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Putting the Cycle Back into Business Cycle
Analysis
Paul Beaudry, Dana Galizia & Franck Portier
Vancouver School of Economics, Carleton University & Toulouse School of
Economics
New Developments in Macroeconomics
ADEMU conference
UCL, London
November 2016
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0. Introduction
Modern Approach to Business Cycles
Equilibrium stochastic dynamic modeling in macro flowered in
the 1970’s
At that point, postwar business cycles were at most 8 years
long business cycles were defined as fluctuations at
periodicities of 8 years or less.
Spectral densities of main macro variables were showing the
“Typical Spectral Shape of an Economic Variable”
(Granger 1969) look like a persistent AR(1) spectrum
This suggested that business cycle theory should not be about
cycles, it should be about co-movements (see Sargent’s
textbook)
2 / 91
0. Introduction
Modern Approach to Business Cycles
Figure 1: Sargent’s textbook
3 / 91
0. Introduction
Modern Approach to Business Cycles
Figure 2: Sargent’s textbook
4 / 91
0. Introduction
Modern Approach to Business Cycles
Equilibrium stochastic dynamic modeling in macro flowered in
the 1970’s
At that point, postwar business cycles were at most 8 years
long business cycles were defined as fluctuations at
periodicities of 8 years or less.
Spectral densities of main macro variables were showing the
“Typical Spectral Shape of an Economic Variable”
(Granger 1969) look like a persistent AR(1) spectrum
This suggested that business cycle theory should not be about
cycles, it should be about co-movements (see Sargent’s
textbook)
All good!
5 / 91
0. Introduction
What we do
We question this focus in this work
We do three things
1. Show that the economy is “more cyclical than you think”, with
40 more years of data.
2. Explain how “weak complementaries”, combined with
accumulation, favor cyclical behavior (recurrent booms and
busts) rather than indeterminacy
3. Estimate a New-Keynesian model extended to include the for
complementarity forces we are highlighting, and see if the data
prefers a “recurring cycle approach”
6 / 91
Roadmap
1. Motivating Facts
2. General Mechanism
3. Empirical Exercice
7 / 91
Roadmap
1. Motivating Facts
2. General Mechanism
3. Empirical Exercice
8 / 91
1. Motivating Facts
Looking for Peaks
If there are important cyclical forces in the economy ...
... this should show up as a distinct peak in the spectrum of
the data
It is well known that (detrended) output data does not display
such peaks (Granger (1969), Sargent (1987))
However, output data may not be best placed to look, as
there is a marked non stationarity that one needs to get rid of.
May be better to look at measures of factor use: ex: hours
worked, employment rates, unemployment rates, capital
utilization.
Things might also have changed since the 70’s as we have
now 40 more years of observation
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1. Motivating Facts
Figure 3: Non Farm Business Hours per Capita
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Date
-8.15
-8.1
-8.05
-8
-7.95
-7.9
-7.85Logs
10 / 91
1. Motivating Facts
Figure 4: Non Farm Business Hours per Capita Spectrum
4 6 24 32 40 50 60 80
Periodicity
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Level
Various High-Pass
11 / 91
1. Motivating Facts
Figure 5: Non Farm Business Hours per Capita, Highpass (50) Filtered
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6%
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1. Motivating Facts
Figure 6: Total Hours per Capita Spectrum
4 6 24 32 40 50 60 80
Periodicity
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Level
Various High-Pass
13 / 91
1. Motivating Facts
Figure 7: Unemployment Rate Spectrum
4 6 24 32 40 50 60 80
Periodicity
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Level
Various High-Pass
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1. Motivating Facts
Figure 8: Capacity Utilization Spectrum
4 6 24 32 40 50 60 80
Periodicity
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Level
Various High-Pass
15 / 91
1. Motivating Facts
Figure 9: Hours Spectrum in Smets & Wouters’ Model
4 6 24 32 40 50 60 80
Periodicity
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
16 / 91
1. Motivating Facts
Figure 10: Output per Capita Spectrum
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Level
Various High-Pass
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1. Motivating Facts
Figure 11: Output per Capita Spectrum
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Various High-Pass
18 / 91
1. Motivating Facts
Figure 12: TFP Spectrum
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
5
10
15
Various High-Pass
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1. Motivating Facts
Figure 13: Non Farm Business Hours per Capita Spectrum
4 6 24 32 40 50 60 80
Periodicity
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Level
Various High-Pass
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Roadmap
1. Motivating Facts
2. General Mechanism
3. Empirical Exercice
21 / 91
Roadmap
1. Motivating Facts
2. General Mechanism
3. Empirical Exercice
22 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Overview
Show a reduced form that is “dynamic Cooper & John
(1988)”
Understand the logic of the existence of strong cyclical forces
(“limit cycle”) in our framework : weak strategic
complementarities + dynamics
Show a forward looking version with saddle path stable limit
cycles
23 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Basic environment
N players (“firms”)
Each firm accumulates a capital good in quantity Xi by
investing Ii
Decision rule and law of motion for X are
Xit+1 = (1 − δ)Xit + Iit (1)
Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 (2)
all parameters are positive, δ < 1, α1 < 1, α2 < 1.
24 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Symmetric allocations
When all agent behave symmetrically:
It
Xt
=
α2 − α1 −α1(1 − δ)
1 1 − δ
ML
It−1
Xt−1
+
α0
0
Both eigenvalues of the matrix ML lie within the unit circle.
Therefore, the system is stable.
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2. General Mechanism
Symmetric allocations
When all agent behave symmetrically:
It
Xt
=
α2 − α1 −α1(1 − δ)
1 1 − δ
ML
It−1
Xt−1
+
α0
0
Proposition 1
Both eigenvalues of the matrix ML lie within the unit circle.
Therefore, the system is stable.
25 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Figure 14: “Phase diagram” in the model without demand
complementarities
Xt
It
∆It = 0
∆Xt = 0
Xs
Is
Here I have assumed that the two eigenvalues are real and positive.
