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Borderland: A Burkean Analysis of the 2010 Ukrainian Presidential Election
Thomas McCloskey
March, 2012
To a casual observer, the 2010 Ukrainian presidential election appeared to be a mismatch.
The Party of Regions’ Viktor Yanykovich, a bear of a man with a history of embarrassing
political losses and lingering scandals, and an inability to articulate or defend his positions, faced
“Ukraine’s Joan of Arc,” peasant-braided prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, a fiery orator with
her own political party railing against corrupt oligarchs (Byrne 1). Throughout the campaign,
Tymoshenko’s massive rallies were populist concerts complete with fireworks and celebrities
while Yanykovich, whose “limitations as a public speaker” were widely known, stuck mostly to
smaller events where he retreated to his unoriginal and dull anti-incumbent stump speech
(Chalupa). In every rhetorical respect Tymoshenko appeared poised to score an impressive win
in the January runoff vote. However, Yanykovich earned a surprising victory, which may call
standard assessments of rhetorical effectiveness into question.
Tymoshenko and Yanykovich’s construction of their presidential images highlights the
limitations of rhetorical strategies. On the one hand, Tymoshenko was clearly the more talented
rhetorician. Her effective speaking style made Yanykovich look unpersuasive and boring. On the
other hand, when saddled with overarching social problems like a limp economy as Tymoshenko
was—Ukraine’s economy shrunk by 15% in 2009 (Way 1)—even the most persuasive politician
faces tremendous obstacles during a campaign. Although Yanykovich and Tymoshenko were not
new to Ukrainian politics, the rhetorical strategies the candidates utilized in creating their
presidential image were groundbreaking for a Ukrainian election and justify rhetorical analysis.
The candidates had much help from American political consultants. Tymoshenko’s campaign

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was organized by president Obama’s 2008 campaign manager David Axelrod’s former firm
ASGK Public Strategies while Yanykovich’s deferred to his advisor since 2005, Paul J.
Manafort, whose business partner led John McCain’s 2008 presidential run. With the help of
advisors, the candidates worked tirelessly to create their own distinct rhetorical image (Levy,
“Ukraine Raises the Pressure,” 2). The communication strategies that were employed by each
candidate will be remembered in years to come. Tymoshenko’s fiery, impassioned rhetoric
established her image as a Ukrainian nationalist, complete with her circular “peasant braid” of
striking blonde hair. Her rhetorical goal was to gain all the benefits of her prime ministerial
incumbency without being associated with the electorate’s frustration with the Yushenko regime,
particularly on economic issues. Tymoshenko’s presidential image was of animated, articulate,
aggressive presidential leadership. Conversely, “Yanykovich acknowledged that he was pursuing
a classic anti-incumbent strategy” (Levy, “Ukraine Raises the Pressure on Opposition Leaders”
2), staying “on message” that is, orange-bashing. As Manafort explained, “Despite the great
expectations from the orange campaign promises of five years ago, the world and the people of
Ukraine see that Tymoshenko has failed” (Levy, “Toppled in Ukraine but Nearing a Comeback,”
2). Yanykovich kept his speeches short and focused on how the economy was crumbling and
arguing that Tymoshenko was to blame. Yanykovich’s presidential image was, simply put, not
being Tymoshenko—an alternative to the very bad economic circumstances he hoped would be
associated with his opponent in the minds of the electorate.
While not exactly a second orange revolution, the 2010 election was just as significant in
terms of Ukraine’s direction and place in the world. Even more than in 2004, the two candidates
were rhetorically distinct and enacted specific communicative strategies to win the election. To
understand Yanykovich’s victory and Tymoshenko’s near-win despite politically

