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Human Performance
         Improvement
             Part I
                     Presented by
      Michael L. McIntosh, CIH, CSP, CHMM
         Oak Ridge National Laboratory




1-1            American Chemical Society
                     August 2010
Human Fallibility


      “… human fallibility is like gravity, weather,
          and terrain, just another foreseeable
        hazard. Error is pervasive … What is not
          pervasive are well-developed skills to
         detect and contain these errors at their
                      early stages.”
                                               -    Weick and Sutcliffe
                       Leading with Resilience in the Face of the Unexpected




1-2
To Err is Human




1-3
To Error is Human (Cont.)




1-4
To Drift is Human




1-5
Why is HPI Important

  •  UCLA research assistant died from injuries
     sustained in a chemical fire on December 29th,
     2008
  •  Texas Tech University student seriously injured on
     January 7th, 2010 when a mixture of nickel
     hydrazine perchlorate exploded in chemistry
     building
  •  SMU student burned on May 11, 2010 in chemistry
     lab by pouring water too quickly on sodium hydride
  •  Explosion injures four people at a University of
     Missouri science lab on June 28, 2010
  •  Chemical Safety Review Board states “it is time to
     begin examining these accidents to see if they can
     be prevented”

I-6
What Cause Occurrences?
                                              Human Errors


      Occurrences
                                        70% Latent
                                        Organizational            30%
      80% Human Error                   Weaknesses*            Individual
                                                             (Slips, trips, lapses)


                        20% Equipment
                        Failures



      * Latent Organizational Weakness = Hidden deficiencies in
        management control process or values


1-7
Anatomy of an Incident
                                          Flawed
                                          Defenses
                                                         Vision,
                                                        Beliefs, &
       Vision,
                                                         Values
      Beliefs, &
       Values



                         on
                   Missi
                   Goals       Incident
                        ies
                   Polic ses
                         s
                   Proce s
                        ram
                   Prog
                                                     Initiating
Latent                                               Action
Organizational
Weaknesses

                                        Error
                                     Precursors
1-8
Significance of an Incident


      The significance (or severity) of an incident
            depends upon the consequences
            suffered, and not on the error that
           initiates it. The error that triggers a
        serious accident … and the error that is
                  one of hundreds with no
        consequences ... can be the same error.



1-9
What is an Error?


     An action that unintentionally departs from an
                    expected behavior.




1 - 10
What is a Violation?


         Intentional acts that deviate from a policy or
           procedure for personal advantage, usually
            adopted for fun, comfort, expedience, or
                           convenience.




1 - 11
Two Kinds of Error


         Active Error
         Immediate consequences.
         Know “who did it.”




                                      Latent Error
                               Lead to latent organizational
                               weaknesses


1 - 12
Principles of
                    Human Performance

         1.  People are fallible - even the best people make
             mistakes.
         2.  Error likely situations are predictable, manageable,
             and preventable.
         3.  Individual behavior is influenced by organizational
             processes and values.
         4.  People achieve high levels of performance largely
             because of the encouragement and reinforcement
             received from leaders, peers, and subordinates.
         5.  Incidents can be avoided through an understanding
             of the reasons mistakes occur and the application of
             the lessons learned from past incidents (or errors).
1 - 13
I - 14
Common Traps -
         Human Information Processing




2 - 15
Information Processing


         We see the world as we are not as it is. It
          is the “I” behind the “eye” that does the
                            seeing
                                          Anais Nin




1 - 16
Common Error Traps –
          At-Risk Attitudes and Behaviors

         Humans possess an innate characteristic to be
         imprecise (i.e., human nature)




          The ability to detect error-likely situations to head off
            preventable events depends largely on how well
          these factors are understood regarding their role in
                               human error.
                                                       James Reason
                                                        - Human Error




2 - 17
At-Risk Attitudes

         •  Inaccurate Risk Perspective: Guided by the
            heart, not by the head
         •  Pride: “Don’t insult my intelligence.”
         •  Heroic: “I’ll get it done, by hook or by crook.”
         •  Invulnerable: “That can’t happen to me.”
         •  Fatalistic: “What’s the use?” or “Que será será”
         •  Bald Tire: “I’ve gone 60K miles without a flat yet.”
         •  Summit Fever: “We’re almost done.”
         •  Pollyanna: “Nothing bad will happen.”
2 - 18
Error-Likely Situation

         An error about to happen:
         •  Typically exists when task-related factors exceed
            the capabilities of the individual (a mismatch)
                                                                   (also called “Error Traps”)



