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Present by : M. M. Ahmadian
Supervisor: Dr. Shahriari
May 2014
Databases hacking, safeguards and
countermeasures
Case study :
Oracle & SQL server malwares
In the name of Allah
Home page : www.mmAhmadian.ir/ Weblog : ahmadian.blog.ir
1.Introduction
2.How databases are hacked?
3.Top Ten Database Security Threats
4.SQL Server malwares
• Cblade
• Spida
• Slammer
5.Oracle rootkits
6.Conclusion
7.References
2
Overview
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
• Databases have the highest rate of breaches among all business assets.
• according to the 2012 Verizon Data Breach Report.
• 96% of breached are from databases.
• databases are at the heart of any organization, storing customer records and other
confidential business data.
But How are databases so vulnerable to breaches?
3
Introduction to Database Security [1]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
4
How much personal data worth?[1]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
http://www.ft.com
5
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
 Password guessing / bruteforcing
 Passwords and data sniffed over the network
• If encryption is not used, passwords and data can be sniffed.
 Exploiting misconfigurations
• Some database servers are open by default
 . Exploiting known/unknown vulnerabilities
• Buffer overflows.
• SQL Injection.
• Etc.
 Exploiting SQL Injection on web applications
• This is one of the easiest and preferred method that criminals use to steal sensitive
information such as credit cards, social security numbers, customer information, etc.
 Stealing disks and backup data.
 If data files and backed up data are not encrypted, once stolen data can be compromised.
 Insiders are a major threat
• If they can log in then they can hack the database.
6
How databases are hacked? [2,3]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
 Malwares
• By email, p2p, IM, CD, DVD, etc.
• Once executed
• Get database servers and login info
• configure connections, Sniffing, etc.
• Connect to database servers (try default accounts if necessary).
• Steal data (run 0day and install rootkit if necessary).
• Find next target
• Looking at linked servers/databases.
• Looking at connections.
• Sniffing.
• Send encrypted data back to attacker by email, HTTPS, covert
channel, etc.
 Installing a rootkit/backdoor
• Actions and database objects can be hidden.
• Designed to steal data and send it to attacker and/or to give the
attacker stealth and unrestricted access at any given time.
7
How databases are hacked?(cons.)
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
8
How databases are hacked?(cons.)
9
Top Ten Database Security Threats: 2010 vs. 2013[1]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
 Cbalde
 dnsservice.exe Worm
 2001-2003
 First MS SQL Server worm.
 With 3 versions
10
SQL server malwares : Cbalde[5]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
11
SQL malwares : Cbalde diagram
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
12
• Update current antivirus software programs
• Force DBA to change the default configuration.
• Restrict access to port 1433 .
SQL server malwares : Cbalde[5]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
13
• Install Patches
• The Aladdin Virus Alert for Win32.Cblade.a is available at the following link: Virus
Alert. The March 2, 2003, virus definitions are available at the following link:
Aladdin
• The Aladdin Virus Alert for Win32.Cblade.b is available at the following link: Virus
Alert. The March 2, 2003, virus definitions are available at the following link:
Aladdin
• The Computer Associates Virus Threat for Win32.SQL, as well as the signature and
engine information, is available at the following link: Computer Associates
• The F-Secure Virus Description for SQL Worm is available at the following link:
Virus Description. The November 24, 2001, and later definition updates are
available at the following link: F-Secure
• …
SQL server malwares : Cbalde[5]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
 Spida MS SQL Server worm.
 Second MS SQL Server worm.
 2002
 Exploit blank sa password.
 Platforms Affected:
 Microsoft SQL Server
 Microsoft Windows 2000
 Microsoft Windows 2003 Server
 Microsoft Windows NT 4.0
 Microsoft Windows XP
 MSRC bad days.
 MS released 12 security bulletins related to SQL
Server and SP3 is released.
 2 remotely exploitable vulnerabilities.
 Worst MS SQL Server year.
14
MS SQL malwares : Spida [5]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
15
MS SQL malwares : Spida [5]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
16
MS SQL malwares : Spida Safeguards [5]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
 Slammer/Sapphire Worm
 Third MS SQL Server worm.
