1. A SUMMARY OF FACTS
COMPARING THE BELIEFS
OF MUSLIMS VS. THOSE OF
IBN TAYMIYYAH AND THE
PHILOSOPHERS’
August 29, 2011
Posted by Sheikh Abu Adam
http://sunnianswers.wordpress.com/
A QUICK LOOK AT THE RESULTS OBTAINED
MUSLIM sayings Ibn Taymiyyah’s
versus those of the sayings versus
philosophers those of the
philosophers
Number of 13 6
disagreements
Number of 1 5
agreements
Number of 0 3
similarities
Total number of 14 14
beliefs compared
% of agreements 7% 36%
% of similar 0% 21%
sayings
% of similar 7% 57%
sayings or

2. agreements
FALSE PROPAGANDA & ACCUSATIONS
A common accusation of the wahabis and other anthropomorphists
throughout history, is that the mainstream scholars of Islam, the
Sunnis, the Asħˆariyys and Maaturiidiyys, took their beliefs from the
Aristotelian philosophers. For someone with insight into the science
of belief, this is obviously ridiculous, as they are bitter enemies, but
those who do not have this insight might be affected by such fear
mongering.
FACT 1
In reality, however, the reason why Sunni scholars engaged deeply
into arguments based on pure reasoning, was to refute the beliefs
of the philosophers. Accordingly, they studied their concepts and
terminology, and then showed how the Aristotelian arguments were
wrong using the terminology of philosophy.
FACT 2
On the other hand, Ibn Taymiyyah also studied Aristotelian arguments,
particularly as presented by the Spanish philosopher Ibn Rusħd (the
grandson). His purpose, however, was quite different. What he wanted
was to find arguments against the Sunnis that could be used to defend
and support his anthropomorphist belief that Aļļaah is something
with a size, in a location, that moves and goes through changes.
During this process he even adopted some beliefs that are identical or
equivalent to those of the Aristotelians.
He was however a rhetorician of proportions, knowing how to sound
convincing to the naïve, without actually saying much at all. He rarely
defines his terms or clarifies exactly what the point of disagreement
is. He sidetracks a lot and makes long and useless discussions arguing
about terminology, “if you by this word this, then I say that,” even
when he knows very well that this is not what his opponent means.
He also hides his own views by arguing through quoting others, or by
saying, “it could be said to that…” or the like. That is why you find him
extremely long winded and incredibly vague. It is because he beats
around the bush so much, that many scholars never discovered him
and caught him red handed with his anthropomorphist agenda.
ANALYSIS OF COMPARISON OF MUSLIM & IBN TAYMIYYAH

3. BELIEFS VS PHILOSOPHERS
The below table outlines some of the fundamental principles of belief
that are disputed between the philosophers, the Sunnis and Ibn
Taymiyyah, to see who resembles one another more. Be forewarned
that the Wahabis will try to skew the results below by making two of
the principle issues into many issues.
The first principle issue is that Aļļaah is not a body, i.e. not something
in a direction that can be pointed at. It is based on this principle that
they denied that any of the words ascribing meanings to Aļļaah in
the Qur’aan and the Sunnah, such as nazala, jaa’, istawa, wajh, yad,
ˆaynayn, janb, qadam, ‘işbiˆ, and yamiin, can be understood in terms
of movement, shape, parts, limbs or the like. So it becomes according
to them, nazala (descend by movement), jaa’ (came by movement),
istawa (become settled), wajh (face), yad (forelimb), ˆayn (organ of
sight), janb (side), qadam (foot), ‘işaabiˆ (fingers), and yamiin (right
hand side), etc. In contrast, the ‘Asħˆariyys will either simply narrate
such words, when apparently ascribed to Aļļaah, without assigning
any meaning, but denying a bodily meaning, or they will look at what
the Arabic language allows of meanings, and choose one meaning
that befits the Creator. For example, jaa’ becomes “His orders came,”
and “istawa” becomes “controls”, and wajh becomes “what is done for
His sake”, and so on. This is not denial of attributes, as the followers
of Ibn Taymiyyah claim, it is a denial of limbs, and this comes back
to one principle belief, namely that Aļļaah is not a body, i.e. not
something with size or shape or borders. Since Ibn Taymiyyah believes
that Aļļaah is a body, he interprets any word that can be understood
in a bodily manner as having a bodily meaning, whereas Muslims
interpret such words in ways that do not involve bodily attributes.
There are therefore many differences on interpretation that in reality
come back to one single principle.
The second principle issue is the Muslim principle belief that Aļļaah is
not something that events happen in, not something that changes,
in contrast with the opposite belief of Ibn Taymiyyah. This is another
principle belief with many sub questions in the same manner as the
first principle issue. For example, ghađab will be interpreted by Ibn
Taymiyyah as emotional change, whereas Muslims will understand it
as Aļļaah willing punishment, without Him changing or being in time.
That being said, here are the details of the analysis:
The belief of the The belief of the The belief of Ibn