           Unintentional deviation
                                                               Jobsite conditions
           from preferred behavior


                                      Degree of mismatch
                                     due to error precursors




2 - 19
Common Error Precursors
                                             (Conditions that Provoke Error)

                            Task Demands                                   Individual Capabilities
           Time pressure (in a hurry)                         Unfamiliarity w/ task / First time evolution
           High Workload (high memory requirements)           Lack of knowledge (mental model)
           Simultaneous, multiple tasks                       New technique not used before
           Repetitive actions / Monotony                      Imprecise communication habits
           Irrecoverable acts                                 Lack of proficiency / Inexperience
           Interpretation requirements                        Indistinct problem-solving skills
           Unclear goals, roles, & responsibilities           “Unsafe” attitude for critical tasks
           Lack of or unclear standards                       Illness / Fatigue
                         Work Environment                                        Human Nature
           Distractions / Interruptions                       Stress
           Changes / Departures from routine                  Habit patterns
           Confusing displays or controls                     Assumptions
           Workarounds / OOS instruments                      Complacency / Overconfidence
           Hidden system response                             Mind-set
           Unexpected conditions                              Inaccurate risk perception
           Lack of alternative indication                     Mental shortcuts (biases)
           Personality conflicts                              Limited short-term memory

          OOS – out of service
2 - 20
Errors are....


          Errors are for the most part unintentional. It
         is very hard for management to control what
         people did not intend to do in the first place.
                                          - Dr. James Reason
                                                  Human Error




5 - 21
Normalized Deviance

         Focusing on one moment in time, you see negligence
         with respect to an old standard or norm.
                                                         Process
                                       Real Risk Level




                                                         Normalized
               Amount of Risk




                                                         Deviance
                                      Perceived Risk



                                                          Values


                                       Time
1 - 22                               (NASA VIDEO)
Goal of Human
                Performance Improvement

         •  Excellence in Performance
            –  Aligns process with values
            –  Improved productivity, efficiency, quality, reliability, & safety
            –  Reduced costs (rework, lost work time, etc.) and risks
            –  Improved performance and effective, informed culture




         Reducing Error + Managing Defenses                        Zero Events
                                                                  (Unwanted Outcomes)

    Anticipate & Prevent Active   Confirm Integrity of Defenses
       Error at the Job-site      and Identify/Eliminate Latent
                                   Organizational Weaknesses
1 - 23
Part II

         •    Performance modes
              –    Skill based
              –    Rule based
              –    Knowledge based
         •    Error Prevention Tools
         •    Just Culture




1 - 24
Human Performance
            Improvement
               Part II
                        Presented by
         Michael L. McIntosh, CIH, CSP, CHMM
              Oak Ridge National Laboratory




1 - 25            American Chemical Society
                        August 2010
Review of Principles of
                   Human Performance

         1.  People are fallible - even the best people make
             mistakes.
         2.  Error likely situations are predictable, manageable,
             and preventable.
         3.  Individual behavior is influenced by organizational
             processes and values.
         4.  People achieve high levels of performance largely
             because of the encouragement and reinforcement
             received from leaders, peers, and subordinates.
         5.  Incidents can be avoided through an understanding
             of the reasons mistakes occur and the application of
             the lessons learned from past incidents (or errors).
1 - 26
Consider
         Performance Modes

             1/2 to 1/10




2 - 27
Skill-Based Errors
                Pre-Programmed Skills or Habits

         •  Chance for error is 1 in 10,000
         •  Error mode is inattention
         •  Unintentional slips or lapses
         •  Intent was correct, action
            inappropriate
         •  Skilled personnel performing
            familiar tasks
         •  Normalized deviation due to familiarity is a
            concern
         •  25% of errors are skill-based


2 - 28
Rule-Based Errors
                    Selecting the Path Forward

         •  Chance for error is 1 in 1,000
         •  Error mode is misinterpretation
         •  Conscious decision making
            using stored rules
         •  Rules must be matched with
            skills
         •  Errors are made when conditions change and
            change is not recognized
         •  60% of all errors are rule-based




2 - 29
Knowledge-Based Errors
                        Breaking New Ground

         •  Chance for error is high - 1 in 2
            to 1 in 10
         •  Error mode is inaccurate mental
            picture
         •  Responding to a totally unfamiliar
            situation
         •  Uncertainty is high – added stress
         •  Fundamental principles and technical
            understanding needed to make a decision
         •  15% of errors are knowledge-based



