SlideShare ist ein Scribd-Unternehmen logo
1 von 54
ACCIDENTS AND LIABILITIES


         Giovanni Sartor | European University Institute
         Giuseppe Contissa | European University Institute
         Paola Lanzi | Deep Blue
         Patrizia Marti | Deep Blue
         Marta Simoncini | European University Institute
Accidents and liabilities: 4 cases



                1. Überlingen
                  2. Linate
    3. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
   4. Automated Highway System (AHS)
Legal analysis: responsible actors I (individuals)
• Pilots:
  • criminal liability (e.g, manslaughter);
  • fault civil liability (e.g. professional liability);
  • disciplinary liability
• ATCOs
  • As for pilots
• Managers:
  • As for pilots, on ground of organisational
    liability
Legal analysis: responsible actors II
(final providers)
• Air companies
  • strict civil liability (with cap and contributory negligence)
  • vicarious civil liability (for faults of pilots and managers),
  • corporate criminal liability (in a few cases and systems)
• Air navigation service provider
  • strict civil liability,
  • vicarious civil liability (for ATCOs and managers),
  • corporate criminal liability
• Airport companies
  • As for air navigation service providers
• Aviation authorities
  • As for air navigation service providers
Legal analysis: responsible actors III
(additional providers )
• Technology providers
  • Product liability, contractual liability (sale or service)
• Standard-setters
  • Fault civil liability
• Maintenance providers
  • Fault liability, contractual liability (services)
• Insurance companies
  • First party insurance, Third party insurance
• States
  • civil liability towards other actors and victims
Legal analysis: legal analysis IV
(victims)
• Operators (pilots, crews, on-ground personnel)
• Passengers
• Owners of carried baggage or goods
• Air companies
• Airports
• Third parties on the surface
Accidents and liabilities: 4 cases



                1. Überlingen
                  2. Linate
    3. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
   4. Automated Highway System (AHS)
ÜBERLINGEN: context




On the night of July 1st, 2002, Bashkirian Airlines Flight 2937 flies over
Ueberlingen (Germany) with 69 people on board
Airspace is controlled by the private Swiss company Skyguide
The accident




Bashkirian Airlines Flight 2937 collides with DHL Flight 611

None of the 71 persons onboard the aircrafts survives.
ÜBERLINGEN: Accident analysis I
•    STANDARD DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURES (latent
     condition):
    • Only one controller
•    TECHNICAL MALFUNCTION (active error):
    • As effect of maintenance interventions the ATC system slowed
      down, phones were not working and STCA deactivated.
•    TECHNICAL MAINTENANCE FAILURE (latent condition):
    • no information about update
ÜBERLINGEN: Accident analysis II
• HUMAN ERROR (active error):
  • Controller did not notice that DHL611 and BAL2937 were both
    at FL360 on a collision course.
• HUMAN ERROR (active error):
  • Controller cleared BAL2937 to expedite the descent, being not
    aware of the TCAS resolution advisory on board.
• INADEQUATE PROCEDURES (active error):
  • the BAL2937’s pilot starts descent manoeuvre, although the
    TCAS suggest climbing, according to Russian procedures
    incoherent with international one
Uberlingen legal analysis: responsible actors
I (individuals)
• Pilots (died on the accident):
  • fault civil liability (e.g. professional liability), but possibly
    exempted for obeying procedures
• ATCOs
  • Criminal liability (manslaughter): acquitted by the Swiss judge;
    a wise choice?
  • Civil liability (only as as ground for vicarious liability)
• Managers:
  • Criminal liability (manslaughter): condemned by the judges
  • Civil liability (only as as ground for vicarious liability)
Uberlingen legal analysis: responsible actors
II (final providers)
• Air companies (Baskyrian Airlines)
  • strict civil liability: condemned
  • vicarious civil liability: acquitted
• Air navigation service provider (Skyguide)
  • strict civil liability
  • vicarious civil liability (for ATCOs and managers)
Uberlingen legal analysis: responsible actors
III (additional providers)
• Technology providers (TCAS producers)
  • Product liability: condemned
• Maintenance providers
  • Fault liability (ATSEP manager): condemned
• Insurance companies
  • First party insurance
  • Third party insurance
• States
  • civil liability towards BAL (Germany)
• Standard-setters
  • No legal procedures against standard-setters
Ueberlingen: general considerations
• No criminal/civil liability for operators.
• Liability for airlines (with recourse against ANSP/State)
• Criminal liability for ANSP managers
• Civil liability for ANSP
• Civil liability for State (with recourse against ANSP?)
• Civil liability for technology producer


• A correct framework? How to share the costs? According to
  causality?
Accidents and liabilities: 4 cases



                1. Überlingen
                  2. Linate
    3. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
   4. Automated Highway System (AHS)
Linate




    On the 8th October 2001, Cessna Citation CJ2 business
    jet crosses the takeoff lane of Scandinavian Airlines
    Flight 686
Linate




     All 114 people on board the two aircrafts
     and 4 persons on the ground are killed
LINATE: Accident Analysis I
• LACK OF RADAR SUPPORT (latent condition)
  • Old radar dismissed, new radar not operative
• LACK OF PERSONNEL (latent condition)
  • Ground controller too busy
• HUMAN ERROR (active behaviour)
  • Cessna was allowed to land, although aircraft and pilot were
    not licensed to operate in this airport
• TECHNICAL MALFUNCTION (latent condition)
  • Due to problems in the R/T, audio was often distorted and
    unclear.
LINATE: Accident Analysis II
• AMBIGUOUS LIGHTS (latent condition)
  • R6 lights were very brilliant, while those of R5 were less
    evident.
• INADEQUATE ROAD SIGNS (latent condition)
  • S4 was an old sign (written in ICAO standard font) no more in
    use at the airport, but still present on the taxilines. S4 is
    present only in R6, not in R5, but its meaning was unknown by
    both pilots and ground controller.
• INADEQUATE STOP BAR LIGHTS (latent condition)
  • The stop bar lights were inadequate and not coherent with the
    standards. The pilot did not perceive them as stop bars.
LINATE: Accident Analysis III
• UNRELIABLE MAPS (latent condition)
  • Pilot and controller were provided with unreliable maps in which
    not all the signals available in the airport were reported.
• MISINTERPRATION AND WRONG CLEARANCE (active error)
  • When the pilot reported to be at S4, approaching the runway, the
    ground controller assumed that the position report was wrong and
    that the flight was actually at the crossroad between R5 and R6.
    As a consequence the ground controller instructed to flight to
    proceed to the North. The ground controller was considering the
    flight on R5 while instead it was approaching the runway.
• RUNWAY INCURSION SENSOR DEACTIVATED (latent
   condition)
  • At the crossing between the taxiline R6 and the runway there was
    a microwave sensor intended to alert the air traffic controller in
    case of runway incursion. However, the sensor had been
    deactivated because of some false alerts it had created before.
Linate legal analysis: responsible actors I
    (individuals)
•    Cessna Pilot (died on the accident):
    • Possible fault civil liability (e.g. professional liability)
•    Flight 686 Pilot (died on the accident):
    • Innocent mistake (no liability)
•    ATCOs
    • Criminal liability (manslaughter): condemned
    • Civil liability (only as as ground for vicarious liability)
•    Managers:
    • Criminal liability (manslaughter):
      - airport director : condemned in first instance, acquitted in appeal
      - Head of aviation authority (ENAC): condemned in first instance, acquitted
        in appeal
      - Head of ATC (ENAV): condemned for manslaughter (no prison for
        amnesty)
    • Civil liability (only as as ground for vicarious liability)
Linate legal analysis: responsible actors II
(final providers)
• Air companies
  • strict civil liability to passengers, costs shared according to
    responsibility (for CESSNA)
• Air navigation service provider (ENAV)
  • strict civil liability
  • vicarious civil liability (for ATCOs and managers)
Linate legal analysis: responsible actors III
(additional providers)
• Technology providers (map producers)
  • Product liability: not addressed
• Maintenance providers
  • Fault liability (radar): condemned ENAV for failed maintenance
• Insurance companies
  • First party insurance
  • Third party insurance
• States
  • Not relevant
• Standard-setters
  • Acquitted ENAC since not task-responsible for safety
Linate: general considerations
• Operator criminally liable, even if working under pressure
• Criminal liability for ANSP managers (through minor
  sentence)
• No criminal liability for standard setting body (ENAC)
• Civil liability for technology producer not addressed


