Project Management in Action in Afghanistan
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Daniel Harmuth was deployed to Afghanistan from 2009-2010 to oversee the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA). His mission was to increase the ANA's capacity to train more soldiers in order to expand the army from 80,000 to 134,000 troops by October 2010. This required expanding training bases, increasing resources and personnel, and overseeing complex logistical and stakeholder coordination challenges. Through project management approaches including developing a work breakdown structure, schedule, risk management, and stakeholder engagement, Harmuth worked to complete the mission on time despite numerous challenges.
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Project Management in Action in Afghanistan
- 1. Project Management in Action ~in Afghanistan Daniel Harmuth, PMP Lieutenant Colonel in U.S. Army Reserves Commander, Detachment 45 NATO Training Mission - Army Technology Services Manager Kern County Sheriff ‘s Office
- 2. Mission My mission in Afghanistan during my deployment from June 2009 through Feb 2010 was to mentor and oversee the Basic Warrior Training of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Commander of a Detachment of 32 U.S. Army Drill Sergeants and 40 contractors.
- 3. 5/20/2009 unclassified 3 Basic Warrior Training (BWT) Mission // Mission Essential Task Mission To instruct new soldiers in Basic, AIT & CTX and train them to high military morals, so they can rescue the Afghan people by fighting the enemies of Afghanistan and the Insurgency. METL Provide Command and Control Plan and Conduct Individual Institutional Training to ANATC Standards Evaluate Institutional Training Support and Sustain Institutional Training Purpose… Establish ANA primacy through training every ANA Soldier on basic Infantry skills first Drill Sergeants: Build the future of ANA strength through a comprehensive drill sergeant school Remote Basic Warrior Training: Manage regional programs and MTTs country-wide to support ANA doctrine and standards Oversee an effective program to transition from Warsaw Pact weapons to NATO weapons Concentrate on overall improvement of basic rifle marksmanship 10 Week Course
- 4. Detachment Locations May 28 2009 UNCLASSIFIED-FOUO 4 Mazar E Sharif Herat KMTC Darulaman Khwost Kandahar
- 5. 5/20/2009 unclassified 5 CENTCOM Gen Petraeus SHAPE Gen Craddock Gen USFOR-A McChrystal COMISAF CSTC-A MG Formica Pol-Mil BG Wolters DCOMISAF Lt Gen Dutton DCG BG Ierardi ANA Dev BG Wynnyk ANP Dev Col Yackley ISC BG Gorecki DATES BG Bingol CTAG Brigadier Baverstock CAPTF BG Givhan CJTF Phoenix BG Huber CJ1 HQ CTAG Col Smailes CJ2 ARSIC (C) 201 Corps CJ3 ARSIC(E) 203 Corps CJ4 CFC CJ5 ARSIC(S) 205 Corps ADU RC(N) CJ6 Log Sch ARSIC(W) 207 Corps CJ7 RC(E) NMAA CJ8 ARSIC(N) 209 Corps CGSC/SOSC RC(S) KMHS ARSIC(K) Capital Division CTC-A RC(W) Coordination KMTC ETTs OMLTs
- 6. 5/20/2009 unclassified 6 KMTC Mentor Group CSTC-A TF Phoenix ANATC CTAG NCO Training Bde S3 S2 S1 TM LDR CS S6 S5 S4 PSG CS CJA Sr SGT CS Officer Training Bde Basic Warrior Training Bde Garrison Adv Combat Training Bde KCC CCC MIC OCS BOTC 1st Kandak MP Combat Arms 2nd Kandak Facilities Combat Support G Coy 1 Coy 3rd Kandak K Coy 2 Coy Medical Combat Service Support 4th Kandak M Coy 3 Coy DFAC HVY WPNS 5th Kandak X Coy Transport Maintenance Logistics Signal Engineer Artillery Mortars Infantry Remote BWT Y Coy RECON Remote BWT Remote BWT P Coy Remote BWT Remote BWT
- 7. 5/20/2009 unclassified 7 KMTC Aerial To Ranges & Tng Areas KMTC Contonement Area Camp Invicta (ISAF) Camp Alamo Camp Warehouse (ISAF)
- 8. Mission Early in the mission, we were given the task (project) to increase the capacity of training such that we could increase the ANA from a 80,000 man army to 134,000 strong by Oct 2010.