4. philosophers Sunnis Taymiyyah
(Asħˆariyys,
Maaturiidiyys and
noble Ĥanbaliyys)
1. Most of the Nothing is eternal He believed that
philosophers other than Aļļaah, Aļļaah is an eternal
believed that the and He is not a body. body (i.e. limited
world is eternal. Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy said: in all 6 directions
They believed {He is now as – a 3 dimensional
that matter is He always was, shape) and that
eternal and that eternally with His there have always
there are one attributes, before been other bodies
or more eternal His creation came with Him, coming
bodies (something into being.} The into existence,
with size) (Adħ- existence of a body one after another
Dħakħiirah, 13). without a beginning eternally without a
(Adħ-Dħakħiirah is is impossible, beginning.[1]
a book written by because it needs a Accordingly, there
a Turkish scholar creator to specify its is one eternal body,
to judge between shape. Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy while other bodies
Al-Ghazaaliyy and said {in brackets}: are eternal in kind in
the philosophers, {The six directions} his view.
as ordered by up, down, front,
Muĥammad Al- back, left and right
Faatiĥ) {do not contain Him}
because that would
make Him {like all
created things}
Similarity to Disagree Identical (in
philosophers meaning, but not
in naming; he calls
the eternal body
Aļļaah, while the
philosophers do not.)
2. The philosophers It is rationally Ibn Taymiyyah said
said that the possible for the it is not rationally
world (anything world to cease to possible that there
other than Aļļaah) exist completely. be no creation

5. cannot cease We only know that it (something other
to exist (Adħ- will continue by the than Aļļaah),
Dħakħiirah, 65). In scriptures that tell us because Aļļaah must
other words, it is a about resurrection always create.[2]
must to them that and eternal life in This is because
other than Aļļaah Paradise or torture in his actions are not
exists. Hell. beginningless and
endless according
to Ibn Taymiyyah,
but happen one after
another.[3] In other
words, it is a must to
him that other than
Aļļaah exists.
Similarity to Disagree Identical in
philosophers meaning, but not in
naming.
3. The philosophers The Sunnis say that Ibn Taymiyyah said
do not accept to Aļļaah has a Will, and that Aļļaah must
say that Aļļaah has that it is impossible always create, as
choice in whether that Aļļaah should mentioned. He said
to create or not need/ be compelled Aļļaah has a choice in
(Adħ-Dħakħiirah, to create. what to create, but
71). not whether to create
or not.[4]
Similarity to Disagree Identical
philosophers
4. The philosophers The Sunnis said that Ibn Taymiyyah
cannot prove that all other than Aļļaah cannot prove that
the world needs need to be created by the world needs a
a creator based Him, and that He is creator based on
on their premises. not of created kind, his premises. This is
This is because such as bodies, so because he said that
they claimed that He does not need a Aļļaah himself is in a
matter, and what creator. place and has 6 limits
they call “the first Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy said (i.e. 3 dimensional)
mind”, and some {in brackets}: {The and yet is not created