2 - 30
I - 31
Error-Prevention Tools
                       - Individuals -

         •  Task Preview
         •  Task Preview
         •  Job-Site Review
         •  Questioning Attitude
         •  Questioning Attitude
         •  Stop (& collaborate) when unsure
         •  Stop (& collaborate) when unsure
         • 
         •    Self-Checking
              Self-Checking
         • 
         •    Procedure Use and Adherence
              Procedure Use and Adherence
         •  Validate Assumptions
         •  Effective Communications
         •  Effective Communications
         •  Place-Keeping
         •  “Do Not Disturb” Sign
2 - 32
Proactive Mental Framework
   Work Situation                                       Situational
     Factors                                            Awareness
           Task                                          Critical
         Demands                                         Steps
                           Task
      Work                Preview                      Error-likely
   Environment                                         Situations

     Individual                                         Potential
    Capabilities    SAFER Dialogue                    Consequences
                    S – Summarize critical steps
         Human      A – Anticipate error traps           Flawed
         Nature     F – Foresee consequences            Defenses
                    E – Evaluate defenses
                    R – Review operating experience
2 - 33
Questioning Attitude

          Fosters thought before action and helps individuals
         maintain an accurate understanding of work conditions.

         •  Used along with Self-Checking
         •  Promotes a preference for facts over assumptions
            and opinions




2 - 34
Stop When Unsure

         Unsure
               = unchartered territory
                     = knowledge-based performance mode
                           = High Error Rate (1/2 to 1/10)
         1.  Stop (pause or time-out) the activity
         2.  Place the equipment and the job site in a safe
             condition
         3.  Notify your immediate supervisor
         4.  Get help from more knowledgeable person(s)
                  Stop and collaborate with an expert!
2 - 35
Self-Checking

           Promotes a preference for facts over assumptions
                             and opinion.

         Pause and think before acting when vital points (critical
         junctures) are reached
         •  When to use?
         •  What to pay attention to?
         •  Where to pay attention

                     Promotes a
                  questioning attitude
2 - 36
Procedure Use & Adherence

         Procedures - intended to direct behavior
         and minimize choices the user has to make
         Error can be introduced when:
         •    Not enough information (or too much)
         •    Interpretation requirements
         •    Procedural non-use / procedure out-dated
         •    Critical steps not identified
         •    Technical errors
         •    Stopping and restarting, etc….
                    Consider place-keeping (physically marking
                        completed steps) to prevent errors
2 - 37
Effective Communication

         Goal = mutual understanding 1 Mom to Joey – “Go
                                        walk the dog before
                 1                      dinner.”
                           2          2 Joey to Mom – “I
                                        understand that you
                 3
                                        want me to walk the
                                        dog before dinner.
                                        Is that correct?”

                                      3 Mom to Joey – “That
                                        is correct” OR “That is
                                        wrong,” and restates
                                        original message
2 - 38
Team Errors

         •  Halo Effect: Blind trust in the competence of specific
            individuals
         •  Pilot / Co-pilot: Subordinate reluctant to challenge
            opinions, decisions, or actions of senior person
         •  Free Riding: One takes the lead
            while others tag along without
            actively scrutinizing the work.




2 - 39
Team Errors (Cont.)

         •  Groupthink: Reluctance to share contradictory
            information for the sake of maintaining harmony
         •  Risky Shift: Tendency to gamble with decisions
            more as a group than if each member was making
            the decision individually – accountability is diffused
            (also called “herd mentality”)


             It takes a team error to
                   have an event.



2 - 40
Error-Prevention Tools
                      - Work Teams -

         • •  Pre-Job Briefings
              Pre-Job Briefings
         • •  Peer-Checking
              Peer Checking
         •  Verification Practices
         •  Flagging
         • •  Turnover
               Turnover
         •  Post-Job Review
         •  Project Planning
         •  Problem Solving
         •  Decision Making
         •  Project Review Meeting
2 - 41
Pre-Job Briefings

         To prepare for what is to be accomplished and for what
                            is to be avoided!
         •  Discuss specifics, including CRITICAL STEPS
         •  Discuss error traps, consequences, defenses, and
            error-prevention techniques
         •  Encourage active engagement by all members
         •  Ensure key participants are present
         •  Discuss actions for work scope changes
         •  Encourage a questioning attitude and self-checking


2 - 42
Peer Checking
                      - Addresses Actions


         A 2nd knowledgeable
         individual verifies
         that the action
         planned is
         appropriate and
         occurs as planned.
         Purpose - to
         prevent errors.