• A correct framework? How to share the costs? According to
  causality?
Accidents and liabilities: 4 cases



                1. Überlingen
                  2. Linate
    3. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
   4. Automated Highway System (AHS)
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

Aircrafts intended to operate without pilot on board




   Autonomous (AUAS)
   remotely piloted aircraft
    systems (RPAS)
Regulatory framework for UAS


AUAS are not admitted in civil aviation
   Art. 8 of the ICAO Convention

RPAS are regulated by the ICAO circular 328/AN 190
   segregated airspace
   remote pilot licence
   remote pilot ultimate responsibility
   use of pilot stations
   commercial, scientific and security applications
UAS over nuclear plant (I)

                       Due to a radiation leak in a
                       nuclear      power      plant,
                       national authorities
                           close     the      lower
                           airspace over this region
                           and
                           authorise a non-military
                           security   mission      to
                           monitor the emissions of
                           the nuclear reactor
UAS over nuclear plant (II)


                              RPAS is used in the
                              mission
                                 2 pilot stations cover
                                 flight trajectory
                                     licensed       Remote
                                     Pilot
                                     UAS Operator
                                     scientist in charge of
                                     data collection
                                 BLOS (Behind Line of
                                 Sight)     mode       of
                                 operations (UA Detect &
                                 Avoid System)
Accident
                      mid-air collision

 A civil flight enters the segregated airspace, to land in the
  nearest airport
 The ATCO takes responsibiliy of the separation between the
  aircraft, and orders UAS to reduce speed
 The UA Detect & Avoid System suggests descent since
  speed reduction insufficient
 Mission Manager chooses speed reduction and pilot
  complies
 UAS collides with civil flight
Analysis of accident
•    LATENT CONDITION
    • The air traffic controller does not have precise information about the time
      of reaction of the UA and its trajectory.
•    ACTIVE ERROR
    • The air traffic controller provides the traffic with an ineffective avoidance
      instruction
•    ACTIVE ERROR
    • The remote pilot of the UA does not perceive that the instruction suggested
      by the air traffic controller will be ineffective.
•    ACTIVE ERROR
    • The mission manager evaluates the suitability of the descent manoeuvre
      suggested by the UA in the light of the mission objectives, but does not
      consider collision risks and requests rejecting it
•    ACTIVE ERROR
    • The remote pilot underestimated collision risks and instructs to reduce
      speed, rather than the maneuver suggested by the UA.
Legal analysis: responsible actors I
(individuals)
• Remote Pilots:
  • criminal liability (e.g, manslaughter?);
  • fault civil liability (e.g. professional liability);
  • disciplinary liability
• ATCOs
  • As for pilots
• Mission Manager:
  • As for pilots (probably not since no responsibility for safety)
Legal analysis: responsible actors II (final
providers)
• Air company of the manned flight
  • strict civil liability (with cap and right of recourse)
  • Fault liability for antecedent malfunctioning?
• Air navigation service provider
  • strict civil liability,
  • vicarious civil liability (for ATCO)
• Airport companies
  • Not applicable
• Aviation authorities
  • As for air navigation service providers
Legal analysis: responsible actors III
(additional providers )
• Technology providers
  • Technology on UAS functioned correctly
• Standard-setters (regulators)
  • Not applicable
• Maintenance providers
  • Not applicable
• Insurance companies
  • First party insurance, Third party insurance
• States
  • Fault civil liability (if height inappropriate?)
UAS accident in landing




  RPASs are integrated in the civil airspace and are
  used for commercial purpose
UAS accident in landing




        Two Pilot stations are employed to control
        aircrafts
             Remote Pilot
             Technical Operator
Accident on ground
•   Communication failure between UA and the Pilot Station
    approaching destination airport (RPAS => AUAS)
 Air Traffic Controller separates the UA from the rest of the
  traffic
 The UA automatically follows the flight plan and manages
  successful landing
 After landing it maintains a too high speed, and crashes into
  airport building
Analysis of accident
•    TECHNICAL FAILURE (ACTIVE ERROR)
    • Failed communication link between Pilot Station and the UA. As a
      remote pilot can download aircraft parameters, but not instruct
      flight.
•    ACTIVE BEHAVIOUR
    • The air traffic controller decides to create a buffer around the UA
      and to avoid crossings in order to minimise the risks associated to
      possible unexpected UA automatic tasks.
•    ACTIVE BEHAVIOUR
    • The tower ATCO decides to dedicate the runway to the UA,
      moving the rest of the traffic to other runways.
•    TECHNICAL FAILURE (ACTIVE ERROR)
    • The UA lands automatically in a perfect way, but after the landing,
      maintains a too high speed, goes out of the runway and finally
      stops against an airport building.
Legal analysis: responsible actors I
(individuals)
• Remote Pilots:
  • Not liable (correct behaviour);
• ATCOs
  • Not liable (correct behaviour)
Legal analysis: responsible actors II (final
providers)
• Air company of the unmanned flight
  • strict civil liability (with cap and right of recourse)
• Air navigation service provider
  • No liability (correct execution of task)
• Airport companies
  • No liability (correct execution of task)
• Aviation authorities
  • No liability (correct execution of task)
Legal analysis: responsible actors III
(additional providers )
•    Technology providers
    • Communication Technology provider: strict liability (product
      liability) or fault liability (service liability), contractual liability (right
      of recourse of UA provider)
    • UA software/hardware provider: as above
•    Standard-setters (regulators)
    • Not applicable
•    Maintenance providers
    • If damage due to maintenance, fault liability (service liability),
      contractual liability (right of recourse of UA provider)
•    Insurance companies
    • First party insurance, Third party insurance
•    States
    • Non applicable
Accidents and liabilities: 4 cases



                1. Überlingen
                  2. Linate
    3. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
   4. Automated Highway System (AHS)
AUTOMATED HIGHWAY SYSTEM (AHS)




   US Department of Transportation (DOT) in 1994 launches
    project for limited access roadway of driverless vehicles
Not yet!