6. other parts of the six directions} up, (see footnote 1). He
world, are eternal. down, front, back, is therefore unable
(Adħ-Dħakħiirah, left and right {do not to establish that
87) contain Him} because things with 6 limits
that would make need a creator, i.e.
Him {like all created all the world as we
things} know it. After all, if
such a complex body
can exist without a
creator, then what
about simpler ones?
Similarity to Disagree Identical
philosophers
5. The philosophers Aļļaah has the power Aļļaah has the power
said that it is only to create infinitely to create infinitely
possible for Aļļaah many creations many creations
to create one appearing over time. appearing over time.
single thing, and
He cannot create
a body. (Adħ-
Dħakħiirah, 99).
Similarity to Disagree Disagree
philosophers
6. The philosophers Sunnis said that He said that Aļļaah
refused to Aļļaah is attributed is attributed with
ascribe to Aļļaah with knowledge, knowledge, power,
attributes that power, life, will, life, will, hearing,
affirm meanings hearing, seeing and seeing and speech
to Aļļaah Himself, speech that are not that are not merely
and are not mere merely negations negations of their
negations. That is, of their opposites. opposites. He said,
knowledge, power, They said that these however, that these
life, will, hearing, are eternal and change over time.
seeing, and speech. unchanging attributes
Even when they that are not in time
use these words, and affirm meanings
they intend by that are eternally

7. them the negation true of Aļļaah,
of some meaning. and are not mere
(Adħ-Dħakħiirah, negations of flaws.
106).
Similarity to Disagree Disagree
philosophers
7. The philosophers Although there are Ibn Taymiyyah
agreed to say differences regarding believed that the
that the creator the details of this creator is a body
is not a body, nor issue, Sunnis said located above
like a body, and that Aļļaah is not in creation,[5] with
He is not in time, time or in place, or created events in it,
place, direction, direction. The bases such as
or existing in for this is the movement.[6]His
something else. Quranic, “He does basis for this is
That is, to ascribe not resemble taking all scriptures
attributes to Aļļaah anything”, which is ascribing a meaning
that negate what understood literally, to Aļļaah according
does not befit Him. and any other to the customary
They also agreed scripture is meanings; the
to ascribe to Him understood in light of meanings that apply
meanings related it. The reason for to creation. He then
to creating, such as this is that the interprets the
providing, creating, reality of the Quranic, “He does
controlling etc. Creator’s existence not resemble
(Adħ-Dħakħiirah, must be complete in anything”
106) perfection, and accordingly. He
created existence is understands this non-
need in each and resemblance to
every sense, mean different from
because it needs a creation the way
creator. Since Aļļaah created things differ
is not created, He from one another, so
cannot resemble He is bigger in size
created things. This than anything else,
is shown by the stronger, etc.
Quranic Accordingly, he
rhetorical, “Is the interpreted words

8. One that Creates like ascribed to Aļļaah in
what does not the scriptures as
create?” meaning physical
attributes and
change, such as
limbs, place,
movement,
emotions, and so on.
Similarity to Identical Disagree
philosophers
8. The philosophers Aļļaah knows He said that Aļļaah
denied that Aļļaah everything with an knows everything,
knows particulars. eternal knowledge but that it changes
(Adħ-Dħakħiirah, that does not change. over time in terms
172). of particulars as
the future becomes
past.[7]
Similarity to Disagree Similar (because
philosophers this means he
believed that
Aļļaah’s knowledge is
bounded by time. )
9. The philosophers The Sunnis said there I haven’t seen Ibn
discussed whether is no way of knowing Taymiyyah mention
the universe itself, such a thing without this, so we’ll give him
as a total body, has revelation from the benefit of the
a self that speaks Aļļaah. doubt.
and moves by will.
(Adħ-Dħakħiirah,
179).
Similarity to Disagree Disagree
philosophers
10. The The Sunnis said that Ibn Taymiyyah is
philosophers said the hit to the floor very vague on this
that normal cause and the breaking of issue. However,
actually influences the glass are two it appears that

