This presentation was given July 23, 2010 by Ed Hauder of Exequity, Robert McCormick of Glass Lewis and Dan Walter of Performensation. It provides a comprehensive look at how Say on Pay has impacted executive compensation in Europe, Australia and the US. The presentation also provides a drill down into each of the executive compensation provisions included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection law, sign July 21, 2010. http://bit.ly/c3kXnM

1. A recorded version of this presentation, with audio, is available at: http://cc.readytalk.com/play?id=d5yovx The Real Impact of Say on Pay and a Brief Update from the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Hosted by: New York-New Jersey Chapter of the NASPP July 23, 2010

2. The Real Impact of Say on Pay and a Brief Update from the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Hosted by: New York-New Jersey Chapter of the NASPP July 23, 2010

3. Today’s Presenters Dan Walter, President and CEO, Performensation Ed Hauder, Senior Advisor, Exequity Robert McCormick, Esq., Chief Policy Officer, Glass Lewis

4. What is Say on Pay? “Say on Pay” (SOP) is used to refer to: Shareholder proposals asking companies to put executive compensation and/or policies to a non-binding shareholder vote As yet, there is no agreement on how companies should respond or how SOP will work The populist view demands a vote on compensation policy and/or pay levels Institutional investors appear to be more interested in regular discussion with Compensation Committees to ensure pay systems align with operating strategies

5. What is Management Say on Pay? Management SOP (MSOP) proposals asking shareholders to approve by a non-binding vote, the company’s executive compensation and policies; in one of two forms (at the moment): Mandatory MSOPs—where the company is required to provide shareholders with an MSOP vote because of a regulation or law, i.e., participants in TARP or CPP are required to provide shareholders with an MSOP vote and public companies incorporated in North Dakota are required to provide an MSOP vote to shareholders Voluntary MSOPs—where the company has voluntarily adopted/provided an MSOP vote to shareholders when not required to do so by any regulation or law

6. What is Say on Pay meant to provide? Ability for shareholders to voice their opinion on pay policies Not a vote on specific compensation pay packages or elements Origin in is current form goes back to 2003, in the United Kingdom Now policy in many countries including: Netherlands, Australia, Sweden, Norway Symbolic or does it change compensation philosophy and execution?

8. Timing issues—how often will an MSOP be presented to shareholders?

9. Annually—typical structure among voluntary adopters; structure required for TARP/CPP companies

10. Biennially—Bristol-Myers Squibb; Colgate-Palmolive; General Mills

11. Triennially—MicrosoftBasic approach taken by Dodd-Frank

15. 2010 Voting on MSOP Proposals All MSOP Proposals—Passed and Failed (n = 194) Voluntary MSOP Proposals—Passed and Failed(n = 47)

16. 2010 Voting on MSOP Votes That Failed MSOP Votes that Failed through May 27, 2010 Actual Vote Figures *As of the proxy record date

17. 2010 Voting on MSOP Proposals That Failed What were the MSOP proposals that failed?

18. 2010 Voting on MSOP Proposals That Failed What were the MSOP proposals that failed?

19. Why did they fail?

20. 2010 Voting on MSOP Proposals That Failed KeyCorp Summary: pay for performance disconnect; STI plan more discretionary and performance results only generally referenced; same metrics used for both STI and LTI increasing KEY’s risk profile Motorola Summary: increase of $8 MM in Dr. Jha’s payment if separation does not occur; Dr. Jha’s amended agreement includes a modified excise tax gross-up provision; and, MOT adjusted results for the MIP program in an inconsistent manner Occidental Summary: repeated failure to address: pay magnitude; pay disparity; peer group disparity; and, performance target issues

21. International Experience with MSOP Votes Source: What International Markets Say on Pay, An Investor Perspective, Institutional Investor Services, April 2007.