1997 financial support withdrawn: project technically feasible but not
realistic also because of unsolved legal issues: Product liability,
Insurance, Safety, Standardization, Privacy
Why such a failure?
• Safety improvement insufficiently established
• Human machine interaction insufficiently analyses
• Liability transfer to technology producers not addressed
• Uncertainty on possible costs prevent insurance
• Privacy concerns need to be addressed
A successful case: airbags




 In patented in 1953. Not used until 1973 for technical
 obstacles and liability concerns.
 Consumers do not want it: stops being offered
 Becomes compulsory in the 1980’s
Why refuse airbags?
• Why car makers and consumers did not want the safe
   technology?
  • Rational choice for car makers: air-bags involve additional
     costs and additional liabilities (and litigation), costs cannot be
     shifted to consumers
  • Possibly-rational choice for consumers: Consumer
     underestimates risks and overestimates his/her skills
Liability transfer
 • Before the introduction of airbags:
   - many injures from crashes
   - user (his insurance) is responsible
     (for negligent driving);

 • After the introduction of airbags:
   - less injures from crashes, some
    injuries from airbags
   - manufacturer is responsible
WHY MANUFACTURERS DID NOT WANT
 AIRBAGS?



              Solutions:
• Educate consumers;
• Make airbags compulsory;
• Reduce manufacturers’ liability (state
  of the art /approval defence, cap?)
Task transfer
• Technology induces task transfers
  • From humans to technology
  • From operators to technology producers-managers
  • Between different operators and their companies
Liability transfers
• liabilities go with task-responsibilities,
• technology-induced task-transfers induce transfers in
   allocation of costs of accidents
  • Cost-transfer from victims to providers (non-compensable
     damage may become compensable, for strict liability/level of
     expected performance)
  • Liability transfers from providers of human services to
     providers of technology
  • Liability transfers between providers of human services
ALIAS CONCLUSIONS
• Automation in ATM (and other socio-technical systems)
  requires a legal framework
• Liabilities can contribute to safety but also hinder just
  culture and the deployment of safety technologies
• We need to manage liabilities so that all useful technologies
  are correctly deployed, and the right incentives are
  provided


• This is the challenge of the ALIAS project
The team
•   Giovanni Sartor, EUI - Project Leader
•   Liam Bannon, DBL
•   Giuseppe Contissa, EUI
•   Paola Lanzi, DBL
•   Patrizia Marti, DBL
•   Anna Masutti, EUI
•   Hans Micklitz, EUI
•   Marta Simoncini, EUI

                                            Thanks for your attention
                           Please register to the ALIAS network!
                             www.aliasnetwork.org/register.html

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Was ist angesagt?

NFPA 402 -- ARFF By the Book
NFPA 402 -- ARFF By the BookNFPA 402 -- ARFF By the Book
NFPA 402 -- ARFF By the Book
Aaron Johnson
 
Baltic_ACO_Manual_ver_1 3_11012011
Baltic_ACO_Manual_ver_1 3_11012011Baltic_ACO_Manual_ver_1 3_11012011
Baltic_ACO_Manual_ver_1 3_11012011
Andreas Michaelsen
 
62 00 icao+doc+9137-airport+services+manual_part+7+-+airport+emergency+planni...
62 00 icao+doc+9137-airport+services+manual_part+7+-+airport+emergency+planni...62 00 icao+doc+9137-airport+services+manual_part+7+-+airport+emergency+planni...
62 00 icao+doc+9137-airport+services+manual_part+7+-+airport+emergency+planni...
manz zaee
 

Was ist angesagt? (19)

Chapter 04 Safety and Aircraft Hazards
Chapter 04 Safety and Aircraft Hazards Chapter 04 Safety and Aircraft Hazards
Chapter 04 Safety and Aircraft Hazards
 
Chapter 07 Apparatus
Chapter 07 ApparatusChapter 07 Apparatus
Chapter 07 Apparatus
 
Chapter 11 Stategic and Tactical Operations
Chapter 11 Stategic and Tactical OperationsChapter 11 Stategic and Tactical Operations
Chapter 11 Stategic and Tactical Operations
 
Media Object File Flt Ops Rwy Ops Seq01
Media Object File Flt Ops Rwy Ops Seq01Media Object File Flt Ops Rwy Ops Seq01
Media Object File Flt Ops Rwy Ops Seq01
 
Basic cargo course manual
Basic cargo course manualBasic cargo course manual
Basic cargo course manual
 
Aero manual Ope basic training 1
Aero manual Ope basic training 1Aero manual Ope basic training 1
Aero manual Ope basic training 1
 
Airside Safety
Airside SafetyAirside Safety
Airside Safety
 
Chapter 08 Rescue Tools and Equipment
Chapter 08 Rescue Tools and Equipment Chapter 08 Rescue Tools and Equipment
Chapter 08 Rescue Tools and Equipment
 
ARFF for Structural Fire Departments
ARFF for Structural Fire DepartmentsARFF for Structural Fire Departments
ARFF for Structural Fire Departments
 
The Crash Of One-Two-GO Airlines Flight 269: The Etiology Of A Preventable Ac...
The Crash Of One-Two-GO Airlines Flight 269: The Etiology Of A Preventable Ac...The Crash Of One-Two-GO Airlines Flight 269: The Etiology Of A Preventable Ac...
The Crash Of One-Two-GO Airlines Flight 269: The Etiology Of A Preventable Ac...
 
2 basic cargo course ULDs
2   basic cargo course ULDs2   basic cargo course ULDs
2 basic cargo course ULDs
 
Chapter 03 Aircraft Familiaration
Chapter 03 Aircraft Familiaration Chapter 03 Aircraft Familiaration
Chapter 03 Aircraft Familiaration
 
Hold baggage Screening : MIS
Hold baggage Screening : MISHold baggage Screening : MIS
Hold baggage Screening : MIS
 
Airside Ops & Ntm
Airside Ops & NtmAirside Ops & Ntm
Airside Ops & Ntm
 
NFPA 402 -- ARFF By the Book
NFPA 402 -- ARFF By the BookNFPA 402 -- ARFF By the Book
NFPA 402 -- ARFF By the Book
 
Baltic_ACO_Manual_ver_1 3_11012011
Baltic_ACO_Manual_ver_1 3_11012011Baltic_ACO_Manual_ver_1 3_11012011
Baltic_ACO_Manual_ver_1 3_11012011
 
ACO COURSE 6
ACO COURSE 6ACO COURSE 6
ACO COURSE 6
 
Chapter 09 Driver/Operator
Chapter 09 Driver/OperatorChapter 09 Driver/Operator
Chapter 09 Driver/Operator
 
62 00 icao+doc+9137-airport+services+manual_part+7+-+airport+emergency+planni...
62 00 icao+doc+9137-airport+services+manual_part+7+-+airport+emergency+planni...62 00 icao+doc+9137-airport+services+manual_part+7+-+airport+emergency+planni...
62 00 icao+doc+9137-airport+services+manual_part+7+-+airport+emergency+planni...
 

