Wat Phra Dhammakaya is the biggest temple in Thailand and the Hope of Bangkok Church was the biggest church in the country. While Hope of Bangkok church has splintered into smaller groups, I believe this essay continues to be relevant in exploring the phenomenal expansion behind these two institutions and the role of the middle class in their growth.

1. Super-size Religion:
Comparing Wat Phra Dhammakaya and Hope of Bangkok Church
Note: This was written in 2005 before the splintering of the Hope of
Bangkok Church. Please contact xingledout<at>gmail.com if you wish to
use any information from this paper.
1

2. CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
TEMPLE VS CHURCH 2
The Provider 2
The Founder 6
The Product 9
Hierarchy and Conformity 11
Recruitment and Membership Patterns 13
Expression of lay religiosity 17
REASONS FOR PHENOMENAL GROWTH 20
Disenchantment with established Buddhism 22
Catering to the Middle Class 26
CONCLUSION 33
REFERENCES 35
2

3. Figure 1 Maha Dhammakaya Cetiya.
Figure 2 Hope of Bangkok Church
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4. INTRODUCTION
One is the biggest temple in Thailand while the other is the biggest church in
Thailand. On an average Sunday, both places of worship draw roughly the same
number of people to their religious centre. Wat Phra Dhammakaya attracts 10,000 to
15,000 Buddhists to the regular Sunday meditation at Pathum Thani while some
10,000 Christians throng the Hope of Bangkok Church for the worship services at
Khlong Toey. Both places had also been dogged by controversies in their respective
religious circles yet both had survived to remain the big players in the religious scene
in contemporary Thailand. Much has been written about Wat Phra Dhammakaya (see
Apinya 1993; Jackson 1989; Suwanna 1990; Zehner 1990) but no one has compared it
with Hope of Bangkok Church. Both temple and church rose to ascendancy in the
1980s and experienced some of their highest growth rates in that period.
In order to do research for this paper, I visited Wat Phra Dhammakaya on August
27 and was taken on a tour of the premises. I also had an extensive interview with
one of the monks there, whose passage into full-time ordination would be described in
this paper. I then went to a Christian concert attended by some 6,000 people staged
by Hope of God Church at Bec Tero Hall on the following day. I also attended their
Sunday worship service on September 4.
This paper aims to compare the two by looking at factors such as their history,
their founder, the recruitment process, and the hierarchical organisation. I will not be
including Santi Asoke in this discussion although it is also seen as a prominent
Buddhist reform movement in the country. While it might be stridently political, its
following is nowhere near the tens of thousands of Wat Phra Dhammakaya.
1

5. This paper also posits that the huge following of the two religious centres is not
only due to their inherent attractions. The fact that both the temple and the church
grew so phenomenally in the 1980s indicates that external factors should also be
considered. This paper concludes by exploring how the burgeoning middle class and
Thai society’s disenchantment with establishment Buddhism have contributed to the
super-size religion practiced in Wat Phra Dhammakaya and Hope of Bangkok Church.
TEMPLE VS CHURCH
The Provider
“The Catholics have their Vatican, the Moslems their Mecca, we Buddhists
therefore await our World Dhammakaya Centre.” Thus spoke Dattajeevo, the
assistant abbot of Wat Phra Dhammakaya during its 20th anniversary celebrations in
1990. This proud self-confident and ambitious assertion reveals the Dhammakaya
leaders’ commitment to expanding their organisational structure so that their
organisation might one day become a Buddhist centre of national or international
repute and influence (Apinya 1993:155). The World Dhammakaya Centre sits on
1,000 acres and comprises the Maha Dhammakaya Centre, the Great Dhammakaya
Assembly Hall and the Phramonkolthepmuni Memorial Hall. The Cetiya, which is
being built at an estimated cost of US$1 billion, is a dome stupa with a one-kilometre-
square area. When completed in 2007, it is supposed to accommodate one million
people. The top of the stupa (Fig. 1) is not painted gold; it is actually made up of
300,000 gold Buddha statuettes. Another 700,000 of the 18-inch-high images will
adorn the rest of the stupa. The assembly hall can sit up to 300,000 people and is
supposed to be the world’s largest single-roofed hall. This is used for the regular
2

6. meditations on Sundays and the nightly dhamma teachings. The memorial hall
houses a solid gold image of Phramonkolthepmuni, the founder of the Dhammakaya
meditation technique, and will be later opened up as a museum. The entire compound
is like a self-contained village, including accommodation for the 1,000 monks, 300
novices and 1,000 lay people, a school, a retreat area. Even the trams used for
transporting visitors and the clothes worn by the lay-people are manufactured within
the compound. It is believed that the temple needs to receive at least 15 million baht a
month in contributions for maintaining overheads (Taylor 1990:141).
When compared to the sprawling compound of the temple, the Hope of Bangkok
Church seems very modest. Tucked away in a corner in Khlong Toey, the church has
a two-storey auditorium, which can sit about 1,500 to 2,000 people. It holds four
services on Sunday, three in Thai and one in Mandarin to cater to its large
congregation. It was quite difficult getting information from the church because the
leaders were quite touchy about revealing numbers, such as the size of the
congregation and the number of pastors. One of the senior pastors hinted that the
government gets nervous when any religious group gets too big, hence their
reluctance to reveal or confirm any numbers (personal interview with Arjan Prayuth
Sariman on August 24). Moreover, after the 1987 split from the other churches,
which would be discussed later, Hope of Bangkok withdrew all literature about the
church from the libraries of the bible seminaries here.
Because of the limited area in the Khlong Toey site, Hope of Bangkok Church has
grown by setting up replica churches around Bangkok, Thailand and the world. There
are now eight Hope of Bangkok churches in the capital, including the one at Khlong
Toey. In 1997, more than 800 Hope churches have been planted, covering most
3