 2003
 The worm was based on proof of concept code
demonstrated at the Black Hat Briefings by David
Litchfield[3]
 Sapphire's spreading strategy is based on random
scanning, like Code Red. [2]
 Exploits UDP port 1434 buffer overflow.
 A patch had been available from Microsoft for six months
prior to the worm's launch, but many installations had not
been patched – including many at Microsoft[5]
 because the SQL Slammer worm was so small in size,
sometimes it was able to get through when legitimate
traffic was not. [2]
17
MS SQL malwares : Slammer [2,3,4,8]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
more than 90% of vulnerable hosts within 10 minutes![4]
18
What a Propagation ?!
MS SQL malwares : Slammer [2,3,4,8]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
19
1. Get inside
• masquerades as a single UDP packet
• The first byte in the string is “04”
• name be at most 16 bytes long and end in “00”
• ssnetlib.dll : SQL Server Resolution Service
2. Reprogram the Machine
• after opening Slammer's too-long UDP "request" is
overwrite its own stack with new instructions that
Slammer has disguised as a routine query
3. Choose Victims at Random
• targeting another computer that could be anywhere
on the Internet.
4. Replicate
• Slammer points to its own code as the data to send.
5. Repeat
MS SQL malwares : Slammer Steps [2]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
• Outcame
• overwhelmed the network with its scanning
• denial of service by flooding the network.
• it shut down
• Bank of America Corp.
• ATMs
• cancellation of airline flights
• blacked out an emergency call center in Seattle.
• Safeguard
• . Before one hooks up a computer, one should define its function and the services necessary to perform that
function. If the computer is not going to be used as a database or web server, then those programs and
services should not be running.
• Use of the "netstat -an" command on a Windows or Unix machine will let you know what ports are open on
your machine. For example, POP3 runs on TCP port 110. If your machine is not running a POP server, this
port should not be open.
• Use ingress/egress filtering at firewall and/or border router to only allow access to the Internet those ports
necessary on that machine for it to perform its function.
20
MS SQL malwares : Slammer [2,3,4,8]
21
• A rootkit is a set of tools used by an attacker
after hacking a computer system that hides logins,
processes, etc. It is commonly used to hide the
operation of an attacker in a compromised system.
Rootkits are more widespread in Operating Systems
but the idea is applicable to databases too.
• Operating Systems and Databases are quite similar in the
architecture.
• Both have
• Users
• Processes
• Jobs
• Executables
• …
Oracle Rootkits [6]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
22
If a database is a (kind of) operating system, then it is possible to
migrate malware (concepts) like viruses or rootkits from the
operating system world to the database world.
Oracle Rootkits [6]
23
• Implementing an Oracle Database Rootkit then a
backdoor:
 PL/SQL,
 Java
 or a combination of both.
• Steps
 PL/SQL scripts that needs to be run on the
Oracle Database server with administrator
privileges
Run Backdoor Console
Oracle Rootkits [6,7]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
24
• Rootkit process:
 Hide Database Users
 User and roles are stored together in the table SYS.USER$
 Hide Processes
 Processes are stored in a special view v$session located in the
schema SYS
 Hide Database Jobs
 Oracle jobs are stored in the table SYS.JOB$
Oracle Rootkits [6,7]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
25
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
26
• An auditor, security consultant or security tool normally only
checks the table sys.user$. But Oracle is using the table
sys.aser$ containing the hidden user.
Oracle Rootkits [6,7]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
27
• Steps
 PL/SQL scripts that needs to be run on the Oracle
Database server with administrator privileges
 Run Backdoor Console
Oracle Rootkits [6,7]
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
28
• We briefly reviewed how databases are hacked specially with the
presence of malwares. Beside all the Patches and Updates If we don't
protect our databases and monitor it(Services, Protocols, Files and
Directories, PortsAuditing and Logging,) sooner or later you will get
hacked, this means lot of money loses and in worst case
running out of business.
