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Targeted Attacks

Barry Shteiman
Director of Security Strategy

1

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Agenda

 Compromised Insider
 Incident Analysis

 Anatomy of an Attack
 Current Controls
 Reclaiming Security

2

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Today’s Speaker - Barry Shteiman

 Director of Security Strategy

 Security Researcher working
with the CTO office
 Author of several application
security tools, including HULK

 Open source security projects
code contributor
 CISSP

 Twitter @bshteiman

3

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Compromised Insider
Defining the Threat Landscape

4

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
―There are two types of companies: companies
that have been breached and companies that
don’t know they’ve been breached.‖
Shawn Henry, Former FBI Executive Assistant Director
NY Times, April 2012

5

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

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Insider Threat Defined

Risk that the access rights of a
trusted person will be used to view,
take or modify data or intellectual
property.
Possible causes:
 Accident
 Malicious intent
 Compromised device

6

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Compromised Insider Defined

A person with no malicious
motivation who becomes an
unknowing accomplice of third
parties who gain access to their
device and/or user credentials.

7

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Malicious vs Compromised Potential

1% < 100%

Source: http://edocumentsciences.com/defend-against-compromised-insiders
8

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Look who made the headlines

Hackers steal sensitive data related to a
planned 2.4B acquisition.

Hacker stole 4-million Social Security
numbers and bank account information from
state tax payers and businesses

9

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Evaluating Magnitude

California 2012 Data Breach Report:
• More than half of the breaches were the result of intentional
intrusions by outsiders or by unauthorized insiders.
Source: State of California Department of Justice, July 2013

Source: Verizon Data Breach Report, 2013
10

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Know your Attacker
Governments
•
•

Stealing Intellectual Property (IP) and raw data, Espionage
Motivated by: Policy, Politics and Nationalism

Industrialized hackers
•
•

Stealing IP and data
Motivated by: Profit

Hacktivists
•
•

11

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Exposing IP and data, and compromising the infrastructure
Motivated by: Political causes, ideology, personal agendas

Confidential
What Attackers Are After

Source: Verizon Data Breach Report, 2013

12

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

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Two Paths, One Goal
Online
Application

User with access
rights (or his/her
device)

Malware (40%)
Social Engineering (29%)

Users (devices) 71%
People 29%

Hacking (various) used
in 52% of breaches

Servers 54%

Data & IP

Source: Verizon Data Breach Report, 2013

13

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Incident Analysis
The South Carolina Data Breach

14

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
What Happened?

4M Individual Records Stolen in a Population of 5M

80%.
15

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
A Targeted Database Attack

Attacker steals
login credentials
via phishing email
& malware
13-Aug-12

16

Attacker logs in
remotely and
accesses the
database
27-Aug-12

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Additional
reconnaissance,
more credentials
stolen
29-Aug-12 11-Sept-12

Confidential

Attacker steals the
entire database

12-Sept-12 14-Sept-12
The Anatomy of an Attack
How does it work

17

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Anatomy of an Attack

Spear
Phishing

18

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Anatomy of an Attack

Spear
Phishing

19

C&C
Comm

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Anatomy of an Attack

Spear
Phishing

20

C&C
Comm

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Data Dump
& Analysis

Confidential
Anatomy of an Attack

Spear
Phishing

21

C&C
Comm

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Data Dump
& Analysis

Broaden
Infection

Confidential
Anatomy of an Attack

Spear
Phishing

22

C&C
Comm

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Data Dump
& Analysis

Broaden
Infection

Confidential

Main Data
Dump
Anatomy of an Attack

Spear
Phishing

23

C&C
Comm

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Data Dump
& Analysis

Broaden
Infection

Confidential

Main Data
Dump

Wipe
Evidence
Searching on Social Networks…

24

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
…The Results

25

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Next: Phishing and Malware
Specialized Frameworks and Hacking tools, such as BlackHole
2.0, allow easy setup for Host Hijacking and Phishing.

How easy is it?

 A three-month BlackHole license,
with Support included, is US$700

26

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Drive-by Downloads Are Another Route
September 2012 ―iPhone 5 Images Leak‖ was caused by a
Trojan Download Drive-By

27

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Cross Site Scripting Is Yet Another Path
Persistent XSS Vulnerable Sites provide the Infection Platform
GMAIL, June 2012

TUMBLR, July 2012

28

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
The Human Behavior Factor

Source: Google Research Paper ―Alice in Warningland‖, July 2013
29

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Current Controls
Wont the NGFW/IPS/AV Stop It?