7. districts of Thailand. Another 40 churches have been established internationally in 19
countries, including the US, Canada, Europe, Australia and most of the countries in
Southeast Asia. (Wongsak 1998:271). All the churches carry the Hope brand, so there
is Hope of Chiang Mai, Hope of Buriram, Hope of Singapore, Hope of London, Hope
of Vancouver and so on. Administratively, they are coordinated by a central office to
ensure that they are all moving in the same spiritual direction. On the other hand, Wat
Dhammakaya has only one super-temple. It has 23 affiliated meditation centres in
Thailand and another 26 branches in 13 countries but they do not operate as temples.
They only offer teaching on the Dhammakaya meditation.
Despite royal patronage in the early days – Princess Sirinthorn laid the foundation
stone for the bot in 1977 – Wat Dhammakaya has come under pressure for its
unorthodox teachings, citation of miracles in order to solicit donations, and the
connection of its abbot to business and land deals. In the 1980s, some villagers, upset
about the loss of their lands to both the main temple complex and a branch in northern
Thailand, damaged a Buddha image belonging to the movement, threatened to set fire
to the temple and attacked the monks (Jackson 1989:215). In late 1998, the temple
once again became the focus of public attention and media scrutiny because of its
dogged solicitation for donations to build the Cetiya regardless of economic downturn.
The Sangha Council announced a nine-issue allegation against abbot Dhammachayo
which included “threatening national security, violating religious principles and
undermining the monarchy” (Rungrawee 1999:14). In 1999, Dhammachayo was
charged with embezzling 96 million baht.
Hope of Bangkok Church, too, was no stranger to controversy. In Thailand, a
church has to come under one of five Christian umbrella organisations before it can be
4

8. recognised as a church by the Department of Religious Affairs. And Hope of
Bangkok came under the Evangelical Fellowship of Thailand (EFT). By 1984, the
church was being accused of seeking to grow at the expense of other churches. There
was public criticism, organisational opposition, pressure on individual members and
even attempts to block or hinder their work. By 1986, churches were preventing their
members from attending Christian meetings where Hope of Bangkok’s founder
Kriengsak Charoenwongsak was speaking, for fear that they would move over to his
church. By January 1987, it was publicly announced that the church had been
suspended from membership in the EFT. The published conditions for reinstatement
included requiring the prior approval of local pastors before Hope of Bangkok could
begin a new church; a public statement forbidding members to invite other Christians
to any of Hope of Bangkok’s activities; prior approval of an individual’s former
pastor before he would be permitted to transfer membership to Hope of Bangkok; and
a public apology to the other church leaders (Zehner 1987:78) To this day, Hope of
Bangkok has not acquiesced to the conditions and it remains suspended. So legally, it
is not a church although it functions as one. Instead it operates under the name of its
foundation – Hope Place. Perhaps because the controversy surrounding Hope of
Bangkok did not revolve around the money politics and doctrinal accusations that
dogged Wat Dhammakaya, Hope of Bangkok continued to receive rave reviews from
international Christian magazines and Kriengsak remained a highly sought-after
speaker overseas despite of problems on the home front.
5

9. The Founder
The Dhammakaya movement grew out of a unique meditation technique
“discovered” by Luang Por Sot of Wat Pak Nam. After his death, several instructors
loosely associated with Wat Pak Nam continued to teach Dhammakaya meditation.
One of these teachers, Upasika Chandra Khonnokyoong (also known as Khun Yay
Chan), attracted a circle of disciples which included the group of Kasetsart University
students who would form the leadership of the future Wat Dhammakaya. Born in
1944, future abbot Chaiboon Sitthitphon became the first in that circle to be ordained
in 1969 and took on the monastic name of Dhammajayo. In 1970, the group obtained
a donation of land in Pathum Thani and started construction of the Buddhist Centre
for Practising Dhamma on the 75 acres of land. In 1978, Wat Phra Dhammakaya was
granted official registration.
Born in 1954, Kriengsak, a former AFS student and Colombo Scholarship holder,
converted to Christianity during his first year of his undergraduate studies at Monash
University in Melbourne. Thoroughly dedicated, he became an assistant pastor and
leader of the Asian ministry at a church in Melbourne, started a Christian club among
university students on campus, studied Greek and took courses at four different bible
training institutes (one at graduate level), while managing to complete his doctorate in
economics on schedule (Zehner 1987:69). While still a student in Australia,
Kriengsak was being given access to church and conference platforms in Australia,
New Zealand, and Southeast Asia. His detailed grasp of scripture and biblical
teaching issues was said by church leaders to be unusual for an Asian. He also became
especially popular in speaking engagements in businessmen’s fellowship and
6

10. Pentecostal churches1. While still an undergraduate, he felt a vision to plant churches
in his homeland. Returning to 1981 with his PhD and subsequently becoming an
economics lecturer at Kasetsart University, he thought of joining in the work of the
existing churches but was put off by their weak state. So in that same year, he started
Hope of Bangkok Church with just five people on the ninth floor of a hospital
building. In the next few years, the church grew so quickly that it moved from the
small meeting room, to a hotel ballroom, then Oscar Theatre and finally to its present
premise.
The profiles of both Dhammajayo and Kriengsak are startlingly similar despite
their 10-year age gap. Both are well-educated – Dhammajayo was also an economics
graduate, but from Kasetsart University. Their mutual link to Kasetsart University is
of course an interesting coincidence. Both started their respective temple and church
in their late 20s. As far as the followers were concerned, both possessed the essence
which Max Weber termed “charisma” akin to the Thai concept of บารมี. A government
official in the Ministry of Education wrote of her first glimpse of Dhammajayo in
1986:
His carriage was magnificent, his complexion clear, clean and
radiantly glowing beneath the yellow robe. The attractiveness of his
appearance…. Filled me with such joy that tears flowed without my
realising it. That picture will surely remain firmly in my heart and
mind as long as I live. It is because Luang Phor has amassed such
great merit that his complexion appears more radiant than that of any
other (Zehner 1990:412)
Kriengsak was also regarded as a man of unusual personal ability. His detailed
knowledge of scripture and his ability to express his views more articulately than
almost anyone else in terms relevant to the hearer gave him a great advantage as a
1
The Pentecostal movement pays special attention to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are believed to
be given to Christians and include abilities to prophesy, heal people, do miracles and cast out demons.
7