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disadvantageous circumstances requires a careful analysis of the rhetoric of the campaign.
Determining how these images were rhetorically constructed can explain why Yanykovich was
able defeat a much more articulate and charismatic opponent. Thus, the purpose of this paper is
to de-construct the ways in which Yanykovich and Tymoshenko rhetorically manufactured their
presidential images before the 2010 election and explain Viktor Yanykovich’s surprising victory.
This paper begins with an analysis of Kenneth Burke’s representative anecdote as
adapted by Barry Brummet as a method of media criticism. Next, this paper examines the
narratives of both candidates in addition to a specific event from the campaign, the “non”
presidential debate in which Yanykovich refused to participate, through Burke’s anecdotal
methodology. Finally, the paper highlights the rhetorical strategies employed and determine why
and how Yanykovich won the election from a rhetorical perspective.
Brummet’s Adaptation of Burke’s Representative Anecdote: A Methodology
Given the expansive nature of rhetoric worthy of examination, critics require a method of
specifying communication artifacts that reflect the complex nature of the texts themselves while
allowing for substantive study. Rhetorical analysis requires critics to make what Burke calls
reductions of reality that condense a complex text into meaningful vocabularies that will reflect
the essence of the given artifact. Burke’s representative anecdote allows for greater analysis of a
specific event during a campaign that therefore lends itself to more accurate discussion of image
construction. However, Barry Brummett’s adaptation outlining how to use the representative
anecdote as a method for media criticism offers a unique extension of Burke’s work. Using
Burke’s representative anecdote as a methodology for media criticism, as explained by
Brummett, has three specific steps: (1) identifying the plot within the anecdote by synthesizing
the discourses that construct it, (2) determining what the rhetorical exigencies and problems are

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that the anecdote reflects, and (3) examining what the anecdote’s suggested solutions to these
problems are. Brummett suggests that this construction can explain a narrative and determine if it
is truly representative of an anecdote’s discourse. In sum, critics construct the most thorough
representative anecdote possible and then determine what problems and solutions it suggests.
ANALYSIS
Brummett’s extension of Burke’s representative anecdote relies on three specific
methodological tenets: (1) identifying the plot inherent within the anecdote, (2) highlighting the
rhetorical exigencies and social structures and problems the anecdote emphasizes, and (3)
determining what the anecdote’s proposed solutions are for the problems it outlines. This section
will apply Brummett’s methodology to the non-debate between the two presidential hopefuls. By
viewing the candidates’ individual anecdotes in this context, this analysis will be able to
construct the ways in which those narratives clashed with each other and changed during a
specific rhetorical event in the anecdote of the non-debate.
The Non-Debate Narrative Anecdote
The Ukrainian constitution mandates that the two main candidates have at least one
televised debate before any national election. Ignoring this mandate, Yanykovich chose to skip
the February 1, 2010, event and give his standard stump speech discussed earlier to news
cameras at his campaign headquarters. This left Tymoshenko all alone across from an empty
lectern, free to criticize her opponent for the entire televised hour. The anecdote of this non-
debate, constructed through a dialectic exchange of candidate speeches and statements in the
media before, during, and after the incident, can be summarized as follows: Yanykovich and
Tymoshenko’s hostile and polarizing rhetoric during the campaign made compromise,
identification and communication with the other side in this setting impossible. Electoral victory

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was the only acceptable outcome for either candidate. The extension of the vitriolic rhetoric from
both candidates during the campaign to their dialogue surrounding the non-debate was to be
expected. This narrative reflects the deeper structures of the context in which it took place, and is
reflected in several rhetorical texts.
In the case of the non-debate, Brummett’s rhetorical problems reflect the anecdotes of
both candidates and present a layered, multi-faceted exchange rather than a single narrative
communicated by one individual. Rather than viewing the perspectives of Yanykovich and
Tymoshenko as independent narratives, the campaign’s rhetoric in the non-debate context
demonstrates how these two anecdotes interact with and influence each other. The two
candidates in the 2010 election did not campaign in a rhetorical vacuum in which Tymoshenko
and Yanykovich simply presented their ideas and let the voters sort out who was right; they not
only presented their narratives, but repeatedly and aggressively attacked those of their opponent
while defending their own perspectives from similar assaults. Their rhetoric evolved to a
dialectical tension between each other, voters, and the social and political context in which it
took place. Viewing Tymoshenko’s and Yanykovich’s anecdotes independently from this multi-
faceted perspective ignores these vital narrative components. Viewing the non-debate as a
representative anecdote offers a view of Tymoshenko’s and Yanykovich’s narratives in conflict
and provides insight into the deeper structures their perspectives present in this unique setting.
Events and real-world realities shape rhetoric and influence communication decisions
during political campaigns. Narratives, and how those anecdotes are presented to voters, are
significantly influenced by the ever-changing political landscape as these deeper structures and
rhetorical problems Brummett highlights evolve. If Yanykovich was not aware of this reality
then his advisors certainly were, because the Party of Region’s candidate could only lose ground

