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Researching Android Device Security 
with the Help of a Droid Army 
Joshua J. Drake 
September 11th, 2014 
44CON – 4th Edition 
London, England 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Agenda 
Introduction 
Building a Droid Army 
Inside the Visionary 
Doing your Bidding 
DEMO 
Conclusion / Q & A 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
INTRODUCTION 
Who, Why and What… 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
About Joshua J. Drake aka jduck 
• Focused on vulnerability research and exploit 
development for the past 15 years 
• Current affiliations: 
• Lead Author of Android Hacker’s Handbook 
• Director of Research Science at Accuvant LABS 
• Founder of the #droidsec research group 
• Some might know me from my work at: 
• Rapid7 Metasploit, VeriSign iDefense Labs 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Motivations 
• I want to help others overcome the biggest 
challenge in Android security research… 
FRAGMENTATION 
aka 
a very heterogeneous device pool 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Causes of Fragmentation 
• Device models differ from each other 
• Hardware, Code changes, Compilation settings 
(ARM vs. Thumb), …and more! 
• Android development is scattered 
• Different parties make changes when developing 
a particular device for release 
(see my previous presentations for details) 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Effects of Fragmentation I 
• Many vulnerabilities only present on a single 
device model or a subset of device models 
• Some bugs are only exploitable on a subset 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Effects of Fragmentation II 
• Both research and test time is multiplied 
• The code behind a given attack surface could 
be COMPLETELY different 
• It’s almost guaranteed to have small differences 
• Possibly more bugs introduced 
• Possibly some fixes back-ported 
• Physical devices become a REQUIREMENT 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
What is a Droid Army? 
Droid Army (noun): 
• A collection of always accessible Android 
devices used to enable large scale security 
research. 
• QUICK DEMO  
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Existing Solutions I 
• App Developers know 
this problem well… 
• Apkudo (260+) 
• Inspired me 
• Testdroid (258) 
• AppThwack (231) 
• Xamarin test cloud (?) 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Existing Solutions II 
• These can be used for some tasks, but not all. 
• Drawbacks 
• Focused on App testing, not security. 
• Legality concerns 
• Is it ok to root their devices? 
• “We never root … -AppThwack” 
• Is it ok to ex-filtrate data? 
• Physical proximity requirements 
• OPSEC fail 
• The answer? 
• Build your own! 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
BUILDING A DROID ARMY 
About the hardware design and acquisition… 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Original Design 
• Very, very simple/crude: 
1. Get a big ass hub 
2. Obtain lots of devices 
3. Connect everything together 
• Initial hardware purchase: 
• Big ass hub: $75 via Amazon 
• Had a few devices, sought more… 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Acquiring Devices 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
0 or $ 
$$ 
$$ 
$$$ 
$$$$$ 
$$ 
X 
1. Ask around! 
2. eBay 
• Fairly easy to get a good deal 
• Esp. damaged but functional devices 
• bad ESN, cracked screen, etc. 
3. Facebook Garage Sales 
4. Craig’s List, Swappa.com, etc. 
• Too pricey IMHO 
5. Buy NEW / Off contract 
• Very pricey (sometimes unavoidable) 
NOTE: new prepaid phones are cheap 
e.g. VZW Moto G - $100 @ BestBuy
THANK YOU! 
The following persons contributed Android devices: 
Accuvant LABS Aarika Rosa Brent Cook 
Charlie Miller Craig Williams EMH 
Gabriel Friedmann Google James Boyd 
Jonathan Cran Justin Case Justin Fisher 
Kevin Finisterre Matt Molinyawe Rick Flores 
@thedude13 Tim Strazzere 
Other generous AHA! Members 
Friends, family, and friends of family 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Version 0.7 – Sep 2012 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Version 0.8 – Oct 2012 
Starting to get serious, as evidenced by the organization! 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Version 1.0 – Dec 2012 
I really started to realize the benefits! 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Version 2.0 – July 2013 
My posse’s getting big and my posse’s getting bigger!! 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Oh no! 
DISASTER STRIKES!! 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Version 2.7 – Nov 2013 
The army is crippled! 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Version 3.0 – Issue I 
• How many devices can we *REALLY* have? 