• Oracle is a powerful database and there are many possibilities to
implement database rootkits in Oracle. With these techniques an attacker
(internal/external) can hide his presence in a hacked database.
29
Conclusion
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
[1] Imperva report, "Top Ten Database Threats:The Most Significant Risks and How to Mitigate
Them",2014
Giuseppe Serazzi and Stefano Zanero,"Computer Virus Propagation Models"
[2] Joanne Pilker,"MS SQL Slammer/Sapphire Worm",Global Information Assurance Certification
Paper,SANS Institute
[3] Leyden, John (6 February 2003). "Slammer: Why security benefits from proof of concept code".
Register. Retrieved 2008-11-29.
[4] Moore, David et al. "The Spread of the Sapphire/Slammer Worm". CAIDA (Cooperative Association for
Internet Data Analysis).
[5] Serazzi, Giuseppe & Zanero, Stefano (2004). "Computer Virus Propagation Models". In Calzarossa,
Maria Carla & Gelenbe, Erol. Performance Tools and Applications to Networked Systems. Lecture Notes
in Computer Science. Vol. 2965. pp. 26–50.
[6] Kornbrust, Alexander.“Oracle Rootkits 2.0”. Black Hat 2006 USA, Las Vegas, NV. 02; Aug
06
[7] Dennis Yurichev,"Oracle RDBMS rootkits and other modifications"Blackhat 2005 .
[8] "ISS Security Brief: Microsoft SQL Slammer Worm Propagation". ISSForum. 25 January 2003.
Retrieved 2008-11-29.
[9]X-Force (January 25, 2003). "Peace of Mind Through Integrity and Insight". Neohapsis Archives.
Retrieved 2008-11-29.
[10] Vern Paxson, Stuart Staniford, and Nicholas Weaver, How to 0wn the Internet in Your Spare Time,
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium (Security '02).
[11]"SQLExp SQL Server Worm Analysis". DeepSight™ Threat Management System Threat Analysis. Jan
28, 2003.
30
References
www.mmAhmadian.ir/
31
Questions?
Thanks
Home page : www.mmAhmadian.ir/
Weblog : ahmadian.blog.ir

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هک پایگاه داده و راهکارهای مقابلهDatabases hacking, safeguards and countermeasures

  • 1. Present by : M. M. Ahmadian Supervisor: Dr. Shahriari May 2014 Databases hacking, safeguards and countermeasures Case study : Oracle & SQL server malwares In the name of Allah Home page : www.mmAhmadian.ir/ Weblog : ahmadian.blog.ir
  • 2. 1.Introduction 2.How databases are hacked? 3.Top Ten Database Security Threats 4.SQL Server malwares • Cblade • Spida • Slammer 5.Oracle rootkits 6.Conclusion 7.References 2 Overview www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 3. • Databases have the highest rate of breaches among all business assets. • according to the 2012 Verizon Data Breach Report. • 96% of breached are from databases. • databases are at the heart of any organization, storing customer records and other confidential business data. But How are databases so vulnerable to breaches? 3 Introduction to Database Security [1] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 4. 4 How much personal data worth?[1] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 6.  Password guessing / bruteforcing  Passwords and data sniffed over the network • If encryption is not used, passwords and data can be sniffed.  Exploiting misconfigurations • Some database servers are open by default  . Exploiting known/unknown vulnerabilities • Buffer overflows. • SQL Injection. • Etc.  Exploiting SQL Injection on web applications • This is one of the easiest and preferred method that criminals use to steal sensitive information such as credit cards, social security numbers, customer information, etc.  Stealing disks and backup data.  If data files and backed up data are not encrypted, once stolen data can be compromised.  Insiders are a major threat • If they can log in then they can hack the database. 6 How databases are hacked? [2,3] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 7.  Malwares • By email, p2p, IM, CD, DVD, etc. • Once executed • Get database servers and login info • configure connections, Sniffing, etc. • Connect to database servers (try default accounts if necessary). • Steal data (run 0day and install rootkit if necessary). • Find next target • Looking at linked servers/databases. • Looking at connections. • Sniffing. • Send encrypted data back to attacker by email, HTTPS, covert channel, etc.  Installing a rootkit/backdoor • Actions and database objects can be hidden. • Designed to steal data and send it to attacker and/or to give the attacker stealth and unrestricted access at any given time. 7 How databases are hacked?(cons.) www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 8. 8 How databases are hacked?(cons.)
