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#RSAC
SESSION ID:
James Wickett
A Pragmatic Union: Security and SRE


LAB2-T14
DevSecOps


Verica


@wickett


Internet Incident Librarian


Verica


@courtneynash


Courtney Nash
Presenter’s Company
Logo – replace or delete
on master slide
#RSAC
What we say here, stays here.


(sort of)
#RSAC
MEASURE Framework for DevSecOps
3
Makers


Experimenting


Automation


Safety


Unrestrained Sharing


Rugged


Empathy
https://www.verica.io/blog/the-measure-of-devsecops/
https://www.slideshare.net/wickett/a-way-to-think-about-devsecops-measure
Presenter’s Company
Logo – replace or delete
on master slide
#RSAC
Enter Site Reliability Engineers
Presenter’s Company
Logo – replace or delete
on master slide
#RSAC
SRE != Operations
Presenter’s Company
Logo – replace or delete
on master slide
#RSAC
Service Contracts
Presenter’s Company
Logo – replace or delete
on master slide
#RSAC
Modern Applications
Presenter’s Company
Logo – replace or delete
on master slide
#RSAC
Modern Traffic


https://medium.com/adobetech/adobe-contributes-to-netflixs-vizceral-open-source-code-dec7aaf5d43e
Presenter’s Company
Logo – replace or delete
on master slide
#RSAC
Failure is an inevitable
by-product of a complex
system's normal
functioning
#RSAC
10
Maker Driven


Experimentation


Automation


Safety


Unrestrained Sharing


Rugged


Empathy
#RSAC
#RSAC
Common Ground for SRE and Security
#RSAC
SRE and Security, a lot in Common Ground
12
Safety Margin


Availability


Chaos Engineering
#RSAC
Definitions
13
Common ground is a critical component of joint activity—things
we do together every day at work, regardless of our roles.


Joint Activity is a mutual agreement to coordinate on both content
(the Who and What) and process (the How and When) towards a
shared goal.
#RSAC
Effective Coordination
14
Interpredictability is knowing how other agents behave in the
system


Directability is the ability to influence others to reframe or
reframe yourself


Common Ground builds group intuition in real time
#RSAC
Common Ground
15
"Two people's common ground is, in effect, the sum of their mutual,
common, or joint knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions." —Herbert H.
Clark


Common ground is not just agreeing on what you will do and
when. It is a form of self-awareness.


Teams must understand how common ground gets staked out and
used in different situations.


And what is most important is to understand that it is not an end-
point or a destination: it is an ongoing process.
#RSAC
Possible areas of common ground for SRE and Security


16
Do we share a basic understanding of the system(s) we are
dealing with?


Do we share and agree on the status of what has transpired in
that system?


What changes in knowledge exist in/across teams since we
started working together?
#RSAC
How the Breakouts will work
17
5 minutes long


Notetaker for each group decided alphabetically based off the
matching character to breakout # of zoom display name


Give space for others to share


Report out in chat at the end of breakouts


Only report out shareable learnings/discussion!


We will be collating all the results in a shared doc
#RSAC
Resources and Report outs
18
bit.ly/2021RSAC
#RSAC
Breakout 1
19
What problems are you experiencing related to the availability,
security, and chaos engineering?


Bonus: how is it going between SRE and Security?


5 minutes, go!


Notetaker is decided alphabetically by first character of display
name
#RSAC
20
Report out:


Why are you here and what problems you are
experiencing related to the topic?
#RSAC
#RSAC
Common Ground: Safety and Resilience
Presenter’s Company
Logo – replace or delete
on master slide
#RSAC
Drifting into failure is a gradual,
incremental decline into
disaster driven by
environmental pressure, unruly
technology and social
processes that normalize
growing risk. No organization is
exempt from drifting into failur
e
Presenter’s Company
Logo – replace or delete
on master slide
#RSAC
Safety Margin
expresses how much
stronger a system is
than it needs to be for
an intended load
#RSAC
24
JOHN ALLSPAW




"AMPLIFYING SOURCES OF RESILIENCE"- QCON LONDON 2019


“Resilience is not a property that a
system has, resilience is something
that a system does
.
#RSAC
Resilience is…
25
A rebound from trauma and a return to equilibrium


Opposite from brittleness and able to be extensible when
surprises challenge the system boundaries


Architected with an ability to adapt to future conditions
Presenter’s Company
Logo – replace or delete
on master slide
#RSAC
Resilience
Resilience represents the ability not only to recover from
threats and stresses but to perform as needed under a
variety of conditions and respond appropriately to both
disturbances as well as opportunities.
Presenter’s Company
Logo – replace or delete
on master slide
#RSAC
Failures are a systems problem because there is
not enough safety margin.