2 - 43
Turnover

             The orderly transfer of information, tasks, and
             responsibilities between individuals or crews

         •  To establish an accurate mental model (situational
            awareness)
         •  Thorough, accurate - may include a walk-down
         •  Use three-point communication
         •  Use written logs




2 - 44
What Individuals can do……

         •  Understand error-provoking factors and human
            fallibility & vulnerabilities
         •  Anticipate error-likely situations
         •  Apply error-prevention tools & techniques
         •  Improve personal capabilities
         •  Use the proactive mental framework and S-A-F-E-R
            dialog




2 - 45
Dependability of Defenses
    HIGH
                             Containment Structures (e.g., shield walls)

                                     Engineered Safeguards
    Reliability of Defense




                                             Interlocks

                                                    Personal Protective Equipment

                                                            Document Reviews

                                Reliability of the defense/       Procedure Use
                                control is inversely
                                proportional to the amount of
                                human intervention required                Caution Tags

                                                                                 Supervision/Qualifications

                                                                                          Self-Checking

           LOW                              Degree of Human Control                                       HIGH
3 - 46
Dependability of Defenses (Cont.)

         WARNING: Defense-in-depth can be a two-edged
         sword.
         •  Redundant defenses improve safety margins but
            also increase complexity.
         •  Flaws, traps, flawed defenses, and safety hazards
            can become more difficult to detect.
             –  Latent conditions allowed to persist


          Weakness in defenses may not be detected and
          repaired … because the people involved often
                       forget to be afraid.
3 - 47
Organizational Values
                    - Error Tolerance -

         Error Tolerance:
         •  Design processes, tasks, equipment, etc., such that
            the inevitable human error will not result in an event
            of consequence.




            Error without consequence shows that our systems
                  are error-tolerant and that they are working.
4 - 48
What Organizations can do….

         •  Foster a culture that values the prevention of errors
            and mishaps
         •  Preclude the development of error-likely situations
         •  Eliminate latent organizational weaknesses that
            provoke error
         •  Create a “Learning” environment that promotes
            continuous improvement
         •  Value error tolerance
         •  Report all errors and near misses
         •  Expect the unexpected, and have appropriate
            contingency plans in place
4 - 49
Errors are....


          Errors are for the most part unintentional. It
         is very hard for management to control what
         people did not intend to do in the first place.
                                          - Dr. James Reason
                                                  Human Error




5 - 50
Value Prevention of Errors


          “If error-free performance (avoiding active
          errors) is not held up as an important value
         or is not expected for daily work, then people
         may adopt unsafe practices to get their work
         done, possibly placing themselves, others, or
                  the facility at risk of an event.”
                                   Human Performance Reference Manual
                                                          INPO 06-003




5 - 51
Value Prevention of Errors

         Understanding human fallibility encourages a proactive
         perspective toward work:
         •  It is easy to err, and a person may not even know it
         •  Workers should possess a keen - and healthy -
            sense of uneasiness toward any activity
            – prompts the mindset: “expect success but
              anticipate failure”
            – fosters intolerance for error traps / precursors



5 - 52
Human Performance


         “Workplaces and organizations are easier
           to manage than the minds of individual
              workers. You can not change the
            human condition, but you can change
             the conditions under which people
                           work.”
                                     - Dr. James Reason




5 - 53
A Just Culture

          Atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged,
         even rewarded, for providing essential information – but
           in which they are also clear about where the line is
         drawn between acceptable and unacceptable behavior.

         •  It is unacceptable to punish all errors and unsafe acts
            regardless of origins and circumstances;
         •  It is equally unacceptable to give blanket immunity
            from sanctions to all actions that could, or did,
            contribute to organizational accidents.



6 - 54
Benefits of a Just Culture

         •  Promotes a reporting and learning culture & honest
            investigation of true organizational weaknesses
         •  Provides forward-looking accountability
         •  Builds Trust … what’s said gets done by management
         •  Ensures respect for the individual
         •  Instills belief that discipline is fairly administered
         •  Maintains zero tolerance for harassment/retaliation
         •  Provides multiple avenues of communication
         •  Builds confidence in broader organizational cause
            investigations

6 - 55
Human
                                        “Success”


             Flawed defenses &
                                                      Individual recognized
              error precursors
                                                           or rewarded
                 eliminated



                                         Praise
         Latent organizational
                                         Cycle
                                                             Increased trust
         weaknesses identified




                    Management more
                     aware of jobsite               Effective
                       conditions                 communication