  • 9. 9 Top Ten Database Security Threats: 2010 vs. 2013[1] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 10.  Cbalde  dnsservice.exe Worm  2001-2003  First MS SQL Server worm.  With 3 versions 10 SQL server malwares : Cbalde[5] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 11. 11 SQL malwares : Cbalde diagram www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 12. 12 • Update current antivirus software programs • Force DBA to change the default configuration. • Restrict access to port 1433 . SQL server malwares : Cbalde[5] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 13. 13 • Install Patches • The Aladdin Virus Alert for Win32.Cblade.a is available at the following link: Virus Alert. The March 2, 2003, virus definitions are available at the following link: Aladdin • The Aladdin Virus Alert for Win32.Cblade.b is available at the following link: Virus Alert. The March 2, 2003, virus definitions are available at the following link: Aladdin • The Computer Associates Virus Threat for Win32.SQL, as well as the signature and engine information, is available at the following link: Computer Associates • The F-Secure Virus Description for SQL Worm is available at the following link: Virus Description. The November 24, 2001, and later definition updates are available at the following link: F-Secure • … SQL server malwares : Cbalde[5] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 14.  Spida MS SQL Server worm.  Second MS SQL Server worm.  2002  Exploit blank sa password.  Platforms Affected:  Microsoft SQL Server  Microsoft Windows 2000  Microsoft Windows 2003 Server  Microsoft Windows NT 4.0  Microsoft Windows XP  MSRC bad days.  MS released 12 security bulletins related to SQL Server and SP3 is released.  2 remotely exploitable vulnerabilities.  Worst MS SQL Server year. 14 MS SQL malwares : Spida [5] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 15. 15 MS SQL malwares : Spida [5] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 16. 16 MS SQL malwares : Spida Safeguards [5] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 17.  Slammer/Sapphire Worm  Third MS SQL Server worm.  2003  The worm was based on proof of concept code demonstrated at the Black Hat Briefings by David Litchfield[3]  Sapphire's spreading strategy is based on random scanning, like Code Red. [2]  Exploits UDP port 1434 buffer overflow.  A patch had been available from Microsoft for six months prior to the worm's launch, but many installations had not been patched – including many at Microsoft[5]  because the SQL Slammer worm was so small in size, sometimes it was able to get through when legitimate traffic was not. [2] 17 MS SQL malwares : Slammer [2,3,4,8] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 18. more than 90% of vulnerable hosts within 10 minutes![4] 18 What a Propagation ?! MS SQL malwares : Slammer [2,3,4,8] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 19. 19 1. Get inside • masquerades as a single UDP packet • The first byte in the string is “04” • name be at most 16 bytes long and end in “00” • ssnetlib.dll : SQL Server Resolution Service 2. Reprogram the Machine • after opening Slammer's too-long UDP "request" is overwrite its own stack with new instructions that Slammer has disguised as a routine query 3. Choose Victims at Random • targeting another computer that could be anywhere on the Internet. 4. Replicate • Slammer points to its own code as the data to send. 5. Repeat MS SQL malwares : Slammer Steps [2] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 20. • Outcame • overwhelmed the network with its scanning • denial of service by flooding the network. • it shut down • Bank of America Corp. • ATMs • cancellation of airline flights • blacked out an emergency call center in Seattle. • Safeguard • . Before one hooks up a computer, one should define its function and the services necessary to perform that function. If the computer is not going to be used as a database or web server, then those programs and services should not be running. • Use of the "netstat -an" command on a Windows or Unix machine will let you know what ports are open on your machine. For example, POP3 runs on TCP port 110. If your machine is not running a POP server, this port should not be open. • Use ingress/egress filtering at firewall and/or border router to only allow access to the Internet those ports necessary on that machine for it to perform its function. 20 MS SQL malwares : Slammer [2,3,4,8]
