1. The Comprehensive Approach
Marc van den Homberg, TNO
Cpt Pieter van Ingen, 1 Civil Military Interaction Command
September 16th 2012, Stenden Hogeschool, Leeuwarden

2. Contents
• Introduction
• Learning objectives
• Movie CIMIC (5 min)
• Introduction to Comprehensive approach
• Differences between civil and military
• How to cooperate and coordinate?
• Collaborative decision making
• Comprehensive approach in practice: case Afghanistan

3. Marc van den Homberg
• Study and work background:
• Ph.D. Physics and MBA
• KPN Research
• TNO, founded ICT4D team in 2006:
• Reserve officer civil-military interaction
Battalion since 2010
• Private:
• Living in Rotterdam, married with two kids
• Hobbies: mountaineering, running

4. Objectives
• To be able to explain the Comprehensive Approach and make the
link to comprehensive security
• To be able to explain the civil military interaction spectrum
• To know the differences between civil and military organisations and
how this impacts their interdependent dealing with a (post) conflict
setting
• To have an understanding of how the theory works in reality..
(Afghanistan)

5. Intrastate
Complex conflicts
emergencies
Catastrophic
Transborder Security
The
terrorism
environment
organized crime

6. Complex emergencies
The roots of these conflicts
are COMPLEX and require a
multidisciplinary and
comprehensive approach to create
a sustainable peace !

7. All the same?
Integrated
Approach
Comprehensive
Crisis
Management
DIME
Civ Mil Interaction

8. NATO Comprehensive approach definition
Synergy amongst all actors and actions of the International Community
through the coordination and de-confliction of its political, development and
security capabilities to face today’s Challenges including Complex
Emergencies
(Result of NATO internal CA Stakeholder Meeting 22 / 23 September 2010)

9. Civil and military actors
Civil actors about the military
“boys with toys”, rigid, authoritarian, conservative,
impatient, arrogant, civilian phobic, excessively
security conscious
Military about civil actors
non-guided organisations, children of the 60s,
tree huggers, undisciplined, unpunctual, anarchic,
anti-military

10. But “thé NGO” does not exist
Position in Comprehensive approach depends on:
• Type of intervention (manmade versus nature disaster)
• Type of organisation (humanitarian versus development)
• Implementing via local organisations or by themselves
• National context (relationship between ministries and NGOs, e.g.
Germany vs Netherlands) and autonomy
Just like “thé military” does not exist…!

11. NGOs versus Military differences
1. Decision making process (flat versus hierarchical; autonomous
versus political)
2. Role (neutrality, impartiality versus choosing sides in a conflict)
3. Long term versus short term
4. Vision on the use of violence
5. Cultural knowledge
6. Execution (process oriented versus task oriented)
7. Involvement of local partners (bottom-up versus top-down)
8. Perception of local population

12. Levels of Interaction
Integration: Integrated planning and
action.
Coherence: Common goals and trust lead to
comprehensive actions – concerted
planning and action.
Cooperation: Shared view and economy of activities
encourages common purposes and common
goals.
De-confliction: Shared view avoids interference and encourages economy
of activities – self-synchronize.
Awareness: Transparency and information sharing enhances shared view of the
engagement space.
Coexistence: The state of being together in the same place at the same time.
Note: Principles of NGOs and IOs limit their potential level of interaction

13. Comprehensive approach matrix
Actors Intra-agency Whole-of- Inter-agency Internal-
government External
Various sections of the Various Canadian Operation Desert Storm, Elections in DRC 2006
United Swedish government government agencies 1991 Gulf War
Various components of UN UK Stabilisation Unit or UN Peacekeeping mission Liberia 2009: use of PRS
Integrated Peacekeeping mission Canadian Stabilization and and UN Country Team, e.g.
Reconstruction Task Force Liberia 2009
DPKO and OCHA work Civilian and military pillars Afghanistan Bonn-process EULEX and the Kosovo
Cooperate together on UN Protection of USA PRT in Afghanistan, 2003; UN-EU cooperation government, 2009
of Civilians Guidelines 2009 in Chad, 2008
DPKO and OCHA in the Civilian and military pillars Humanitarian cluster UN and Sudanese
Coordinate field of Norwegian PRT in approach to coordinate; Independent Electoral
Afghanistan, 2009 Kosovo UNMIK Commission in April 2010
elections
Various parts of EU in Chad DFID and MOD fail to agree Humanitarian community UNAMID and Government
Coexist in 2008 on common evaluation and MONUC in Eastern of Darfur, 2008
criteria for UK PRT in DRC, 2009
Afghanistan, 2008
Various sections of a US State Department, US Humanitarian agencies and Taliban and ISAF/UNAMA;
Compete ministry compete for Department of Defense and UNMIL disagree on Government of Chad and
funding CIA in Afghanistan, 2007 movement of IDPs from MINURCAT, 2010
Monrovia, 2005
Coherence and coordination The limits of the comprehensive approach, Cedric de Coning
and Karsten Friss, Journal of International Peacekeeping 15 (2011) 243-272