Andere mochten auch

Dn12 u3 a18_rrmg
Dn12 u3 a18_rrmgDn12 u3 a18_rrmg
Dn12 u3 a18_rrmg
Mary Ramos
 
Mundo virtual Tamara Montoro Pareja
Mundo virtual Tamara Montoro Pareja Mundo virtual Tamara Montoro Pareja
Mundo virtual Tamara Montoro Pareja
tamaramontoro
 
CFSSA (Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency) permition granted to G...
CFSSA (Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency) permition granted to G...CFSSA (Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency) permition granted to G...
CFSSA (Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency) permition granted to G...
Goran Jurum
 
Glosario de términos.
Glosario de términos.Glosario de términos.
Glosario de términos.
mokona95
 
Folleto de andrea mendoza
Folleto de andrea mendozaFolleto de andrea mendoza
Folleto de andrea mendoza
Andrea11077
 
Cibermilitancia
CibermilitanciaCibermilitancia
Cibermilitancia
Ana Aldea
 
Mapa de Políticas de Empleo para Jóvenes en América Latina / Evelyn Vezza
Mapa de Políticas de Empleo para Jóvenes en América Latina / Evelyn VezzaMapa de Políticas de Empleo para Jóvenes en América Latina / Evelyn Vezza
Mapa de Políticas de Empleo para Jóvenes en América Latina / Evelyn Vezza
EUROsociAL II
 
Zenoss core beta_installation_guide_r5.0.0b2_d99.14.253
Zenoss core beta_installation_guide_r5.0.0b2_d99.14.253Zenoss core beta_installation_guide_r5.0.0b2_d99.14.253
Zenoss core beta_installation_guide_r5.0.0b2_d99.14.253
Sachin Jaypatre
 
Deutscher AIDA Instructor Kurs 2011
Deutscher AIDA Instructor Kurs 2011 Deutscher AIDA Instructor Kurs 2011
Deutscher AIDA Instructor Kurs 2011
Werner Giove
 

Andere mochten auch (20)

Dn12 u3 a18_rrmg
Dn12 u3 a18_rrmgDn12 u3 a18_rrmg
Dn12 u3 a18_rrmg
 
Mundo virtual Tamara Montoro Pareja
Mundo virtual Tamara Montoro Pareja Mundo virtual Tamara Montoro Pareja
Mundo virtual Tamara Montoro Pareja
 
CFSSA (Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency) permition granted to G...
CFSSA (Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency) permition granted to G...CFSSA (Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency) permition granted to G...
CFSSA (Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency) permition granted to G...
 
Glosario de términos.
Glosario de términos.Glosario de términos.
Glosario de términos.
 
Folleto de andrea mendoza
Folleto de andrea mendozaFolleto de andrea mendoza
Folleto de andrea mendoza
 
Mattias Diagl - Low Budget Tooling - Excel-ent
Mattias Diagl - Low Budget Tooling - Excel-entMattias Diagl - Low Budget Tooling - Excel-ent
Mattias Diagl - Low Budget Tooling - Excel-ent
 
Jiří Král: Jak zadat výrobu webu dodavateli
Jiří Král: Jak zadat výrobu webu dodavateliJiří Král: Jak zadat výrobu webu dodavateli
Jiří Král: Jak zadat výrobu webu dodavateli
 
World transport policy
World transport policyWorld transport policy
World transport policy
 
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 342 - Institutions and Convergence (prelimi...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 342 - Institutions and Convergence (prelimi...CASE Network Studies and Analyses 342 - Institutions and Convergence (prelimi...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 342 - Institutions and Convergence (prelimi...
 
Cibermilitancia
CibermilitanciaCibermilitancia
Cibermilitancia
 
Wide Vision - Linked In Slide Show
Wide Vision - Linked In Slide ShowWide Vision - Linked In Slide Show
Wide Vision - Linked In Slide Show
 
Power Point Alianza Blanca
Power Point Alianza BlancaPower Point Alianza Blanca
Power Point Alianza Blanca
 
Mapa de Políticas de Empleo para Jóvenes en América Latina / Evelyn Vezza
Mapa de Políticas de Empleo para Jóvenes en América Latina / Evelyn VezzaMapa de Políticas de Empleo para Jóvenes en América Latina / Evelyn Vezza
Mapa de Políticas de Empleo para Jóvenes en América Latina / Evelyn Vezza
 
Istra gourmet 2013
Istra gourmet 2013Istra gourmet 2013
Istra gourmet 2013
 
Presentación Chinchurreta Español
Presentación Chinchurreta EspañolPresentación Chinchurreta Español
Presentación Chinchurreta Español
 
Annuaire de la délégation Française au WAQ 2015
Annuaire de la délégation Française au WAQ 2015Annuaire de la délégation Française au WAQ 2015
Annuaire de la délégation Française au WAQ 2015
 
Zenoss core beta_installation_guide_r5.0.0b2_d99.14.253
Zenoss core beta_installation_guide_r5.0.0b2_d99.14.253Zenoss core beta_installation_guide_r5.0.0b2_d99.14.253
Zenoss core beta_installation_guide_r5.0.0b2_d99.14.253
 
Informe de 100 dias de gestion
Informe de 100 dias de gestionInforme de 100 dias de gestion
Informe de 100 dias de gestion
 
Deutscher AIDA Instructor Kurs 2011
Deutscher AIDA Instructor Kurs 2011 Deutscher AIDA Instructor Kurs 2011
Deutscher AIDA Instructor Kurs 2011
 
Brochure dis ind
Brochure dis indBrochure dis ind
Brochure dis ind
 

Ähnlich wie Accidents and Liabilities by ALIAS Consortium

ALIAS: results of Legal Network Themes Survey
ALIAS: results of Legal Network Themes SurveyALIAS: results of Legal Network Themes Survey
ALIAS: results of Legal Network Themes Survey
ALIAS Network
 
LIABILITY AND ALLOCATION OF BURDEN INVOLVING AUTOMATED SYSTEMS IN AVIATION: R...
LIABILITY AND ALLOCATION OF BURDEN INVOLVING AUTOMATED SYSTEMS IN AVIATION: R...LIABILITY AND ALLOCATION OF BURDEN INVOLVING AUTOMATED SYSTEMS IN AVIATION: R...
LIABILITY AND ALLOCATION OF BURDEN INVOLVING AUTOMATED SYSTEMS IN AVIATION: R...
ALIAS Network
 
Failure to Communicate R2
Failure to Communicate R2Failure to Communicate R2
Failure to Communicate R2
Richard Hayden
 

Ähnlich wie Accidents and Liabilities by ALIAS Consortium (20)

Liabilities and automation in aviation
Liabilities and automation in aviationLiabilities and automation in aviation
Liabilities and automation in aviation
 
ALIAS: results of Legal Network Themes Survey
ALIAS: results of Legal Network Themes SurveyALIAS: results of Legal Network Themes Survey
ALIAS: results of Legal Network Themes Survey
 
LIABILITY AND ALLOCATION OF BURDEN INVOLVING AUTOMATED SYSTEMS IN AVIATION: R...
LIABILITY AND ALLOCATION OF BURDEN INVOLVING AUTOMATED SYSTEMS IN AVIATION: R...LIABILITY AND ALLOCATION OF BURDEN INVOLVING AUTOMATED SYSTEMS IN AVIATION: R...
LIABILITY AND ALLOCATION OF BURDEN INVOLVING AUTOMATED SYSTEMS IN AVIATION: R...
 