11. religious leader. A voracious reader, skilled speaker and organiser, a creative thinker
with an eye for detail, and a hard-driving worker determined to win souls and produce
church-planters, he and his church pointed the way to a new era of progress for the
Thai church as a whole.
Moreover, both men were believed to be imbued with supernatural power. The
narrative style of Dhammajayo’s biography resembled that found in traditional
depictions of historical heroes or Buddhist saints, with their frequent references to
auspicious omens. It mentioned for example his mother’s auspicious dream before
his birth and discussed the signs during his childhood of possessing a faculty of
premonition (Apinya 1993:166). Dhammajayo himself claimed to be able to use
high-level meditation to cure members who were ill or to help them avert bad luck
(Bowers 1996:20). As for Kriengsak, whenever people came to him with a request
for prayer, they expected an answer with confidence. Although he preached endlessly
that anyone with faith would see God answer prayer, the answers just seemed to come
a bit faster when he was the one doing the praying (Zehner 1987:84).
Both men were dedicated to renewing Thai Buddhism and Thai Christianity with
their aggressively evangelistic movements. By forbidding monks to participate in
non-normative practices such as fortune-telling and dispensing lottery numbers,
Dhammajayo aimed to provide an alternative to Buddhism that had been perceived as
stultified by hierarchy and ceremonial ritual. Kriengsak, who had been nicknamed the
“Apostle of Hope”, wanted his church to challenge traditional Thai concepts that
Christianity is Western-owned because unlike many churches which were a branch of
a foreign denomination, Hope of Bangkok was started by a Thai and was indigenous.
Yet, while Dhammajayo had managed to come through all the allegations and charges
8

12. and remained the abbot of the temple, Kriengsak stepped down in the late 1990s after
a personal scandal tainted his reputation. He is now a party-list parliamentarian under
the Democrat Party.
The Product
The Dhammakaya movement is in the Mahanikay tradition and has the support of
some of the most senior Mahanikay administrative monks, including Somdet Phra
Phutthakohsajan, abbot of Wat Benjamabophit. Dhammakaya is a discipline teaching
that within the human body there exist different layers of bodies, the most refined of
which is the ninth body in the form of a pure white lotus-shaped Buddha image that
will lead the person into nibbana. This ninth body shines with a cool bright light and
is called Dhammakaya. It is claimed that all meditative practices lead to the
Dhammakaya and there is no other way to nibbana except this way (Suwanna
1990:401). Despite the doctrinal controversy that arose from equating the
Dhammakaya with the way to enlightenment, practitioners were not bothered by it,
they seemed more intent on the promised realisation of a happy state of mind. This
gave rise to critics questioning whether the temple was offering spirituality of
“religious pleasure” comparable to that of recreation clubs and fishing parks (Keyes
1999:33). On Sundays, devotees would meditate together at the same time –
transforming a previously personal pursuit into a corporate activity – by imagining a
clear, crystal ball in the centre of their body, two inches above their navel. Many
have claimed the benefits from their meditation, such as increased inner peace,
improved concentration and greater success in studies (Zehner 1990:415). So while
other progressive religious movements such as Suan Mokh and Santi Asoke have
9

13. completely denied all miracles and supernatural powers, Wat Dhammakaya has
continuously promoted them in order to draw more followers.
On top of the Sunday meditation, the temple offers nightly dhamma teaching
which is beamed live to some 50,000 viewers and listeners over satellite TV and the
temple’s website (personal interview with Venerable Burin Thitakusalo, August 27).
This is now taught largely by Dhammajayo, who used to visit the temple only once a
month in the past. Burin made some very telling remarks:
“In the past, the abbot would stay in Chiang Mai and do high-level
meditation. He comes to Wat Dhammakaya maybe once a month. But
when we started building [the Cetiya], he needed to do fund-raising. So
he started coming weekly and now he comes daily to teach dhamma.”
The temple also relies heavily on media and technology to get its message across to
the public as well as put up spectacular productions for special occasions. By the
mid-1980s, the Dhammakaya movement was also producing a growing volume of
publications aimed at young, educated readers.
Meanwhile, the three-hour worship services at Hope of Bangkok Church on
Sundays are very modern and contemporary affairs. The service starts with an hour
of singing – the Christian songs are in the pop-rock style and are played by a talented
band, consisting of a drummer, two keyboardists, two guitarists, a bassist and six
singers. Once in a while, there will also be a team of dancers. The second hour is
taken up by the pastor who preaches a sermon from the bible and makes it applicable
to daily life. In the final hour, the congregation is given time to respond to the
evangelistic invitations. Whether through concentrated peer pressure, effective
witness, or the effect of experiencing the corporate worship experience for the first
time, many visitors decide to convert to be Christian on their first visit. The church
10

14. was averaging 20 to 30 first-time decisions per week (Zehner 1987:75). At the same
time, people who were suffering from illness or problems could request for prayer
during this response time. Hope of Bangkok Church is quite well-known for the
miracles that take place there. Healings of people who were sick beyond medical aid
were documented regularly. There have also been documented cases of paralytics and
cancer patients who were miraculously healed after prayer (Wongsak 1998:277). On
top of the worship service, members can sign up for one-hour bible lessons. These
are not merely sit-and-listen sessions. The members have to do supplementary
reading, memorise verses from the bible and take exams. To instil discipline, fines
were imposed for tardiness, absence and failure to recite the week’s memory verses if
called on.
Hope of Bangkok Church is arguably the leader among churches in the use of
media and technology. When I attended the Christian concert that the church put up
at Bec Tero Hall, I was impressed with the slickness of the entire production – the
music, the dancing, the laser beams, the dry-ice effect and not forgetting the waving
of light sticks by the congregation. It looked (and sounded) exactly like any rock
concert. The church churns out a lot of media resources such as TV soap operas with
biblical principles behind them. The musicians are prolific in writing their own
Christian songs and translating the latest ones from the US or Australia. And
ironically, while Hope of Bangkok Church is considered on the fringe of the Christian
circle here, many churches are actually lapping up all these media resources.
Hierarchy and Conformity
11

15. Given the strong personalities of Dhammajayo and Kriengsak, it is not surprising
that they rule their roosts like priest kings. Decisions are made privately among a few
individuals with no intent of revealing the details to line personnel. Lay followers
have little freedom to decide on the ways in which different tasks are carried out.
There is very little downward responsiveness to upward communications. Both men
looked upon themselves as benevolent superiors guiding or managing obedient and
respectful inferiors, taking a paternalistic stance towards the members. For example,
when Dattajeevo preaches, he uses the term “ลูก” to address the lay followers.
Kriengsak used to regard the members as sheep (แกะ) to be looked after. Apinya
(1993) suggests that the paternalistic legacy in Wat Dhammakaya stemmed from the
fact that both the abbot and assistant abbot graduated from Kasetsart University,
which is well-known for its strict and strong “seniority tradition”. In the same way,
Zehner (1987) proposes that Kriengsak, being the grandson of Chinese immigrants
and thus socialised in synthesis of Thai and Chinese cultural worlds, was the
functional equivalent of the traditional Chinese patriarch atop the family business,
especially when the core of his church leadership was composed mainly of young,
acculturated Thai-Chinese and highly-educated elite and semi-elite Thai. Kriengsak
was the chief administrator and source and arbiter of all authority in church.
The strict hierarchies went hand-in-hand with the conscious push for conformity
within both the temple and the church. Wat Dhammakaya is primarily concerned
with personal morality, not about Pali or reinterpretations of scripture. Its
personalistic view of the world is espoused in authoritarian language with a clear and
simple message – there is a correct way of religious practice, a correct way of acting,
and that is the Dhammakaya way (Swearer 1991:665). This is also why members
12