14. How to cooperate/coordinate (1)
Common ground
1. Commitment to peace and stability
2. Hard working attitude
3. International experience
4. Life with hardship and danger
5. Personal risk of injury
6. Decision making under pressure
7. Frustration with political decision making

15. How to cooperate/coordinate (2)
Mutual benefit
Military-Civil Interaction Civil-Military Interaction
• Local knowledge • Security
• Experience • Information (roads, weather, maps,
• Information and contacts mines, incidents…)
• Assessment • Support within means and
www.dfid.gov.uk capabilities (medical, comms,
www.usaid.gov logistics)
• Language and customs • Situation Assessment

16. How to cooperate/coordinate (3)
Levels of interaction
Integration Projects jointly executed, or
by NGOs but financed by
the military
Cooperation Direct cooperation around
agreed upon activities but
separately executed
Awareness Military and NGOs
exchange information wrt
safety, reconstruction and
development projects
Coexistence Military (e.g. PRT) and
NGOs are present in the
same area but have no
close relationship

17. How to cooperate/coordinate (4)
Some additional observations
• Exchange of information is done between stakeholders, but quite
often behind the scenes and with strict conditions
• Open cooperation between NGOs and military is –because of
security reasons- almost never a good idea
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs forms a natural interface between Defense
and NGOs
• Local NGOs are more pragmatic in their dealing with soldiers than
INGOs

18. How to cooperate/coordinate (5)
Collaborative decision making

19. Challenges in collaborative decision making
• How can all actors overcome their differences and cooperate in complex
mission environments?
• How do diplomacy, defense and development activities enforce instead of
oppose each other?
• How can the actors be adaptive?

20. What is Collaborative Decision Making?
• Characteristics
• For civil and military parties in complex mission environments
• Based on military and civilian (planning) processes
• Translation of political aims in specific approaches and activities
• Adaptive ways to stability, development and security, not end state
driven
• Unity of Effort/Unity of Purpose (instead of Unity of Command)
• Track record
• Uruzgan Campaign Plan
• Comprehensive Mission Design Kunduz

21. Non endstate driven, but iterative approach
STARTING
Long term
POINT
objective
MISSION

22. Comprehensive Decision Making

23. Backbone CDM process:
Conceptual framework
Factors to mitigate Factors to exploit
Sec. Forces Presence
National programmes
Unsupportive leaders
IO/GO/NGO activities
Supportive leaders
Influence of INS
Local Conflicts
Narcotics (OC)
How to get there?
How to use it?
1. Governance
Development themes
2. Rule of Law
3. Security Apparatus
4. Education
5. Healthcare
6. Agriculture & Rural Development
7. Infrastructure & natural resources
8. Economic Development
9. Social Protection

24. Marc van den Homberg,
Questions?? Ideas? 21032012
Jump in!
Feel free to contact me at:
Marc van den Homberg
+31 6 51069884
marc.vandenhomberg@tno.nl

25. References
For this presentation the following sources were used:
• Collaborative Decision Making, Ingrid van Bemmel and Aletta
Eikelboom, Jan 19th 2012, presentation for 1 GNC.
• NATO’s Contribution to a Comprehensive Approach, Nils T. Gallagher,
CCOE
• De comprehensive approach vanuit NGO perspectief: Une liaison
dangereuse, Paul van den Berg en Eveline Rooijmans, CA
Conferentie, 23 mei 2012, The Hague
• Civiel-militaire relaties in complexe noodsituaties, Kees Homan, Hfd 8
in Humanitaire ruimte: tussen onpartijdigheid en politiek
• Coherence and coordination The limits of the comprehensive
approach, Cedric de Coning and Karsten Friss, Journal of
International Peacekeeping 15 (2011) 243-272

26. Pieter van Ingen

27. 95%
Decision making:
95% of our decision are made within a few milliseconds and based on
our need for happiness/satisfaction and security, short-term oriented
Therefore:
Comprehensive approach with people we don’t know is very difficult.
Trust has to be established first

29. Economic
Strategy
Strategy
Strategy
Strategy
Strategy
Security
Political
Social
IO
2050
2010 2010 2010 2010 2010
2010010
2
Mission Approach URUZGAN: Conceptual Framework
Sec. Forces Presence
TFU effects
Enablers
National programmes
IO/GO/NGO activities
Infl. of powerbrokers
Local Conflicts
Disablers
Narcotics (OC)
OMF activities

31. Change ambition
Main Players
Diplomacy Governor
District
Commanders and foreign affairs Chiefs
officials
Defence Security
Force
End State
Battle group, mentoring &Liaison & police
teams
Development From Civ effects
To development
Reconstruction and mentoring
teams

33. DIPLOMACY

34. DEFENCE

35. DEVELOPMENT

36. DIPLOMACY-project

37. DIPLOMACY-project

38. DEFENCE-project

39. Development-project

40. Development-
project

41. Development-project

42. Development-project

43. ISAF ends in 2014 in Afghanistan once transition is done to:
• Local authorities
• Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
Note that this implies that not all three D’s from 3D are covered
NATO (USECT)
• Understand
• Shape
• Engage Defence
• Consolidate
• Transition
U S E CT
Development
Diplomacy