• Turns out USB has some limitations! 
• Max. hub nesting depth – 7 (root hub counts!) 
• Max. devices (incl. hubs) – 127 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Version 3.0 – USB Design I 
• Realistic max droidz = 108 
• Hit 127 pretty quickly, with only 19 hubs 
• Several unusable ports :-/ 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Version 3.0 – USB Design II 
• Built off recommendations, reports of previous 
success, and my own experiences 
• Thanks Charlie Miller, Sergey Bratus, others! 
• Parts list: 
• 10x D-Link DUB-H7 hubs (Amazon - $26 ea) 
• 7 ports, remarkably stable 
• Software power control! 
• 70x Micro-USB cables (Monoprice - $1-2 ea) 
• Some 1.5 ft, some 3 ft 
• Some w/ferrite core, some w/o 
• NOTE: a 6ft cable helps if touching a device is needed 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Version 3.0 – USB Design III 
• Currently topology: 
• root -> 7 port hub -> 7 hubs -> droidz 
• Supports ~ 49 USB devices 
• Another issue becomes apparent… 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Version 2.7 – Issue II 
Wall Warts + Power Strip = FAIL 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Version 3.0 – Power Design I 
• Modeled after some Bitcoin miner’s projects 
• https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=74397.0 
• Parts list: 
1. An ATX power supply (surplus ) 
2. 10x Male Molex connectors 
• From FrozenCPU or 3D print ‘em! 
3. 40x Molex Pins (FrozenCPU) 
4. 10x wired barrels (two options) 
1. Butcher power supplies that came with the hubs 
2. Order some (DigiKey CP-2191-ND) 
• I ordered new and assembled my own. The result… 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Version 3.0 – Power Design II 
The fancy Molex to Barrel cable 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Version 3.0 – Power Design III 
The power cables all wired up. 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
More Scale Issues 
• More than 108 devices 
• More USB host adapters – PCI-X slot limits 
• Use a small ARM box (ODROID?) 
• Connect via Ethernet 
• Achieves ~Limitless scale !! 
• Running out of physical space! 
• Pondering a vertical solution 
• Maybe power phones without batteries? 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Version 3.0 – Dec 2013 
The result of the version 3.0 overhaul 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Version 3.5 – Current 
TODAY! 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
INSIDE THE VISIONARY 
About the Android Cluster Toolkit… 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Android Cluster Toolkit I 
• No tools like this existed… 
…or at least none were available 
…guess it’s time to build them! 
• Features: 
• Provision new devices quickly/easily 
• Manage devices by human-friendly names 
• Handle transient devices (not always connected) 
• Perform tasks against one or more device 
• https://github.com/jduck/android-cluster-toolkit 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Android Cluster Toolkit II 
• Requirements: ADB binary and Ruby 
• Scripts wrap Android Debug Bridge (ADB) 
• README.md covers details and usage 
• Simple but elegant and powerful 
• 1 device, multiple devices, all devices 
• Recommended I: 
• Minor patch to ADB: 
https://gist.github.com/jduck/8849310 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Recommendation II - BusyBox 
• The tools on an Android devices are limited 
• e.g., some don’t have “grep” 
• BusyBox solves this problem 
• Best BusyBox binary out there (AFAIK): 
• Provided by saurik (Jay Freeman) 
• Only works on devices >= Android 2.3.x 
• Features: 
• More busybox tools (SELinux!!) 
• Built against bionic (shows users/groups correctly) 
http://cache.saurik.com/android/armeabi/busybox 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Supporting Data 
• Firmware images for devices (“stock roms”) 
• Restore your devices to factory settings 
• Extracting offsets, addresses offline 
• Source code 
• AOSP checkout 
• Compiler toolchain, etc 
• Base source for Android devices 
• Exact code for Nexus devices 
• GPL releases 
• Linux kernel for device kernels 
• More info in AHH and slides from previous talks 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
DOING YOUR BIDDING 
Deploying your army for security research… 
…NOW WITH DEMOS! 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Tasks I 
• All device interaction!! 