HUMAN FACTORS REPORT STUDY CASES
HUMAN FACTORS REPORT STUDY CASES HUMAN FACTORS REPORT STUDY CASES
HUMAN FACTORS REPORT STUDY CASES
 
Carolina Rius Alarco - liabilities and automation in aviation - rpas
Carolina Rius Alarco - liabilities and automation in aviation - rpasCarolina Rius Alarco - liabilities and automation in aviation - rpas
Carolina Rius Alarco - liabilities and automation in aviation - rpas
 
Elmar Giemulla - emerging issues from aviation law and aviation security law
Elmar Giemulla - emerging issues from aviation law and aviation security lawElmar Giemulla - emerging issues from aviation law and aviation security law
Elmar Giemulla - emerging issues from aviation law and aviation security law
 
ts-06x01.pdf
ts-06x01.pdfts-06x01.pdf
ts-06x01.pdf
 
Avsec policy
Avsec policyAvsec policy
Avsec policy
 
ts-02x01.pdf
ts-02x01.pdfts-02x01.pdf
ts-02x01.pdf
 
Avionics-Embedded systems-basic
Avionics-Embedded systems-basicAvionics-Embedded systems-basic
Avionics-Embedded systems-basic
 
Failure to Communicate R2
Failure to Communicate R2Failure to Communicate R2
Failure to Communicate R2
 
Korean Air Cargo Crash
Korean Air Cargo CrashKorean Air Cargo Crash
Korean Air Cargo Crash
 
Elmar Giemulla - legal issues in collision avoidance systems
Elmar Giemulla  - legal issues in collision avoidance systemsElmar Giemulla  - legal issues in collision avoidance systems
Elmar Giemulla - legal issues in collision avoidance systems
 
Use of Helicopters in Emergency Operations
Use of Helicopters in Emergency OperationsUse of Helicopters in Emergency Operations
Use of Helicopters in Emergency Operations
 
DPE Runway Incursion
DPE Runway IncursionDPE Runway Incursion
DPE Runway Incursion
 
Human Factor Study Case
Human Factor Study CaseHuman Factor Study Case
Human Factor Study Case
 
AIRPORT EMERGENCY PLAN FAAN.pdf
AIRPORT EMERGENCY PLAN FAAN.pdfAIRPORT EMERGENCY PLAN FAAN.pdf
AIRPORT EMERGENCY PLAN FAAN.pdf
 
Amedeo Santosuosso - judicial approaches on rpas
Amedeo Santosuosso - judicial approaches on rpasAmedeo Santosuosso - judicial approaches on rpas
Amedeo Santosuosso - judicial approaches on rpas
 
NTSB presents: Air Traffic Control - Trust but Verify
NTSB presents: Air Traffic Control - Trust but VerifyNTSB presents: Air Traffic Control - Trust but Verify
NTSB presents: Air Traffic Control - Trust but Verify
 
Cat iii presentation
Cat iii presentationCat iii presentation
Cat iii presentation
 

Mehr von ALIAS Network

Mehr von ALIAS Network (20)

Paola Tomasello - Liabilities of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS): th...
Paola Tomasello - Liabilities of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS): th...Paola Tomasello - Liabilities of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS): th...
Paola Tomasello - Liabilities of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS): th...
 
Luca Falessi - the caa perspective on the future of atm
Luca Falessi - the caa perspective on the future of atmLuca Falessi - the caa perspective on the future of atm
Luca Falessi - the caa perspective on the future of atm
 
Ken Carpenter - application of legal case to acas x
Ken Carpenter - application of legal case to acas xKen Carpenter - application of legal case to acas x
Ken Carpenter - application of legal case to acas x
 
Ken Carpenter - a new generation of airborne collision avoidance systems acas x
Ken Carpenter - a new generation of airborne collision avoidance systems acas xKen Carpenter - a new generation of airborne collision avoidance systems acas x
Ken Carpenter - a new generation of airborne collision avoidance systems acas x
 
Damiano Taurino - operational usages and regulatory framework of rpas
Damiano Taurino - operational usages and regulatory framework of rpasDamiano Taurino - operational usages and regulatory framework of rpas
Damiano Taurino - operational usages and regulatory framework of rpas
 
Anthony Smoker - the ifatca perspective on the future of atm
Anthony Smoker - the ifatca perspective on the future of atmAnthony Smoker - the ifatca perspective on the future of atm
Anthony Smoker - the ifatca perspective on the future of atm
 
Anthony Smoker - the atcos perspective on RPAS: The IFATCA view
Anthony Smoker - the atcos perspective on RPAS: The IFATCA viewAnthony Smoker - the atcos perspective on RPAS: The IFATCA view
Anthony Smoker - the atcos perspective on RPAS: The IFATCA view
 
Dennis Shomko - rpas industry perspective: who’s in charge?
Dennis Shomko - rpas industry perspective: who’s in charge?Dennis Shomko - rpas industry perspective: who’s in charge?
Dennis Shomko - rpas industry perspective: who’s in charge?
 
Roger Sethsson - insurance perspective on automation and innovation in aviation
Roger Sethsson - insurance perspective on automation and innovation in aviationRoger Sethsson - insurance perspective on automation and innovation in aviation
Roger Sethsson - insurance perspective on automation and innovation in aviation
 
Luca Save - a human factors perspective: the loat
Luca Save - a human factors perspective: the loatLuca Save - a human factors perspective: the loat
Luca Save - a human factors perspective: the loat
 
Giovanni Sartor - addressing legal and social aspects the alias project
Giovanni Sartor - addressing legal and social aspects the alias projectGiovanni Sartor - addressing legal and social aspects the alias project
Giovanni Sartor - addressing legal and social aspects the alias project
 
Alfredo Roma - addressing liabilities with rpas
Alfredo Roma - addressing liabilities with rpasAlfredo Roma - addressing liabilities with rpas
Alfredo Roma - addressing liabilities with rpas
 
Stefano Prola - IATA input in alias legal case
Stefano Prola - IATA input in alias legal caseStefano Prola - IATA input in alias legal case
Stefano Prola - IATA input in alias legal case
 
Marc Bourgois - experience from long-term and innovative research
Marc Bourgois - experience from long-term and innovative researchMarc Bourgois - experience from long-term and innovative research
Marc Bourgois - experience from long-term and innovative research
 
Maurizio Mancini - the ansp perspective
Maurizio Mancini - the ansp perspectiveMaurizio Mancini - the ansp perspective
Maurizio Mancini - the ansp perspective
 
Hanna Schebesta - test application results
Hanna Schebesta - test application resultsHanna Schebesta - test application results
Hanna Schebesta - test application results
 
Pierpaolo Gori - elements of regulation on remotely piloted aircraft systems
Pierpaolo Gori - elements of regulation on remotely piloted aircraft systemsPierpaolo Gori - elements of regulation on remotely piloted aircraft systems
Pierpaolo Gori - elements of regulation on remotely piloted aircraft systems
 
Giuseppe Contissa - the legal case
Giuseppe Contissa - the legal caseGiuseppe Contissa - the legal case
Giuseppe Contissa - the legal case
 
Giuseppe Contissa - rpas test application
Giuseppe Contissa - rpas test applicationGiuseppe Contissa - rpas test application
Giuseppe Contissa - rpas test application
 
Giuseppe Contissa - agenda and logistics
Giuseppe Contissa - agenda and logisticsGiuseppe Contissa - agenda and logistics
Giuseppe Contissa - agenda and logistics
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen

Call Girls In DLf Gurgaon ➥99902@11544 ( Best price)100% Genuine Escort In 24...
Call Girls In DLf Gurgaon ➥99902@11544 ( Best price)100% Genuine Escort In 24...Call Girls In DLf Gurgaon ➥99902@11544 ( Best price)100% Genuine Escort In 24...
Call Girls In DLf Gurgaon ➥99902@11544 ( Best price)100% Genuine Escort In 24...
lizamodels9
 
FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Majnu Ka Tilla, Delhi Contact Us 8377877756
FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Majnu Ka Tilla, Delhi Contact Us 8377877756FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Majnu Ka Tilla, Delhi Contact Us 8377877756
FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Majnu Ka Tilla, Delhi Contact Us 8377877756
dollysharma2066
 