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by debating Tymoshenko. An overview of the political landscape before the non-debate
illustrates this fact. Ukraine remains extremely divided for several reasons, though there is still
room for issues to influence the results of a given election. First, Ukraine’s central oblasts,
Cherkassy, Poltava and Kirovograd, act as “swing” regions and vary between the major political
parties in any given election in much the same way that Ohio, Colorado and Florida frequently
alternate in American politics. These vital regions represent the literal and figurative middle
ground for Ukrainian elections and voters in these oblasts are highly influenced by major issues
such as the economy. In the 2010 race, Yanykovich did much better than expected in all three
“swing” regions. Second, the actual number of voters can vary significantly in a given election
and influence their results. In other words, Yanykovich does not need the citizens of the western
stronghold Lviv oblast to vote for him in order to win; he just needs a substantial percentage of
those voters to stay home instead of voting for Tymoshenko, or no one at all. Voter turnout in the
2010 election was the lowest in over 10 years, and 4.4% of voters—a majority of whom were
from western regions—chose the “against all” option on the ballot, indicating that issues such as
the economy kept many Tymoshenko supporters home on election day (Halpin 4). In sum,
despite ever-increasing polarization of political discourse, many Ukrainian voters are nonetheless
influenced by issues, the most significant of which in 2010 was the falling economy, an issue
which Yanykovich was politically ahead on. This reality meant that if nothing changed before
the election, Yanykovich would win, a fact that influenced his rhetorical decision not to debate
Tymoshenko.
Yanykovich’s rhetorical problem in the context of the non-debate was political self-
preservation. While his campaign anecdote was about the economy and related to all Ukrainians,
his debate narrative was about him winning the election and related only directly to himself and

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his supporters. This represents a rhetorical shift from social issues towards more deliberate
strategic maneuvering. Because Yanykovich correctly believed he had a winning narrative about
the economy in place, anything that might disrupt that anecdote in the minds of voters was
politically dangerous for him. Any change in these conditions could therefore only hurt the front-
running, leading candidate, meaning that participating in a debate with Tymoshenko on live
television was a no-win scenario for Yanykovich. If he had debated his opponent, the fiery orator
Tymoshenko, she might have been able to sway some voters into thinking that the economic
tailspin Ukraine found itself in was actually the fault of Yanykovich’s obstructionist policies in
Parliament, or worse, that the economy was not the most important issue for Ukrainians to
consider when going to the polls. The only alternative for Yanykovich which guaranteed a
relatively low-risk, positive result, was not to debate at all. Aware that he could only lose ground
by debating Tymoshenko—and that he likely would sink in the polls if he stood at a podium and
let his rhetorically skilled opponent call him a thief, liar and rapist for an hour on television—
Yanykovich decided not to show up to the debate at all and went into spin-control mode. Several
rhetorical texts reflect this strategy.
Claiming that such communication skills are silly and unnecessary to lead a country,
Yanykovich implied that Tymoshenko’s rhetorical abilities were a vice and not a virtue in his
response to a reporter’s question about why he refused to debate his opponent: “I wasn’t trained
as an artist. Therefore competing with Tymoshenko in this profession is something I won’t do.
As a matter of principle. It’s not my profession” (Yanykovich, “I Wasn’t Trained As An Artist”
2). In other words, Yanykovich implied that his opponent’s enthusiasm for debating made her an
out-of-touch artist and sophist who could not relate to the normal, hard-working Ukrainians
whom he represented. This rhetoric represents Yanykovich’s effort to shift the discussion back