• Query for: 
• “fingerprint” 
• Linux kernel version 
• System-on-Chip 
• ADB user privileges 
• Root status 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Tasks II 
• Auditing tasks: 
• Check for driver (exynos-mem, pvrsrvkm) 
• Comparing devices 
• Processes 
• File system 
• init scripts 
• Key files 
• Manifests 
• /system/etc/permissions/platform.xml 
• Plenty more! 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Tasks III 
• Other tasks: 
• Install an app 
• Push files to all devices 
• Pull files from all devices 
• Offline interaction 
• Test exploits (CVE-2013-6282) 
• Subset interaction!! 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Tasks IV 
• Final demo 
• Running scripts 
• e.g., kernel config – heap selection 
• Other tasks (w/o demo): 
• Send Intents 
• Fuzzing 
• Checking compatibility 
• Tested “PatchDroid” by Dr. Collin Mulliner 
• Testing addJavascriptInterface 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
CONCLUSION 
These are the facts you are looking for. 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Lessons Learned 
• Various problems appeared over time 
• Occasionally disappearing devices 
• Require intervention, sometimes manual :-/ 
• Random sounds emanating from cluster 
• Distracting! 
• Li-Ion batteries do not like overcharging! 
• Swollen, scary, need replacing 
• Seem to live ~ 2 years 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Future Directions I 
• MOAR DEVICES!!@#$%! 
• Please donate! 
• http://www.droidsec.org/donate/ 
• Further automation 
• privmap, canhazaxs, device diffing, etc 
• Automated firmware switching, setup 
• I’m open to suggestions! 
• Email me ;-) 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Conclusions 
• Device differences complicate security 
research. 
• Building and using a Droid Army helps you 
scale your research! 
• Provide quick and easy access to any particular 
device, version of Android, etc. 
• It’s worth the investment! 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Recommendations 
• Use the recommended hardware design! 
• Ask around for old/unused devices 
• Follow device buying guidelines 
• Use / contribute to the tools! 
• Join and contribute to droidsec ;-) 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Book Giveaway! 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
ASK ME ANYTHING! 
Joshua J. Drake 
jdrake [at] accuvant.com 
jduck on Twitter, IRC, etc. 
Accuvant Headquarters 
1125 17th Street, Suite 1700, Denver, CO 80202 
800.574.0896 
www.accuvant.com 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
BONUS SLIDES 
These didn’t make the cut… 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Causes of Fragmentation (detailed) 
• Device models differ from each other 
• Hardware 
• SoC, peripherals, CPU features, RAM size, etc. 
• Code changes 
• Made by various ecosystem players 
• GOOG, SoCs, OEMs, carriers, third parties, etc. 
• Android OS / Framework, Linux kernel, etc. 
• Compilation settings (ARM vs. Thumb) 
• …and more! 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Provisioning New Devices 
• Device databases 
• devices-orig.rb 
• maps device serial numbers to names 
• devices.rb 
• generated from devices-orig.rb by reconfig.rb 
• scan.rb 
• shows you devices that are in ‘adb devices’ but not in 
your database 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Provisioning a New Node 
1. Plug the device in 
2. If not running ADB as root: 
1. Get USB Vendor:Product 
2. Add to udev scripts 
3. Replug :-/ 
3. Run ./scan.rb 
4. Add to devices-orig.rb 
5. Run ./reconfig.rb 
6. Upload busybox 
7. Root the device 
8. Do some research! 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Where do you get firmware/src? 
This stuff is spread allllll over the place :-/ 
Various places, step-by-step directions 
Google/OEM download sites 
Snagging OTA updates 
community ROM collection sites 
random searching - "stock roms" etc. 
See AHH Appendices or my 2013 slide decks 
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Maintenance Tasks 
• Fixing problems as they appear (seldom) 
• Acquiring more devices is time consuming 
• Provisioning new devices 
• Quick and easy with the toolkit! 
• Updating firmware / source code 
• Also time consuming (slow downloads!) 