Call Girls Navi Mumbai Just Call 9907093804 Top Class Call Girl Service Avail...
Call Girls Navi Mumbai Just Call 9907093804 Top Class Call Girl Service Avail...Call Girls Navi Mumbai Just Call 9907093804 Top Class Call Girl Service Avail...
Call Girls Navi Mumbai Just Call 9907093804 Top Class Call Girl Service Avail...
Dipal Arora
 
Insurers' journeys to build a mastery in the IoT usage
Insurers' journeys to build a mastery in the IoT usageInsurers' journeys to build a mastery in the IoT usage
Insurers' journeys to build a mastery in the IoT usage
Matteo Carbone
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)

A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A SALESMAN / WOMAN
A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A  SALESMAN / WOMANA DAY IN THE LIFE OF A  SALESMAN / WOMAN
A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A SALESMAN / WOMAN
 
How to Get Started in Social Media for Art League City
How to Get Started in Social Media for Art League CityHow to Get Started in Social Media for Art League City
How to Get Started in Social Media for Art League City
 
Uneak White's Personal Brand Exploration Presentation
Uneak White's Personal Brand Exploration PresentationUneak White's Personal Brand Exploration Presentation
Uneak White's Personal Brand Exploration Presentation
 
Mysore Call Girls 8617370543 WhatsApp Number 24x7 Best Services
Mysore Call Girls 8617370543 WhatsApp Number 24x7 Best ServicesMysore Call Girls 8617370543 WhatsApp Number 24x7 Best Services
Mysore Call Girls 8617370543 WhatsApp Number 24x7 Best Services
 
VVVIP Call Girls In Greater Kailash ➡️ Delhi ➡️ 9999965857 🚀 No Advance 24HRS...
VVVIP Call Girls In Greater Kailash ➡️ Delhi ➡️ 9999965857 🚀 No Advance 24HRS...VVVIP Call Girls In Greater Kailash ➡️ Delhi ➡️ 9999965857 🚀 No Advance 24HRS...
VVVIP Call Girls In Greater Kailash ➡️ Delhi ➡️ 9999965857 🚀 No Advance 24HRS...
 
Call Girls In DLf Gurgaon ➥99902@11544 ( Best price)100% Genuine Escort In 24...
Call Girls In DLf Gurgaon ➥99902@11544 ( Best price)100% Genuine Escort In 24...Call Girls In DLf Gurgaon ➥99902@11544 ( Best price)100% Genuine Escort In 24...
Call Girls In DLf Gurgaon ➥99902@11544 ( Best price)100% Genuine Escort In 24...
 
Organizational Transformation Lead with Culture
Organizational Transformation Lead with CultureOrganizational Transformation Lead with Culture
Organizational Transformation Lead with Culture
 
Value Proposition canvas- Customer needs and pains
Value Proposition canvas- Customer needs and painsValue Proposition canvas- Customer needs and pains
Value Proposition canvas- Customer needs and pains
 
FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Majnu Ka Tilla, Delhi Contact Us 8377877756
FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Majnu Ka Tilla, Delhi Contact Us 8377877756FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Majnu Ka Tilla, Delhi Contact Us 8377877756
FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Majnu Ka Tilla, Delhi Contact Us 8377877756
 
Call Girls In Panjim North Goa 9971646499 Genuine Service
Call Girls In Panjim North Goa 9971646499 Genuine ServiceCall Girls In Panjim North Goa 9971646499 Genuine Service
Call Girls In Panjim North Goa 9971646499 Genuine Service
 
Forklift Operations: Safety through Cartoons
Forklift Operations: Safety through CartoonsForklift Operations: Safety through Cartoons
Forklift Operations: Safety through Cartoons
 
BAGALUR CALL GIRL IN 98274*61493 ❤CALL GIRLS IN ESCORT SERVICE❤CALL GIRL
BAGALUR CALL GIRL IN 98274*61493 ❤CALL GIRLS IN ESCORT SERVICE❤CALL GIRLBAGALUR CALL GIRL IN 98274*61493 ❤CALL GIRLS IN ESCORT SERVICE❤CALL GIRL
BAGALUR CALL GIRL IN 98274*61493 ❤CALL GIRLS IN ESCORT SERVICE❤CALL GIRL
 
RSA Conference Exhibitor List 2024 - Exhibitors Data
RSA Conference Exhibitor List 2024 - Exhibitors DataRSA Conference Exhibitor List 2024 - Exhibitors Data
RSA Conference Exhibitor List 2024 - Exhibitors Data
 
Dr. Admir Softic_ presentation_Green Club_ENG.pdf
Dr. Admir Softic_ presentation_Green Club_ENG.pdfDr. Admir Softic_ presentation_Green Club_ENG.pdf
Dr. Admir Softic_ presentation_Green Club_ENG.pdf
 
Mondelez State of Snacking and Future Trends 2023
Mondelez State of Snacking and Future Trends 2023Mondelez State of Snacking and Future Trends 2023
Mondelez State of Snacking and Future Trends 2023
 
Call Girls Navi Mumbai Just Call 9907093804 Top Class Call Girl Service Avail...
Call Girls Navi Mumbai Just Call 9907093804 Top Class Call Girl Service Avail...Call Girls Navi Mumbai Just Call 9907093804 Top Class Call Girl Service Avail...
Call Girls Navi Mumbai Just Call 9907093804 Top Class Call Girl Service Avail...
 
Call Girls Pune Just Call 9907093804 Top Class Call Girl Service Available
Call Girls Pune Just Call 9907093804 Top Class Call Girl Service AvailableCall Girls Pune Just Call 9907093804 Top Class Call Girl Service Available
Call Girls Pune Just Call 9907093804 Top Class Call Girl Service Available
 
Insurers' journeys to build a mastery in the IoT usage
Insurers' journeys to build a mastery in the IoT usageInsurers' journeys to build a mastery in the IoT usage
Insurers' journeys to build a mastery in the IoT usage
 
Monthly Social Media Update April 2024 pptx.pptx
Monthly Social Media Update April 2024 pptx.pptxMonthly Social Media Update April 2024 pptx.pptx
Monthly Social Media Update April 2024 pptx.pptx
 
Ensure the security of your HCL environment by applying the Zero Trust princi...
Ensure the security of your HCL environment by applying the Zero Trust princi...Ensure the security of your HCL environment by applying the Zero Trust princi...
Ensure the security of your HCL environment by applying the Zero Trust princi...
 