26 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Introducing strategic interactions
“Dynamic Cooper & John (1988)”
Consider
Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F
Ijt
N
F > 0 : strategic complementarities
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Figure 15: “Best response” rule for a given history - Multiple Equilibria
Ijt
N
Iit Iit=
Ijt
N
α0 −α1Xit +
α2Iit−1
Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F
Ijt
N
28 / 91
Figure 16: “Best response” rule for a given history
Ijt
N
Iit Iit=
Ijt
N
α0 −α1Xit +
α2Iit−1
Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F
Ijt
N
29 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Restrictions on F
Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F
Ijt
N
We choose to be in a “non-pathological” case
A steady state exists
F (·) < 1 uniqueness of the period t equilibrium
uniqueness of the steady state
30 / 91
Figure 17: “Best response” rule for a given history
Ijt
N
Iit Iit=
Ijt
N
αt
Iit = αt + F
Ijt
N
Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F
Ijt
N
31 / 91
2. General Mechanism
The two sources of fluctuations
We restrict to symmetric allocations
Two forces of determination of allocations:
× static strategic interactions “multipliers” (Cooper &
John (1988)) local instability
× History (accumulated I that shows up in X) affects allocations
through the intercept of the “best response” function
global stability
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Figure 17: “Best response” rule for a given history
Ijt
N
Iit Iit=
Ijt
N
αs
αt
Iit = αt + F
Ijt
N
αt = α0 − α1
∞
0 (1 − δ)τ+1Ijt−1−τ + α2Iit−1
32 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Intuition for the limit cycle
Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F
Ijt
N
F
Ijt
N (Strategic complementarities): centrifugal force that
pushes away from the steady state when close to.
−α1Xit (Accumulation): centripetal force that pushes towards
the steady state when away from.
α2Iit−1 (Sluggishness) : avoid jumping back an forth around
the steady state (“flip”)
The steady state locally unstable, but forces push the economy
smoothly back to the steady state when it is further from it.
33 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Intuition for the limit cycle
Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F
Ijt
N
F
Ijt
N (Strategic complementarities): centrifugal force that
pushes away from the steady state when close to.
−α1Xit (Accumulation): centripetal force that pushes towards
the steady state when away from.
α2Iit−1 (Sluggishness) : avoid jumping back an forth around
the steady state (“flip”)
The steady state locally unstable, but forces push the economy
smoothly back to the steady state when it is further from it.
33 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Intuition for the limit cycle
Iit = α0−α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F
Ijt
N
F
Ijt
N (Strategic complementarities): centrifugal force that
pushes away from the steady state when close to.
−α1Xit (Accumulation): centripetal force that pushes towards
the steady state when away from.
α2Iit−1 (Sluggishness) : avoid jumping back an forth around
the steady state (“flip”)
The steady state locally unstable, but forces push the economy
smoothly back to the steady state when it is further from it.
33 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Intuition for the limit cycle
Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F
Ijt
N
F
Ijt
N (Strategic complementarities): centrifugal force that
pushes away from the steady state when close to.
−α1Xit (Accumulation): centripetal force that pushes towards
the steady state when away from.
α2Iit−1 (Sluggishness) : avoid jumping back an forth around
the steady state (“flip”)
The steady state locally unstable, but forces push the economy
smoothly back to the steady state when it is further from it.
33 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Intuition for the limit cycle
Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F
Ijt
N
F
Ijt
N (Strategic complementarities): centrifugal force that
pushes away from the steady state when close to.
−α1Xit (Accumulation): centripetal force that pushes towards
the steady state when away from.
α2Iit−1 (Sluggishness) : avoid jumping back and forth around
the steady state (“flip”)
The steady state locally unstable, but forces push the economy
smoothly back to the steady state when it is further from it.
33 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Stable limit cycle
Xs
Is
−1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Xt
It
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2. General Mechanism
Stable limit cycle
Xs
Is
−1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Xt
It
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2. General Mechanism
Stable limit cycle
Xs
Is
−1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Xt
It
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2. General Mechanism
Stable limit cycle
Xs
Is
−1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Xt
It
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2. General Mechanism
Looking for the limit cycle
How do we prove the existence of a limit cyle?
Limit cycles are typically ocurring when there are bifurcations
in non-linear dynamical systems
Simply stated : the SS looses stability when a parameter (here
the degree of strategic complementarities) increases.
35 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Dynamics with strategic interactions
Math
Dynamics is
It
Xt
=
α2 − α1 −α1(1 − δ)
1 1 − δ
ML
It−1
Xt−1
+
α0+F(It)
0
Local dynamics is
It
Xt
=
α2−α1
1−F (Is ) − α1(1−δ)
1−F (Is )
1 1 − δ
M
It−1
Xt−1
+
1 − α2−α1
1−F (Is ) Is + α1(1−δ)
1−F (Is ) Xs
0
When F (Is) varies from −∞ to 1, eigenvalues of M vary
36 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Strategic substitutabilities – F negative
Proposition 2
As F (IS ) varies from 0 to −∞, the eigenvalues of M always stay
within the unit circle and therefore the system remains locally
stable.
37 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Strategic complementarities – F positive
Proposition 3
As F (Is) varies from 0 towards 1, the dynamic system will become
locally unstable.
(bifurcation)
38 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Bifurcations
3 types of bifurcation
× Fold bifurcation: appearance of an eigenvalue equal to 1,
× Flip bifurcation: appearance of an eigenvalue equal to -1
× Hopf bifurcation: appearance of two complex conjugate
eigenvalues of modulus 1.
We are interested in Hopf bifurcation because the limit cycle
will be “persistent”
39 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Bifurcations
Proposition 4
As F (Is) varies from 0 towards 1, the dynamic system will become
unstable and:
No flip bifurcations
If α2 > α1/(2 − δ)2, then a Hopf (Neimark-Sacker)
bifurcation will occur.
If α2 < α1/(2 − δ)2, then a flip bifurcation will occur.
40 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Bifurcations
In the case of flip and Hopf bifurcation, a limit cycle appears
In case of Hopf, the cycle is “smooth”
Condition for an Hopf bifurcation:
Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F
Ijt
N
× as δ approaches 0, α2 > 1/4
× in general, what is needed is δ not too large and α2 large
enough
41 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Stability of the limit cycle
In the case of the Hopf bifurcation, the limit cycle can be
attractive (the bifurcation is supercritical) or repulsive (the
bifurcation is subcritical)
42 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Stability of the limit cycle
Proposition 5
If F (Is) is sufficiency negative, then the Hopf bifurcation will be
supercritical. Therefore, the limit cycle is attractive.