16. have to dress in white when going to the temple. At Hope of Bangkok Church, there
was an assumption that it is a strength to have everybody “believe the same”
(มีความเชื่อเหมือนกัน), in having all the replica churches to teach the same lessons exactly
the same way, in having church administrations run on the same patterns. A lot of
paperwork is churned out each week just to keep everybody on the same track.
Recruitment and Membership Patterns
Both the temple and the church have a very strict recruitment process for its
clerical members. As a result at least 80 per cent of the monks in the temple and
pastors in the church possess a tertiary degree (interviews with Prayuth and Burin).
Wat Dhammakaya selects most of its clerical members from among youths
participating in the Dhammadayada (“dhamma-heir”) Training and Hot Season Mass
Ordination for specially chosen university students. This annual three-month long
training programme starts off with military physical training, which is seen as a
necessary prerequisite for later components of the programme. In the second month,
participants take part in intensive and strict meditation training which includes the
observance of the Eight Precepts and eight-hour-per-day meditation practice. Those
who pass this month of Dhammadayada training are then selected to participate in a
mass ordination ceremony performed at Wat Benjamabophit by the abbot of that
monastery. The students then remain monks for one month and return to the
Dhutanga Sathana or ascetic practices area at Wat Dhammakaya before disrobing to
continue their studies at the beginning of the academic year in June. More than 1,000
students go through this programme a year.
13

17. While most of the students would return to university, complete their studies and
get a job in the secular world, some return to don the yellow robe for life. Contrary to
Thai monastic practice, Dhammakaya monks make a vow to ordain for life. Burin,
aged 27, is one such example and has been a monk for the last six years. During the
third year of his studies in journalism and mass communication in Thammasat
University, he began to feel emptiness in his life. He wanted to fill the gap within
him so he decided to learn meditation and enrolled in the Dhammadayada programme.
But when it ended, he decided to stay on for another year as a monk to learn more
about meditation. He did return to Thammasat to complete the final year of his
studies. Upon graduation, he traded a Young Journalist Scholarship for the yellow
robes. Speaking in impeccable English, he said, “I decided that I wanted to be a
Dhammakaya journalist, to spread news of peace and use my English for Buddha. It’d
be better for my own happiness.”2 As the baby of the family, Burin’s parents became
quite concerned when he became very involved in Wat Dhammakaya during his
university days, especially with all the rumours saying that the temple is a cult. But
they were won over when they saw how his life had changed and they have since
become loyal temple devotees. “I was very hot-tempered in the past but meditating
helped me to control my emotions,” he explained.3 Although it was difficult for his
parents to accept it when Burin decided to ordain for life, his entire family, including
his four brothers and sisters, attended his ordination. “My mother is now quite happy
to have a monk for a son because she says I only talk about good things while my
2
The vocabulary and rhetoric used by Dhammakaya followers are similar to those found in Christian
jargon. Their initiation into the meditation is like a conversion experience – once upon a time, there
was emptiness in their life, but after meditating, they are filled with joy. Burin’s goal to use his English
skills for Buddha easily parallels the Christian who wants to use his talents for God.
3
His words again parallel the life-change experience that new Christian converts always testify about.
14

18. siblings tell her all their family and work problems,” he said. “Besides, while my
brothers give her money, I actually give her merit.” Burin’s story is not uncommon in
Wat Dhammakaya and it shows how effective the temple had been in recruiting the
cream of the crop from the universities while attracting their network of family,
relatives and friends to the temple.
While Hope of Bangkok Church does not have such a systematic recruitment
process, Kriengsak seemed to have been open from the start about his desires to
attract as many good people as possible to help lead in accomplishing the vision. He
screened prospective members, telling them, “If you’re not prepared to work hard,
you would be better off attending somewhere else.” (Zehner 1987:72)
Because the clerics at both the temple and church are well-educated, they have
been able to attract a sizeable proportion of the middle to join them. Temple statistics
show that 41 per cent of the members are students, and 22 per cent are private
business owners (Suwanna 1990:407). At Hope of Bangkok, more than half the
members are made up of students and young professionals (interview with Prayuth).
In fact, the main support base for both movements is tertiary students. This also
indicates the open-ness of young people of that age group to spiritual matters,
especially because it is a period of transition between childhood and adulthood for
them. At the last count in 1987 (because there were too many after that to be counted),
Wat Dhammakaya controlled more than 50 Student Buddhist Clubs in Thailand.
There are also Hope care groups in most of the major universities in Thailand, where
church members meet on campus, encourage one another in the midst of their studies
and evangelise to their classmates together.
15

19. At Hope of Bangkok, lay members are organised in a tiered system. The smallest
component is the care group. People are divided into groups ranging in size from 5 to
10 individuals who are supervised by a leader. The grouping is done in as
homogeneous a manner as possible. For example, doctors and nurses are grouped
together. Two or three care groups form a unit. One level higher, two or three units
are grouped together and headed by another leader. This configuration extends
upward to the pastoral team, which is headed by a senior pastor. Within each care
group, members are paired up so that a more mature Christian takes care of a younger
Christian. The pair meets every week to pray together, read the bible and chit chat
(Wongsak 1988:273). The lives of members are monitored quite closely in this
system. So, for example, if a member wants to date someone, he has to inform the
person he is accountable to (พี่เลี้ยง) who will then inform the leader of the care group,
who will inform the leader of the unit. The leaders of the care groups and units are
not paid church staff; they have their own jobs. They are selected based on their
maturity, knowledge of the bible and their track record in proselytizing.
At Wat Dhammakaya, ordinary lay members are also strictly monitored and
“regulated”. They are organised into small sub-groups of about 60 to 70 people each,
each with its own leader who mediates with the central lay administration. Apart
from carrying out the traditional function of supplying provisions for the temple, they
are also “mediators” who draw in further resources from the wider public through
their networks of personal relations. In view of this fund-raising function, sub-group
leaders are selected either by virtue of their influential social or economic status or on
account of their own personal persuasive talent (Apinya 1993:159).
16

