro-women redistribution of wealth, an increase in I w that is exactly
compensated by a decrease in I h .




Suicides rates are the expected probability of conﬂict times the
likelihood of suicide in case of conﬂict.





→ Proposition: When suicide rates are positive, pro-women
redistribution decreases the ratio of female to male suicide rate.






Eﬀect of a pro-women redistribution on suicides for both genders is
ambiguous.






Effect of a pro-women redistribution on suicides for both genders is
ambiguous.

It depends crucially on the effect on the likelihood of conflict.


Example with linear utility

Assume linear utilities




V w (I , x, θw ) = xbI + θw & V h (I , x, θh ) = (1 − x)bI + θh .

and uniform distribution of θs between 0 and θ.






When wives own nothing they’ll accept anything → husbands oﬀer
x = 0 & no conﬂict.







If relatively small surplus, (b − 1)I < θ, husbands with low valuations
oﬀer nothing as long as women’s share of wealth is low enough→ Conﬂict
necessarily rises over this interval.







If relatively small surplus, (b − 1)I < θ, husbands with low valuations
offer nothing as long as women’s share of wealth is low enough→ Conflict
necessarily rises over this interval.

As we keep on raising women’s share of wealth, conflict will then
decrease as women and men are becoming more equal.



Let b = 1.2, θ = 50 and U j (I ) = I for j ∈ {h, w }.




Costs of conﬂict follow a Pareto distribution (κ = 0.5 and α = 1.1





I = 100





I = 100

We progressively raise the level of resources owned by the wife I w from
1 to 99.


−3
x 10
0.07 2.5

Female Suicide Rate
0.06 Probability of Conflict
Male Suicide Rate
2

0.05

1.5
0.04

0.03 1

0.02

0.5
0.01

0 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Wife Wealth Wife Wealth

(a) likelihood of conﬂict (b) suicide rates
Figure: Eﬀect of Pro-Women Redistribution


Other Possible Explanation



Brothers and Sisters




Theoretically similar





Marital discord more relevant in stylized evidence






Women pushed to suicides







Does not explain men’s suicides







Does not explain men’s suicides

Indian Evidence Act: when a woman commits suicide within 7 years of
her married life, her husband quickly come under suspicion.


Conclusion
We study the impact of female property rights on male and female
suicides in India.


Conclusion
suicides in India.
State level variation in women’s property right generated by state
Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act and to agricultural land rights


Conclusion
suicides in India.


Conclusion
suicides in India.
We build a model of intra-household bargaining with asymmetry of
information and conﬂict.


Conclusion
suicides in India.
Pro-women redistribution decreases the female:male suicide ratio


Conclusion
suicides in India.
Pro-women redistribution can raise marital conﬂict.


Conclusion
suicides in India.
Pro-women redistribution can raise marital conﬂict.

In which case male suicides increase and female suicides can increase or
decrease.

01.17.2013 - Garance Genicot

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01.17.2013 - Garance Genicot