F < 0 corresponds to an S − shaped reaction function
Ijt
N
Iit Iit=
Ijt
N
αt
Iit = αt + F
Ijt
N
43 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Intuition for genericity
Figure 18: Stable Steady State
44 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Intuition for genericity
Figure 19: Hopf Supercritical bifurcation: Attractive Limit Cycle
45 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Numerical example
Let me show an arbitrary numerical example with that
reduced form model
46 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Numerical example
Figure 20: A particular F function
I
F(I)
a0
slope β0
slope β1
slope β2 F(I)
γ1I1
γ2I2
I1 I2Is
47 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Numerical example
Figure 21: Deterministic simulation
I, X, linear model I, X, nonlinear model
period
50 100 150 200
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
X
I
period
0 50 100 150 200 250
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
X
I
48 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Numerical example
Figure 22: Deterministic simulation of the nonlinear model
Spectral density
Period
4 8 12 20 32 40 60 80
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
49 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Numerical example
Figure 23: One stochastic simulation
Linear model Nonlinear model
period
50 100 150 200
I
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
period
0 50 100 150 200 250
I
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
50 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Numerical example
Figure 24: Deterministic and Stochastic simulation of the nonlinear model
Spectral density of I
4 8 12 20 32 40 60 80
Period
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
I
51 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Numerical example
Figure 24: Deterministic and Stochastic simulation of the nonlinear model
Spectral density of I
4 8 12 20 32 40 60 80
Period
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
I
51 / 91
2. General Mechanism
What the results are not
Figure 25: xt = sin(ωt)
0 50 100 150 200
t
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
xt
52 / 91
2. General Mechanism
What the results are not
Figure 26: xt = sin(ωt) + ut
0 50 100 150 200
t
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
xt
53 / 91
2. General Mechanism
What the results are
Figure 27: Reduced Form Model
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
period
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
I
54 / 91
2. General Mechanism
What the results are
Figure 28: Reduced Form Model
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
period
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
I
55 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Adding Forward looking elements
Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + α3Et[Iit+1] + F
Ijt
N
with accumulation remaining the same
Xit = (1 − δ)Xit + Iit
Restrict attention to situations where this system is saddle
path stable absent of complementarities.
Generally true when all three are between 0 and 1.
In this case, more difficult to get analytical results.
56 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Set of potential bifurcation with Forward looking elements
Initial situation has two stable roots and one unstable
Three types of bifurcations are possible:
1. The unstable root enters the unit circle: local indeterminacy
arises
2. One stable root leaves the unit circle: instability arises with a
flip or fold type bifurcation
3. Two stable roots leave the unit circle simultaneous because
they are complex: this is a Hopf bifurcation
57 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Set of potential bifurcation with Forward looking elements
Figure 29: Eigenvalues of the Reduced Form Model
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Re(λ)
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Im(λ)
α1 = 0.5, α2 = 0.45, α3 = -0.1, δ = 0.5
57 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Set of potential bifurcation with Forward looking elements
Initial situation has two stable roots and one unstable
Three types of bifurcations are possible:
1. The unstable root enters the unit circle: local indeterminacy
arises
2. One stable root leaves the unit circle: instability arises with a
flip or fold type bifurcation
3. Two stable roots leave the unit circle simultaneous because
they are complex: this is a Hopf bifurcation
57 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Set of potential bifurcation with Forward looking elements
Figure 30: Eigenvalues of the Reduced Form Model
-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
Re(λ)
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Im(λ)
α1 = -0.3, α2 = -0.2, α3 = -0.5, δ = 0.05
57 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Set of potential bifurcation with Forward looking elements
Initial situation has two stable roots and one unstable
Three types of bifurcations are possible:
1. The unstable root enters the unit circle: local indeterminacy
arises
2. One stable root leaves the unit circle: instability arises with a
flip or fold type bifurcation
3. Two stable roots leave the unit circle simultaneous because
they are complex: this is a Hopf bifurcation
57 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Set of potential bifurcation with Forward looking elements
Figure 31: Eigenvalues of the Reduced Form Model
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Re(λ)
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Im(λ)
α1 = 0.3, α2 = 0.6, α3 = -0.3, δ = 0.05
57 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Set of potential bifurcation with Forward looking elements
Initial situation has two stable roots and one unstable
Three types of bifurcations are possible:
1. The unstable root enters the unit circle: local indeterminacy
arises
2. One stable root leaves the unit circle: instability arises with a
flip or fold type bifurcation
3. Two stable roots leave the unit circle simultaneous because
they are complex: this is a Hopf bifurcation
57 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Figure 32: A Saddle Limit Cycle
58 / 91
2. General Mechanism
Set of results
Proposition 6
If unique steady state, then no indeterminacy nor Fold bifurcations
Proposition 7
If α2 (sluggishness) sufficiently large, then no Flip Bifurcations.
Hence, under quite simple conditions only relevant bifurcation
is a determinate Hopf.
59 / 91
Figure 33: Eigenvalues Configuration At First Bifurcation (δ = .05)
red = indeterminacy, yellow = unstable, gray = saddle
60 / 91
Roadmap
1. Reduced Form Model
2. General Mechanism
3. Empirical Exercice
61 / 91
Roadmap
1. Reduced Form Model
2. General Mechanism
3. Empirical Exercice
62 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Exploring empirically whether US Business Cycles may reflect a
Stochastic Limit Cycles.
Stylized NK model which is extended to allow for the forces
highlighted in our general structure.
We add accumulation of durable-housing goods and habit
persistence : accumulation and sluggishness
Financial frictions under the form of a counter-cyclical risk
premium : complementarities
Estimate parameters based on spectrum observations and
higher moments. (use perturbation method and indirect
inference)
See whether model favors parameters the generate limit cycle.
If so, explore nature of intrinsic limit cycle and perform some
counter factual exercises.
63 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Basic Elements of the Model
1. Household buy consumption services to maximise utility
taking prices as given
2. Firms supply consumption services to the market where the
services can come from existing durable goods or new
production.
3. These firms have sticky prices.
4. Central Bank set policy rate according to a type of Taylor rule
5. Interest rate faced by households is the policy rate plus a risk
premium, where the risk premium varies with the cycle.
64 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Extending a 3 equation NK model
The representative household who can buy/rent consumption
services from the market.
The households Euler will have the familiar form (assuming
external habit)
U (Ct − γCt−1) = βtEtU(Ct+1 − γCt)(1 + rt)
Allow that interest rate faced by household may include a risk
premium
(1 + rt) = (1 + it + rp
t )
where rp
t can respond to activity, or unemployment
Have Taylor rule of form
it = Φ1Etπt+1 + Φ2Et t+1
t is (log) employment or output gap,
U(z) = − exp − z
Ω , Ω > 0 65 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Allowing for durable goods and accumulation
Firms produce an intermediate factor
Mjt = BF (ΘtLjt) ,
Mt is used to produce consumptions services or durable
goods, that are sold to the households:
Ct = sXt + (1 − ϕ)Mt
where Xt is the stock of durable goods,
Xt+1 = (1 − δ)Xt + ϕMt
Households own the stock of durable-housing, rent it to firms,
who supply back the consumption services as a composite
good.
66 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Risk premium
The interest rate which household face is assume to be equal
to the policy rate plus a risk premium
(1 + rt) = (1 + it + rp
t )
where rp
t is a premium over the back rate.
The risk premium is assumed to be an decreasing function of
the economic activity, where the output gap and employment
gap are interchangeable
rp
t = g(Lt)
Here we are allowing the interest premium to be a non-linear
function of activity.