20. Other than the lay members, there is an interesting membership category called
lay personnel or lay people. They are quite unlike the traditional “temple boys”, who
were sent to live, serve and learn from monks. They also differ from the traditional
“lay committee of the temple”, who are more free to shift between temple service and
mundane life, and do not have to commit themselves to any special kind of strict
moral practices. But Wat Dhammakaya’s lay personnel are expected to stringently
adhere to moral standards and conduct their everyday affairs in a proper and orderly
fashion. The way the lay people are recruited resembles that of a secular business
enterprise: it includes interviews, a written exam on general knowledge of Buddhism,
a three-month training programme, and a three-month probation period. They have to
strictly observe the Eight Precepts (ordinary laymen are expected to observe only Five
Precepts), and practise oral and face-to-face persuasive techniques in the Dhamma
propagating “knock-door programme” which takes them from house to house in all
the densely residential areas in Bangkok. The lowest educational requirement for its
personnel is a college certificate. Most of them are 26-35 years of age, and all of
them are single. They live inside the temple wall, receive a small salary (the temple
offers them some welfare services) and wear a white uniform.
Expression of lay religiosity
Merit-making or ทําบุญ is an indispensable part of every Buddhist ceremony and the
most popular expression of lay religiosity although according to doctrine, the Buddha
praised worship through the practice of Dhamma (Pali: patipatti puja) more than
material worship (Pali: amisa puja) or worship through the supply of material goods
to monks. Merit-making is seen as the act of accumulating good deeds which, in the
17

21. course of rebirths, will bring one to better states of life, then to the different levels of
heaven, and gradually closer to the ultimate target of nibbana. At the societal level,
merit-making activities are a significant resource channel for temples. Wat
Dhammakaya has not only sought to revitalise the traditional merit-making concept,
but introduced a modern and systematic mechanism for fund-raising or resource
mobilisation. A handbook on merit-making written by the assistant abbot, asserts an
absolute faith in the existence of other worlds and the traditionally elaborated causal
relations attached to the merit act. This faith is seen as the necessary condition for the
full attainment of merit result in next lives. It also provides numerical elaborations of
the “benefits” or “profits” to be gained from different merit acts4 (Dattajeevo 1989).
The Dhammakaya movement stresses that merit-making provides individuals with
their only chance to save their souls.
This stress on merit-making is further heightened by the modern systematic
arrangement and varied forms of merit activities. One interesting merit act involves
the so-called “crystal ball of accumulated merit” which allows one to “bank” on merit.
A transparent plastic ball is sold to lay members who, after filling it up with coins and
banknotes will present it to the monks to accrue merit. The temple has also taken
steps to ensure comfort and convenience in merit-making. Buses to facilitate the
merit-making are available every Sunday from different spots in Bangkok. At the
temple, a free lunch is distributed. Things needed for merit-making such as food,
flowers, candles, and incense are sold in handy ready-to-use packages. Polite lay
personnel in clean white dress are ready at hand to give advice and information. In
4
For example, it explains that if a rich man donates money for almsgiving but lets his servant deliver
the money, he will receive only 30 per cent of the “profits” of his act whereas his servant will receive
the remaining 70 per cent of the “profits” from the mere act of handing alms to monks.
18

22. short, merit-making has become a well-packaged and ready-made good which can be
easily acquired and “consumed” (Apinya 1993:168).
At the heart of this well-oiled fund-raising machine are the lay sub-groups. Fund-
raising reaches a high normally before the grand annual rituals, such as kathin in
October and makha bucha in February. All its members are encouraged not only to
use a direct, face-to-face approach which taps into family and working networks, but
to also use the “knock-door” strategy with the wider public. In sub-group leader
meetings, techniques to encourage fund-raising are continuously discussed and small
crystal Buddha images are given as rewards to those members who first raise a given
amount within a determined period. In 1988, the temple even won an award for its
market planning strategies from the Business Management Association of Thailand.
While some Buddhists were embarrassed by the temple’s receipt of the award, the
members have taken pride in the award. For them, the survival of Buddhism requires
that some of the logic of the market or ways of the “world” be adopted (Apinya
1993:169).
On the other hand, at Hope of Bangkok Church, the term บุญ is never mentioned
except to deny its cosmic claims. The idea that one might gain divine favour through
offerings or good works is regularly rejected in teaching. The church emphasises the
importance of giving, especially the 10 per cent of one’s salary or allowance that is
supposed to belong to God according to doctrine. However, the church’s offering
collections (compared to Buddhist merit-making) are typically rushed, light-hearted
affairs, apparent afterthoughts tacked onto the end of the main ritual performances.
The amounts given are rarely announced except as a collective total. The senior
pastor and leadership team make the decision about expenditures within the limits of
19

23. the church income and budget. The senior pastor himself does not handle money,
however, to avoid any possible accusations. Counting the money is normally taken
care of by a team to avoid embezzlement of funds (Wongsak 1998:278).
At the church, a more common way of expressing lay religiosity is to bring family
and friends to church, as well as inviting them to evangelistic events. They are driven
more by their enthusiasm to share their new faith with them than to accrue merit.
However, the more people one brings to Christ (and to church), the more one’s stature
in church grows. As mentioned earlier, the legitimacy of one’s leadership position is
based on the number of people one has converted. Hence, the church has a very
persistent follow-up system where lay leaders call up visitors and keep inviting them
to go back to church.5
REASONS FOR PHENOMENAL GROWTH
King Vajiravudh blended the concepts of nation, religion, and king into a
governing ideology for modern Thailand and advocated a civil religion in Thailand, in
which nation seemed to supersede religion (Buddhism). This notion of a civil religion
was reinforced under the military regimes of Phibunsongkram and Sarit Thanarat.
Sarit in particular exploited the civil religion tradition as a way of legitimating his
1957 coup d’état and of promoting national integration through the creation of the
national Dhammacarika mission to the hill tribes6 and the national Dhammadhutta
5
I left my mobile number with one of the lay leaders I met at the concert the church put up. Two hours
after the concert, she called and invited me to go to church the following day, although I had already
made it quite clear that I am a Christian and I am already settled in another church. For the following
week, she called me every day. I stopped answering her calls and she reduced it to calling me every
other day.
6
Monks were sent to hill tribes scattered in the northern border region to convert them to Buddhism, in
the face of the communists’ attempt at infiltration and the Christian missionary efforts at conversion.
20