Accidents and Liabilities by ALIAS Consortium

  • 1. ACCIDENTS AND LIABILITIES Giovanni Sartor | European University Institute Giuseppe Contissa | European University Institute Paola Lanzi | Deep Blue Patrizia Marti | Deep Blue Marta Simoncini | European University Institute
  • 2. Accidents and liabilities: 4 cases 1. Überlingen 2. Linate 3. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 4. Automated Highway System (AHS)
  • 3. Legal analysis: responsible actors I (individuals) • Pilots: • criminal liability (e.g, manslaughter); • fault civil liability (e.g. professional liability); • disciplinary liability • ATCOs • As for pilots • Managers: • As for pilots, on ground of organisational liability
  • 4. Legal analysis: responsible actors II (final providers) • Air companies • strict civil liability (with cap and contributory negligence) • vicarious civil liability (for faults of pilots and managers), • corporate criminal liability (in a few cases and systems) • Air navigation service provider • strict civil liability, • vicarious civil liability (for ATCOs and managers), • corporate criminal liability • Airport companies • As for air navigation service providers • Aviation authorities • As for air navigation service providers
  • 5. Legal analysis: responsible actors III (additional providers ) • Technology providers • Product liability, contractual liability (sale or service) • Standard-setters • Fault civil liability • Maintenance providers • Fault liability, contractual liability (services) • Insurance companies • First party insurance, Third party insurance • States • civil liability towards other actors and victims
  • 6. Legal analysis: legal analysis IV (victims) • Operators (pilots, crews, on-ground personnel) • Passengers • Owners of carried baggage or goods • Air companies • Airports • Third parties on the surface
  • 7. Accidents and liabilities: 4 cases 1. Überlingen 2. Linate 3. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 4. Automated Highway System (AHS)
  • 8. ÜBERLINGEN: context On the night of July 1st, 2002, Bashkirian Airlines Flight 2937 flies over Ueberlingen (Germany) with 69 people on board Airspace is controlled by the private Swiss company Skyguide
  • 9. The accident Bashkirian Airlines Flight 2937 collides with DHL Flight 611 None of the 71 persons onboard the aircrafts survives.
  • 10. ÜBERLINGEN: Accident analysis I • STANDARD DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURES (latent condition): • Only one controller • TECHNICAL MALFUNCTION (active error): • As effect of maintenance interventions the ATC system slowed down, phones were not working and STCA deactivated. • TECHNICAL MAINTENANCE FAILURE (latent condition): • no information about update
  • 11. ÜBERLINGEN: Accident analysis II • HUMAN ERROR (active error): • Controller did not notice that DHL611 and BAL2937 were both at FL360 on a collision course. • HUMAN ERROR (active error): • Controller cleared BAL2937 to expedite the descent, being not aware of the TCAS resolution advisory on board. • INADEQUATE PROCEDURES (active error): • the BAL2937’s pilot starts descent manoeuvre, although the TCAS suggest climbing, according to Russian procedures incoherent with international one
  • 12. Uberlingen legal analysis: responsible actors I (individuals) • Pilots (died on the accident): • fault civil liability (e.g. professional liability), but possibly exempted for obeying procedures • ATCOs • Criminal liability (manslaughter): acquitted by the Swiss judge; a wise choice? • Civil liability (only as as ground for vicarious liability) • Managers: • Criminal liability (manslaughter): condemned by the judges • Civil liability (only as as ground for vicarious liability)
  • 13. Uberlingen legal analysis: responsible actors II (final providers) • Air companies (Baskyrian Airlines) • strict civil liability: condemned • vicarious civil liability: acquitted • Air navigation service provider (Skyguide) • strict civil liability • vicarious civil liability (for ATCOs and managers)
  • 14. Uberlingen legal analysis: responsible actors III (additional providers) • Technology providers (TCAS producers) • Product liability: condemned • Maintenance providers • Fault liability (ATSEP manager): condemned • Insurance companies • First party insurance • Third party insurance • States • civil liability towards BAL (Germany) • Standard-setters • No legal procedures against standard-setters
  • 15. Ueberlingen: general considerations • No criminal/civil liability for operators. • Liability for airlines (with recourse against ANSP/State) • Criminal liability for ANSP managers • Civil liability for ANSP • Civil liability for State (with recourse against ANSP?) • Civil liability for technology producer • A correct framework? How to share the costs? According to causality?
  • 16. Accidents and liabilities: 4 cases 1. Überlingen 2. Linate 3. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 4. Automated Highway System (AHS)
  • 17. Linate On the 8th October 2001, Cessna Citation CJ2 business jet crosses the takeoff lane of Scandinavian Airlines Flight 686
  • 18. Linate All 114 people on board the two aircrafts and 4 persons on the ground are killed
  • 19. LINATE: Accident Analysis I • LACK OF RADAR SUPPORT (latent condition) • Old radar dismissed, new radar not operative • LACK OF PERSONNEL (latent condition) • Ground controller too busy • HUMAN ERROR (active behaviour) • Cessna was allowed to land, although aircraft and pilot were not licensed to operate in this airport • TECHNICAL MALFUNCTION (latent condition) • Due to problems in the R/T, audio was often distorted and unclear.
  • 20. LINATE: Accident Analysis II • AMBIGUOUS LIGHTS (latent condition) • R6 lights were very brilliant, while those of R5 were less evident. • INADEQUATE ROAD SIGNS (latent condition) • S4 was an old sign (written in ICAO standard font) no more in use at the airport, but still present on the taxilines. S4 is present only in R6, not in R5, but its meaning was unknown by both pilots and ground controller. • INADEQUATE STOP BAR LIGHTS (latent condition) • The stop bar lights were inadequate and not coherent with the standards. The pilot did not perceive them as stop bars.
  • 21. LINATE: Accident Analysis III • UNRELIABLE MAPS (latent condition) • Pilot and controller were provided with unreliable maps in which not all the signals available in the airport were reported. • MISINTERPRATION AND WRONG CLEARANCE (active error) • When the pilot reported to be at S4, approaching the runway, the ground controller assumed that the position report was wrong and that the flight was actually at the crossroad between R5 and R6. As a consequence the ground controller instructed to flight to proceed to the North. The ground controller was considering the flight on R5 while instead it was approaching the runway. • RUNWAY INCURSION SENSOR DEACTIVATED (latent condition) • At the crossing between the taxiline R6 and the runway there was a microwave sensor intended to alert the air traffic controller in case of runway incursion. However, the sensor had been deactivated because of some false alerts it had created before.
  • 22. Linate legal analysis: responsible actors I (individuals) • Cessna Pilot (died on the accident): • Possible fault civil liability (e.g. professional liability) • Flight 686 Pilot (died on the accident): • Innocent mistake (no liability) • ATCOs • Criminal liability (manslaughter): condemned • Civil liability (only as as ground for vicarious liability) • Managers: • Criminal liability (manslaughter): - airport director : condemned in first instance, acquitted in appeal - Head of aviation authority (ENAC): condemned in first instance, acquitted in appeal - Head of ATC (ENAV): condemned for manslaughter (no prison for amnesty) • Civil liability (only as as ground for vicarious liability)
  • 23. Linate legal analysis: responsible actors II (final providers) • Air companies • strict civil liability to passengers, costs shared according to responsibility (for CESSNA) • Air navigation service provider (ENAV) • strict civil liability • vicarious civil liability (for ATCOs and managers)
  • 24. Linate legal analysis: responsible actors III (additional providers) • Technology providers (map producers) • Product liability: not addressed • Maintenance providers • Fault liability (radar): condemned ENAV for failed maintenance • Insurance companies • First party insurance • Third party insurance • States • Not relevant • Standard-setters • Acquitted ENAC since not task-responsible for safety
  • 25. Linate: general considerations • Operator criminally liable, even if working under pressure • Criminal liability for ANSP managers (through minor sentence) • No criminal liability for standard setting body (ENAC) • Civil liability for technology producer not addressed • A correct framework? How to share the costs? According to causality?