67 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Taylor rule and dichotomy with inflation
Modified Taylor rule:
it = φ0 + φ1Etπt+1 + φ2Et t+1
φ1 = 1 the Central Bank as setting the expected real
interest.
This approach has the attractive feature of making the model
bloc recursive, where the inflation rate last is solved as a
function of the marginal cost.
With this approach, we can explore the properties of the real
variables without need to to be specific about the source and
duration of price stickiness (which is not our focus)
68 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Reduced Form
Solution is
t = µt − α1Xt + α2 t−1 + α3Et [ t+1] + F( t)
together with accumulation
Xt+1 = (1 − δ) Xt + ψ t
Shocks
× AR(1) discount factor shock βt
× TFP Θ is constant
69 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Evidence on Rates
Substantial evidence that interest rate spreads are
countercyclical
But are movements in the spread at right frequency for our
story?
70 / 91
Figure 34: Spectral Density, Spread (BBA bonds-FFR, Moody’s)
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Level
Various High-Pass
71 / 91
Figure 35: Spectral Density, Real Policy Rate
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Level
Various High-Pass
72 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Estimation
Estimate parameters of model by SMM
Targets
× spectrum of hours worked on the frequencies 2-50
× spectrum of interest rate spread on the frequencies 2-50
× Set of other higher moments (kurtosis and skewness of hours
and spread)
We will check whether model is also consistent with interest
rate observations over this range.
We calibrate δ = .05.
73 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Figure 36: Spectrum fit for Hours
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
5
10
15
20
Data
Model
74 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Figure 37: Hours Spectrum in Smets & Wouters’ Model
4 6 24 32 40 50 60 80
Periodicity
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
75 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Figure 38: Spectrum fit for Spread
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Data
Model
76 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Figure 39: Spectrum fit for Real Policy Rate
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Data
Model
77 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Figure 40: Fit for Target Moments
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
corr(l, rp
)
skew(l)
skew(rp
)
kurt(l)
kurt(rp
)
Data
Model
78 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Figure 41: Sample Draw for Hours
0 50 100 150 200 250
Period #
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Hours(%)
79 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Figure 42: Sample Draw for Hours, no shocks
0 50 100 150 200 250
Period #
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
Hours(%)
80 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Figure 43: Spectrum for Hours, no shocks
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
10
20
30
40
50
60 Data
Model
81 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Figure 44: Sample Draw for Hours no Complementarities
0 50 100 150 200
t
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
ˆlt
82 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Figure 45: Spectrum for Hours, no Complementarities
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
5
10
15
20
Data
Model
83 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Shocks
Table 1: Estimated Parameter Values
γ 0.5335
Φ2 0.1906
Ω 4.6178
ρ -0.0000
σ 0.8525
R1 -0.1626
R2 0.00076
R3 0.00027
Shocks are important in our framework for explaining the data
But they are iid
Hence, almost all dynamics are internal.
84 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Nonlinearities
Table 2: Estimated Parameter Values
γ 0.5335
Φ2 0.1906
Ω 4.6178
ρ -0.0000
σ 0.8525
R1 -0.1626
R2 0.00076
R3 0.00027
Nonlinearities are crucial for the existence of a stochastic limit
cycle
But they are small
85 / 91
3. Empirical Exercice
Nonlinearities
Figure 46: Sensitivity of the Real Interest Rate Faced by the Households
to Economic Activity
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4
Hours (%)
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Φ2l+˜R(l)(%perannum)
86 / 91
4.Conclusion
The dominant paradigm for explaining macro-economic
fluctuations focus on how different shocks perturb an
otherwise stable system
Such a perspective may be biased due to an excess focus on
rather high frequency movements
However, if we look at slightly lower frequencies – extending
from 32 to at least 40 quarters– there is strong signs of
cyclical behavior
Contribution:
1. Shown that models with ’weak’ complementarities and
accumulation offer a promising framework to explain such
observations. In particular, such framework can easily generate
limit cycles.
2. When extending a simple NK model to include these factors
and adopting a slightly lower frequency focus– 2-60 quarter–
we find support for very strong endogenous cyclical mechanism.
Would be interesting to extend such analysis to international
context
87 / 91
88 / 91
Figure 47: Theoretical Spectral Density (Sum of three AR(2))
4 6 24 32 40 5060 80100 200
Periodicity
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
89 / 91
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
×10
4
Theoretical
Average
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
×10
4
Theoretical
Average
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
×10
4
Theoretical
Average
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
×10
4
Theoretical
Average
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Theoretical
Average
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
Theoretical
Average
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
×10
4
Theoretical
Average
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
×10
4
Theoretical
Average
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Theoretical
Average
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Theoretical
Average
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
5000
10000
15000
Theoretical
Average
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
Theoretical
Average
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
Theoretical
Average
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Theoretical
Average
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Theoretical
Average
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Periodicity
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
Theoretical
Average
90 / 91
Log of Period
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Level
Various Bandpass
Log of Period
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Level
Various Bandpass
Log of Period
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Level
Various Bandpass
Log of Period
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Level
Various Bandpass
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
Log of Period
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Level
Various Bandpass
Log of Period
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Level
Various Bandpass
Log of Period
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Level
Various Bandpass
Log of Period
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Level
Various Bandpass
Log of Period
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Level
Various Bandpass
Log of Period
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
0
5
10
15
20
25
Level
Various Bandpass
Log of Period
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Level
Various Bandpass
Log of Period
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Level
Various Bandpass
Log of Period
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Level