22. International Experience with MSOP Votes—UK MSOP votes were required for public companies in the U.K. starting in 2003 after adoption of the UK’s Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 on August 1, 2002 Statement of company’s policy on directors’ [executives’] remuneration (set forth in Appendix) The goals of the MSOP movement in the UK were: Improve the linkage between pay and performance Empower shareholders and improve shareholder democracy Create greater focus and ownership of compensation process by remuneration committees Engage shareholders on remuneration policies in genera

23. International Experience with MSOP Votes—UK Significant UK Shareholder Rejections of Remuneration Resolutions Source: RiskMetrics Group

24. International Experience with MSOP Votes—UK Reasons for UK Shareholders’ opposing, abstaining, or voting for an MSOP proposal Source: Say on Pay, Six Years On, Lessons from the UK Experience, a report by Railpen Investments and PIRC Limited (September 2009)

25. Empirical Evidence: Research from the UK Say on Pay does not have a great impact on most companies June 2008 Study Academic Paper by FabrizioFerri and David Maber Harvard Business School No evidence that Say on Pay changed the levels or growth of executive compensation Higher sensitivity of CEO cash and total pay to negative operating performance

26. Empirical Evidence: Cautionary UK research August 2009 Study Jeffrey N. Gordon, Columbia University The details of pay-for-performance may be too complex to effectively communicate to shareholders Annual voting requirement may result in a narrow range of compensation best practices Smaller firms would be unlikely to benefit for Say on Pay and restrictions to act like larger firms, may negatively impact their ability to grow Truly abnormal pay may be limited to a large companies in a small group of industries

27. Empirical Evidence: Research from the US and UK Say on Pay may create shareholder value August 2009 Study JieCai and Ralph A. Walkling, Drexel University Stocks of firms with the highest abnormal CEO pay and low pay-for-performance sensitivity react in a significant, positive manner to the Say-on-Pay More value created in companies with strong ownership by “vote-no” mutual funds. Dissenting voice creates pressure for change.

28. International Experience with MSOP Votes—Australia Australia’s Proposed Changes to MSOP Votes The Productivity Commission (PC) released a review of executive pay in Australia in January 2010 The Australian government responded to the PC’s report in April 2010 and indicated it would introduce legislation to implement many of the PC’s 17 recommendations, including the “two strikes” proposal for MSOP votes As currently proposed, the two strikes proposal for MSOP votes would work as follows: A minimum 25% “no” vote on remuneration report triggers reporting obligation on how concerns addressed, and A subsequent “no” vote of at least 25% activates a resolution for elected directors to submit for re-election within 90 days Unclear whether this would apply to the entire board, or just the remuneration committee or chair Additionally, the proposals with which the Australian government agreed included: Prohibiting key management personnel from voting undirected proxies on remuneration resolutions, and Prohibiting key management personnel that hold shares from voting on their own remuneration arrangements

29. Companies that will be most impacted by MSOP Companies with excessive or ineffective executive compensation Companies with independent-mind shareholders who are willing to challenge management Companies that have historically responded positively to shareholder pressure

30. Shareholder Response to MSOP Proposals Shareholder response to MSOP votes is likely to be heavily influenced by the type of shareholder they are: Retail account (mom & pop) shareholders—likely to ignore MSOP votes (and all other votes) unless something captures their attention and makes them want to vote Active investors—short-term (hedge funds, opportunists, etc.)—looking for the lowest cost response that will maximize short-term share returns Active investors—long-term (mutual funds)—looking for low cost response that will maximize long-term share returns Index investors—long-term owners with little overhead costs from investment activities – looking for most effective response that will result in the best long-term share returns possible Interestingly, in the UK, it was the index investors which led the adoption of MSOP votes. Largely because they had funds available due to their structure and could not take a “Wall Street Walk” if a company began to disappoint them Felt the best way to improve on their investments was to agitate for change and open dialogues with management and boards