  • 26. Accidents and liabilities: 4 cases 1. Überlingen 2. Linate 3. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 4. Automated Highway System (AHS)
  • 27. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Aircrafts intended to operate without pilot on board  Autonomous (AUAS)  remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS)
  • 28. Regulatory framework for UAS AUAS are not admitted in civil aviation  Art. 8 of the ICAO Convention RPAS are regulated by the ICAO circular 328/AN 190  segregated airspace  remote pilot licence  remote pilot ultimate responsibility  use of pilot stations  commercial, scientific and security applications
  • 29. UAS over nuclear plant (I) Due to a radiation leak in a nuclear power plant, national authorities close the lower airspace over this region and authorise a non-military security mission to monitor the emissions of the nuclear reactor
  • 30. UAS over nuclear plant (II) RPAS is used in the mission 2 pilot stations cover flight trajectory licensed Remote Pilot UAS Operator scientist in charge of data collection BLOS (Behind Line of Sight) mode of operations (UA Detect & Avoid System)
  • 31. Accident mid-air collision  A civil flight enters the segregated airspace, to land in the nearest airport  The ATCO takes responsibiliy of the separation between the aircraft, and orders UAS to reduce speed  The UA Detect & Avoid System suggests descent since speed reduction insufficient  Mission Manager chooses speed reduction and pilot complies  UAS collides with civil flight
  • 32. Analysis of accident • LATENT CONDITION • The air traffic controller does not have precise information about the time of reaction of the UA and its trajectory. • ACTIVE ERROR • The air traffic controller provides the traffic with an ineffective avoidance instruction • ACTIVE ERROR • The remote pilot of the UA does not perceive that the instruction suggested by the air traffic controller will be ineffective. • ACTIVE ERROR • The mission manager evaluates the suitability of the descent manoeuvre suggested by the UA in the light of the mission objectives, but does not consider collision risks and requests rejecting it • ACTIVE ERROR • The remote pilot underestimated collision risks and instructs to reduce speed, rather than the maneuver suggested by the UA.
  • 33. Legal analysis: responsible actors I (individuals) • Remote Pilots: • criminal liability (e.g, manslaughter?); • fault civil liability (e.g. professional liability); • disciplinary liability • ATCOs • As for pilots • Mission Manager: • As for pilots (probably not since no responsibility for safety)
  • 34. Legal analysis: responsible actors II (final providers) • Air company of the manned flight • strict civil liability (with cap and right of recourse) • Fault liability for antecedent malfunctioning? • Air navigation service provider • strict civil liability, • vicarious civil liability (for ATCO) • Airport companies • Not applicable • Aviation authorities • As for air navigation service providers
  • 35. Legal analysis: responsible actors III (additional providers ) • Technology providers • Technology on UAS functioned correctly • Standard-setters (regulators) • Not applicable • Maintenance providers • Not applicable • Insurance companies • First party insurance, Third party insurance • States • Fault civil liability (if height inappropriate?)
  • 36. UAS accident in landing RPASs are integrated in the civil airspace and are used for commercial purpose
  • 37. UAS accident in landing Two Pilot stations are employed to control aircrafts Remote Pilot Technical Operator
  • 38. Accident on ground • Communication failure between UA and the Pilot Station approaching destination airport (RPAS => AUAS)  Air Traffic Controller separates the UA from the rest of the traffic  The UA automatically follows the flight plan and manages successful landing  After landing it maintains a too high speed, and crashes into airport building
  • 39. Analysis of accident • TECHNICAL FAILURE (ACTIVE ERROR) • Failed communication link between Pilot Station and the UA. As a remote pilot can download aircraft parameters, but not instruct flight. • ACTIVE BEHAVIOUR • The air traffic controller decides to create a buffer around the UA and to avoid crossings in order to minimise the risks associated to possible unexpected UA automatic tasks. • ACTIVE BEHAVIOUR • The tower ATCO decides to dedicate the runway to the UA, moving the rest of the traffic to other runways. • TECHNICAL FAILURE (ACTIVE ERROR) • The UA lands automatically in a perfect way, but after the landing, maintains a too high speed, goes out of the runway and finally stops against an airport building.
  • 40. Legal analysis: responsible actors I (individuals) • Remote Pilots: • Not liable (correct behaviour); • ATCOs • Not liable (correct behaviour)
  • 41. Legal analysis: responsible actors II (final providers) • Air company of the unmanned flight • strict civil liability (with cap and right of recourse) • Air navigation service provider • No liability (correct execution of task) • Airport companies • No liability (correct execution of task) • Aviation authorities • No liability (correct execution of task)
  • 42. Legal analysis: responsible actors III (additional providers ) • Technology providers • Communication Technology provider: strict liability (product liability) or fault liability (service liability), contractual liability (right of recourse of UA provider) • UA software/hardware provider: as above • Standard-setters (regulators) • Not applicable • Maintenance providers • If damage due to maintenance, fault liability (service liability), contractual liability (right of recourse of UA provider) • Insurance companies • First party insurance, Third party insurance • States • Non applicable
  • 43. Accidents and liabilities: 4 cases 1. Überlingen 2. Linate 3. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 4. Automated Highway System (AHS)
  • 44. AUTOMATED HIGHWAY SYSTEM (AHS) US Department of Transportation (DOT) in 1994 launches project for limited access roadway of driverless vehicles
  • 45. Not yet! 1997 financial support withdrawn: project technically feasible but not realistic also because of unsolved legal issues: Product liability, Insurance, Safety, Standardization, Privacy
  • 46. Why such a failure? • Safety improvement insufficiently established • Human machine interaction insufficiently analyses • Liability transfer to technology producers not addressed • Uncertainty on possible costs prevent insurance • Privacy concerns need to be addressed
  • 47. A successful case: airbags In patented in 1953. Not used until 1973 for technical obstacles and liability concerns. Consumers do not want it: stops being offered Becomes compulsory in the 1980’s
  • 48. Why refuse airbags? • Why car makers and consumers did not want the safe technology? • Rational choice for car makers: air-bags involve additional costs and additional liabilities (and litigation), costs cannot be shifted to consumers • Possibly-rational choice for consumers: Consumer underestimates risks and overestimates his/her skills
  • 49. Liability transfer • Before the introduction of airbags: - many injures from crashes - user (his insurance) is responsible (for negligent driving); • After the introduction of airbags: - less injures from crashes, some injuries from airbags - manufacturer is responsible
  • 50. WHY MANUFACTURERS DID NOT WANT AIRBAGS? Solutions: • Educate consumers; • Make airbags compulsory; • Reduce manufacturers’ liability (state of the art /approval defence, cap?)
  • 51. Task transfer • Technology induces task transfers • From humans to technology • From operators to technology producers-managers • Between different operators and their companies
  • 52. Liability transfers • liabilities go with task-responsibilities, • technology-induced task-transfers induce transfers in allocation of costs of accidents • Cost-transfer from victims to providers (non-compensable damage may become compensable, for strict liability/level of expected performance) • Liability transfers from providers of human services to providers of technology • Liability transfers between providers of human services
  • 53. ALIAS CONCLUSIONS • Automation in ATM (and other socio-technical systems) requires a legal framework • Liabilities can contribute to safety but also hinder just culture and the deployment of safety technologies • We need to manage liabilities so that all useful technologies are correctly deployed, and the right incentives are provided • This is the challenge of the ALIAS project
  • 54. The team • Giovanni Sartor, EUI - Project Leader • Liam Bannon, DBL • Giuseppe Contissa, EUI • Paola Lanzi, DBL • Patrizia Marti, DBL • Anna Masutti, EUI • Hans Micklitz, EUI • Marta Simoncini, EUI Thanks for your attention Please register to the ALIAS network! www.aliasnetwork.org/register.html