30

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
What Are the Experts Saying?

―Flame was a failure for the antivirus industry. We really should have been able
to do better. But we didn’t. We were out of our league, in our own game.‖
Mikko Hypponen, F-Secure, Chief Research Officer
Source: http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/06/internet-security-fail/

31

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Security Threats Have Evolved…

2001

2013

AntiVirus
Firewall
IPS

AntiVirus
Firewall
IPS

Sources: Gartner, Imperva analysis
32

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Security Redefined
Forward Thinking

33

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
The DISA Angle

―In the past, we’ve all been about protecting our
networks—firewall here, firewall there, firewall
within a service, firewall within an organization,
firewalls within DISA. We’ve got to remove those
and go to protecting the data‖
Lt. Gen. Ronnie Hawkins JR – DISA.
AFCEA, July 2012

34

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Rebalance Your Security Portfolio

35

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Assume You Can Be Breached

36

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Incident Response Phases for Targeted Attacks

Reduce Risk
Size Up the Target
Prevent Compromise
Compromise A User
Detection
Initial Exploration

Containment
Solidify Presence
Impersonate
Privileged User

Insulate sensitive
data
Password
Remediation

Steal Confidential Data
Device Remediation
Cover Tracks

Post-incident
Analysis
37

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Webinar Materials
Join Imperva LinkedIn Group,
Imperva Data Security Direct, for…

Post-Webinar
Discussions

Webinar
Recording Link

38

Answers to
Attendee
Questions

Join Group

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Questions?
www.imperva.com

39

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential
Thank You!