31. Shareholder Response to MSOP Proposals Several Possible Shareholder Approaches to MSOP Votes

32. Glass Lewis (GL) Policies Regarding MSOP Proposals Will support MSOP proposals where: Pay is aligned with performance, and Shareholders are provided with a clear, comprehensive discussion of the processes and procedures related to executive compensation Specifically, GL’s approach to evaluating MSOP proposals involves the following: CD&A Analysis Evaluates content and clarity, consists of a nuanced approach when assessing companies’ rationale for significant adjustments made to performance metrics, target payouts, and benchmarking CD&A disclosure is rated based on a critique of several key elements, including: Whether the company provides a reasonable rationale for benchmarking at a specific percentile Its disclosure of performance metrics Its disclosure of how actual performance translates into pay decisions Its evaluation of a companies’ rationale for granting discretionary cash or equity awards, and Its review of the extent to which performance plays a role in the granting of equity incentives Proprietary Pay-for-Performance Analysis Evaluates the relationship between relative executive compensation and relative performance GL benchmarks the compensation of the NEOs to the compensation of the NEOs at peer companies and compares the company’s performance to that of those same peers

33. RiskMetrics Group Policies Regarding MSOP Proposals Assesses MSOP proposals on a case-by-case basis, considering the following factors in light of a company’s specific circumstances and the board’s disclosed rationale for its practices: Relative Considerations Assessment of performance metrics relative to business strategy, as discussed and explained in the CD&A Evaluation of peer groups used to set target pay or award opportunities Alignment of company performance and executive pay trends over time (e.g., performance down; pay down) Assessment of disparity between total pay of the CEO and other NEOs Design Considerations Balance of fixed versus performance-driven pay Assessment of excessive practices with respect to perks, severance packages, SERPs, and burn rates Communication Considerations Evaluation of information and board rationale provided in CD&A about how compensation is determined Assessment of board’s responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues RiskMetrics Group also will use MSOP proposals as the primary vehicle to address “problematic pay practices”

34. RiskMetrics Group Problematic Pay Practices Problematic Pay Practices Formerly referred to as “poor” pay practices Now, two groups: “Major”—can lead to negative vote recommendations if one exists; set out in the 2010 Policy Updates “Minor”—can lead to negative vote recommendations if more than one exists; set out in the 2010 Compensation FAQs RMG will utilize MSOP proposals as the initial vehicle to address problematic pay practices. RMG may recommend votes: Against MSOP proposals Against/Withhold from compensation committee members or, in rare cases where full board is deemed responsible for the practice, all directors, or when no MSOP item is on the ballot, or when the board has failed to respond to concerns raised in prior MSOP evaluations Against an equity-based incentive plan proposal if excessive non-performance-based equity awards are the major contributor to a pay-for-performance misalignment List is extensive and detailed

35. Other Influential Voices Council of Institutional Investors The Corporate Library

37. At least once every 6 years shareholders must be given an opportunity to vote on the frequency of MSOP votes

38. Companies must provide a choice of voting every year, every two years or every three years

40. Critical Questions to be Resolved Will SEC exempt smaller companies from MSOP for some period? What form will the vote on frequency take? What changes will occur with shareholders whose current stance is against MSOP? What will the final rules look like once all of the details are settled? Will this change the frequency or levels of pay in a measurable way?

41. Critical Steps as You Move Forward Know your shareholder base, what they want and what they do not like regarding your compensation policies, designs, awards and payments Open up lines of communication with your shareholders before next proxy season – both the investment and voting sides of your institutional shareholders Understand what compensation issues your shareholders could have with your company, and how those might influence their vote on MSOP proposals and your directors

42. Critical Steps as You Move Forward, cont. Explore ways to address any perceived issues with your compensation Evaluate any compensation changes or tweaks through the rubric of the MSOP vote so you can anticipate any negative reaction that such changes or tweaks might engender and act to minimize or address any shareholder concerns Review disclosures to ensure executive compensation is understandable (plain English, executive summary, charts, graphs, tables should be utilized as much as possible), the whys of compensation decisions are explained, and the rationale for controversial pay practices is clearly articulated