24. programs in rural development7. Such programmes featured the Buddhist sangha as
an arm of government national integration schemes. The National Sangha Act of 1962,
for example, promulgated a highly centralised sangha with increased potential as a
pawn of the government for the promotion of the goals of a secular nation-state.
Overt assertion of political control over the sangha between 1957 and 1973, while
maintaining Buddhism as the established religion, also began to stimulate some in the
growing middle class to begin questioning whether such a politically-controlled
sangha could hold a monopoly on Buddhist charisma. This questioning would become
more intense in the 1970s.
Coupled with the post-World War II rise of a secular ethos of Thailand, especially
in urban areas, the promotion of Buddhism as a civil religion provided the conditions
under which fundamentalist sectarian trends emerged as an oppositional response
within the Thai religious spectrum. The push toward national integration has served
to undermine regional and local identities often rooted in religious traditions. The
changes accompanying this form of political modernization have included rapid
industrialization and urbanization, dramatic increases in landless, wage-dependent
peasants, the expansion of higher learning throughout the country with an emphasis
on the acquisition of technical skills, and the development of a nouveau-riche
commercial class accompanied by a new “class-ism” based primarily on wealth and
economic power. Wat Dhammakaya and Hope of Bangkok Church speak to a time of
religious and cultural confusion, decline abetted by rampant modernization and
secularization. They are one type of response to the stress of cultural and religious
7
Under the project, several hundred monks from Bangkok volunteered to spend a few months every
year in the rural areas working with the local monks in activities organised to meet villagers’ needs, as
part of counter-insurgency operations, although it was cloaked under the manifest aim of bringing the
dhamma to the people.
21

25. disruption, value disorientation and social anomie brought on by the economic, social
and cultural disruptions. In this section I will discuss how both the church and the
temple stepped in at the correct time to offer an alternative to the burgeoning middle
class as well as to a Thai society disillusioned with established Buddhism.
Disenchantment with established Buddhism
The state-promoted image of Thai Buddhism as a united national church,
uniformly adhered to, uniformly understood, and acting as a unifying national force,
is by and large a façade which has been created by the force of state domination and
control of the sangha administration. This façade of unity masks real divisions within
the religion which in turn reflect the social and political divisions in Thai society.
Keyes (1999) argues that the crisis that emerged in the 1970s radically undermined
the moral authority of the established sangha in the eyes of politically significant
elements of the Thai populace, fragmenting Buddhism in Thailand into a number of
distinctive Buddhisms, each claiming to embody moral authority. The political crisis
in the 1970s was bracketed by two key dates, Sipsi Tula, referring to October 14, 1973
when a student-led revolution succeeded, with the back of the King, in overthrowing
the military dictatorship of Thanom Kittikachorn and Prapas Charusathien, and Hok
Tula, October 6, 1976, when military and police forces were used with unprecedented
brutality to end student protests and overthrow the democratically elected government.
In the midst of this turbulence, a highly respected senior monk, Kittivuddho Bhikku,
emerged to provide Buddhist legitimation for the use of violence against the
“enemies” of Thailand. The failure of the supreme sangha council, the Maha Thera
Samakhom, to discipline Kittivuddho for his heterodox advocacy of a militant
22

26. Buddhism appeared to provide establishment Buddhist sanction for an unprecedented
Buddhist legitimation of political violence.
In early 1976, Kittivuddho was conspicuous at a demonstration organised by
right-wing Nawaphon to demand a military-led government to meet the growing
communist threat. This action seemed directly in violation of laws forbidding monks
to become involved in overt political actions. Liberal newspapers called on the
Sangha Council to discipline him. Despite the Sangharaja’s mild condemnation of
Kittivuddho, the Council took no action against him (Keyes 1978:151). Instead of
repenting for his political involvement, Kittivuddho began to advocate that “the
killing of communists is not demeritorious” in his interview and sermons. Offering
scriptural support for his position, he claimed the demerit from killing communists is
offset by the greater merit that comes from preserving the nation, religion and
monarchy. The Maha Thera Samakhom was strongly pressured by the press, student
activities and social critics to take action against Kittivuddho. But it decided that no
action could be taken, on the grounds that the evidence was either ambiguous or
inconclusive. This decision, Keyes argues, had the effect of convincing many that the
Council had been too strongly subjected to political influence to be able to reach a
conclusion that would have been more religiously appropriate in light of
Kittivuddho’s clear disregard of basic Buddhist tenets. In other words, the established
sangha was shown to be subordinate to politics.
The undermining of the sangha’s authority continued later in September 1976
when a Thammayut monk, who subsequently became the Sangharaja, together with
other ranking monks were persuaded to allow former dictator Thanom to return from
exile in order to be ordained as a monk at the famous royal temple of Wat Bowoniwet.
23

27. Thanom’s donning of the yellow robes of a member of the sangha was clearly
designed to signify that he had turned his back on his former role as military dictator.
Far from being an action that provided moral legitimation for reconciliation, however,
it proved to be a goad for protests by students. These protests would end in a violent
tragedy that would forever colour the memories of the role the established sangha had
played in setting the stage for Hok Tula.
The new government that came into power after Oct 6, 1976, seemed to be going
along the lines of militant Buddhism. A year later, the same military junta that had
headed the October 6 coup staged another coup and unequivocally rejected militant
Buddhism and embraced moves to create an order that would allow space for citizens
holding divergent views about the relationship between the state, society and religion.
This openness allowed for the fragmentation of Buddhism and in the 1980s, four
significant Buddhist movements – socially-engaged Buddhism (Buddhadasa Bhikku),
heterodox Buddhism (Santi Asoke), Buddhist ecology (forest monks) and evangelical
Buddhism (Dhammakaya) – had all succeeded in gaining places that are clearly
independent of the established sangha.
Wat Dhammakaya has taken pains to present itself as a dynamic cutting edge
reformist movement to make Buddhism meaningful to modern life. With the sangha
becoming inactive, noncommitted and uninformed, the Dhammakaya movement
represents attempts to revive the role of the sangha on three fronts – doctrinal
education, spiritual, and administration – all of which have lagged behind the secular
world and the daily lives of urban people (Suwanna 1990:406). Conscious that it is
being watched by the state and the sangha authorities, the temple has abided by the
sangha’s hierarchical rules of the game and sought to impress senior patrons in the
24

