Copyright Ian Ellis-Jones 2003 - Published in Australian Humanist Autumn 2003 – All Rights Reserved

1. DOIN' WHAT COMES NATUR'LLY
TOWARD A HUMANIST THEORY OF ETHICS
by Dr Ian Ellis- Jones
Published in Australian Humanist
Autumn 2003
What is "good"? What is "right"? How should human beings behave
toward others? These questions are not just the stuff of religion. Indeed,
they belong most properly to the realm of ethics, and Humanism is, at the
very least, concerned with ethics and ethical conduct. However, is it at all
possible to speak meaningfully of anything being "good" or "right" in a so-
called postmodern world?
Most theories of ethics, in particular, those based on religion, are normative, that is, they
are concerned with what human beings supposedly ought to do. All such theories are
fundamentally flawed, being guilty of moralism, subjectivism, pragmatism and what
Professor John Anderson of the University of Sydney used to refer to as "relativist
confusions". The latter term refers to illogical confusion about "qualities" and "relations",
that is, the qualitative question, “Is X good?”, is wrongly confused or amalgamated with
relational questions about X's being wanted, or supported, or being brought about by
human beings.
What is required, and what Humanism offers, is a positive, objective, realistic, non-
moralistic, non-prescriptive, secular theory of ethics, but I would first like to refer to
some of the more common theories of ethics that are clearly flawed and unacceptable.
FLAWED THEORY No. 1.
Something is "good" or "right"
if it is of such a kind
as to evoke the approval or admiration
of the majority of people.
There are a number of problems with such a theory. First, it totally avoids the real
question of what is "good" or "right", with its self-serving democratic (whatever that

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means) appeal to whatever meets with widespread approval or admiration. However,
we cannot possibly say that the majority and not the minority is necessarily right about
any particular issue unless we have first considered the issue in question. If, for
example, a majority of people is in favour of a military strike against Iraq, does that
make it “good” or “right”? Intuitively we know that such an approach, with its
effervescent appeal to and reliance upon public opinion polls, cannot be the correct one.
For one thing, the theory rules out as literally meaningless any attempt to alter so-called
majority belief by moral argument.
Furthermore, how are we to determine what constitutes the majority, and what about
changes in attitudes over time? And are the views of a minority necessarily "wrong"
and to be dismissed out-of-hand? Of course, not.
FLAWED THEORY No. 2.
Something is "good" or "right"
if the person who uses the word
has or tends to have a feeling or attitude
of a certain kind about what that person
pronounces "good" or "right".
In other words, if you think it is “good” or “right”, or feel “deep down” that it is, well, it is!
The war cry of the 1960s, still very much with us. “There are no absolute values …
Everything is relative.” Well, there may be no absolutes, but that does not necessarily
mean that there are no objective standards. Objectivity is something altogether
different.
Theory No. 2 is pure subjectivism, pragmatism and relativism. Two people would never
mean the same thing when they pronounced something good, since either would just
mean, "That is approved (disapproved) of by me". Indeed the same person would not
necessarily, if ever, mean the same thing by an ethical judgment on two different
occasions.
Furthermore, if ethical judgments are simply about our own actual feelings or attitudes,
why should we ever invoke, as we constantly do, their likely consequences for others,
which is certainly not evidence about our own feelings or attitudes?

3. Page 3
FLAWED THEORY No. 3.
Something is "good" or "right"
if an impartial, objective bystander
- "reasonable person" -
would adjudge it to be "good" or "right".
This theory has enormous appeal to judges and lawyers generally, who constantly
invoke the so-called "reasonable person" test in legal decision-making in the largely
misguided belief that such a person actually exists in the real world. In law, the
"reasonable person" is a notional (that really means fictitious!) person who is capable of
reasoning, and who does so appropriately with the knowledge of all relevant objective
facts.
But what can "impartial", "objective" or "reasonable" mean here, in the context of Theory
No. 3? It is equivalent to saying that something is "good" or "right" when it is approved
by somebody who only approves what is really "good" or "right" (for the so-called
reasonable person could do nothing but that, otherwise he or she would not be
"reasonable"). This is obviously circular, and altogether unsatisfactory except to some
black-letter lawyers of whom, regrettably, there are far too many in existence.
FLAWED THEORY No. 4.
Something is “good” or “right”
if it has satisfying consequences (“works”)
for a person or persons.
There it is again. Plain, old-fashioned pragmatism. However, a thing has satisfying
consequences BECAUSE it is “good” or “right”. It is not “good” or “right” by reason of it
having satisfying consequences (whatever that means). Indeed, a thing might still be
“good” or “right” EVEN IF it does not have satisfying consequences. Enough said.
Good night, William James.
FLAWED THEORY No. 5.
Something is "good" or "right"
if it (a) promotes the most pleasure
and/or causes the least pain, or
(b) fulfils peoples' preferences without frustrating