43. Some Parting Thoughts on MSOP Say on Pay is not a harbinger of doom Executive compensation at most companies is not likely to be dramatically impacted We will continue to see growth in performance-based pay, but variety may be stifled Companies with poor remuneration practices may see positive shareholder value as a result of compensation changes The real impact may be the need for improved communication and explanation of compensation practices This may be especially important for companies with adversarial shareholder, but reasonable executive remuneration policies

44. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Executive Compensation Provisions (Sections 951–957)

45. Background The following presentation walks through the highlights of the executive compensation provisions contained in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This presentation is based on the version of the bill dated June 26, 2010 (5:27 p.m.) and posted on the House Committee on Financial Services Web page: http://financialservices.house.gov/Key_Issues/Financial_Regulatory_Reform/Financial_Regulatory_Reform062410.html (under Title IX—Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities). Act was signed into law by President Obama, July 22, 2010 For more information about Exequity, please visit our Web site at www.exqty.com.

46. Overview – Part 1 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) has several provisions that impact executive compensation, including: A nonbinding shareholder vote on the compensation of executives as disclosed in the proxy (“say on pay vote”) at least once every 3 years. A nonbinding shareholder vote on the frequency of the say on pay vote at least once every 6 years. A nonbinding shareholder vote on golden parachutes. Requirement for most public companies to have only independent directors on their compensation committees. Requirement for most public companies’ compensation committees to utilize only independent compensation consultants and other advisors. Mandate for most compensation committees to be given authority to retain a compensation consultant and independent legal counsel and other advisers, including fiscal authority.

47. Overview – Part 2 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) has several provisions that impact executive compensation, including: Requirement for companies to disclose more information about executive compensation, including: Pay versus performance; Median annual total compensation of all employees; CEO’s annual total compensation; and Ratio of median annual total compensation of all employees to that of the CEO. Requirement for public companies to implement a clawback policy. Requirement for companies to disclose their policy with respect to executive and director hedging of company equity securities. Making covered financial institutions subject to enhanced compensation structure reporting and prohibitions. Eliminates broker votes on director elections, executive compensation, or any other significant matter, as determined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for uninstructed shares held by beneficial owners.

48. Golden Parachute Votes In any proxy for a meeting where shareholders will be asked to approve an acquisition, merger, consolidation, or proposed sale or other disposition of all or substantially all the assets of an issuer (CIC), the following must be disclosed and a separate, nonbinding shareholder vote must be held to approve: Any agreements or understandings with named executive officers concerning any type of compensation that is based on or otherwise relates to the acquisition, merger, consolidation, sale, or other disposition of all or substantially all the assets of the issuer (“CIC Compensation”); The aggregate total of all such compensation that may (and the conditions upon which it may) be paid or become payable to or on behalf of such executive officer; and Effective for shareholder meetings occurring more than 6 months after Dodd-Frank is enacted. This vote is not required if agreements or understandings were previously subject to a say on pay vote. Issues/Concerns Broad definition of CIC Compensation; seems to include vesting of prior awards like IRC Section 280G. Thus, disclosure and vote seems expansive. The rules specifically provide that no vote is necessary if previously approved in say on pay vote. If no design changes occur, will a prior vote eliminate need to have vote in merger proxy? Can the “aggregate total” be adequately disclosed and approved in a prior proxy? How (if at all) will this relate to the termination disclosures for named executive officers in proxies? Will this change the current form of disclosure, either by rule or practice? What happens if the board has authorized CIC Compensation and contractually bound the company but shareholders don’t agree? The shareholder vote is nonbinding—what will the practical consequence be? Can or will companies guard against such a scenario, e.g., will contracts contain shareholder approval contingency clauses?