  • 21. 21 • A rootkit is a set of tools used by an attacker after hacking a computer system that hides logins, processes, etc. It is commonly used to hide the operation of an attacker in a compromised system. Rootkits are more widespread in Operating Systems but the idea is applicable to databases too. • Operating Systems and Databases are quite similar in the architecture. • Both have • Users • Processes • Jobs • Executables • … Oracle Rootkits [6] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 22. 22 If a database is a (kind of) operating system, then it is possible to migrate malware (concepts) like viruses or rootkits from the operating system world to the database world. Oracle Rootkits [6]
  • 23. 23 • Implementing an Oracle Database Rootkit then a backdoor:  PL/SQL,  Java  or a combination of both. • Steps  PL/SQL scripts that needs to be run on the Oracle Database server with administrator privileges Run Backdoor Console Oracle Rootkits [6,7] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 24. 24 • Rootkit process:  Hide Database Users  User and roles are stored together in the table SYS.USER$  Hide Processes  Processes are stored in a special view v$session located in the schema SYS  Hide Database Jobs  Oracle jobs are stored in the table SYS.JOB$ Oracle Rootkits [6,7] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 26. 26 • An auditor, security consultant or security tool normally only checks the table sys.user$. But Oracle is using the table sys.aser$ containing the hidden user. Oracle Rootkits [6,7] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 27. 27 • Steps  PL/SQL scripts that needs to be run on the Oracle Database server with administrator privileges  Run Backdoor Console Oracle Rootkits [6,7] www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 28. 28
  • 29. • We briefly reviewed how databases are hacked specially with the presence of malwares. Beside all the Patches and Updates If we don't protect our databases and monitor it(Services, Protocols, Files and Directories, PortsAuditing and Logging,) sooner or later you will get hacked, this means lot of money loses and in worst case running out of business. • Oracle is a powerful database and there are many possibilities to implement database rootkits in Oracle. With these techniques an attacker (internal/external) can hide his presence in a hacked database. 29 Conclusion www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 30. [1] Imperva report, "Top Ten Database Threats:The Most Significant Risks and How to Mitigate Them",2014 Giuseppe Serazzi and Stefano Zanero,"Computer Virus Propagation Models" [2] Joanne Pilker,"MS SQL Slammer/Sapphire Worm",Global Information Assurance Certification Paper,SANS Institute [3] Leyden, John (6 February 2003). "Slammer: Why security benefits from proof of concept code". Register. Retrieved 2008-11-29. [4] Moore, David et al. "The Spread of the Sapphire/Slammer Worm". CAIDA (Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis). [5] Serazzi, Giuseppe & Zanero, Stefano (2004). "Computer Virus Propagation Models". In Calzarossa, Maria Carla & Gelenbe, Erol. Performance Tools and Applications to Networked Systems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 2965. pp. 26–50. [6] Kornbrust, Alexander.“Oracle Rootkits 2.0”. Black Hat 2006 USA, Las Vegas, NV. 02; Aug 06 [7] Dennis Yurichev,"Oracle RDBMS rootkits and other modifications"Blackhat 2005 . [8] "ISS Security Brief: Microsoft SQL Slammer Worm Propagation". ISSForum. 25 January 2003. Retrieved 2008-11-29. [9]X-Force (January 25, 2003). "Peace of Mind Through Integrity and Insight". Neohapsis Archives. Retrieved 2008-11-29. [10] Vern Paxson, Stuart Staniford, and Nicholas Weaver, How to 0wn the Internet in Your Spare Time, Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium (Security '02). [11]"SQLExp SQL Server Worm Analysis". DeepSight™ Threat Management System Threat Analysis. Jan 28, 2003. 30 References www.mmAhmadian.ir/
  • 31. 31 Questions? Thanks Home page : www.mmAhmadian.ir/ Weblog : ahmadian.blog.ir