• Sometimes requires re-rooting :-/ 
• Infrequent updates reduce the workload  
Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

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44CON 2014 - Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army, Joshua J Drake

  • 1. Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army Joshua J. Drake September 11th, 2014 44CON – 4th Edition London, England Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 2. Agenda Introduction Building a Droid Army Inside the Visionary Doing your Bidding DEMO Conclusion / Q & A Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 3. INTRODUCTION Who, Why and What… Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 4. About Joshua J. Drake aka jduck • Focused on vulnerability research and exploit development for the past 15 years • Current affiliations: • Lead Author of Android Hacker’s Handbook • Director of Research Science at Accuvant LABS • Founder of the #droidsec research group • Some might know me from my work at: • Rapid7 Metasploit, VeriSign iDefense Labs Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 5. Motivations • I want to help others overcome the biggest challenge in Android security research… FRAGMENTATION aka a very heterogeneous device pool Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 6. Causes of Fragmentation • Device models differ from each other • Hardware, Code changes, Compilation settings (ARM vs. Thumb), …and more! • Android development is scattered • Different parties make changes when developing a particular device for release (see my previous presentations for details) Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 7. Effects of Fragmentation I • Many vulnerabilities only present on a single device model or a subset of device models • Some bugs are only exploitable on a subset Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 8. Effects of Fragmentation II • Both research and test time is multiplied • The code behind a given attack surface could be COMPLETELY different • It’s almost guaranteed to have small differences • Possibly more bugs introduced • Possibly some fixes back-ported • Physical devices become a REQUIREMENT Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 9. What is a Droid Army? Droid Army (noun): • A collection of always accessible Android devices used to enable large scale security research. • QUICK DEMO  Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 10. Existing Solutions I • App Developers know this problem well… • Apkudo (260+) • Inspired me • Testdroid (258) • AppThwack (231) • Xamarin test cloud (?) Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 11. Existing Solutions II • These can be used for some tasks, but not all. • Drawbacks • Focused on App testing, not security. • Legality concerns • Is it ok to root their devices? • “We never root … -AppThwack” • Is it ok to ex-filtrate data? • Physical proximity requirements • OPSEC fail • The answer? • Build your own! Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 12. BUILDING A DROID ARMY About the hardware design and acquisition… Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 13. Original Design • Very, very simple/crude: 1. Get a big ass hub 2. Obtain lots of devices 3. Connect everything together • Initial hardware purchase: • Big ass hub: $75 via Amazon • Had a few devices, sought more… Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 14. Acquiring Devices Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 0 or $ $$ $$ $$$ $$$$$ $$ X 1. Ask around! 2. eBay • Fairly easy to get a good deal • Esp. damaged but functional devices • bad ESN, cracked screen, etc. 3. Facebook Garage Sales 4. Craig’s List, Swappa.com, etc. • Too pricey IMHO 5. Buy NEW / Off contract • Very pricey (sometimes unavoidable) NOTE: new prepaid phones are cheap e.g. VZW Moto G - $100 @ BestBuy
  • 15. THANK YOU! The following persons contributed Android devices: Accuvant LABS Aarika Rosa Brent Cook Charlie Miller Craig Williams EMH Gabriel Friedmann Google James Boyd Jonathan Cran Justin Case Justin Fisher Kevin Finisterre Matt Molinyawe Rick Flores @thedude13 Tim Strazzere Other generous AHA! Members Friends, family, and friends of family Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 16. Version 0.7 – Sep 2012 Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 17. Version 0.8 – Oct 2012 Starting to get serious, as evidenced by the organization! Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 18. Version 1.0 – Dec 2012 I really started to realize the benefits! Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 19. Version 2.0 – July 2013 My posse’s getting big and my posse’s getting bigger!! Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 20. Oh no! DISASTER STRIKES!! Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 21. Version 2.7 – Nov 2013 The army is crippled! Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 22. Version 3.0 – Issue I • How many devices can we *REALLY* have? • Turns out USB has some limitations! • Max. hub nesting depth – 7 (root hub counts!) • Max. devices (incl. hubs) – 127 Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 23. Version 3.0 – USB Design I • Realistic max droidz = 108 • Hit 127 pretty quickly, with only 19 hubs • Several unusable ports :-/ Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 24. Version 3.0 – USB Design II • Built off recommendations, reports of previous success, and my own experiences • Thanks Charlie Miller, Sergey Bratus, others! • Parts list: • 10x D-Link DUB-H7 hubs (Amazon - $26 ea) • 7 ports, remarkably stable • Software power control! • 70x Micro-USB cables (Monoprice - $1-2 ea) • Some 1.5 ft, some 3 ft • Some w/ferrite core, some w/o • NOTE: a 6ft cable helps if touching a device is needed Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 25. Version 3.0 – USB Design III • Currently topology: • root -> 7 port hub -> 7 hubs -> droidz • Supports ~ 49 USB devices • Another issue becomes apparent… Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 26. Version 2.7 – Issue II Wall Warts + Power Strip = FAIL Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 27. Version 3.0 – Power Design I • Modeled after some Bitcoin miner’s projects • https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=74397.0 • Parts list: 1. An ATX power supply (surplus ) 2. 10x Male Molex connectors • From FrozenCPU or 3D print ‘em! 3. 40x Molex Pins (FrozenCPU) 4. 10x wired barrels (two options) 1. Butcher power supplies that came with the hubs 2. Order some (DigiKey CP-2191-ND) • I ordered new and assembled my own. The result… Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 28. Version 3.0 – Power Design II The fancy Molex to Barrel cable Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 29. Version 3.0 – Power Design III The power cables all wired up. Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 30. More Scale Issues • More than 108 devices • More USB host adapters – PCI-X slot limits • Use a small ARM box (ODROID?) • Connect via Ethernet • Achieves ~Limitless scale !! • Running out of physical space! • Pondering a vertical solution • Maybe power phones without batteries? Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 31. Version 3.0 – Dec 2013 The result of the version 3.0 overhaul Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 32. Version 3.5 – Current TODAY! Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 33. INSIDE THE VISIONARY About the Android Cluster Toolkit… Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 34. Android Cluster Toolkit I • No tools like this existed… …or at least none were available …guess it’s time to build them! • Features: • Provision new devices quickly/easily • Manage devices by human-friendly names • Handle transient devices (not always connected) • Perform tasks against one or more device • https://github.com/jduck/android-cluster-toolkit Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 35. Android Cluster Toolkit II • Requirements: ADB binary and Ruby • Scripts wrap Android Debug Bridge (ADB) • README.md covers details and usage • Simple but elegant and powerful • 1 device, multiple devices, all devices • Recommended I: • Minor patch to ADB: https://gist.github.com/jduck/8849310 Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 36. Recommendation II - BusyBox • The tools on an Android devices are limited • e.g., some don’t have “grep” • BusyBox solves this problem • Best BusyBox binary out there (AFAIK): • Provided by saurik (Jay Freeman) • Only works on devices >= Android 2.3.x • Features: • More busybox tools (SELinux!!) • Built against bionic (shows users/groups correctly) http://cache.saurik.com/android/armeabi/busybox Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 37. Supporting Data • Firmware images for devices (“stock roms”) • Restore your devices to factory settings • Extracting offsets, addresses offline • Source code • AOSP checkout • Compiler toolchain, etc • Base source for Android devices • Exact code for Nexus devices • GPL releases • Linux kernel for device kernels • More info in AHH and slides from previous talks Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 38. DOING YOUR BIDDING Deploying your army for security research… …NOW WITH DEMOS! Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 39. Tasks I • All device interaction!! • Query for: • “fingerprint” • Linux kernel version • System-on-Chip • ADB user privileges • Root status Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 40. Tasks II • Auditing tasks: • Check for driver (exynos-mem, pvrsrvkm) • Comparing devices • Processes • File system • init scripts • Key files • Manifests • /system/etc/permissions/platform.xml • Plenty more! Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 41. Tasks III • Other tasks: • Install an app • Push files to all devices • Pull files from all devices • Offline interaction • Test exploits (CVE-2013-6282) • Subset interaction!! Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 42. Tasks IV • Final demo • Running scripts • e.g., kernel config – heap selection • Other tasks (w/o demo): • Send Intents • Fuzzing • Checking compatibility • Tested “PatchDroid” by Dr. Collin Mulliner • Testing addJavascriptInterface Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 43. CONCLUSION These are the facts you are looking for. Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 44. Lessons Learned • Various problems appeared over time • Occasionally disappearing devices • Require intervention, sometimes manual :-/ • Random sounds emanating from cluster • Distracting! • Li-Ion batteries do not like overcharging! • Swollen, scary, need replacing • Seem to live ~ 2 years Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 45. Future Directions I • MOAR DEVICES!!@#$%! • Please donate! • http://www.droidsec.org/donate/ • Further automation • privmap, canhazaxs, device diffing, etc • Automated firmware switching, setup • I’m open to suggestions! • Email me ;-) Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 46. Conclusions • Device differences complicate security research. • Building and using a Droid Army helps you scale your research! • Provide quick and easy access to any particular device, version of Android, etc. • It’s worth the investment! Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 47. Recommendations • Use the recommended hardware design! • Ask around for old/unused devices • Follow device buying guidelines • Use / contribute to the tools! • Join and contribute to droidsec ;-) Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 48. Book Giveaway! Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 49. ASK ME ANYTHING! Joshua J. Drake jdrake [at] accuvant.com jduck on Twitter, IRC, etc. Accuvant Headquarters 1125 17th Street, Suite 1700, Denver, CO 80202 800.574.0896 www.accuvant.com Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 50. BONUS SLIDES These didn’t make the cut… Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 51. Causes of Fragmentation (detailed) • Device models differ from each other • Hardware • SoC, peripherals, CPU features, RAM size, etc. • Code changes • Made by various ecosystem players • GOOG, SoCs, OEMs, carriers, third parties, etc. • Android OS / Framework, Linux kernel, etc. • Compilation settings (ARM vs. Thumb) • …and more! Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 52. Provisioning New Devices • Device databases • devices-orig.rb • maps device serial numbers to names • devices.rb • generated from devices-orig.rb by reconfig.rb • scan.rb • shows you devices that are in ‘adb devices’ but not in your database Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 53. Provisioning a New Node 1. Plug the device in 2. If not running ADB as root: 1. Get USB Vendor:Product 2. Add to udev scripts 3. Replug :-/ 3. Run ./scan.rb 4. Add to devices-orig.rb 5. Run ./reconfig.rb 6. Upload busybox 7. Root the device 8. Do some research! Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 54. Where do you get firmware/src? This stuff is spread allllll over the place :-/ Various places, step-by-step directions Google/OEM download sites Snagging OTA updates community ROM collection sites random searching - "stock roms" etc. See AHH Appendices or my 2013 slide decks Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  • 55. Maintenance Tasks • Fixing problems as they appear (seldom) • Acquiring more devices is time consuming • Provisioning new devices • Quick and easy with the toolkit! • Updating firmware / source code • Also time consuming (slow downloads!) • Sometimes requires re-rooting :-/ • Infrequent updates reduce the workload  Researching Android Device Security with the Help of a Droid Army – 44CON - 4th Edition – Joshua J. Drake – © 2014 Accuvant, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Hinweis der Redaktion

  1. Introduction – about me and why I did this work Building a Droid Army – about the hardware design, acquisition, costing, etc Doing your Bidding – the tools, maintenance tasks, required software, conducting security research/testing, with examples Conclusion – key take-aways Q & A
  2. The initial design was pretty simple I got a big ass hub, and set out to get some devices…
  3. I didn’t know what I was doing at first. This slide is the culmination of over a year of trying to buy Android devices cheap. NOTE: Damaged phones must have working LCD, digitizer, and USB Acquiring Android devices will be, by far, the biggest expense.
  4. I want to take a quick second to thank these people. If you’re in the room, stand up and take a bow. We owe you a round of applause for your help during this research.
  5. I started out fairly modest using a couple of my own old devices. On top of those, I got a few other devices donated to the cause. Also pictured is the Manhattan Mondo Hub It’s a 28 port hub, but has some issues that we’ll get to in a bit. For one, plugging it in and running “lsusb” showed internally it was just several hubs cascaded
  6. In October, I started getting serious. I organized things to make room for plans to buy some more devices from eBay. I also bought a ton of USB cables from Monoprice (YAY MONOPRICE!) A couple of development boards were added to the collection (Origen Quad and Pandaboard)
  7. This picture shows what I call the 1.0 version. I really started to see the benefits of having a wide range of devices accessible.