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towards the issue that he was ahead on—the economy. Before the debate, Yanykovich’s
representatives were less delicate in addressing their candidate’s refusal to participate. In another
rhetorical text, “Hanna Herman, deputy head of Yanykovich’s Party of Regions, explained why
her boss will not debate on live television. ‘Tymoshenko is a liar,’ Herman said. ‘It would be a
waste of time to debate anything with her in public’” (Byrne 2). Given the extremely hostile
rhetoric characterizing the campaign to that point, Yanykovich could get away with simple
insults aimed at his opponent since those who agreed with his assessment of Tymoshenko would
agree with him and those who backed Tymoshenko would not vote for him anyway. The
alarmingly hostile discourse characterizing the campaigns of both candidates discussed in
chapter two pushed the electorate to extremes. Consequently, the campaign’s rhetoric created an
exigence in which it was acceptable for Yanykovich to not show up for a legally-mandated
televised debate.
In response to Yanykovich’s decision to not engage her in a public setting, Tymoshenko
was presented with a distinct rhetorical problem that mirrored her opponents’ issue: threatened
political survival. Although Tymoshenko’s narrative was the same in this context as it was
throughout the campaign—nationalism should come first and Yanykovich is an inarticulate
coward—her rhetorical problem shifted from highlighting Ukraine’s national identity crisis to
keeping her political hopes alive. Tymoshenko likely knew the importance of televised debates
in which candidates can educate the electorate, illuminate their (and their opponents’) positions,
clarify issues, force dialogue on difficult social problems and offer voters a more honest look at
themselves and the campaign in general. For these reasons, political debates are a potent
representation of candidates and their rhetoric, more so than any other single event during a
campaign. In addition to these realities, Tymoshenko is a much more skilled public speaker than

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Yanykovich, so the ground she stood to gain in the polls had the debate taken place was
presumably substantial. When Yanykovich did not show up for the debate, Tymoshenko’s
rhetoric needed to respond to this changing political reality.
With her opponent a no-show for the debate, Tymoshenko could have made the rhetorical
choice to not show up, and hold a press conference or rally at which she could again attack her
opponent. However, she instead made the strategic decision to attend the non-debate and let
Yanykovich’s podium stand empty in the hope that it would serve as a visual example of her
“Yanykovich is a coward” rhetoric akin to how the reconstitutive discourse of her hair and attire
conveys her Ukrainian nationalism. While her nationalist campaign anecdote was directed at the
entire country, her shifting rhetorical problem of political self-preservation for the non-debate
anecdote focused on herself and her supporters, in much the same way Yanykovich’s did.
Tymoshenko’s choice to attend the non-debate and rail against her opponent for an hour on
television provides a rhetorical text demonstrating her adaptation to the changing political
context of the campaign. Moreover, in a series of speeches and press releases also serving as
rhetorical texts, she echoed her sentiments from a previous primary debate in which Yanykovich
also refused to participate, saying that “Viktor Yanykovich is truly afraid of open discussion”
(Tymoshenko, “About last night’s show” 1) and that his lack of involvement is “both sad and
funny” (Tymoshenko, “Open letter” 2). In her open letter to Yanykovich released the following
day that serves as a text for this exigence, Tymoshenko attacked her opponent for his lack of
participation in the debate, calling him a coward. The ad homonym insults from Tymoshenko
were nothing new, and reflect the same anecdote that she had been communicating to voters
throughout the campaign about Yanykovich’s cowardice and inability to lead Ukraine. However,
while her narrative remained the same, her rhetorical problem in the non-debate anecdote is

