Military control in pakistan

1. Military Control in
Pakistan-The Parallel
State ,Mazhar Aziz /Editor
data available Price:
$150.00 ,
ISBN: 978-0-415-43743-1
,Binding: Hardback
Published by: Routledge
,Publication Date: 24th
October 2007 ,Pages: 160

2. Book Review by Major
Agha H Amin (Retired)
October 2008
Mazhar Aziz's book on military and
politics in Pakistan is a new addition to
books dealing with civil military relations
in Pakistan.
Mazhar Aziz Mazhar Aziz (PhD, University
of Nottingham, 2006) is a former
Pakistani civil servant and an independent
scholar with research interests in
democracy and political representation,
civil-military relations and foreign policy.

3. He is an outsider to the Pakistani military
having observed it as a civil servant who
at times are junior partners in the civil
military nexus in Pakistan barring few
exceptions like the old fox Ghulam Ishaq
or the half military half civilian Iskandar
Mirza.
Aziz in words of a reviewer "introduces
the concept of institutional path
dependency. According to him, the
institutional innovations of the formative
years of Pakistan's history (1947-54)
created a form of path dependency that
has been responsible for thwarted
democratisation, military intervention and
post-military withdrawal crises." Aziz
however fails to define this concept of "
Institutional Path" precisely and also fails
to connect it with the negative British

4. colonial military legacy particulary the
British Imperial policy in Punjab from
1849-1947.
Under the British the Punjab the
preferred British recruiting area for the
army from 1857 till 1947 had a special
status.It was a non regulation province
where the deputy commissioner was far
more powerful than in any British
province and most of the initial deputy
commissioners were ex army.It was a
province where the feudals and the
British had a special relationship.It was a
province where the vast bulk of British
intelligence resources were employed as
its location was the most strategic in
entire British India.It was a province
which had the closest link and the largest
contribution to the British war effort as
far as 1857 ,First World War and Second
World War were concerned.

5. While the Indian Army and notably the
Punjabis , and most particularly the
Punjabi Muslims were the closest
collaborators of the British immediately
after partition the Pakistani Army
particularly its pro British generals were
the most valuable political asset of the
British.The Pakistani generals led by Ayub
Khan soon out of personal ambition
became the self styled guardians of
Pakistans territorial and ideological
boundaries.Ayub Khan with open support
of civil servants like Ghulam Mohammad
and the military cum civil servant
Iskandar Mirza on his own started
negotiating with USA and boasted that
the US Director CIA was his best friend.At
this point in time Ayub was propelled to
do so by personal ambition and by the
declared intention of safeguarding
Pakistan and the army's institutional

6. interests on the pretext of acquiring US
weapons.In this case he was however not
alone.The initial move for US aid was
made by Mr Jinnah and later by Liaquat
Ali Khan and Ghulam Mohammad.From
1954 onwards however Ayub was picked
out by USA as USA's best bet.India was
too large to be manipulated and India's
Congress too formidable a party to be
messed with.In Pakistan however
manipulation was simpler because of the
pre partition feudal military civil service
connection.Thus in case of Ayub the
mafia was not military alone but civil
military West Pakistani feudal with
Punjabis in lead and all conspiring to
reduce the Dravidian Bengalis
politically.What followed was a joint
conspiracy by the army with a
linguistically Punjabi chief in league with
Punjabi feudals and civil servants to
snatch legitimate political power from the
Bengalis.Mazhar Aziz misses this point or
has practiced selective distortion.

7. The Yahya takeover of 1969 was the
most credible intervention by the army
done out of national interests.General
Yahya did make an honest attempt to
introduce direct franchise and provincial
autonomy.Unfortunately he failed
because all of pakistan's rulers starting
from Jinnah had mishandled the Bengalis
and the situation became unmanageable.
Zia on the other hand acted out of
personal motives because he feared that
Bhutto wanted to sack him and the top
army generals feared Bhutto who was a
popular leader.Again a case of class
interests rather than institutional
interests.