49. Compensation Committee Independence Companies will not be permitted to be publicly listed unless their compensation committees are composed entirely of independent directors. Definition of “independence” will be issued by the national securities exchanges and associations, taking into consideration relevant factors, including: The source of compensation of a director, including any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee paid by the company to such director; and Whether the director is affiliated with the company, a subsidiary, or an affiliate of a subsidiary. The SEC shall permit national securities exchanges and associations to exempt a particular relationship from the above requirements, taking into consideration the size of the company and any other relevant factors. Issues/Concerns We expect the definition of independence to be largely the existing definitions used by the national securities exchanges and associations for audit committee members, tailored to members of the compensation committee. This requirement will put a final nail in the coffin of having nonindependent directors sit on a compensation committee (which is now only a minor practice).

50. Independence of Compensation Consultants and Other Compensation Committee Advisers Compensation committees of public companies may only select a compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser (“advisers”) after taking into consideration the factors identified by the SEC. The SEC must identify factors that affect the independence of an adviser. Such factors shall be competitively neutral among categories of advisers and preserve the ability of compensation committees to retain the services of members of any such category, and shall include: The provisions of other services to the company by the person that employs the adviser; The amount of fees received from the company by the person that employs the adviser, as a percentage of the total revenue of the person that employs the adviser; The policies and procedures of the person that employs the adviser that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest; Any business or personal relationship of the adviser with a member of the compensation committee; and Any stock of the company owned by the adviser. The compensation committee, at its discretion, may retain the services of an adviser. However, this does not: Require the compensation committee to implement or act consistently with the advice or recommendations of the adviser; or Affect the ability or obligation of a compensation committee to exercise its own judgment in fulfillment of the duties of the compensation committee. Required disclosures—for any shareholder meeting occurring on or after the 1-year anniversary of the date of enactment of Dodd-Frank, public companies will be required to disclose in their proxies whether: The compensation committee retained or obtained the advice of a compensation consultant; and The work of the compensation consultant has raised any conflict of interest and, if so, the nature of the conflict and how it is being addressed.

51. Independence of Compensation Consultants and Other Compensation Committee Advisers (Continued) Companies that fail to comply with the requirements of this section of Dodd-Frank will be prohibited from being publicly listed; those failing to comply will be given a “reasonable opportunity to cure any defects” before their listing is prohibited. SEC will permit the national securities exchanges and associations to exempt a category of issuers from the compensation committee independence and independent adviser requirements. Shall take into account the potential impact on smaller reporting companies. Controlled companies shall be exempt from these requirements. Controlled company is a company that is listed on a national securities exchange or association and holds an election for the board of directors in which more than 50% of the voting power is held by an individual, a group, or another company. The SEC must conduct a study and review of the use of compensation consultants and the effects of such use and submit a report to Congress within 2 years after enactment of Dodd-Frank on the results of such study and review. Issues/Concerns The language does permit compensation committees to engage any adviser they like so long as they at least consider the factors to be promulgated by the SEC. However, consistent with current trends, these requirements will likely persuade a majority of companies to engage independent advisers to advise their compensation committees. Unclear just how the factors mentioned in Dodd-Frank will be applied by the SEC. The SEC regulations are unlikely to outright prohibit the consultant from providing any other services to the company, but this may in practice become a compensation committee requirement. Note, this also applies to other advisors such as legal counsel; this could result in committees engaging different legal counsel than the counsel involved in other corporate matters.

52. Executive Compensation Disclosures Pay vs. Performance—SEC must require each company to disclose in any proxy for an annual meeting a clear description of any compensation required to be disclosed under the proxy disclosure rules, including: Information that shows the relationship between executive compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the company, taking into account any change in the value of shares of stock and dividends and any distributions; this disclosure may include a graphic. Additional Disclosures—SEC shall require companies to disclose in any filing which requires disclosure regarding the compensation of a company’s named executive officers: The median of the annual total compensation of all employees, except the CEO (Median Employee Annual Compensation); The annual total compensation of the CEO (CEO Annual Compensation); and The ratio of the Median Employee Annual Compensation to the CEO Annual Compensation. Total compensation is defined as it is for purposes of the Total Compensation column in the Summary Compensation Table. Issues/Concerns Determining the Median Employee Annual Compensation will take a significant amount of work for companies with large employee bases and/or operations in multiple countries. For example, total compensation includes annual pension increases which can significantly increase the disclosure burden. Since ratios will almost always be a sizeable multiple, it is likely to spark shareholder ire where company performance is subpar. Note, again, that this ratio is done largely based on pay opportunity rather than actual pay realized, particularly with respect to equity incentives. This pay ratio concept has historically been used to compare executive pay across various countries. However, it is unlikely to guide future pay decisions nor allow for solid comparisons across companies. For example, outsourcing decisions can have a material impact on the calculation.