Various Bandpass
Log of Period
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
0
5
10
15
20
25
Level
Various Bandpass
Log of Period
4 6 24 32 40 50 60
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Level
Various Bandpass
91 / 91

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Putting the cycle back into business cycle analysis

  • 1. Putting the Cycle Back into Business Cycle Analysis Paul Beaudry, Dana Galizia & Franck Portier Vancouver School of Economics, Carleton University & Toulouse School of Economics New Developments in Macroeconomics ADEMU conference UCL, London November 2016 1 / 91
  • 2. 0. Introduction Modern Approach to Business Cycles Equilibrium stochastic dynamic modeling in macro flowered in the 1970’s At that point, postwar business cycles were at most 8 years long business cycles were defined as fluctuations at periodicities of 8 years or less. Spectral densities of main macro variables were showing the “Typical Spectral Shape of an Economic Variable” (Granger 1969) look like a persistent AR(1) spectrum This suggested that business cycle theory should not be about cycles, it should be about co-movements (see Sargent’s textbook) 2 / 91
  • 3. 0. Introduction Modern Approach to Business Cycles Figure 1: Sargent’s textbook 3 / 91
  • 4. 0. Introduction Modern Approach to Business Cycles Figure 2: Sargent’s textbook 4 / 91
  • 5. 0. Introduction Modern Approach to Business Cycles Equilibrium stochastic dynamic modeling in macro flowered in the 1970’s At that point, postwar business cycles were at most 8 years long business cycles were defined as fluctuations at periodicities of 8 years or less. Spectral densities of main macro variables were showing the “Typical Spectral Shape of an Economic Variable” (Granger 1969) look like a persistent AR(1) spectrum This suggested that business cycle theory should not be about cycles, it should be about co-movements (see Sargent’s textbook) All good! 5 / 91
  • 6. 0. Introduction What we do We question this focus in this work We do three things 1. Show that the economy is “more cyclical than you think”, with 40 more years of data. 2. Explain how “weak complementaries”, combined with accumulation, favor cyclical behavior (recurrent booms and busts) rather than indeterminacy 3. Estimate a New-Keynesian model extended to include the for complementarity forces we are highlighting, and see if the data prefers a “recurring cycle approach” 6 / 91
  • 7. Roadmap 1. Motivating Facts 2. General Mechanism 3. Empirical Exercice 7 / 91
  • 8. Roadmap 1. Motivating Facts 2. General Mechanism 3. Empirical Exercice 8 / 91
  • 9. 1. Motivating Facts Looking for Peaks If there are important cyclical forces in the economy ... ... this should show up as a distinct peak in the spectrum of the data It is well known that (detrended) output data does not display such peaks (Granger (1969), Sargent (1987)) However, output data may not be best placed to look, as there is a marked non stationarity that one needs to get rid of. May be better to look at measures of factor use: ex: hours worked, employment rates, unemployment rates, capital utilization. Things might also have changed since the 70’s as we have now 40 more years of observation 9 / 91
  • 10. 1. Motivating Facts Figure 3: Non Farm Business Hours per Capita 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Date -8.15 -8.1 -8.05 -8 -7.95 -7.9 -7.85Logs 10 / 91
  • 11. 1. Motivating Facts Figure 4: Non Farm Business Hours per Capita Spectrum 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 80 Periodicity 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Level Various High-Pass 11 / 91
  • 12. 1. Motivating Facts Figure 5: Non Farm Business Hours per Capita, Highpass (50) Filtered 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6% 12 / 91
  • 13. 1. Motivating Facts Figure 6: Total Hours per Capita Spectrum 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 80 Periodicity 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Level Various High-Pass 13 / 91
  • 14. 1. Motivating Facts Figure 7: Unemployment Rate Spectrum 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 80 Periodicity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Level Various High-Pass 14 / 91
  • 15. 1. Motivating Facts Figure 8: Capacity Utilization Spectrum 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 80 Periodicity 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Level Various High-Pass 15 / 91
  • 16. 1. Motivating Facts Figure 9: Hours Spectrum in Smets & Wouters’ Model 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 80 Periodicity 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 16 / 91
  • 17. 1. Motivating Facts Figure 10: Output per Capita Spectrum 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 Level Various High-Pass 17 / 91
  • 18. 1. Motivating Facts Figure 11: Output per Capita Spectrum 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Various High-Pass 18 / 91
  • 19. 1. Motivating Facts Figure 12: TFP Spectrum 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 5 10 15 Various High-Pass 19 / 91
  • 20. 1. Motivating Facts Figure 13: Non Farm Business Hours per Capita Spectrum 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 80 Periodicity 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Level Various High-Pass 20 / 91
  • 21. Roadmap 1. Motivating Facts 2. General Mechanism 3. Empirical Exercice 21 / 91
  • 22. Roadmap 1. Motivating Facts 2. General Mechanism 3. Empirical Exercice 22 / 91
  • 23. 2. General Mechanism Overview Show a reduced form that is “dynamic Cooper & John (1988)” Understand the logic of the existence of strong cyclical forces (“limit cycle”) in our framework : weak strategic complementarities + dynamics Show a forward looking version with saddle path stable limit cycles 23 / 91
  • 24. 2. General Mechanism Basic environment N players (“firms”) Each firm accumulates a capital good in quantity Xi by investing Ii Decision rule and law of motion for X are Xit+1 = (1 − δ)Xit + Iit (1) Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 (2) all parameters are positive, δ < 1, α1 < 1, α2 < 1. 24 / 91
  • 25. 2. General Mechanism Symmetric allocations When all agent behave symmetrically: It Xt = α2 − α1 −α1(1 − δ) 1 1 − δ ML It−1 Xt−1 + α0 0 Both eigenvalues of the matrix ML lie within the unit circle. Therefore, the system is stable. 25 / 91
  • 26. 2. General Mechanism Symmetric allocations When all agent behave symmetrically: It Xt = α2 − α1 −α1(1 − δ) 1 1 − δ ML It−1 Xt−1 + α0 0 Proposition 1 Both eigenvalues of the matrix ML lie within the unit circle. Therefore, the system is stable. 25 / 91
  • 27. 2. General Mechanism Figure 14: “Phase diagram” in the model without demand complementarities Xt It ∆It = 0 ∆Xt = 0 Xs Is Here I have assumed that the two eigenvalues are real and positive. 26 / 91
  • 28. 2. General Mechanism Introducing strategic interactions “Dynamic Cooper & John (1988)” Consider Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F Ijt N F > 0 : strategic complementarities 27 / 91
  • 29. Figure 15: “Best response” rule for a given history - Multiple Equilibria Ijt N Iit Iit= Ijt N α0 −α1Xit + α2Iit−1 Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F Ijt N 28 / 91
  • 30. Figure 16: “Best response” rule for a given history Ijt N Iit Iit= Ijt N α0 −α1Xit + α2Iit−1 Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F Ijt N 29 / 91
  • 31. 2. General Mechanism Restrictions on F Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F Ijt N We choose to be in a “non-pathological” case A steady state exists F (·) < 1 uniqueness of the period t equilibrium uniqueness of the steady state 30 / 91
  • 32. Figure 17: “Best response” rule for a given history Ijt N Iit Iit= Ijt N αt Iit = αt + F Ijt N Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F Ijt N 31 / 91