6 - 56
HROs
                 Cultures of Mindfulness
         High Reliability Organizations (HROs):
         Diverse organizations that share a
         singular demand: They have no
         choice but to function reliably. If
         reliability is compromised, severe
         harm results.
         1.  Healthy preoccupation with failure
         2.  Reluctance to oversimplify
         3.  Sensitivity to operations
         4.  Maintain capabilities for resilience
         5.  Deference to expertise
              Adapted from “Managing the Unexpected,” by Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe
6 - 57
References

    •  Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, James Reason,
       Ashgate, 2006
    •  Managing Maintenance Error, James Reason and Alan Hobbs,
       Ashgate, 2003
    •  The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error, Ashgate, 2006
    •  Just Culture, Sidney Dekker, Ashgate, 2007
    •  The Design of Everyday Things, Donald Norman, Basic Book, 1988
    •  Blink, Malcolm Gladwell, Back Bay Books, 2005
    •  The Human Contribution, James Reason, Ashgate, 2008
    •  The Challenger Launch Decision, Diane Vaughan, University of
       Chicago Press, 1997
    •  Why Hospitals Should Fly, John J. Nance, JD, Second River
       Healthcare Press, 2008

I - 58

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Principles of Human Performance Improvement

  • 1. Human Performance Improvement Part I Presented by Michael L. McIntosh, CIH, CSP, CHMM Oak Ridge National Laboratory 1-1 American Chemical Society August 2010
  • 2. Human Fallibility “… human fallibility is like gravity, weather, and terrain, just another foreseeable hazard. Error is pervasive … What is not pervasive are well-developed skills to detect and contain these errors at their early stages.” -  Weick and Sutcliffe Leading with Resilience in the Face of the Unexpected 1-2
  • 3. To Err is Human 1-3
  • 4. To Error is Human (Cont.) 1-4
  • 5. To Drift is Human 1-5
  • 6. Why is HPI Important •  UCLA research assistant died from injuries sustained in a chemical fire on December 29th, 2008 •  Texas Tech University student seriously injured on January 7th, 2010 when a mixture of nickel hydrazine perchlorate exploded in chemistry building •  SMU student burned on May 11, 2010 in chemistry lab by pouring water too quickly on sodium hydride •  Explosion injures four people at a University of Missouri science lab on June 28, 2010 •  Chemical Safety Review Board states “it is time to begin examining these accidents to see if they can be prevented” I-6
  • 7. What Cause Occurrences? Human Errors Occurrences 70% Latent Organizational 30% 80% Human Error Weaknesses* Individual (Slips, trips, lapses) 20% Equipment Failures * Latent Organizational Weakness = Hidden deficiencies in management control process or values 1-7
  • 8. Anatomy of an Incident Flawed Defenses Vision, Beliefs, & Vision, Values Beliefs, & Values on Missi Goals Incident ies Polic ses s Proce s ram Prog Initiating Latent Action Organizational Weaknesses Error Precursors 1-8
  • 9. Significance of an Incident The significance (or severity) of an incident depends upon the consequences suffered, and not on the error that initiates it. The error that triggers a serious accident … and the error that is one of hundreds with no consequences ... can be the same error. 1-9
  • 10. What is an Error? An action that unintentionally departs from an expected behavior. 1 - 10
  • 11. What is a Violation? Intentional acts that deviate from a policy or procedure for personal advantage, usually adopted for fun, comfort, expedience, or convenience. 1 - 11
  • 12. Two Kinds of Error Active Error Immediate consequences. Know “who did it.” Latent Error Lead to latent organizational weaknesses 1 - 12
  • 13. Principles of Human Performance 1.  People are fallible - even the best people make mistakes. 2.  Error likely situations are predictable, manageable, and preventable. 3.  Individual behavior is influenced by organizational processes and values. 4.  People achieve high levels of performance largely because of the encouragement and reinforcement received from leaders, peers, and subordinates. 5.  Incidents can be avoided through an understanding of the reasons mistakes occur and the application of the lessons learned from past incidents (or errors). 1 - 13
  • 15. Common Traps - Human Information Processing 2 - 15
  • 16. Information Processing We see the world as we are not as it is. It is the “I” behind the “eye” that does the seeing Anais Nin 1 - 16
  • 17. Common Error Traps – At-Risk Attitudes and Behaviors Humans possess an innate characteristic to be imprecise (i.e., human nature) The ability to detect error-likely situations to head off preventable events depends largely on how well these factors are understood regarding their role in human error. James Reason - Human Error 2 - 17