  8. At this point all of the ports on the MondoHub were full. I even added another small hub to feed more devices.
  9. One of the “Android TV” devices gave up randomly, apparently its flash memory failed. OH NO! The MondoHUB died!! I always had a feeling this was going to happen. I frequently had issues with devices falling off. I’d have to go physically replug them, etc. It turns out the 4A power supply isn’t really enough to cover 28 x 0.5A (LOL?) Maybe that explains the black mk802 rolling over too, heh. In any case, I cobbled some stuff together to get back up and running…
  10. Unfortunately, this setup reduced the max devices from 35 to 19 :-/ I had to take around a dozen devices offline. To make matters worse, devices acquired in the interim couldn’t be used. The new hubs seemed much better overall, so I started working a version 3.0 design to address previous issues…
  11. This issue was something I was noodling on since August. When I added the small hub, I realized I needed to think of a more long term solution as I acquired more devices. I sought out to determine what the real/practical limits of USB were. After some crowd sourcing and reading, I found out the limits and put together a plan.
  12. This is what I came up with as an optimal solution. It reaches the max of 127 devices with 19 hubs and lets me use 108 (!!) USB devices! Time to order parts again!!
  13. I don’t have 108 devices, so I didn’t go for the full build. I just wanted to get my 42 devices online, so I ordered enough for that. Total cost for this order was around $400.00 NOTE: A 6ft cable can really help if you want to work closely with a device. This is so you can sit at your desk and not have to unplug it from its normal spot.
  14. Once the devices arrived, I went with the design shown here. However, I quickly ran into another problem!
  15. As you can see, I could only use 3 of 6 outlets on the strip :-/ In December 2013, I did some research looking for a solution to this issue
  16. Ultimately, found out that Bitcoin miners had ran into this issue as well. Their solution was to use an ATX power supply with custom cables. Basically they just put barrel connectors onto the 5V wires coming off the power supply. I had an old 350w power supply lying around. I confirmed it could supply up to 35A on the 5V rail, and went for it. The most tedious part was crimping the molex pins. Still, it only took about 2 hours. This would probably be easier if you have the crimping tool instead of using needle nose pliers + solder like I did, heh.
  17. This is one of the cables after assembly. Next I went ahead and plugged in my ATX power supply and wired everything up.
  18. Here’s the power setup wired up. To turn the power supply on, you have to short PS_ON to ground on the motherboard connector. This simulates a power switch. Of course you could wire in and use a legit switch instead. If you don’t want to build this yourself, the bitcoin forum OP was selling cables. Not sure if he still is. Certainly not the only solution, just the one I’m currently using.
  19. Duplicate devices can be used to run different firmware versions More host adapters partially solves the USB dilemma, but isn’t tested and has limited utility. Requires host machine disassembly Will run out of PCI-X slots pretty quickly Exposing connected devices to Ethernet using a small pass-through box should solve it entirely. Not don’t yet, planned for future
  20. After everything was wired, I started wiring up the devices and setting them out on the table. I took this picture just after making sure everything was live and working.
  21. And here’s what this droid army looks like today.
  22. The tools are ruby scripts that wrap adb, so only two requirements: Ruby and ADB Although simple, these tools are quite powerful The minor patch is for convenience only. It changes the home directory and terminal size when connecting to an ADB shell
  23. Just push to /data/local/tmp, don’t “install” Keeps devices clean!
  24. Key take-aways from this presentation.
  25. Duplicate devices can be used to run different firmware versions More host adapters partially solves the USB dilemma, but isn’t tested and has limited utility. Requires host machine disassembly Will run out of PCI-X slots pretty quickly Exposing connected devices to Ethernet using a small pass-through box should solve it entirely. Not don’t yet, planned for future
  26. Biggest cost is the devices themselves ($0 - $800 ea)