9. in reality its effect, different creations of he is close to the
i.e. the causes Aļļaah, thus the hit muˆtazilite view,
between created has no real influence, namely that things
things, such as only apparently and do have actual
glass hits floor according to the intrinsic influence
– glass breaks is normal correlation on each other, but
a matter of real that Aļļaah has that this is created
influence. (Adħ- created between in them, and they
Dħakħiirah, 219). things, such as: use it by Aļļaah’s
heat (one creation) permission.[8] This is
– burn (another half way to the belief
creation), of the philosophers,
hit (one creation) who believed that
– break (another such influence is not
creation), created. For example,
jump off cliff (one it could be then,
creation) – fall down according to him heat
(another creation), (one creation) – burn
etc. (a creation brought
into existence by
heat.)
Similarity to Disagree Similar
philosophers
11. The The Asħˆariyys Ibn Taymiyyah
Aristotelians agreed that if bodies agreed with the
believed that are divided, one Aristotelians and
bodies do not would eventually criticized the
contain indivisible reach an element Asħˆariyys for
elements that are that is not divisible. their claim that
not divisible in the Not by force, and all bodies must
mind’s eye. not even in the consist of indivisible
mind’s eye could it particles.[10]This is
be divided. This is because he believed
because if one said Aļļaah to be a body,
e.g. that a stone is and did not want to
infinitely divisible into say openly that this
infinite quantities, body is divisible.
then this would He did however say

10. necessitate that the that it is shrinkable,
stone has infinite as seen in the
quantity, which would quote in last quoted
mean that its size paragraph ofthis
is infinite, and this article.
is clearly not the
case.[9]
Similarity to Disagree Identical
philosophers
12. The Platonic It is impossible that Since Ibn Taymiyyah
philosophers other than Aļļaah allows for created
believed that the could exist without a kinds to be eternal,
human soul is beginning. he would say that
beginningless. the human soul
Aristoteleans as a kind could be
disagreed. (Adħ- beginningless, even
Dħakħiirah, 248). if he did not say this
about the soul in
particular.
Similarity to Disagree Similar
philosophers:
13. The Since the apparent Ibn Taymiyyah has
philosophers meaning of the no dispute with
denied bodily scriptures is that Sunnis on this matter
resurrection, as there will be bodily – as far as I know.
well as Hell and resurrection and Hell
Paradise, and or Paradise for them,
said that what we must accept this.
the prophets said There is no reliable
regarding this evidence contrary to
are all figures of this. The philosophers
speech. (Adħ- reasoned that the
Dħakħiirah, 261). non-existent cannot
re-exist, because it
will be something
else. The answer is
that it was possible

11. in existence in
the first place, so
one cannot say it
becomes impossible
in existence after
that.
Similarity to Disagree Disagree
philosophers
14. The The primary bases Ibn Taymiyyah
philosophers for religious claims to stick to
developed their knowledge are the the scriptures more
opinions on Qur’aan and than anyone, but
theology without ĥadiitħ.[11] As for due to his blindness
support from the mind, its role is he ended up
revelation. (Adħ- to conceptualize and understanding them
Dħakħiirah, 270). judge in terms of in a contradictory
true and false. It is manner,[12] and in
the tool by which the a way that ruins the
scriptures can be premises for proving
understood through that Aļļaah exists by
sound deductive observing creation.
reasoning, and For details see the
avoiding PDF article:
contradictory ideas. Rational Quranic
It is not in itself a Islam vs Wahabism
tool for knowing See also:
facts of religion. For children: “How
However, the can we know that all
knowledge that other religions than
Aļļaah exists, has Islam are incorrect
Will, Power and when there are so
Knowledge can be many?”
achieved without
scripture, because
creation definitely
needs a creator.
Likewise, the mind
alone can reach the