  • 18. At-Risk Attitudes •  Inaccurate Risk Perspective: Guided by the heart, not by the head •  Pride: “Don’t insult my intelligence.” •  Heroic: “I’ll get it done, by hook or by crook.” •  Invulnerable: “That can’t happen to me.” •  Fatalistic: “What’s the use?” or “Que será será” •  Bald Tire: “I’ve gone 60K miles without a flat yet.” •  Summit Fever: “We’re almost done.” •  Pollyanna: “Nothing bad will happen.” 2 - 18
  • 19. Error-Likely Situation An error about to happen: •  Typically exists when task-related factors exceed the capabilities of the individual (a mismatch) (also called “Error Traps”) Unintentional deviation Jobsite conditions from preferred behavior Degree of mismatch due to error precursors 2 - 19
  • 20. Common Error Precursors (Conditions that Provoke Error) Task Demands Individual Capabilities   Time pressure (in a hurry)   Unfamiliarity w/ task / First time evolution   High Workload (high memory requirements)   Lack of knowledge (mental model)   Simultaneous, multiple tasks   New technique not used before   Repetitive actions / Monotony   Imprecise communication habits   Irrecoverable acts   Lack of proficiency / Inexperience   Interpretation requirements   Indistinct problem-solving skills   Unclear goals, roles, & responsibilities   “Unsafe” attitude for critical tasks   Lack of or unclear standards   Illness / Fatigue Work Environment Human Nature   Distractions / Interruptions   Stress   Changes / Departures from routine   Habit patterns   Confusing displays or controls   Assumptions   Workarounds / OOS instruments   Complacency / Overconfidence   Hidden system response   Mind-set   Unexpected conditions   Inaccurate risk perception   Lack of alternative indication   Mental shortcuts (biases)   Personality conflicts   Limited short-term memory OOS – out of service 2 - 20
  • 21. Errors are.... Errors are for the most part unintentional. It is very hard for management to control what people did not intend to do in the first place. - Dr. James Reason Human Error 5 - 21
  • 22. Normalized Deviance Focusing on one moment in time, you see negligence with respect to an old standard or norm. Process Real Risk Level Normalized Amount of Risk Deviance Perceived Risk Values Time 1 - 22 (NASA VIDEO)
  • 23. Goal of Human Performance Improvement •  Excellence in Performance –  Aligns process with values –  Improved productivity, efficiency, quality, reliability, & safety –  Reduced costs (rework, lost work time, etc.) and risks –  Improved performance and effective, informed culture Reducing Error + Managing Defenses Zero Events (Unwanted Outcomes) Anticipate & Prevent Active Confirm Integrity of Defenses Error at the Job-site and Identify/Eliminate Latent Organizational Weaknesses 1 - 23
  • 24. Part II •  Performance modes –  Skill based –  Rule based –  Knowledge based •  Error Prevention Tools •  Just Culture 1 - 24
  • 25. Human Performance Improvement Part II Presented by Michael L. McIntosh, CIH, CSP, CHMM Oak Ridge National Laboratory 1 - 25 American Chemical Society August 2010
  • 26. Review of Principles of Human Performance 1.  People are fallible - even the best people make mistakes. 2.  Error likely situations are predictable, manageable, and preventable. 3.  Individual behavior is influenced by organizational processes and values. 4.  People achieve high levels of performance largely because of the encouragement and reinforcement received from leaders, peers, and subordinates. 5.  Incidents can be avoided through an understanding of the reasons mistakes occur and the application of the lessons learned from past incidents (or errors). 1 - 26
  • 27. Consider Performance Modes 1/2 to 1/10 2 - 27
  • 28. Skill-Based Errors Pre-Programmed Skills or Habits •  Chance for error is 1 in 10,000 •  Error mode is inattention •  Unintentional slips or lapses •  Intent was correct, action inappropriate •  Skilled personnel performing familiar tasks •  Normalized deviation due to familiarity is a concern •  25% of errors are skill-based 2 - 28
  • 29. Rule-Based Errors Selecting the Path Forward •  Chance for error is 1 in 1,000 •  Error mode is misinterpretation •  Conscious decision making using stored rules •  Rules must be matched with skills •  Errors are made when conditions change and change is not recognized •  60% of all errors are rule-based 2 - 29
  • 30. Knowledge-Based Errors Breaking New Ground •  Chance for error is high - 1 in 2 to 1 in 10 •  Error mode is inaccurate mental picture •  Responding to a totally unfamiliar situation •  Uncertainty is high – added stress •  Fundamental principles and technical understanding needed to make a decision •  15% of errors are knowledge-based 2 - 30