  • 33. 2. General Mechanism The two sources of fluctuations We restrict to symmetric allocations Two forces of determination of allocations: × static strategic interactions “multipliers” (Cooper & John (1988)) local instability × History (accumulated I that shows up in X) affects allocations through the intercept of the “best response” function global stability 32 / 91
  • 34. Figure 17: “Best response” rule for a given history Ijt N Iit Iit= Ijt N αs αt Iit = αt + F Ijt N αt = α0 − α1 ∞ 0 (1 − δ)τ+1Ijt−1−τ + α2Iit−1 32 / 91
  • 35. 2. General Mechanism Intuition for the limit cycle Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F Ijt N F Ijt N (Strategic complementarities): centrifugal force that pushes away from the steady state when close to. −α1Xit (Accumulation): centripetal force that pushes towards the steady state when away from. α2Iit−1 (Sluggishness) : avoid jumping back an forth around the steady state (“flip”) The steady state locally unstable, but forces push the economy smoothly back to the steady state when it is further from it. 33 / 91
  • 36. 2. General Mechanism Intuition for the limit cycle Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F Ijt N F Ijt N (Strategic complementarities): centrifugal force that pushes away from the steady state when close to. −α1Xit (Accumulation): centripetal force that pushes towards the steady state when away from. α2Iit−1 (Sluggishness) : avoid jumping back an forth around the steady state (“flip”) The steady state locally unstable, but forces push the economy smoothly back to the steady state when it is further from it. 33 / 91
  • 37. 2. General Mechanism Intuition for the limit cycle Iit = α0−α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F Ijt N F Ijt N (Strategic complementarities): centrifugal force that pushes away from the steady state when close to. −α1Xit (Accumulation): centripetal force that pushes towards the steady state when away from. α2Iit−1 (Sluggishness) : avoid jumping back an forth around the steady state (“flip”) The steady state locally unstable, but forces push the economy smoothly back to the steady state when it is further from it. 33 / 91
  • 38. 2. General Mechanism Intuition for the limit cycle Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F Ijt N F Ijt N (Strategic complementarities): centrifugal force that pushes away from the steady state when close to. −α1Xit (Accumulation): centripetal force that pushes towards the steady state when away from. α2Iit−1 (Sluggishness) : avoid jumping back an forth around the steady state (“flip”) The steady state locally unstable, but forces push the economy smoothly back to the steady state when it is further from it. 33 / 91
  • 39. 2. General Mechanism Intuition for the limit cycle Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F Ijt N F Ijt N (Strategic complementarities): centrifugal force that pushes away from the steady state when close to. −α1Xit (Accumulation): centripetal force that pushes towards the steady state when away from. α2Iit−1 (Sluggishness) : avoid jumping back and forth around the steady state (“flip”) The steady state locally unstable, but forces push the economy smoothly back to the steady state when it is further from it. 33 / 91
  • 40. 2. General Mechanism Stable limit cycle Xs Is −1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 −1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Xt It 34 / 91
  • 41. 2. General Mechanism Stable limit cycle Xs Is −1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 −1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Xt It 34 / 91
  • 42. 2. General Mechanism Stable limit cycle Xs Is −1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 −1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Xt It 34 / 91
  • 43. 2. General Mechanism Stable limit cycle Xs Is −1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 −1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Xt It 34 / 91
  • 44. 2. General Mechanism Looking for the limit cycle How do we prove the existence of a limit cyle? Limit cycles are typically ocurring when there are bifurcations in non-linear dynamical systems Simply stated : the SS looses stability when a parameter (here the degree of strategic complementarities) increases. 35 / 91
  • 45. 2. General Mechanism Dynamics with strategic interactions Math Dynamics is It Xt = α2 − α1 −α1(1 − δ) 1 1 − δ ML It−1 Xt−1 + α0+F(It) 0 Local dynamics is It Xt = α2−α1 1−F (Is ) − α1(1−δ) 1−F (Is ) 1 1 − δ M It−1 Xt−1 + 1 − α2−α1 1−F (Is ) Is + α1(1−δ) 1−F (Is ) Xs 0 When F (Is) varies from −∞ to 1, eigenvalues of M vary 36 / 91
  • 46. 2. General Mechanism Strategic substitutabilities – F negative Proposition 2 As F (IS ) varies from 0 to −∞, the eigenvalues of M always stay within the unit circle and therefore the system remains locally stable. 37 / 91
  • 47. 2. General Mechanism Strategic complementarities – F positive Proposition 3 As F (Is) varies from 0 towards 1, the dynamic system will become locally unstable. (bifurcation) 38 / 91
  • 48. 2. General Mechanism Bifurcations 3 types of bifurcation × Fold bifurcation: appearance of an eigenvalue equal to 1, × Flip bifurcation: appearance of an eigenvalue equal to -1 × Hopf bifurcation: appearance of two complex conjugate eigenvalues of modulus 1. We are interested in Hopf bifurcation because the limit cycle will be “persistent” 39 / 91
  • 49. 2. General Mechanism Bifurcations Proposition 4 As F (Is) varies from 0 towards 1, the dynamic system will become unstable and: No flip bifurcations If α2 > α1/(2 − δ)2, then a Hopf (Neimark-Sacker) bifurcation will occur. If α2 < α1/(2 − δ)2, then a flip bifurcation will occur. 40 / 91
  • 50. 2. General Mechanism Bifurcations In the case of flip and Hopf bifurcation, a limit cycle appears In case of Hopf, the cycle is “smooth” Condition for an Hopf bifurcation: Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + F Ijt N × as δ approaches 0, α2 > 1/4 × in general, what is needed is δ not too large and α2 large enough 41 / 91
  • 51. 2. General Mechanism Stability of the limit cycle In the case of the Hopf bifurcation, the limit cycle can be attractive (the bifurcation is supercritical) or repulsive (the bifurcation is subcritical) 42 / 91
  • 52. 2. General Mechanism Stability of the limit cycle Proposition 5 If F (Is) is sufficiency negative, then the Hopf bifurcation will be supercritical. Therefore, the limit cycle is attractive. F < 0 corresponds to an S − shaped reaction function Ijt N Iit Iit= Ijt N αt Iit = αt + F Ijt N 43 / 91
  • 53. 2. General Mechanism Intuition for genericity Figure 18: Stable Steady State 44 / 91
  • 54. 2. General Mechanism Intuition for genericity Figure 19: Hopf Supercritical bifurcation: Attractive Limit Cycle 45 / 91
  • 55. 2. General Mechanism Numerical example Let me show an arbitrary numerical example with that reduced form model 46 / 91
  • 56. 2. General Mechanism Numerical example Figure 20: A particular F function I F(I) a0 slope β0 slope β1 slope β2 F(I) γ1I1 γ2I2 I1 I2Is 47 / 91
  • 57. 2. General Mechanism Numerical example Figure 21: Deterministic simulation I, X, linear model I, X, nonlinear model period 50 100 150 200 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 X I period 0 50 100 150 200 250 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 X I 48 / 91
  • 58. 2. General Mechanism Numerical example Figure 22: Deterministic simulation of the nonlinear model Spectral density Period 4 8 12 20 32 40 60 80 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 49 / 91
  • 59. 2. General Mechanism Numerical example Figure 23: One stochastic simulation Linear model Nonlinear model period 50 100 150 200 I 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 period 0 50 100 150 200 250 I 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 50 / 91