28. Elder Council with its work. It has also attempted to enhance its secular and religious
connections by inviting monks awarded with important honour titles, members of the
royal monarchy, and high-ranking officials, both civic and military, to preside over its
religious ceremonies.
On top of seeking to promote a renewed sense of unity that was no longer
effectively engendered by the tripartite symbol of nation, religion, and king, Wat
Dhammakaya advocated a seriousness of religious practice for both monk and laity.
Disillusioned with stories of monks getting drunk and caught in all kinds of scandals,
the disciplined monks at Wat Dhammakaya were seemed to embody higher moral
authority. The strict recruitment process can be seen as attempts to restore to the
monkhood its aura of holiness in the face of increasing evidence that monks are
indulging more and more in worldly affairs. The temple’s policy on life-time
ordination also further cemented its role as a source of moral regeneration. These
were all factors that drew devotees by the thousands to the temple.
In the same way, I suggest that the weakening of established Buddhism had
contributed to the growth of Hope of Bangkok Church. Thais who grew up as
Buddhists and became disappointed by stories of wayward monks and the ineffective
sangha would be looking for alternatives. Some would flock to the new Buddhist
reform movements while others would be more willing to try a new religion than
before. And Hope of Bangkok Church was opening its doors at the opportune
moment. Under the strong and charismatic leadership of Kriengsak, the church
provided clear and sure answers to life’s problems and questions. Impressed by the
miracles that were taking place in the church, former Buddhists thronged the church
because they felt it met their needs. The warm atmosphere of the corporate worship
25

29. times was a big attraction to the converts. Coupled with the church’s persistent
follow-up system, it is not surprising that the church grew so rapidly.
Catering to the Middle Class
In the past, the middle class was very small, consisting mostly of those working in
the government bureaucracy. With industrial development, many new jobs requiring
education and skills have been created. And for many university and school graduates,
working with modern privately-run companies now is as attractive as or even more
than working with the government in view of the higher pay scale and better
opportunities for creativity. A new and more independent middle class has been
formed consisting of both indigenous Thais and Thais of Chinese descent who
formerly felt aloof from Thai society. Together with the old middle class they
represent a liberal, democratic force in demanding changes in the status quo so that
there will be more opportunities for upward social mobility for them. Assuming that
persons engaged in professional, technical, administrative, executive, managerial,
clerical and government occupations are considered as belonging to the middle class,
the census figures clearly indicate its considerable expansion – from 2.57 per cent of
the total working population in 1960 to 7.86 per cent in 1970 and 10.16 per cent in
1980 (Prasert 1987:286).
The Thai middle class, like the conservative establishment, regard Buddhism as a
key institutional source of social and political legitimacy. However, given that the
interests and advancement of the new bourgeois are dependent upon socio-economic
development and change, rather than upon maintenance of the status quo, they wish to
see a new interpretation of Buddhist doctrine and practice which supports their
26

30. interests rather than shoring up the position of the establishment. For this reason
many intellectual Buddhists desire Buddhism to act as the ideological foundation of a
religious and moral approach to socio-economic development, as a unique Thai
alternative to both capitalism and communism. The twin demands being placed upon
Buddhism by progressive lay Buddhists are, firstly, that it promote or at least support
socio-economic development and modernisation and secondly, that its primary
emphasis be directed to the concerns of this world.
But the middle class followers are often frustrated by the inactivity of traditional
clergy and their inability to come to terms with contemporary problems. Traditionally,
the ecclesiastical authorities communicated with a simple two class division in Thai
society, the elite ruling elements and the slave or peasantry. The new disjunctive
bourgeoisie are seemingly ill-fitted to the persisting social and political order. As
over 90 per cent of the members of the sangha are from the rural uneducated populace,
the sangha has drifted far away from the urban, relatively well-educated middle class.
Most members of the sangha do offer ritualistic services and give occasional sermons
to the urban middle class but a wide gap still exists between the two groups (Suwanna
1990:406). It is this gap that both Wat Dhammakaya and Hope of Bangkok Church
try to fill. While the weakening of established Buddhism contributed to their growth,
it was really the urban middle class that helped them expand so astronomically.
Both Dhammajayo and Kriengsak were part of this burgeoning middle class, so
they knew firsthand what this strata of society wants and needs. Being well-educated
themselves, they were able to attract the educated Thais to the temple and church
respectively. Hence, in the 1980s, they began to attract significant followings among
the urban middle classes and especially among the “conservative Thai equivalent of
27

31. Western ’yuppies’ (Jackson 1989:205). These ‘yuppies’ were both a product of the
rapid growth in the Thai economy in the 1980s and reaction to the political activism
that gave rise to the violence of the 1970s. These individuals, most of them educated
to the high school or university level or beyond, are accustomed to learning from the
book and the lecture, and even in religious matters they are more sensitive to the
norms of their age-group peers than they are to the traditions of their elders. Both
Wat Dhammakaya and Hope of Bangkok Church cater to this style of learning by
shaping their sermons along these lines, and as well as producing a veritable volume
of publications aimed at young educated readers.
Educated Thais are also increasingly appropriating the traditional clerical form of
religion and rejecting the traditionally more limited religious role of the layperson. A
middle class disillusioned with the traditional ritualistic lay form of Thai Buddhism
now seeks “direct participation”. At Wat Dhammakaya, this comes in the form of
meditation, which is now widely regarded as a legitimate and appropriate lay spiritual
activity leading to the attainment of a direct personal experience of or insight into the
Buddha’s teachings on salvation. In the past, urban Thai Buddhists used to seek out
monks of the ascetic or dhutanga tradition living in remote mountain or forest retreats,
who are regarded as possessing supernatural powers achieved through their
meditation (usually samadhi) and as embodying the spiritual truths taught by the
Buddha. However, by undertaking ascetic dhutanga practices in intensive meditation
sessions and thereby attaining supernatural experiences, lay followers of Wat
Dhammakaya internalise and appropriate for themselves the spiritual power and
legitimacy which has traditionally been attributed to forest monks. Thus the temple
28