  • 32. Error-Prevention Tools - Individuals - •  Task Preview •  Task Preview •  Job-Site Review •  Questioning Attitude •  Questioning Attitude •  Stop (& collaborate) when unsure •  Stop (& collaborate) when unsure •  •  Self-Checking Self-Checking •  •  Procedure Use and Adherence Procedure Use and Adherence •  Validate Assumptions •  Effective Communications •  Effective Communications •  Place-Keeping •  “Do Not Disturb” Sign 2 - 32
  • 33. Proactive Mental Framework Work Situation Situational Factors Awareness Task Critical Demands Steps Task Work Preview Error-likely Environment Situations Individual Potential Capabilities SAFER Dialogue Consequences S – Summarize critical steps Human A – Anticipate error traps Flawed Nature F – Foresee consequences Defenses E – Evaluate defenses R – Review operating experience 2 - 33
  • 34. Questioning Attitude Fosters thought before action and helps individuals maintain an accurate understanding of work conditions. •  Used along with Self-Checking •  Promotes a preference for facts over assumptions and opinions 2 - 34
  • 35. Stop When Unsure Unsure = unchartered territory = knowledge-based performance mode = High Error Rate (1/2 to 1/10) 1.  Stop (pause or time-out) the activity 2.  Place the equipment and the job site in a safe condition 3.  Notify your immediate supervisor 4.  Get help from more knowledgeable person(s) Stop and collaborate with an expert! 2 - 35
  • 36. Self-Checking Promotes a preference for facts over assumptions and opinion. Pause and think before acting when vital points (critical junctures) are reached •  When to use? •  What to pay attention to? •  Where to pay attention Promotes a questioning attitude 2 - 36
  • 37. Procedure Use & Adherence Procedures - intended to direct behavior and minimize choices the user has to make Error can be introduced when: •  Not enough information (or too much) •  Interpretation requirements •  Procedural non-use / procedure out-dated •  Critical steps not identified •  Technical errors •  Stopping and restarting, etc…. Consider place-keeping (physically marking completed steps) to prevent errors 2 - 37
  • 38. Effective Communication Goal = mutual understanding 1 Mom to Joey – “Go walk the dog before 1 dinner.” 2 2 Joey to Mom – “I understand that you 3 want me to walk the dog before dinner. Is that correct?” 3 Mom to Joey – “That is correct” OR “That is wrong,” and restates original message 2 - 38
  • 39. Team Errors •  Halo Effect: Blind trust in the competence of specific individuals •  Pilot / Co-pilot: Subordinate reluctant to challenge opinions, decisions, or actions of senior person •  Free Riding: One takes the lead while others tag along without actively scrutinizing the work. 2 - 39
  • 40. Team Errors (Cont.) •  Groupthink: Reluctance to share contradictory information for the sake of maintaining harmony •  Risky Shift: Tendency to gamble with decisions more as a group than if each member was making the decision individually – accountability is diffused (also called “herd mentality”) It takes a team error to have an event. 2 - 40
  • 41. Error-Prevention Tools - Work Teams - • •  Pre-Job Briefings Pre-Job Briefings • •  Peer-Checking Peer Checking •  Verification Practices •  Flagging • •  Turnover Turnover •  Post-Job Review •  Project Planning •  Problem Solving •  Decision Making •  Project Review Meeting 2 - 41
  • 42. Pre-Job Briefings To prepare for what is to be accomplished and for what is to be avoided! •  Discuss specifics, including CRITICAL STEPS •  Discuss error traps, consequences, defenses, and error-prevention techniques •  Encourage active engagement by all members •  Ensure key participants are present •  Discuss actions for work scope changes •  Encourage a questioning attitude and self-checking 2 - 42
  • 43. Peer Checking - Addresses Actions A 2nd knowledgeable individual verifies that the action planned is appropriate and occurs as planned. Purpose - to prevent errors. 2 - 43
  • 44. Turnover The orderly transfer of information, tasks, and responsibilities between individuals or crews •  To establish an accurate mental model (situational awareness) •  Thorough, accurate - may include a walk-down •  Use three-point communication •  Use written logs 2 - 44
  • 45. What Individuals can do…… •  Understand error-provoking factors and human fallibility & vulnerabilities •  Anticipate error-likely situations •  Apply error-prevention tools & techniques •  Improve personal capabilities •  Use the proactive mental framework and S-A-F-E-R dialog 2 - 45
  • 46. Dependability of Defenses HIGH Containment Structures (e.g., shield walls) Engineered Safeguards Reliability of Defense Interlocks Personal Protective Equipment Document Reviews Reliability of the defense/ Procedure Use control is inversely proportional to the amount of human intervention required Caution Tags Supervision/Qualifications Self-Checking LOW Degree of Human Control HIGH 3 - 46