53. Clawback Provision—Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation Policy Public companies can only be listed if they comply with the following requirements: Each company shall: Disclose its policy on incentive-based compensation that is based on financial information required to be reported under the securities laws; and In the event that the company is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the company with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, recover from any current or former executive officer who received incentive-based compensation (including stock options awarded as compensation) during the 3-year period preceding the date on which the company is required to prepare an accounting restatement, based on the erroneous data, in excess of what would have been paid to the executive officer under the accounting restatement. Issues/Concerns How will compensation that is based on or related to the movement in the company’s stock price be treated under this required clawback policy? In other words, with respect to such awards, how can a company determine what “excess amount” was paid if the stock price reflected the market’s understanding of the financial reporting information that was restated? Will shareholders have the right to bring a derivative action under this provision if a company does not? How will this clawback provision interact with any mandatory holding periods a company has imposed on company securities received by executives or directors, especially where the amounts held relate to a period prior to the 3-year period prior to any required restatement? Can the “appropriate” clawback amount be defined or must this by its nature require significant discretion? How will other legal challenges be addressed (e.g., wage laws), if at all?

54. Disclosure Regarding Employee and Director Hedging SEC shall require companies to disclose in any proxy for an annual meeting whether any employee or member of the board of directors, or any designee of such employee or director, is permitted to purchase financial instruments (including prepaid variable forward contracts, equity swaps, collars, and exchange funds) that are designed to hedge or offset any decrease in the market value of equity securities: Granted to the employee or director by the company as part of his compensation; or Held, directly or indirectly, by the employee or director. Issues/Concerns Given the Section 16 insider trading rules, hedging activities by officers and directors were not prevalent practice. However, this will cause companies to formalize an anti-hedging policy (if they have not already done so) and apply the policy to all employees. To the extent any employee or director is hedging, and the company is concerned about disclosing such transactions, they may wish to undo these transactions prior to the filing of their next proxy.

55. Enhanced Compensation Structure Reporting for Financial Companies Covered financial institutions will be subject to new rules and regulations to be promulgated by the appropriate Federal regulators within 9 months after enactment of Dodd-Frank. These regulations will require each covered financial institution to disclose to the appropriate Federal regulator the structures of all incentive-based compensation arrangements offered by such covered financial institutions sufficient to determine whether the compensation structure: Provides an executive officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder with excessive compensation, fees, or benefits; or Could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial institution. Covered financial institutions with less than $1 billion of assets will be exempt from these requirements. Issues/Concerns Based on the review conducted by the Federal Reserve of large, complex banking organizations, it is safe to assume that the appropriate Federal regulators will be looking to make significant changes with respect to compensation, including requiring: Mandatory holding periods; A significant portion of compensation to be deferred; and Introducing an absolute metric governing payouts of any performance-based compensation subject to relative performance measures, e.g., relative total shareholder returns. We believe compensation at covered financial institutions will be transformed as a result of this provision and the Federal Reserve’s recent review. It remains to be seen how compensation programs will be changed and the impact this may have on financial institutions’ ability to attract, motivate, and retain key talent.