32. short-circuits the seeking out of spiritual power from forest monks by relocating that
power within the lay followers themselves (Jackson 1989:207).
The same concept of “direct participation” is found in Hope of Bangkok Church.
Christian doctrine teaches that there is a God who listens to and answers prayers. It is
taught frequently in the church that anyone who prays in faith will get an answer to
his prayers. Because of the personal relationship that the Christian has with God, he
can go to God directly with his needs and prayers. There is no need for a mediator, no
need to make merit through a third party. Moreover, Hope of Bangkok Church does
not separate believers into “laity” and “clergy” distinctions. It is taught that all
believers should serve God to their fullest possible capacity. Kriengsak once said, “In
fact, I see no room for allowing the people to simply attend church and watch the
performance of the ‘full-time’ chosen ones!” At least 75 per cent of the church
attendants are actively involved in ministry at church (Kriengsak 1990:33).
Both Wat Dhammakaya and Hope of Bangkok Church have also ensured that their
image appeal to the sensibilities of the middle class. For example, Wat Dhammakaya
has a clean, quiet, orderly appearance. In its starkly functionalist bot, there are no
money trees, secondary figures, altar decorations, or flags (Fig. 3). Just a solitary
spotlighted Buddha image commands the viewer’s attention, a central modern image
– an image lacking in any distinctively Thai characteristics. The carpeted room
projects a sense of order and stability (Fig. 4). Temple regulations forbid loud talking,
radios and advertising. It also never stages a traditional temple fair and an air of
serenity pervades the area. In contrast with the milling crowds of a traditional temple,
Wat Dhammakaya’s orderliness is legendary – everyone sits, meditates, and even
leaves their shoes, all in orderly lines (Fig. 5).
29

33. Figure 3: The bot is a stylised version of the one at the Marble Temple.
Figure 4: Inside the bot. Figure 5: Shoes have to be placed in the box.
30

34. Likewise, Hope of Bangkok Church presents a very modern image. Upon arriving
for the Sunday worship service, there are well-dressed ushers at the entrance
performing a pretty wai at you (Fig. 6). While you walk past them to make your way
to the air-conditioned auditorium, there is a seven-piece ensemble playing classical
music along the hallway. The auditorium has a huge stage, stocked with modern band
instruments (Fig. 7). There are also large screens on both sides of the stage. The
whole atmosphere is akin to that of a concert (Fig. 8). Bedecked in suits, the
musicians and pastors both look and sound professionally.
Figure 6: Ushers give a Thai welcome. Figure 7: The stage is being readied for the session.
Figure 8: Note the orderliness as people wait for the next worship session.
31

35. While both Wat Dhammakaya and Hope of Bangkok Church cater to the middle
class in similar patterns, there are two additional aspects that the temple provides for.
First its popularity among Bangkok university students reflects a growing
conservatism among a section of the middle class. This group sees its social
advancement in terms of developing an accord with the establishment and building a
firm place for itself in the traditional power structure, rather than seeking to oppose
the establishment and usurp its dominant political position, which was a prominent
trend among students in the 1970s. Wat Dhammakaya’s Dhammadayada training
system instils obedience and loyalty to the traditional values of the Thai establishment
and promises selected students the reward of upward social mobility and entrance to
elite jobs and positions. The training programme is also developing into a run or
“class” or “year” system, a system of contacts and allegiances commonly found
among graduates of the same course at Thai universities and military training
academies. The notion of run diaw-kan, being a “graduate of the same class”, is
strong in Thailand and provides the structuring principle of a large number of old
boys’ networks that continue to provide group solidarity, professional contact, and
moral support after graduation. Those students who complete the Dhammadayada
training identify themselves by the year they undertook the programme, beginning
with run 1 in 1979. Hence, the training not only provides a meal ticket to better jobs
but also establishes contact with a network of peers who will also be undertaking
professional careers and may be able to offer assistance or advice on business and
other matters in the future (Jackson 1989:214).
Secondly, Wat Dhammakaya operates under capitalist mentality and preaches “the
more you donate, the more merit you receive” (Rungrawee 1999:11). Taylor (1990)
32

36. maintains that the temple set out with the undisguised goal of making money and had
invested in ventures as pharmaceuticals, milk powder, publishing and printing.
Although it has often been questioned whether the Dhammakaya movement is a true
religion or in fact a business transaction utilising the language of religion, by
integrating capitalism into its structure, it has become popular with contemporary
urban Thais who equate efficiency, orderliness, cleanliness, elegance, grandeur,
spectacle, competition and material success with goodness. The concretization of
Buddhist ideals also corresponds with the concrete sensual satisfactions of a consumer
society. Although quite well-educated, members of the temple are not intellectuals.
They seem to represent a segment of the emerging middle class that is keen on
achieving both worldly pleasure and peace of mind in religious form. The typical
follower is a lay person who combines spiritual retreat on the weekends with work or
study in the everyday world during the rest of the week. For these people, the
movement offers religious legitimation for inequalities in wealth since success in the
world is held to be a reward for spiritual attainment. After practising the meditation
method taught by the monks who lead the movement, it is believed that “students will
study better and people will be more successful in their businesses” (Jackson
1990:213). In short, Wat Dhammakaya could be viewed as a capitalist version of
Buddhism aimed at urban Thais who are used to comfort, convenience, and the instant
gratification found in consumer society.
CONCLUSION
Despite hailing from two very different religious traditions, both Wat
Dhammakaya and Hope of Bangkok Church had adopted modern management
33

37. techniques while preserving traditional hierarchical rules relating to the conduct of
interpersonal relationships. Their emphasis on meditation, order, discipline, and a
centralised organisational structure have further contributed to its efficient
management of people and control over the organisation. Some of the similarities in
organisation are, however, skin-deep. For example both the temple and church
divided their lay members into smaller groups. At the temple, these groups are used
for fund-raising purposes while the groups in the church are used to build members up
in their spirituality. Moreover, while Wat Dhammakaya has unabashedly built itself a
mammoth, super-sized temple at Pathum Thani, Hope of Bangkok Church has
preferred to keep a low profile. Although there is supposed to be religious freedom in
Thailand, Buddhism remains the dominant religion and any church that grows too
large would be seen as a threat by right-wing elements.
While both Wat Dhammakaya and Hope of Bangkok Church had gained from the
weakening of established Buddhism in Thailand, it was really the discontent of the
middle class that spurred their growth. The high level of commitment demanded by
these two movements is perhaps a panacea needed by an insecure and disillusioned
middle class. Their broad-based popular support stems from an astute packaging of a
fundamentalist form of religion that offers a way of embracing a secularized modern
lifestyle while retaining the communal identity once offered by traditional Buddhism.
Hence, the emergence and growth of these two movements illustrate on one hand the
limitations of state Buddhist ideology, and reflect on the other hand, changing social
relations and cultural transformation. Urban middle-class groups will continue to feed
into such movements, as long as the Sangha Order fails to respond to their concerns,
expectations and needs.
34

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