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unique. While the previous anecdote reflected a problem of Ukraine’s national identity crisis,
these texts convey a sense of political desperation on the part of the Tymoshenko campaign.
Every major poll showed that Yanykovich had a small but decisive lead during the days before
the election, and the non-debate represented the last major chance for Tymoshenko to gain
ground on her opponent. This reality did not escape Tymoshenko, and her rhetorical problem in
this instance was that she knew her odds of victory were quickly dwindling. The persuasiveness
of Tymoshenko’s nationalist narrative depends on her ability to use that anecdote to attack her
opponent with it and communicate that discourse to voters, two things Yanykovich denied her by
refusing to debate.
Although the narratives for both candidates remained the same in the context of the non-
debate, with Tymoshenko still beating the nationalist drum and insulting her opponent and
Yanykovich staying on his economic message, this analysis demonstrates that the rhetorical
problems behind these discourses shifted towards a need for political survival for each candidate.
The success of his economic narrative influenced Yanykovich’s rhetoric and actions by
convincing him to not show up to debate his opponent and instead attack her in the same ways he
had been, which in turn influenced Tymoshenko to go to the debate anyway and insult him on
television hoping to make up some ground in the polls.
When determining what solutions are present in an anecdote for the problems it outlines,
Brummett explains that such rhetorical remedies are essentially the completion of the discourse.
Just as the anecdote highlights real-life problems facing the audience, the solutions provide the
agents with the “symbolic resources to face their real situations” (Brummett 164). In providing
potential solutions to these problems, the anecdote offers the audience a genuine sense of hope to
combat such issues and, as previously described by Brummett, “equips a culture for living in that

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situation” (164). The rhetorical solutions presented by the anecdote do not necessarily have to be
expressly outlined in the discourse; instead, these solutions are frequently implied by the
problems presented and emerge as the natural response to such dilemmas. Therefore, the
solutions should respond to the overarching problems in the rhetoric. For the non-debate
anecdote, these solutions are complicated. While the rhetorical problems presented during the
campaign referred to Ukrainian society in general in relation to poverty and a cultural identity
crisis, the problems present in the non-debate anecdote relate only to Yanykovich, Tymoshenko,
and their supporters, and are concerned only with the political survival of individual candidates.
Given the zero-sum nature of elections—there can only be one winner—it is rhetorically difficult
to find solutions to these dilemmas for the two candidates in the non-debate narrative, especially
given the exceedingly hostile and vitriolic rhetoric they used against each other during the
campaign. In other words, Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanykovich will probably never get
along. Despite this reality, there is rhetorical hope in bridging the polarizing divides left by
Yanykovich’s and Tymoshenko’s campaigns for their supporters. The non-debate anecdote
suggests several rhetorical solutions.
The polarized Ukrainian citizenry cannot, for the most part, relate to the other side.
Ukraine’s eastern and western regions have distinct ethnicities, religions, cultures and values,
and in political discourse these differences typically manifest themselves in the aggressive,
personal attacks that characterized the 2010 campaign, and in the lack of discourse characterizing
the non-debate anecdote. Yanykovich’s unwillingness to debate Tymoshenko on television
reflects this cultural bifurcation. Despite having a great deal in common with each other, most
Ukrainians refuse to identify with the cross-country counterparts and neither do their political
leaders. Yanykovich and Tymoshenko typify this lack of identification by refusing to engage