40

© 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Confidential

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Targeted attacks

  • 1. Targeted Attacks Barry Shteiman Director of Security Strategy 1 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 2. Agenda  Compromised Insider  Incident Analysis  Anatomy of an Attack  Current Controls  Reclaiming Security 2 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 3. Today’s Speaker - Barry Shteiman  Director of Security Strategy  Security Researcher working with the CTO office  Author of several application security tools, including HULK  Open source security projects code contributor  CISSP  Twitter @bshteiman 3 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 4. Compromised Insider Defining the Threat Landscape 4 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 5. ―There are two types of companies: companies that have been breached and companies that don’t know they’ve been breached.‖ Shawn Henry, Former FBI Executive Assistant Director NY Times, April 2012 5 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 6. Insider Threat Defined Risk that the access rights of a trusted person will be used to view, take or modify data or intellectual property. Possible causes:  Accident  Malicious intent  Compromised device 6 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 7. Compromised Insider Defined A person with no malicious motivation who becomes an unknowing accomplice of third parties who gain access to their device and/or user credentials. 7 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 8. Malicious vs Compromised Potential 1% < 100% Source: http://edocumentsciences.com/defend-against-compromised-insiders 8 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 9. Look who made the headlines Hackers steal sensitive data related to a planned 2.4B acquisition. Hacker stole 4-million Social Security numbers and bank account information from state tax payers and businesses 9 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 10. Evaluating Magnitude California 2012 Data Breach Report: • More than half of the breaches were the result of intentional intrusions by outsiders or by unauthorized insiders. Source: State of California Department of Justice, July 2013 Source: Verizon Data Breach Report, 2013 10 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 11. Know your Attacker Governments • • Stealing Intellectual Property (IP) and raw data, Espionage Motivated by: Policy, Politics and Nationalism Industrialized hackers • • Stealing IP and data Motivated by: Profit Hacktivists • • 11 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Exposing IP and data, and compromising the infrastructure Motivated by: Political causes, ideology, personal agendas Confidential
  • 12. What Attackers Are After Source: Verizon Data Breach Report, 2013 12 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 13. Two Paths, One Goal Online Application User with access rights (or his/her device) Malware (40%) Social Engineering (29%) Users (devices) 71% People 29% Hacking (various) used in 52% of breaches Servers 54% Data & IP Source: Verizon Data Breach Report, 2013 13 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 14. Incident Analysis The South Carolina Data Breach 14 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 15. What Happened? 4M Individual Records Stolen in a Population of 5M 80%. 15 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 16. A Targeted Database Attack Attacker steals login credentials via phishing email & malware 13-Aug-12 16 Attacker logs in remotely and accesses the database 27-Aug-12 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Additional reconnaissance, more credentials stolen 29-Aug-12 11-Sept-12 Confidential Attacker steals the entire database 12-Sept-12 14-Sept-12
  • 17. The Anatomy of an Attack How does it work 17 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 18. Anatomy of an Attack Spear Phishing 18 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 19. Anatomy of an Attack Spear Phishing 19 C&C Comm © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 20. Anatomy of an Attack Spear Phishing 20 C&C Comm © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Data Dump & Analysis Confidential
  • 21. Anatomy of an Attack Spear Phishing 21 C&C Comm © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Data Dump & Analysis Broaden Infection Confidential
  • 22. Anatomy of an Attack Spear Phishing 22 C&C Comm © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Data Dump & Analysis Broaden Infection Confidential Main Data Dump
  • 23. Anatomy of an Attack Spear Phishing 23 C&C Comm © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Data Dump & Analysis Broaden Infection Confidential Main Data Dump Wipe Evidence
  • 24. Searching on Social Networks… 24 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 25. …The Results 25 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 26. Next: Phishing and Malware Specialized Frameworks and Hacking tools, such as BlackHole 2.0, allow easy setup for Host Hijacking and Phishing. How easy is it?  A three-month BlackHole license, with Support included, is US$700 26 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 27. Drive-by Downloads Are Another Route September 2012 ―iPhone 5 Images Leak‖ was caused by a Trojan Download Drive-By 27 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 28. Cross Site Scripting Is Yet Another Path Persistent XSS Vulnerable Sites provide the Infection Platform GMAIL, June 2012 TUMBLR, July 2012 28 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 29. The Human Behavior Factor Source: Google Research Paper ―Alice in Warningland‖, July 2013 29 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 30. Current Controls Wont the NGFW/IPS/AV Stop It? 30 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 31. What Are the Experts Saying? ―Flame was a failure for the antivirus industry. We really should have been able to do better. But we didn’t. We were out of our league, in our own game.‖ Mikko Hypponen, F-Secure, Chief Research Officer Source: http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/06/internet-security-fail/ 31 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 32. Security Threats Have Evolved… 2001 2013 AntiVirus Firewall IPS AntiVirus Firewall IPS Sources: Gartner, Imperva analysis 32 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 33. Security Redefined Forward Thinking 33 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 34. The DISA Angle ―In the past, we’ve all been about protecting our networks—firewall here, firewall there, firewall within a service, firewall within an organization, firewalls within DISA. We’ve got to remove those and go to protecting the data‖ Lt. Gen. Ronnie Hawkins JR – DISA. AFCEA, July 2012 34 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 35. Rebalance Your Security Portfolio 35 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 36. Assume You Can Be Breached 36 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 37. Incident Response Phases for Targeted Attacks Reduce Risk Size Up the Target Prevent Compromise Compromise A User Detection Initial Exploration Containment Solidify Presence Impersonate Privileged User Insulate sensitive data Password Remediation Steal Confidential Data Device Remediation Cover Tracks Post-incident Analysis 37 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 38. Webinar Materials Join Imperva LinkedIn Group, Imperva Data Security Direct, for… Post-Webinar Discussions Webinar Recording Link 38 Answers to Attendee Questions Join Group © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 39. Questions? www.imperva.com 39 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential
  • 40. Thank You! 40 © 2013 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Confidential

Hinweis der Redaktion

  1. Barry: “Less than 1% of your employees may be malicious insiders, but 100% of your employees have the potential to be compromised insiders.”
  2. 2013 VDBIRMalware 40% of breachesSocial 29%Hacking 52%Assets compromisedServers 54User (devices) 71People 29
  3. Anna Kournikova virus author stands trialLenient sentence in prospectBy John LeydenPosted in Security, 14th September 2001 13:58 GMTThe author of the infamous Anna Kournikova email worm has appeared in court in the Netherlands with prosecutors calling for a lenient sentence for his admitted crime.Lawyers for 20-year old Jan de Wit have called for the dismissal of charges against him, arguing that the worm caused minimal damange. The FBI submitted evidence to the Dutch court, suggesting that $166,000 in damages was caused by the worm, based on reports of damage from 55 firms