8. Aziz misses the point that the army or its
top clique was used by the USA to
achieve its geopolitical ends in
Pakistan.Every military takeover in
Pakistan had some link with USA or
became a servile instrument to further US
geopolitical objectives.
Aziz also fails to note that initial military
takeovers were more personality oriented
while starting from Zia the army's
generals very correctly called the trade
union of generals acted out of class
interests.After 1977 it became the stated
objective of the Pakistan Army's top
generals and its intelligence agencies to
destroy all independent political
leadership in Pakistan.Thus every political
party was penetrated and every effort
made to destroy independent political
leadership.The Punjab again was the

9. centre of these efforts and the emergence
of Nawaz Sharif in 1988 was the high
point of these covert efforts.
General Zia's successor General Beg did
hold the elections of 1988 but failed to
control the ISI pursuing a parallel policy
or simply ignored what it was doing thus
destabilisng and removing the first PPP
government in 1990.In 1990 Mr Nawaz
Sharif was the best choice of the army's
ruling clique but he was removed in
1993.In this case again the matter was
not entirely or even 50 % institutional but
a collusion of a Pashtun president and a
Pashtun army chief to remove a Punjabi
PM who was becoming too assertive.Their
natural choice was a Sindhi lady .This
move again was unconstitutional and
motivated by personal and ethnic
motivation rather than institutional
motivation.

10. In 1999 the Musharraf coup was again
motivated by personal considerations
rather than any institutional
considerations.Many generals supported
Musharraf because they had been fired by
Nawaz Sharif notably General Mahmud
Corps Commander Rawalpindi.
After 2001 however Musharraf got a great
opportunity to play the role of USA's best
collaborator.Again a continuation of the
Punjab loyalty to British of 1857 and
Ayub loyalty to USA in the Cold War or
Zia loyalty to USA in 1979-1988.
It would be more correct to describe the
army in Pakistan as a mixture of

11. institutional and class loyalty with
personal motivation and ambition of the
army chief as the main catalyst.The army
is divided into many classes and the real
culprits are the top 150 or 200 generals
around the chief.Their ambition distorts
the whole scenario and their selfish
actions cannot be called institutional
interests.
Unless their is total defeat as happened
to the Russian Army in 1917 the
hegemony of the army signified by these
top 150-200 windbag generals would
continue come what may !
Now how to bell the cat.Only defeat in
war can reduce the army's role in
Pakistan.The same happened in Russia in
1905 and 1917.In Turkey in 1918.In
Japan in 1945,Alone the Pakistani
politicians cannot do it.They are the test

12. tube babies of many army intelligence
agencies.
It appears that change is round the
corner.The army is facing internal
fractures.Its lower ranks for the first time
in its history were involved in at least two
major assassination attempts against the
army chief and these included many
soldiers from Musharraf's own SSG
commandos.The army is being challenged
by Islamists and its credibility is being
reduced.Conventional war is out but the
secret war at covert levels
continues.India intelligence knows that
the war never ended and so does the
Pakistani intelligence.For the first time in
West Pakistan's hopeless history the
army is being challenged in NWFP and
Balochistan and the threat has not been
contained.This is an ethnic war as its a
Punjabi Army with junior Pashtun

13. auxillaries like the Yusufzais and Khattaks
fighting the Baloch and tribals .
The army is trying to sell itself to USA as
its best bet but it appears that the USA
has decided that some structural changes
are needed in the Pakistan Army.
The bottom line however is not the
Pakistani generals but US policy , at least
at the Defence Department,State
Department,CIA and DIA level.They want
the Pakistani generals.They do not trust
the Pakistani politicians and that's the
main reason why the Pakistani generals
and only the top 20 are guarding their
class interests .A small class by numbers
but very influential and destructive.

14. Only defeat in war or Balkanisation will
reduce the role of Pakistani
generals.Mazhar misses this point.
To conclude Aziz fails to present a
comprehensive case for the Instutional
path theory although he makes many
repetitions in the core 100 pages of his
book.