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each other in any kind of discourse. During the 2010 campaign these candidates instead framed
the discussion as a winner-take-all political exchange where one culture will win and the other
will be invalidated, making dialogue and compromise impossible, as exemplified by the non-
debate. Relying on Burke, Brummett highlights how consubstantiation allows for identification
with others without sacrificing personal identity in the process. This consubstantiation is the
apparent solution this discourse suggests for the problem of Ukraine’s national identity crisis of
Tymoshenko’s anecdote and for the lack of discourse in the non-debate narrative. The question
remains, what can supporters of political and cultural rivals Yanykovich and Tymoshenko find to
be consubstantial about? The non-debate anecdote suggests two specific rhetorical alternatives.
The first consubstantial solution suggested by the anecdote for eastern and western
Ukrainians to bond over is their mutual dislike of both Yanykovich and Tymoshenko. Some
4.4% of voters in the 2010 election chose the “against all” option on the ballot, meaning that
over one million people went to the polls in freezing February temperatures, did not like any of
the options, and voted for no one in protest of the two major candidates. Pravda characterized
the election as “rape v. robbery,” a sentiment that many Ukrainians clearly agreed with as
reflected in the number of protest votes. The 2010 election marked the seventh consecutive year
that Yanykovich and Tymoshenko had played central roles in national politics and most of that
time was defined by squabbling, corruption and negative attacks on each other, along with an
unwillingness to work together or even talk about any issue which was represented in the non-
debate. As the high number of protest votes suggest, the Ukrainian people are likely tired of them
both, and this shared dislike of each candidate represents a place for consubstantiation. This
agreement between eastern and western Ukrainians that the country needs a change from
Tymoshenko and Yanykovich is one solution to the problem of the national identity crisis

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suggested by the anecdote. Moreover, if moderate and respected politicians like Serhiy Tigipko,
Yuriy Lutsenko—who was jailed in February, 2011, on trumped up charges by president
Yanykovich (Levy, Toppled in Ukraine but Nearing a Comeback,” 2)—and Arseney Yatsenyuk
capitalize on this consubstantial frustration with business as usual, as exemplified by the non-
debate, there is room for a fundamental change in Ukrainian political leadership. While the first
avenue for consubstantiation focuses on the agents involved in the discourse of the non-debate
anecdote, the second shared identification suggested by this narrative is on the content of the
rhetoric involved.
Despite frequent disagreements, the one thing Ukrainians could agree on before the 2010
elections, from western Lviv to eastern Luhansk, was that the economy was terrible. This shared
frustration with high unemployment, rising prices, and a devalued currency represents the second
option suggested by the non-debate anecdote for a consubstantial solution. As previously
discussed, in 2010, Ukraine was enduring a severe economic downturn. Burke describes
consubstantiality as “commonality of substance. That is, we have in common certain substances
including physical embodiment [and] common aspirations” (Herrick 234). The aspirations of
working class Ukrainians are fairly universal across all of the country’s geographic regions: a
good job, cheap gas and lower food prices, a viable health care system that can take care of their
children if they get sick and some entertaining singers on channel four’s Eurovision every night.
By focusing on these shared aspirations and overarching concerns, almost all of which are
economically-oriented, consubstantiality becomes a viable solution to the problem of Ukraine’s
identity crisis, the propagation of which was partially responsible for the non-debate anecdote. In
other words, “[b]y recognizing and building on our consubstantiality, identification among
people—and thus healing from the wound of our separation—becomes a rhetorical possibility”

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(Herrick 234). This consubstantial solution suggests that the focus for Ukrainian voters should be
on actual issues over polarizing rhetoric. Instead of allowing politicians to distract them with
personal attacks, gendered language, and a general refusal to engage the other side in substantive
debate (as the non-debate anecdote exemplifies), the electorate should vote for the candidates
who they believe best address the problems affecting the lives of the people. This second
consubstantial strategy of focusing entirely on germane issues would prevent politicians like
Tymoshenko and Yanykovich from using populist, personal, polarizing rhetoric to divide
uniformly poor people whose only difference is on which side of the Dnipro River they were
born.
For candidates, this consubstantial solution suggests a focus on issues in the form of
direct discussion instead of on the attacking of political opponents that the non-debate anecdote
highlights. In Ukraine such a shift in rhetoric would represent a fundamental change in the
political discourse; the tone of election campaigns would naturally become more civil and debate
would increase. In other words, if candidates are focusing entirely on the actual issues affecting
the lives of voters in reasoned, public dialogues, there would be less room for personal attacks on
the opposition. Given the increasing collective disgust with the polarizing rhetorical strategies of
both Yanykovich and Tymoshenko, such a focus on actual issues and open discussion would
likely create increased civil involvement and democratic participation among the electorate.
During the 2010 campaign, each candidate seemed more concerned with using the collapsing
economy as a tool to slam their opponent than with actually addressing such problems, and the
non-debate reflects this situation. By focusing on what consubstantiality can be found to unite
voters instead of searching for any lack of identification that divides Ukrainians, candidates
would likely be pleasantly surprised by the results.

