LTG ATIQ UR RAHMAN SIMPLY WHITE WASHES 4 FFs GLORIOUS 1948 WAR PERFORMANCE-LOW MILITARY HISTORY WRITING STANDARDS IN PAKISTAN

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LTG ATIQ UR RAHMAN SIMPLY WHITE WASHES 4 FFs GLORIOUS 1948 WAR
PERFORMANCE-LOW MILITARY HISTORY WRITING STANDARDS IN PAKISTAN
• June 2021
• DOI:
• 10.13140/RG.2.2.27786.18881
• Project:
• Military History
• Agha H Amin
EXCERPTS FROM Pakistan Army
Infantry Battalion Performance in
1948 Kashmir War- A Summary
ISBN: 9798510588026
Pakistan Army Infantry Battalion Performance in 1948 Kashmir
War
• May 2021

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• DOI:
• 10.13140/RG.2.2.29295.15526
• Agha H Amin

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While military history books concentrate on broad
military events , unit performance is generally overlooked
and not critically appraised.
This short book , first of three concentrates on unit
performance in Pakistan Armys three wars.
This first volume deals with infantry battalion
performance in Pakistans first war in history.

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The war started in late October 1947 .The official
Pakistan position is that Pakistan Army was first
introduced in Kashmir war in May 1948.1
However this scribes regiment PAVO Cavalry 11th
Frontier
Force was inducted in Kashmir war as early as October
1947 when wireless fitted jeep was sent by Pakistan
Armys director military intelligence to monitor the tribal
invasion of Kashmir on Abbottabad-Muzaffarabad-Uri-
Srinagar axis.2
Lieutenant General Attiq ur Rahman in his history of
PIFFERS states that 1st
Mountain Artillery Regiments 3rd
Peshawar Mountain Battery was deployed in Kashmir as
early as February 1948.3
Attiq stated that 4th
Battalion, 13th
Frontier Force Rifles
sent a company to participate in Kashmir war in Poonch
as early as 1st
February 1948.4
Initially 10 Brigade of 7 Division was given responsibility
for Jhelum and Neelum Valley5
and one of its battalions
4/16 Punjab was deployed in Chakothi area in Jhelum
Valley.6
1
Page-113-THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Historical Section -General Staff Branch-General
Headquarters-Rawalpindi-December 1970.
2
Page-153-Punjab CAVALRY-M.Y Effendi-Oxford University Press-Karachi-2007
3
Page-42-THE WARDENS OF THE MARCHES-A History of the Piffers-1947-71- Lieutenant
General M.Attiqur Rahman-Wajid Alis Publishers-Lahore -1984.
4
Page-50- THE WARDENS OF THE MARCHES-A History of the Piffers-1947-71-Op Cit.
5
Page-133- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.
6
Page-134- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.

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10 Brigade comprised 4/10 Baluch ,3/12 Frontier Force
Regiment, 5/13 Frontier Force Rifles and 4/16 Punjab.7
Only 4/16 Punjab was initially deployed in Jhelum valley
while other units stayed in Abbottabad.
However it was soon realised that 10 Brigade
Commander Haji Iftikhar was not the best man to face
the most dangerous brunt of Indian attack.8
The Pakistan Army chief Gracey in consultation with
Major General Loftus Tottenham then decided that the
ideal man to lead Pakistan Armys most decisive and
critical front in Kashmir was Brigadier Akbar Khan
(Pareech Khel) the highest decorated serving officer in
Pakistan Army who had won a DSO in Burma and was
regarded as an expert in dealing with tribal Pathans.
Gracey was Akbar Khans divisional commander in Burma
and personally knew him.It was Gracey who had
recommended Akbar Khan for the award of the
“Distinguished Service Order” for outstanding bravery
and leadership.
7
Page-178-THE PAKISTAN ARMY-1947-49- Major General Shaukat Riza -Wajid Alis (Private)
Limited- Lahore-1989.
8
Series of Interviews with Ex Major General Akbar Khan conducted by this scribe in 1985-89.

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Thus 10 Brigade was withdrawn to Abbottabad and 101
Brigade commanded by Brigadier Akbar Khan (Pareech
Khel) D.S.O was tasked for defence of Jhelum as well as
Kishanganga (Neelum) Valleys.9
Thus 4/16 Punjab of 10 Brigade was replaced at
Chakothi by 1/13 FF Rifles of 101 Brigade on 13 May
1948 10
and sent back to Abbottabad.
The official history of 1970 noted that Brigadier Akbar
Khan was selected as he was uniquely suited for the
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Page-135- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.
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Page-135- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.

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task .11
The official history noted that Akbar knew the
terrain in great detail.
This was so because Akbar had earlier led the Tribal
invasion of Kashmir in October-November 1947.
101 Brigade comprised 5/12 FF Regiment (Guides
Infantry , 1/13 FF Rifles and 2/13 FF Rifles.12
2/1 Punjab
earlier part of 102 Brigade at Bannu was also placed
under its command.
In addition the brigade also received 4/10 Baluch earlier
part of 10 Brigade.
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Page-135- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.
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Page-135- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.

