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-Prashanth Sivarajan
Prash.siv@gmail.com
What is BeEF?
BeEF is short for The Browser Exploitation Framework. It is
a penetration testing tool that focuses on the web browser.
Amid growing concerns about web-borne attacks against
clients, including mobile clients, BeEF allows the professional
penetration tester to assess the actual security posture of a
target environment by using client-side attack vectors. Unlike
other security frameworks, BeEF looks past the hardened
network perimeter and client system, and examines
exploitability within the context of the one open door: the
web browser. BeEF will hook one or more web browsers and
use them as beachheads for launching directed command
modules and further attacks against the system from within
the browser context.
How it works
UI Overview
Information Gathering
Network Discovery
Social Engineering
Exploit
Persistence
Command Modules
Information Gathering
Network Discovery
Social Engineering
Exploit
Persistence
Browser Fingerprinting
Detect Plugins
(Quicktime/VLC/Silverlight)
Host Fingerprinting
Detect logged in sessions
Command Modules
Information Gathering
Network Discovery
Social Engineering
Exploit
Persistence
Internal IP Address
Ping Sweep
DNS Enumeration
Port Scanning
Network Fingerprinting
NAT Pinning
Command Modules
Information Gathering
Network Discovery
Social Engineering
Exploit
Persistence
Prompt Fake Login Page
Redirect
Embed iFrames
Fake flash/browser Updates
Flash camera & Mic
permission
Click jacking assist
Command Modules
Information Gathering
Network Discovery
Social Engineering
Exploit
Persistence
Several Device
specific CSRF
modules
Command Modules
Information Gathering
Network Discovery
Social Engineering
Exploit
Persistence
Foreground iframe
Popup Under
Man in the browser
Command Modules
Metasploit Integration
• Start msgrpc on metasploit
• Enable metasploit in config.yaml
• Configure BeEF with msgrpc username and pwd in
extensions/metasploit/config.yaml
• Start beef
Tunnelling Proxy
• Doesn’t work like it used to thanks to same
origin policy of browsers
• Make request in the context of the hooked
browser.
BeEF API Example
• Authenticate
• List hooked browsers
• Make persistent (popup under)
• Determine the type of browser
• if browser.match(/^IE/)
{ add iframe with URL for Metasploit module
ms10_046_shortcut_icon_dllloader}
Else
{execute a different module}

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Browser Exploit Framework

  • 2. What is BeEF? BeEF is short for The Browser Exploitation Framework. It is a penetration testing tool that focuses on the web browser. Amid growing concerns about web-borne attacks against clients, including mobile clients, BeEF allows the professional penetration tester to assess the actual security posture of a target environment by using client-side attack vectors. Unlike other security frameworks, BeEF looks past the hardened network perimeter and client system, and examines exploitability within the context of the one open door: the web browser. BeEF will hook one or more web browsers and use them as beachheads for launching directed command modules and further attacks against the system from within the browser context.
  • 5. Information Gathering Network Discovery Social Engineering Exploit Persistence Command Modules
  • 6. Information Gathering Network Discovery Social Engineering Exploit Persistence Browser Fingerprinting Detect Plugins (Quicktime/VLC/Silverlight) Host Fingerprinting Detect logged in sessions Command Modules
  • 7. Information Gathering Network Discovery Social Engineering Exploit Persistence Internal IP Address Ping Sweep DNS Enumeration Port Scanning Network Fingerprinting NAT Pinning Command Modules
  • 8. Information Gathering Network Discovery Social Engineering Exploit Persistence Prompt Fake Login Page Redirect Embed iFrames Fake flash/browser Updates Flash camera & Mic permission Click jacking assist Command Modules
  • 9. Information Gathering Network Discovery Social Engineering Exploit Persistence Several Device specific CSRF modules Command Modules
  • 10. Information Gathering Network Discovery Social Engineering Exploit Persistence Foreground iframe Popup Under Man in the browser Command Modules
  • 11. Metasploit Integration • Start msgrpc on metasploit • Enable metasploit in config.yaml • Configure BeEF with msgrpc username and pwd in extensions/metasploit/config.yaml • Start beef
  • 12. Tunnelling Proxy • Doesn’t work like it used to thanks to same origin policy of browsers • Make request in the context of the hooked browser.
  • 13. BeEF API Example • Authenticate • List hooked browsers • Make persistent (popup under) • Determine the type of browser • if browser.match(/^IE/) { add iframe with URL for Metasploit module ms10_046_shortcut_icon_dllloader} Else {execute a different module}