  • 47. Dependability of Defenses (Cont.) WARNING: Defense-in-depth can be a two-edged sword. •  Redundant defenses improve safety margins but also increase complexity. •  Flaws, traps, flawed defenses, and safety hazards can become more difficult to detect. –  Latent conditions allowed to persist Weakness in defenses may not be detected and repaired … because the people involved often forget to be afraid. 3 - 47
  • 48. Organizational Values - Error Tolerance - Error Tolerance: •  Design processes, tasks, equipment, etc., such that the inevitable human error will not result in an event of consequence. Error without consequence shows that our systems are error-tolerant and that they are working. 4 - 48
  • 49. What Organizations can do…. •  Foster a culture that values the prevention of errors and mishaps •  Preclude the development of error-likely situations •  Eliminate latent organizational weaknesses that provoke error •  Create a “Learning” environment that promotes continuous improvement •  Value error tolerance •  Report all errors and near misses •  Expect the unexpected, and have appropriate contingency plans in place 4 - 49
  • 50. Errors are.... Errors are for the most part unintentional. It is very hard for management to control what people did not intend to do in the first place. - Dr. James Reason Human Error 5 - 50
  • 51. Value Prevention of Errors “If error-free performance (avoiding active errors) is not held up as an important value or is not expected for daily work, then people may adopt unsafe practices to get their work done, possibly placing themselves, others, or the facility at risk of an event.” Human Performance Reference Manual INPO 06-003 5 - 51
  • 52. Value Prevention of Errors Understanding human fallibility encourages a proactive perspective toward work: •  It is easy to err, and a person may not even know it •  Workers should possess a keen - and healthy - sense of uneasiness toward any activity – prompts the mindset: “expect success but anticipate failure” – fosters intolerance for error traps / precursors 5 - 52
  • 53. Human Performance “Workplaces and organizations are easier to manage than the minds of individual workers. You can not change the human condition, but you can change the conditions under which people work.” - Dr. James Reason 5 - 53
  • 54. A Just Culture Atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged, even rewarded, for providing essential information – but in which they are also clear about where the line is drawn between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. •  It is unacceptable to punish all errors and unsafe acts regardless of origins and circumstances; •  It is equally unacceptable to give blanket immunity from sanctions to all actions that could, or did, contribute to organizational accidents. 6 - 54
  • 55. Benefits of a Just Culture •  Promotes a reporting and learning culture & honest investigation of true organizational weaknesses •  Provides forward-looking accountability •  Builds Trust … what’s said gets done by management •  Ensures respect for the individual •  Instills belief that discipline is fairly administered •  Maintains zero tolerance for harassment/retaliation •  Provides multiple avenues of communication •  Builds confidence in broader organizational cause investigations 6 - 55
  • 56. Human “Success” Flawed defenses & Individual recognized error precursors or rewarded eliminated Praise Latent organizational Cycle Increased trust weaknesses identified Management more aware of jobsite Effective conditions communication 6 - 56
  • 57. HROs Cultures of Mindfulness High Reliability Organizations (HROs): Diverse organizations that share a singular demand: They have no choice but to function reliably. If reliability is compromised, severe harm results. 1.  Healthy preoccupation with failure 2.  Reluctance to oversimplify 3.  Sensitivity to operations 4.  Maintain capabilities for resilience 5.  Deference to expertise Adapted from “Managing the Unexpected,” by Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe 6 - 57
  • 58. References •  Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, James Reason, Ashgate, 2006 •  Managing Maintenance Error, James Reason and Alan Hobbs, Ashgate, 2003 •  The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error, Ashgate, 2006 •  Just Culture, Sidney Dekker, Ashgate, 2007 •  The Design of Everyday Things, Donald Norman, Basic Book, 1988 •  Blink, Malcolm Gladwell, Back Bay Books, 2005 •  The Human Contribution, James Reason, Ashgate, 2008 •  The Challenger Launch Decision, Diane Vaughan, University of Chicago Press, 1997 •  Why Hospitals Should Fly, John J. Nance, JD, Second River Healthcare Press, 2008 I - 58