- 13. Risk Management
- 15. Implementation
- 16. Project Charter
- 17. Scope Statement
- 18. WBS
- 19. Scope Control
- 23. Project Charter “a document that formally authorizes a project.” The project charter addresses important aspects of a project, and can be linked to all nine knowledge areas that are listed in the PMBOK May 28 2009 UNCLASSIFIED-FOUO 11
- 24. Project Charter Operations order from Higher HQ (Combined Security Transition Command / NATO Training Mission - Army). Similar to Project Charter as there are strategic dependencies. Tasked to define resources and plan to achieve results
- 26. Identify base capacity growth requirements for KMTC, Herat, MeS, Khwost, and Darulaman Training Center to maximize training output
- 27. Identify Resources to include equipment
- 30. Improve already low ANA leadership numbers and performance
- 32. New Kandahar RBWT WBS
- 36. Quarters
- 37. Mess Halls
- 38. Ranges
- 39. Equipment
- 40. Uniforms and Initial issue equipment
- 42. Completed before contractors and building resources could be secured/identified
- 45. Lack of quality building supplies in theatre
- 46. Initial Issue Equipment vendors could not increase production in time
- 47. Higher HQ re-organized various ancillary teams in the same locations to oversee construction
- 48. BWT Mentors sent to Kandahar to oversee building of new training base
- 50. the Afghan Army Trainers, Drill SGTs, Officer requirements
- 54. BWTShortages of Instructors to Taskiel 1389a
- 55. BWTShortages of Drill SGTs to Taskiel 1389a
- 56. RBWT/BWT Sync Matrix – Increase Instructors and Drill SGTs Aug 10 2009 29 UNCLASSIFIED-FOUO
- 57. RBWT/BWT Sync Matrix – ANA/Camp/Mentors
- 59. Plan to bring the ANA in to make it their plan
- 61. Briefing ANA General Staff
- 62. Get ANA MoD to issue Directive for mission
- 64. ANA Ministry of Defense
- 66. ANA General Staff at Training Commands
- 67. ANA Command Staff at KMTC
- 69. Lack of recruits to fill the capacity
- 70. Lack of facilities built on-time
- 71. Lack of ANA instructors and Cadre
- 73. Pay raises
- 74. Alternate facilities, tents, contract food
- 76. Weekly tracking of indicators (priority, impact)
- 77. Weekly tracking of contracted construction
- 78. Murphy’s Law
- 80. Construction supply convoys looted
- 81. Corp of Engineers changed electrical codes to NEC standards in middle of construction
- 82. Recruiting surged to the point where classes were overfilled to 150%
- 87. Contracts handled at J4, CTAG-A and CJ4, CSTC-A (NTM-A)
- 89. Movement of new Cadre & Trainers to remote locations
- 90. Kandahar base construction delayed, so scheduled class was conducted at KMTC in Gym with leadership for KAH, but KMTC equipment
- 92. May 28 2009 UNCLASSIFIED-FOUO 38
Hinweis der Redaktion
- I was mobilized in March 2009 to head up a detachment of Army Drill SGTs to oversee and mentor the Afghan Army Basic Warrior Training. This is an enduring mission of my USAR Division since 2005.
- Explain mission at KMTC and 5 remote locations.
- In one way or another, we used these PMI Knowledge areas to take on our new taking.Some may have been used formally, and some informally. I’ll illustrate this as we go on.
- In the military we receive an Operations Order that is similar to a Project Charter.Project Charter Definition (click for transition)As the Project Charter authorized a project, an Operations Order signed by the Commanding General give authorization, priority of support, vision, leadership, communication, time frames, and other information.
- In the military we receive an Operations Order that is similar to a Project Charter.Project Charter Definition (click for transition)As the Project Charter authorized a project, an Operations Order signed by the Commanding General give authorization, priority of support, vision, leadership, communication, time frames, and other information.
- Based on the direction given in the OO, we had to go and determine the real scope behind the “Broad Brush” scope statements.
- This is a abstract of the planning spreadsheet of training classes by dates and locations that is synchronized with other operations: - Build Leadership - Unit leadership trainingUnit equipment fieldingUnit collective trainingTransporting new units to duty locations
- In the midst of pulling back the onion skins of developing scope, we uncovered many challenges.Many of these seemed so daunting that we were not sure the mission could be accomplished in the time frame and resource allotted.Attrition rate was 25%Cadre fills were so low we could barely complete the current mission
- We developed a WBS (Ghannt Chart) based on locations, facilities to increase/improve, leadership to develop,
- I took this to the higher HQ staff (logistics and Engineer) to discuss what needed to happen and when, based on the WBS.Because the Higher HQ staff did not have a PM background they did not want to take the time to learn how a WBS worked. These were British, French and American Officers.Thus, I turned it into a spreadsheet to brief in my meeting with the General.