56. Voting by Brokers Dodd-Frank prohibits brokers from voting securities unless the beneficial owner has instructed the broker how to vote the proxy on the following matters: Election of directors; Executive compensation; or Any other significant matter, as determined by the SEC. But does not include the uncontested election of directors of any investment company. Dodd-Frank specifically does not prohibit a national securities exchange from promulgating rules that would expand the list of such matters regarding which brokers are prohibited from voting without instructions from the beneficial owner Issues/Concerns This provision will apply to the new mandatory say on pay votes regarding executive compensation, which will have a negative impact on vote outcomes and likely will force companies to evaluate whether a proxy solicitation campaign targeted at retail beneficial owners is warranted. Likely will increase the influence of proxy advisory firms as the broker votes are not counted on the above issues.

57. About Robert McCormick Prior to joining Glass Lewis, Bob McCormick was the Director of Investment Proxy Research at Fidelity Management & Research Co., which he joined in 1997. At Fidelity, he managed the proxy voting of more than 700 retail and mutual fund accounts, holding 4,000 domestic and international securities worth in excess of $1 trillion. Prior to joining Fidelity, McCormick was a staff attorney at Keenan, Powers & Andrews and Prudential Securities Incorporated, both in New York City. McCormick is an attorney who earned his law degree from Quinnipiac University School of Law after graduating with honors from Providence College. He serves on the International Corporate Governance Network’s Cross-Border Voting Practices and Securities Lending committees. Robert McCormick, Esq.rmccormick@glasslewis.com 415-678-4228 www.glasslewis.com

58. About Ed Hauder Edward Hauder—Senior Executive Compensation Advisor Senior advisor and practical thought leader: Ed is known industry-wide as a leading advisor on executive compensation matters. He maintains long-term relationships with numerous companies, serves on the CompensationStandards.com Executive Compensation Task Force, maintains his acclaimed Equity Compensation Blog, edwardhauder.com, and is a practical thought leader on compensation matters. Experience across a range of industries: Ed has consulted with hundreds of companies in multiple industries on all aspects of executive and director compensation. Ed focuses on helping companies design compensation programs that help them achieve their strategic goals and objectives, while at the same time keeping them out of the penalty box with shareholders and the media. Ed also helps companies understand and find practical solutions for technical matters impacting compensation, e.g., financial accounting, securities, tax, and corporate governance issues. His expertise includes RiskMetrics Group (a.k.a. ISS) compensation modeling and policies, which enabled him to create the Flexible Share Authorization to maximize equity plan flexibility. Articles and quotes on compensation issues: Ed has recently written articles that have appeared in The Corporate Board, workspan Weekly, BNA’s Executive Compensation Library, and Tax Management Compensation Planning Journal. He has been quoted in such publications as BNA’s Pension & Benefits Daily, Business Finance,Forbes, HRMagazine, and The NASPP Advisor. Background and education: Before joining Exequity, Ed was employed as a Principal at Buck Consultants where he managed the Technical Solutions and Innovation Team. Prior to that, Ed was a member of Hewitt Associates’ Executive Compensation Center of Technical Excellence. Ed received a B.A. in International Relations from Juniata College, a J.D., cum laude, from Seattle University School of Law, and an LL.M. (Tax), with honors, from IIT-Chicago-Kent College of Law. Contact information:edward.hauder@exqty.com or (847) 996-3990Ed’s Equity Compensation Plan Blog: www.edwardhauder.com

59. About Dan Walter Dan Walter, CEP, President and CEO of Performensation. Dan has more than 15 years of experience assisting companies with both executive and broad-based compensation programs. He provides end-to-end solutions for private and public companies in both the United States and abroad. His clients have ranged from entrepreneurial start-ups to established Fortune 100 companies providing his clients with a unique perspective on compensation issues. Dan’s expertise includes equity compensation, executive programs, performance-based pay and talent management issues. His experience with these programs includes: diagnosis, design, communication, administration and reporting. Dan has experience with all forms of equity including stock options, restricted shares and units, stock purchase and performance-based programs. Phone: ofc: +1-415-625-3405 | mobile: +1-917-734-4649 Twitter: @performensation | Skype: performensation LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/in/danwalter Performensation Website: www.performensation.com Equity Compensation Experts: www.equitycompensationexperts.groupsite.com CompensationCafe Blog: www.compensationcafe.com