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IMPLICATIONS
The purpose of this thesis offered in chapter 1 was to analyze the ways in which
Yanykovich and Tymoshenko rhetorically manufactured their presidential images before the
2010 election and in the process explain Viktor Yanykovich’s surprising victory from a
rhetorical perspective. The answer is as complicated as Ukrainian identity. On the surface, the
answer is simple: Yanykovich won the election over Tymoshenko because his representative
anecdote was more persuasive for voters. To casual observers of Ukraine’s political and
economic landscape, it would appear that campaigning as an incumbent in 2010 would present
nearly impossible problems for any campaign. The sitting prime minister, Tymoshenko, had no
chance of getting elected president because of the economy and frustration with her orange
revolution team’s inability to pass promised reforms.
Two general conclusions can be drawn about Tymoshenko’s rhetorical strategies. First,
had she not committed to her candidate-driven nationalist approach, she might have lost the
election by a much wider margin. Second, had Tymoshenko been able to campaign as the
opposition and been on the “right side” of the economic issues facing Ukraine, she could have
beaten Yanykovich in an electoral landslide. Despite being limited in terms of rhetorical
strategies, this analysis indicates that the candidate-driven model of image construction can be
extremely persuasive for many voters. Yanykovich’s rhetorical tactics, although similarly
limited, were also persuasive.
This paper examined the 2010 Ukrainian presidential election between Viktor
Yanykovich and Yulia Tymoshenko through the lens of the presidential imaging strategies used
and the narratives that the candidates constructed. After outlining Barry Brummett’s

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representative anecdote methodology, this paper examined the anecdotes of both Yanykovich
and Tymoshenko as well as that of a single rhetorical event from the campaign, the non-debate in
which Yanykovich refused to participate. This analysis led to several significant implications
about imaging strategies, Brummett’s methodology, and Ukrainian political discourse.
At the time of this writing, if anyone were to Google the word “Ukraine,” they would be
bombarded with advertisements for Ukrainian mail-order brides and single women, or perhaps
descriptions of Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi’s “voluptuous” Ukrainian nurse. Based on
this evidence, Ukraine has been presented as more of a brothel than as a country with a rich
cultural history and a riveting and unique political landscape. It has been little over two years
since Victor Yanykovich was elected president and during that time enough amazing events have
occurred in the rhetorical discourse of Ukraine that an entirely new master’s thesis could be
written. For example, president Yanykovich appointed long-time aide Mykola Azaroz as his
prime minister. Azarov refuses to speak Ukrainian or appoint a woman to his cabinet, and he
called a priest to his office in order to exorcise the spirit of former prime minister Tymoshenko,
adding that it was “easier to breathe” in there afterwards (Harding, “Ukrainian Women,” 3). The
subsequent jailing of Tymoshenko and her top aides, in addition to the various violent brawls in
parliament, are all unique rhetorical texts that deserve analysis. In its short history, Ukraine has
proven that it is unlike any democracy in the world; its leaders behave in ways that would make
them unelectable in western countries, and yet half the citizenry seems largely unfazed by these
narratives as long as candidates represent their side of the Dnipro River. The country is also torn
between the Russian Federation and the Western political organizations. In several generations,
Ukraine could be part of Russia, a powerful member of the European Union, or an independent,
thriving regional power. The rhetorical choices its leaders make and the persuasiveness of their

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narratives will have a great deal to do with the direction the nation takes during that time. For
these reasons, communication scholars should take a much greater interest in this literal and
rhetorical borderland.

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