  • 60. 2. General Mechanism Numerical example Figure 24: Deterministic and Stochastic simulation of the nonlinear model Spectral density of I 4 8 12 20 32 40 60 80 Period 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 I 51 / 91
  • 61. 2. General Mechanism Numerical example Figure 24: Deterministic and Stochastic simulation of the nonlinear model Spectral density of I 4 8 12 20 32 40 60 80 Period 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 I 51 / 91
  • 62. 2. General Mechanism What the results are not Figure 25: xt = sin(ωt) 0 50 100 150 200 t -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 xt 52 / 91
  • 63. 2. General Mechanism What the results are not Figure 26: xt = sin(ωt) + ut 0 50 100 150 200 t -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 xt 53 / 91
  • 64. 2. General Mechanism What the results are Figure 27: Reduced Form Model 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 period 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 I 54 / 91
  • 65. 2. General Mechanism What the results are Figure 28: Reduced Form Model 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 period 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 I 55 / 91
  • 66. 2. General Mechanism Adding Forward looking elements Iit = α0 − α1Xit + α2Iit−1 + α3Et[Iit+1] + F Ijt N with accumulation remaining the same Xit = (1 − δ)Xit + Iit Restrict attention to situations where this system is saddle path stable absent of complementarities. Generally true when all three are between 0 and 1. In this case, more difficult to get analytical results. 56 / 91
  • 67. 2. General Mechanism Set of potential bifurcation with Forward looking elements Initial situation has two stable roots and one unstable Three types of bifurcations are possible: 1. The unstable root enters the unit circle: local indeterminacy arises 2. One stable root leaves the unit circle: instability arises with a flip or fold type bifurcation 3. Two stable roots leave the unit circle simultaneous because they are complex: this is a Hopf bifurcation 57 / 91
  • 68. 2. General Mechanism Set of potential bifurcation with Forward looking elements Figure 29: Eigenvalues of the Reduced Form Model -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 Re(λ) -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 Im(λ) α1 = 0.5, α2 = 0.45, α3 = -0.1, δ = 0.5 57 / 91
  • 69. 2. General Mechanism Set of potential bifurcation with Forward looking elements Initial situation has two stable roots and one unstable Three types of bifurcations are possible: 1. The unstable root enters the unit circle: local indeterminacy arises 2. One stable root leaves the unit circle: instability arises with a flip or fold type bifurcation 3. Two stable roots leave the unit circle simultaneous because they are complex: this is a Hopf bifurcation 57 / 91
  • 70. 2. General Mechanism Set of potential bifurcation with Forward looking elements Figure 30: Eigenvalues of the Reduced Form Model -3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 Re(λ) -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 Im(λ) α1 = -0.3, α2 = -0.2, α3 = -0.5, δ = 0.05 57 / 91
  • 71. 2. General Mechanism Set of potential bifurcation with Forward looking elements Initial situation has two stable roots and one unstable Three types of bifurcations are possible: 1. The unstable root enters the unit circle: local indeterminacy arises 2. One stable root leaves the unit circle: instability arises with a flip or fold type bifurcation 3. Two stable roots leave the unit circle simultaneous because they are complex: this is a Hopf bifurcation 57 / 91
  • 72. 2. General Mechanism Set of potential bifurcation with Forward looking elements Figure 31: Eigenvalues of the Reduced Form Model -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 Re(λ) -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 Im(λ) α1 = 0.3, α2 = 0.6, α3 = -0.3, δ = 0.05 57 / 91
  • 73. 2. General Mechanism Set of potential bifurcation with Forward looking elements Initial situation has two stable roots and one unstable Three types of bifurcations are possible: 1. The unstable root enters the unit circle: local indeterminacy arises 2. One stable root leaves the unit circle: instability arises with a flip or fold type bifurcation 3. Two stable roots leave the unit circle simultaneous because they are complex: this is a Hopf bifurcation 57 / 91
  • 74. 2. General Mechanism Figure 32: A Saddle Limit Cycle 58 / 91
  • 75. 2. General Mechanism Set of results Proposition 6 If unique steady state, then no indeterminacy nor Fold bifurcations Proposition 7 If α2 (sluggishness) sufficiently large, then no Flip Bifurcations. Hence, under quite simple conditions only relevant bifurcation is a determinate Hopf. 59 / 91
  • 76. Figure 33: Eigenvalues Configuration At First Bifurcation (δ = .05) red = indeterminacy, yellow = unstable, gray = saddle 60 / 91
  • 77. Roadmap 1. Reduced Form Model 2. General Mechanism 3. Empirical Exercice 61 / 91
  • 78. Roadmap 1. Reduced Form Model 2. General Mechanism 3. Empirical Exercice 62 / 91
  • 79. 3. Empirical Exercice Exploring empirically whether US Business Cycles may reflect a Stochastic Limit Cycles. Stylized NK model which is extended to allow for the forces highlighted in our general structure. We add accumulation of durable-housing goods and habit persistence : accumulation and sluggishness Financial frictions under the form of a counter-cyclical risk premium : complementarities Estimate parameters based on spectrum observations and higher moments. (use perturbation method and indirect inference) See whether model favors parameters the generate limit cycle. If so, explore nature of intrinsic limit cycle and perform some counter factual exercises. 63 / 91
  • 80. 3. Empirical Exercice Basic Elements of the Model 1. Household buy consumption services to maximise utility taking prices as given 2. Firms supply consumption services to the market where the services can come from existing durable goods or new production. 3. These firms have sticky prices. 4. Central Bank set policy rate according to a type of Taylor rule 5. Interest rate faced by households is the policy rate plus a risk premium, where the risk premium varies with the cycle. 64 / 91
  • 81. 3. Empirical Exercice Extending a 3 equation NK model The representative household who can buy/rent consumption services from the market. The households Euler will have the familiar form (assuming external habit) U (Ct − γCt−1) = βtEtU(Ct+1 − γCt)(1 + rt) Allow that interest rate faced by household may include a risk premium (1 + rt) = (1 + it + rp t ) where rp t can respond to activity, or unemployment Have Taylor rule of form it = Φ1Etπt+1 + Φ2Et t+1 t is (log) employment or output gap, U(z) = − exp − z Ω , Ω > 0 65 / 91
  • 82. 3. Empirical Exercice Allowing for durable goods and accumulation Firms produce an intermediate factor Mjt = BF (ΘtLjt) , Mt is used to produce consumptions services or durable goods, that are sold to the households: Ct = sXt + (1 − ϕ)Mt where Xt is the stock of durable goods, Xt+1 = (1 − δ)Xt + ϕMt Households own the stock of durable-housing, rent it to firms, who supply back the consumption services as a composite good. 66 / 91
  • 83. 3. Empirical Exercice Risk premium The interest rate which household face is assume to be equal to the policy rate plus a risk premium (1 + rt) = (1 + it + rp t ) where rp t is a premium over the back rate. The risk premium is assumed to be an decreasing function of the economic activity, where the output gap and employment gap are interchangeable rp t = g(Lt) Here we are allowing the interest premium to be a non-linear function of activity. 67 / 91