12. conclusion that
Muĥammad ibn
ˆAbduļļaah was
indeed the
Messenger of Aļļaah.
In short, the
premises for knowing
that the Qur’aan and
the Prophet’s
teachings are
sources of true
information are
reached by the mind
by observation of the
nature of creation.
Similarity to Disagree Disagree
philosophers
MUSLIM sayings Ibn Taymiyyah’s
versus those of the sayings versus
philosophers those of the
philosophers
Number of 13 6
disagreements
Number of 1 5
agreements
Number of 0 3
similarities
Total number of 14 14
beliefs compared
% of agreements 7% 36%
% of similar 0% 21%
sayings
% of similar 7% 57%

13. sayings or
agreements
[1] Ibn Taymiyyah said:
“This middle saying among the three sayings of Al-Qaađii Abuu Yaˆlaa
is the one that agrees with what Aĥmad says and others among the
imaams. He [i.e. Aĥmad ibn Ĥanbal – and this is a lie, Aĥmad believed
what Muslims believe, but that is another matter (Trans.)] has stated,
“Aļļaah is in a particular direction, and He is not spread out in all
directions. Rather, He is outside the world, distinct from His creation,
separate from it, and He is not in every direction.”
This is what Aĥmad, may Aļļaah have mercy upon him, meant when he
said,
“He has a limit that only He knows.”
If Aĥmad had meant the direction towards the ˆArsħ (Throne) only,
then this would be known to Aļļaah’s slaves, because they know that
Aļļaah’s limit from this direction is the ˆArsħ, so we know then that
the limit they do not know is unqualified, and is not specified for the
direction of the ˆarsħ.” (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/438)
Accordingly, Ibn Taymiyyah’s saying was that Aļļaah has one limit
which is known, and that is the ˆArsħ, and that the other directions
are also limited, but these are unknown to us. This is understood from
his support to the expression “He is not spread out in all directions”.
This is made even clearer in his statement:
“That something existing should not be increasing, or decreasing, or
neither increasing nor decreasing, and yet exist and not have a size –
this is impossible.” (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/601)
In other words, he is of the opinion that everything that exists,
including the Creator, must have a size. According to Ibn Taymiyyah
then, Aļļaah has a size limited by 6 limits.

14. He is also of the opinion that creation as a kind has always existed
without a beginning, because he believes that Aļļaah’s creating
happens in time. Therefore, he argues, Aļļaah has always been doing
one act after another (i.e. creating) without a beginning. He says:
“It is a necessity of Aļļaah’s self to act, but not an act in particular, and
not having something done in particular, so there is no eternal object
in the world, and He is not a complete cause for anything in the world,
but He has in beginningless eternity always been a complete cause for
something, one after another…” (Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/97) Since nothing
exists in his belief, except what has a size, we can understand that he
believes bodies to be eternal in kind, even if each individual body has
a beginning, except the Creator’s.
[2] He says:
“It is a necessity of Aļļaah’s self to act, but not an act in particular, and
not having something done in particular,…” (Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/97)
[3] Ibn Taymiyyah said:
“It has become clear that nothing can come into existence except from
an actor that does something one after another.” (Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/
141) He also said:
“An act is impossible except bit by bit.” (Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/141)
[4] See footnote 2.
[5] See footnote #1
[6] Ibn Taymiyyah said :
In the above statement, Ibn Taymiyyah addresses his opponent, who
has stated that movement must have a beginning, so it cannot be an
attribute of perfection. Ibn Taymiyyah responds to this: “Beginning