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2/13 FF Rifles was initially deployed in Bagh.13
Later it
was deployed in operations in Pir Kanthi area in June
1948.
1/13 FF Rifles was deployed in Chakothi area while 2/1
Punjab was deployed in Nanga Tak area north of River
Jhelum initially and later employed in attack in Tiplpatra
area and was finally brought back to Nanga Tak later.
While 5/12 FF (Guides) was later placed under command
10 Brigade when the brigade was inducted in Tithwal
sector in May 1948.
Official history published in December 1970 thus stated
that 101 Brigade was alerted in first week of May 1948 to
be prepared to move up the Jhelum valley if the threat
developed there.14
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Page-185 - THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.
14
Page-113- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.

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Pakistani accounts dealing with 1947-48 Kashmir war are
highly confusing so we will deal with all units regiment
wise.
Researching this book took many years and I was deeply
disappointed in the course of this research to learn that
many books we regarded as the gospel truth had serious
factual errors like below:--

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Collecting casualties of all units was a Herculean task.I
contacted Brigadier Hafeez of Pakistan Army Heritage cell
in this regard but he was most ineffective.
Finally Major General Kaizad Maneck Sopariwala entered
the arena like an angel and was crucial in helping me
gather the final part of the puzzle i.e Baluch Regiment
casualties in this war.
I visited AK Regiment centre also but was deeply
disappointed with this organisation who seemed most
disinterested in assisting any researcher.

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This work is a primer to further research and it is
sincerely hoped that it will help researchers dealing with
this most obscure part of Indo Pak military history.

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2/12 Frontier Force Regiment 234(later 4 FF)
Shockingly this battalion’s actions were simply not
mentioned in the PIFFER history of Lieutenant General
Atiq ur Rahman, although the book lists casualties that
this battalion suffered in Kashmir war on page-234.15
Shaukat Riza places this battalion as part of Bannu
Brigade (102 Brigade) .16
From page-145 of Kashmir Campaign this scribe deduced
that this battalion was initially part of Brigadier Haji
Ahmads 10 Brigade deployed in Tithwal.17
However it was placed under command Brigadier Akbar
Khan’s 101 Brigade in July 1948 and was reserve
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battalion in Pandu operation.
Two of its companies and battalion headquarters were
used on 22/23rd
July 1948 to reinforce Major Afridi’s right
column at point 9178 (Pandu Peak) which it reached on
23rd
July 1948 evening , having made a forced march
under its commanding officer colonel Saeed .19
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Page-234-THE WARDENS OF THE MARCHES – Op cit.
16
Page-212- THE PAKISTAN ARMY-1947-49-Op Cit.
17
Page-145- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.
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Page-194- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.
19
Page-204- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.

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On 24th
July Lieutenant Colonel Saeed sent a platoon of D
Company 4/10 Baluch from Pandu peak to probe Indian
defences of 2 Bihar Battalion at Pandu village.This
platoon discovered that the whole Indian battalion had
withdrawn.
Colonel Saeed then occupied Pandu village.20
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Page-204- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.

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2/12 FF was tasked by Brigadier Akbar Khan to capture
Chota Qazi Nag peak. They attacked the peak with two
companies on 25th
July 1948.Due to bad map reading or
due to bad visibility mist and fog etc as per official history
2/12 FF captured a lower height 500 yards short of Chota
Qazi Nag peak and thought that they had captured Chota
Qazi Nag. They dug in here and reported success.
However the next morning the battalion discovered that
they had not captured Chota Qazi Nag.21
The battalion remained dug in here as the Indians had
occupied Chota Qazi Nag in strength.
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Page-208 and 209- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.

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On 7th
August 1948 the battalion repulsed an Indian
attack on their positions opposite Chota Qazi Nag
inflicting severe losses on the Indians.22
In early November 1948 Indians again attacked 2/12 FF
in strength but the attack was repulsed.23
Brigadier Akbar Khan tasked 2/12 FF to capture Chota
Qazi Nag.In order to destroy the impregnable Indian
bunkers at Chota Qazi Nag Brigadier Akbar tasked a gun
of 3 Mountain Battery.However this gun sank deep into
the ground after firing four rounds and was unable to aim
at the bunkers.The Indians retaliated with artillery fire
causing heavy casualties to 2/12 FF. 24
Thus the operation
against Chota Qazi Nag was a failure again.
In November 1948 2/12 FFR and 2/1 Punjab were
transferred from 101 Brigade to Bagh sector under
Brigadier Adam Khan as the Indian pressure against
Poonch was intense.25
There is not much to write about 2/12 FFR operations in
this sector as main Indian attack to link up Poonch was
delivered from south.
As per Lieutenant General Atiq ur Rahmans Piffer history
2/12 FFR lost 16 killed , all other ranks during the entire
1948 war.26
22
Page-213- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.
23
Page-215- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.
24
Page-216- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.
25
Page-226- THE KASHMIR CAMPAIGN-1947-48-Op Cit.
26
Page-234- THE WARDENS OF THE MARCHES – Op cit.

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