  • 84. 3. Empirical Exercice Taylor rule and dichotomy with inflation Modified Taylor rule: it = φ0 + φ1Etπt+1 + φ2Et t+1 φ1 = 1 the Central Bank as setting the expected real interest. This approach has the attractive feature of making the model bloc recursive, where the inflation rate last is solved as a function of the marginal cost. With this approach, we can explore the properties of the real variables without need to to be specific about the source and duration of price stickiness (which is not our focus) 68 / 91
  • 85. 3. Empirical Exercice Reduced Form Solution is t = µt − α1Xt + α2 t−1 + α3Et [ t+1] + F( t) together with accumulation Xt+1 = (1 − δ) Xt + ψ t Shocks × AR(1) discount factor shock βt × TFP Θ is constant 69 / 91
  • 86. 3. Empirical Exercice Evidence on Rates Substantial evidence that interest rate spreads are countercyclical But are movements in the spread at right frequency for our story? 70 / 91
  • 87. Figure 34: Spectral Density, Spread (BBA bonds-FFR, Moody’s) 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Level Various High-Pass 71 / 91
  • 88. Figure 35: Spectral Density, Real Policy Rate 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 Level Various High-Pass 72 / 91
  • 89. 3. Empirical Exercice Estimation Estimate parameters of model by SMM Targets × spectrum of hours worked on the frequencies 2-50 × spectrum of interest rate spread on the frequencies 2-50 × Set of other higher moments (kurtosis and skewness of hours and spread) We will check whether model is also consistent with interest rate observations over this range. We calibrate δ = .05. 73 / 91
  • 90. 3. Empirical Exercice Figure 36: Spectrum fit for Hours 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 5 10 15 20 Data Model 74 / 91
  • 91. 3. Empirical Exercice Figure 37: Hours Spectrum in Smets & Wouters’ Model 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 80 Periodicity 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 75 / 91
  • 92. 3. Empirical Exercice Figure 38: Spectrum fit for Spread 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Data Model 76 / 91
  • 93. 3. Empirical Exercice Figure 39: Spectrum fit for Real Policy Rate 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Data Model 77 / 91
  • 94. 3. Empirical Exercice Figure 40: Fit for Target Moments -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 corr(l, rp ) skew(l) skew(rp ) kurt(l) kurt(rp ) Data Model 78 / 91
  • 95. 3. Empirical Exercice Figure 41: Sample Draw for Hours 0 50 100 150 200 250 Period # -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Hours(%) 79 / 91
  • 96. 3. Empirical Exercice Figure 42: Sample Draw for Hours, no shocks 0 50 100 150 200 250 Period # -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 Hours(%) 80 / 91
  • 97. 3. Empirical Exercice Figure 43: Spectrum for Hours, no shocks 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Data Model 81 / 91
  • 98. 3. Empirical Exercice Figure 44: Sample Draw for Hours no Complementarities 0 50 100 150 200 t -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 ˆlt 82 / 91
  • 99. 3. Empirical Exercice Figure 45: Spectrum for Hours, no Complementarities 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 5 10 15 20 Data Model 83 / 91
  • 100. 3. Empirical Exercice Shocks Table 1: Estimated Parameter Values γ 0.5335 Φ2 0.1906 Ω 4.6178 ρ -0.0000 σ 0.8525 R1 -0.1626 R2 0.00076 R3 0.00027 Shocks are important in our framework for explaining the data But they are iid Hence, almost all dynamics are internal. 84 / 91
  • 101. 3. Empirical Exercice Nonlinearities Table 2: Estimated Parameter Values γ 0.5335 Φ2 0.1906 Ω 4.6178 ρ -0.0000 σ 0.8525 R1 -0.1626 R2 0.00076 R3 0.00027 Nonlinearities are crucial for the existence of a stochastic limit cycle But they are small 85 / 91
  • 102. 3. Empirical Exercice Nonlinearities Figure 46: Sensitivity of the Real Interest Rate Faced by the Households to Economic Activity -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 Hours (%) -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 Φ2l+˜R(l)(%perannum) 86 / 91
  • 103. 4.Conclusion The dominant paradigm for explaining macro-economic fluctuations focus on how different shocks perturb an otherwise stable system Such a perspective may be biased due to an excess focus on rather high frequency movements However, if we look at slightly lower frequencies – extending from 32 to at least 40 quarters– there is strong signs of cyclical behavior Contribution: 1. Shown that models with ’weak’ complementarities and accumulation offer a promising framework to explain such observations. In particular, such framework can easily generate limit cycles. 2. When extending a simple NK model to include these factors and adopting a slightly lower frequency focus– 2-60 quarter– we find support for very strong endogenous cyclical mechanism. Would be interesting to extend such analysis to international context 87 / 91
  • 105. Figure 47: Theoretical Spectral Density (Sum of three AR(2)) 4 6 24 32 40 5060 80100 200 Periodicity 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 89 / 91
  • 106. 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 ×10 4 Theoretical Average 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 ×10 4 Theoretical Average 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 ×10 4 Theoretical Average 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 ×10 4 Theoretical Average 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 Theoretical Average 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 Theoretical Average 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 ×10 4 Theoretical Average 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 ×10 4 Theoretical Average 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 Theoretical Average 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 Theoretical Average 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 5000 10000 15000 Theoretical Average 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 Theoretical Average 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 Theoretical Average 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 Theoretical Average 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 Theoretical Average 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Periodicity 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 Theoretical Average 90 / 91
  • 107. Log of Period 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Level Various Bandpass Log of Period 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Level Various Bandpass Log of Period 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Level Various Bandpass Log of Period 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Level Various Bandpass 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 Log of Period 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Level Various Bandpass Log of Period 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Level Various Bandpass Log of Period 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Level Various Bandpass Log of Period 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Level Various Bandpass Log of Period 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Level Various Bandpass Log of Period 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 0 5 10 15 20 25 Level Various Bandpass Log of Period 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Level Various Bandpass Log of Period 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Level Various Bandpass Log of Period 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Level Various Bandpass Log of Period 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 0 5 10 15 20 25 Level Various Bandpass Log of Period 4 6 24 32 40 50 60 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Level Various Bandpass 91 / 91