15. for its kind or each distinct movement? The first is impossible, but the
second is accepted as true.” (Dar’ Taˆaaruđ A-ˆAql wa-n-Naql, 4/160)
In other words, it is not impossible that there are infinitely many
movements in the past in Ibn Taymiyyah’s view, and it can be an
attribute of Aļļaah, since it is an attribute of perfection in his view. This
is based on his belief that Aļļaah is a body, because a body that cannot
move is “stuck” and it is better to be able to move than to be stuck.
Sunnis believe that Aļļaah is not a body, so the attributes of being
able to move or being stuck do not apply to Him. Note that movement
is not an attribute of perfection, because movement happens due to
the need to move, although being stuck is even worse, as it signifies
inability to do what one needs to to do. Both movement and being
stuck are thus attributes of imperfection.
Ibn Taymiyyah also said:
“So this is not correct except according to what they innovated by
their saying “Aļļaah does not move and things do not come into
existence in Him,” by which they denied that He settled on the throne
after being unsettled and that He comes on the Day of Judgment and
other things that Aļļaah described Himself with in the Qur’aan and
ĥadiitħ.” (Al-Fataawaa Al-Kubraa, 5/128)
He also said:
It has become clear that other than the necessary in existence can
influence the necessary in existence (the necessary in existence, i.e.
Allaah(.
This shows that Ibn Taymiyyah considered Aļļaah to have bodily
attributes based on his understanding of the scripture texts. He
understood them according to the customary meanings that are true of
creation.
[7] Ibn Taymiyyah said regarding Aļļaah’s attribute of knowledge:

16. “This attribute is beginningless, since it is impossible that He be
attributed with it as some particular time (and not others). However,
one should not delve deeply on this and end up saying what the
kalaam scholars say: “Verily He knows the event when it happens
with a beginningless knowledge,” for this implies that the knowledge of
something previously non-existing during both its existence and non-
existence one single knowledge. This is irrational, because knowledge
follows what exists.”
He says this, because He believes Aļļaah to must be in time,
since He believes He is a body (see footnote1,) and that Aļļaah’s
beginninglessness is a beginningless series of moments. See one
of Ibn Taymiyyah’s follower’s argument for this with a rebuttal
here:Aļļaah is not in time.
[8] Ibn Taymiyyah plays word games on this issue, so it is hard to
catch what he is actually saying. However, the following phrase of his
is telling. Because he rejects the idea that created things have real
influence, as the Sunnis say, and then states:
He says: If Aļļaah created causes, and created through them other
things, and controlled the matters of the skies and the earth, then this
would be more complete in ability than creating something by itself,
without creating another power, other than it, by which He creates it.
In other words, He is saying that the power of creating can be put
in causes, and other created things. This means that he believes
that Aļļaah could have partners in creating, which is another shirk to
add to the list of the other ones he commits. This belief is identical
to that of the Muˆtazilah. This is not perfection, as he claims, but
in contradiction to it, because it is among the perfect attributes of
Aļļaah that His Power is not merely a possibility, but an uncreated
eternal necessary attribute. Aļļaah’s attribute of Power is necessary in
existence, and therefore not amendable. Had it been amendable, or
shareable, then this would mean that it was not necessary in the first
place, and it would have needed a creator, like anything that is subject
to specification and change. Actually, Ibn Taymiyyah’s argument is
identical to Christian arguments like this one. A related topic regarding
omnipotence is also presented here.

17. [9] See also this article.
[10] Ibn Taymiyyah said:
“Some of the authors in Kalaam science make the affirmative belief
in the indivisible particle of bodies the saying of the Muslims, and
claim that denying it is the saying of the non-Muslims. This is because
they don’t know anything about the sayings of the Muslims except
what they found in the books of their shaykħs, the people of kalaam
science, the innovation in religion that the Salaf and the Imams spoke
against.” (Minhaaj As-Sunnah An-Nabawiyyah, 138)
[11] Scholarly ijmaaˆ consensus and Islamic legal analogy (qiyaas)
are also proofs, of course, but these are established as proofs by
Qur’aan and ĥadiitħ.
[12] This article addresses this problem: The ‘Simple’ Wahabi Belief II:
Contradiction versus narration