- During the process of construction to increase capacity, the Recruiting Command initiated a signing bonus and increased the salary of all soldier ranks. This quickly ballooned the recruiting numbers and Recruiting Command had thousands of recruits in holding areas waiting for Basic Training.
- Estimating how long it would take to perform these tasks when we have not down these repetitively in any location in Afghanistan.Local contractors were all different in each area.We had troubles getting the current quantities of equipment to remote bases, so doubling the quantities was a concern, along with vendors that could not guarantee delivery….
- Our main schedule was based on the long pole in the tent, which was facility increase construction.Higher HQ completed their project schedule and briefed to the General before they secured contractors to work on the projects. By the time the contractors were secured, scheduled were already behind, and the typical response from them as to if they could complete on time was “In Shala”…Culture to never say “no”…
- As the plan was briefed by Higher HQ before the details came in, the budgets were too low. The issue with people that did not have to execute on the ground making the final plans.My predecessor went around the country to our various training locations and determined the resource requirements, but after I reviewed it and our mission, I figured his estimates were 50% too light. This created issues in budgets, allotting new positions for ANA Leadership and Cadre, and also U.S. Mentors. Cost over runs were a norm.
- Relating back to my predecessor defining resources:I was told he did not develop these with the Afghan Counterparts.We told the Afghan Leadership to develop their personnel resource requirements and we also did the same. We set-up meetings to review theirs together……By doing this we gained their trust as we wanted to hear what they wanted and they were more open to our suggestions. They also accompanied us when we had to argue with Higher HQ for the 50% more ANA personnel.The next slides are an example of what I briefed the General regularly.
- This slide was to display the sheer lack of ANA Cadre we had…Pay attention to the “Short” in the last column.
- Percentages were “Short”
- This was our synchronization plan to generate ANA Cadre…. Which was not the preferred method, but maybe the only one which would work due to corruption in the Corps.
- Early planning meeting with Coalition Partners and Staffs were without the ANA.How to make the plan “their plan”.Even though we think we control the military progress, we had to beg to get ANA MoD to issue a Directive, as the ANA would not do anything without it.
- Some of our Higher HQ staff would think that because the developed a plan, the ANA would follow it.We had to brief and get each level of Commander. This would have been easier for the NTM-A Commander to get MoD to issue the Directive at the beginning.Because this would affect each local Commander, I had to travel around and get each to by into the plan so they would actually execute it once the recruits started to come, and training schedules changed, etc.
- Needless to say, everything in Afghanistan involved Risk, aside from IEDs and being shot at.We used 3 of the 6 PMBOK Risk Mgt processesWith everything being constant or the same as previous years with seasonal changes in recruiting, we all knew that we only had a slim chance of everything aligning and the facilities being ready, recruits to fill capacity, and enough Cadre.We also identified intra-country transportation as an issue.
- For Risk Monitoring, we had weekly meeting across Kabul at our Higher HQ or at NTM-A to include all staff members from multiple commandsEngineersLogisticsRecruitingTrainingPersonnelMurphy’s Law
- Procurement management was managed at our Higher HQ (CTAG-A), and was literally a dumpster fire:Contracts were being let without us validating the requirementsContractors identified previously were getting engaged in other construction projects by other US Army CommandsHigher HQ contracts officer went on 3 weeks leave, then was relieved of logistics dutiesEveryone wanted to wash their hands of the contracts in the endWe sent 2 Drill SGTS to assist, and then everyone acted as though they were respon..
- In the end, everything happened as most U.S. Military operations, “not according to plan”:Remote base facilities were getting completed not in the planned order…re-route recruits…New ANA Cadre were being assigned, but those Officers either failed to report or did not exist. Took weeks to deconflict…. Kandahar base was so off schedule, that we ahd to accept the class of 1400 recruits in Kabul at KMTC in the new base gym that didn’t have the showers working yet..Recruiting was so full, Higher HQ just started shipping recruits to remote based to hold for a while until official class dates.
- The pushed implementation schedules of the remote base facilities started to converge on another major event – our Detachment’s impending RIPTOA.In the end, facilities were livable for the additional recruits, equipment started to arrive, Cadre started to appear out of nowhere from MoD (albeit wrong ranks), OCIE was shipping and arrive un-disturbed in containers.We were still scrambling to fix issues like inoperative showers, Cadre, vehicle shortages or going to the wrong command, new Command and Control structure for RBWTs BUT……I got a surprise Facebook notification on Aug 10, 2010….