4. Page 4
the preferences of others, or
(c) satisfies our or one's desires in the long run.
These are all various forms of utilitarianism, and there are enormous problems with
them all, just as there were with the moral pragmatism of Theory No. 4. What is meant
by "pleasure" and "pain", and how does one measure them (assuming they can be
quantified at all)? It is trite to say that what gives one human being pleasure may well
be entirely painful to others. Are we to once again engage upon some exercise in
democracy, and count heads? Can preferences be ranked and weighed in the balance,
especially as regards others? Who will keep score of all the supposed preferences, and
for how long? And how "long" is the "long run"? It is all impractical and unworkable.
FLAWED THEORY No. 6.
Something is "good" or "right"
if it is in conformity
with evolutionary development.
At first glance this sounds appealing, especially to Humanists, with its salutary appeal to
human evolution. However, the theory doesn't really take us anywhere. After all,
whatever happens can be said to be in accordance with evolutionary development,
otherwise it could not happen at all. Worse still, we can end up with some pernicious
form of Social Darwinism, not to mention economic rationalism and the more
undesirable aspects of globalisation. Be careful.
FLAWED THEORY No. 7.
Something is "good" or "right"
if it is commanded or required by X
(X being God/Buddha/Jesus Christ/the Pope/
the Bible/the Koran, or whoever or whatever).
“Jesus loves me, this I know, for the Bible tells me so.” Really?
This theory - and there are a great number of variations of it - amalgamates the two
otherwise distinct notions of "being good" and "being required/commanded". If we
ought to do X because we are commanded or required by someone or something
supposedly in or of "authority", that can only mean that we are commanded or required

5. Page 5
by X to obey the commands or requirements of X.
That is not a theory of ethics at all, for if "good" or "right" is whatever is commanded or
required by someone or something supposedly in or of "authority", who or which, of
course, only commands or requires what is "good" or "right", the most that we have is
an arbitrary and meaningless tautology.
More significantly, it is not possible to argue logically from the fact that because
something is commanded or required - irrespective of who or what commands or
requires it - to a value judgment that what is commanded or required is "good" or "right"
or that it is morally right to obey the command or comply with the supposed
requirement.
There are a great many other so-called theories of ethics, but, for the most part, they
are all combinations or variations of some or all of the above. So, is there a Humanist
theory of ethics that is positive, objective, realistic, non-moralistic, non-prescriptive and
secular? In my view, there is, and it may be expressed as follows:
A HUMANIST THEORY OF ETHICS.
Something is "good" or "right"
if it is objectively "good" or "right".
At first glance, this theory appears to be circular just like some of the flawed theories
referred to above, but nothing could be further from the truth. The fact is we as human
beings are acquainted with certain things directly by experience (eg the colour "red").
We know sufficiently what "good" or "right" is by the experience of apprehending "good"
or "right" things, as to see a red rose is also to see what redness is. "Goodness" or
"rightness" is there to be recognised, as an occurrence in time and space ... as a fact. It
is something with which we have long been in certain ways acquainted.
As AH editor Rosslyn Ives pointed out in her challenging article, "How Shall We Live?
An Exploration of Humanist Ethics" (AH, Autumn 2002), the criterion for a "good" or a
"bad" action is the objective effect of that action on human well-being. Whatever
improves human well-being or decreases human misery is "good" or "right"; whatever
reduces well-being and increases human misery is "bad" or "wrong".

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Human well-being is something that is palpably discernible and objective. Indeed, it can
be assessed and appreciated in terms of adequate food, clean water, clean air,
ecological sustainability, reasonable housing, good health, fair education, and so forth.
There may be some argument about what is "adequate", "reasonable" and "fair", but
there can be little or no argument about what improves human well-being or decreases
human misery in the sense described above.
I wish to point out that we are not talking utilitarianism here ... pleasure, pain,
happiness, personal preferences, and so forth. We are talking about actions and
consequences of actions that are universal and the same for all human beings. We
must simply “look and see”.
In this theory of ethics, the “goodness” or “rightness” of a thing is not dependent upon or
constituted by being liked or wanted or believed in, for, as Professor Anderson pointed
out on so many occasions, NOTHING is constituted by, nor can it be defined or
explained by reference to, the relations it has to other things.
Here we have a theory of ethics that is objective and realistic, and which altogether
avoids the "relativist confusions" of most of the other so-called theories of ethics which
speak in terms of what we ought to do. We are to do, not what is commanded or
required, not what others think is "good" or right", not even what we ourselves think is
"good" or "right" nor what supposedly accords with the genetic theory of natural
selection. We are to do that which is objectively "good" or "right", that which is
intrinsically "good" or "right", that which has the natural quality "good" or "right". In
short, in the words of songwriter Irving Berlin, from the musical play Annie Get Your
Gun, we are to do "what comes natur'lly" in the sense just described.
In my respectful opinion, this is the only satisfactory basis for a Humanist theory of
ethics.
-oo0oo-