- Adrian Cockroft
Presenter’s Company
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on master slide
#RSAC
Presenter’s Company
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on master slide
#RSAC
Presenter’s Company
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on master slide
#RSAC
https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-the-plane-paradox-more-automation-should-mean-more-training/
Contrary to popular myth, pilot error is not the cause of most
accidents. This belief is a manifestation of hindsight bias and the
false belief in linear causality. It’s more accurate to say that pilots
sometimes
fi
nd themselves in scenarios that overwhelm them. More
automation may very well mean more overwhelming scenarios. This
may be one reason why the rate of fatal large commercial airplane
crashes per million
fl
ights in 2020 was up over 2019.
Safety Automation
#RSAC
Breakout 2: Safety and Resilience
31
Where are Safety and Security at odds in your organization?


What areas of common ground can you find between them?


5 minutes, go!


Notetaker is decided alphabetically by second character of
display name
#RSAC
32
Report out:


Common ground between Safety and Security
#RSAC
#RSAC
Common Ground: Security Chaos Engineering
#RSAC
Security Chaos Engineering
34
The identi
fi
cation of security control
failures through proactive
experimentation to build con
fi
dence
in the system’s ability to defend
against malicious conditions in
production.
#RSAC
4 Components of Security Chaos Engineering
35
Define expected behavior of a security defense


Hypothesize that when security turbulence is introduced it will
be either prevented, remediated, or detected.


Introduce a variable that introduces security turbulence.


Try to disprove the hypothesis by looking for a difference in
expected behavior and actual behavior
#RSAC
SCE experiments don’t…
36
validate a config; they exercise it


check authentication privileges; they attempt to thwart them


trust network settings; they send real traffic


check application policy; they interact with the application


build a model from infrastructure templates; they build
understanding from experimentation
#RSAC
37
#RSAC
38
The high-level business
driver … maintaining the
highest level of safety and
security possible.
#RSAC
Verification vs. Validation
39
Verification, think DAST / IAST


Outside-In testing


Validating, think SAST


Unit Testing
#RSAC
40
by writing and running runtime
checks to ensure that the
application is always deployed
correctly, configured correctly,
and is running safely.


Chapter 13: Operations
#RSAC
Breakout 3: Chaos Engineering
41
What is the attitude towards Chaos Engineering (or SCE) at your
organization?


What areas of Common Ground can you find for Security Chaos
Engineering in your organization?


Bonus, what SCE experimentation could you get up and running
in your organization?


Notetaker = 3rd character, 5 minutes, go!
#RSAC
42
Report out:


Security Chaos Engineering
#RSAC
#RSAC
Common Ground: Availability
#RSAC
SLOs, SLAs, SLIs
44
Service Level Objective - target reliability (or security) for a given
service


Service Level Agreement - contractual obligation to customers


Service Level Indicator - The assessment of service outcome that
you think matters to users
https://sre.google/workbook/implementing-slos/
#RSAC
Error Budgets
45
Error Budget = 100% - SLO


Error budget is the slack in the system


Allows balance between feature velocity, reliability, (and security)
#RSAC
Breakout 4: Availability
46
There is an auth service for a FinTech global payment company
that regularly deals with AccountTakeOver (ATO) attacks. Each
month they assess if the tooling is too sensitive or not.


How would you setup an SLO for the service?


What would go into your error budget determination?


Notetake = 4th character and 5 minutes, go!
#RSAC
47
Report out:


Availability and SLOs
#RSAC


Apply What We Have Learned Today
48
Next week you should:


– Identify one area to build Common Ground


In the first three months following this presentation you should:


– Find areas to experiment within security or SRE, to collect data for future
collaboration


– Use Availability incidents and outages as way to collaborate between tribes


Within six months you should:


– Have had conversations around Safety, Availability, and Chaos between groups


– Built automation and experimentation under Security Chaos Engineering
#RSAC
Resources and Report outs
49
bit.ly/2021RSAC
#RSAC
#RSAC
Stay in touch!
wickett@verica.io


courtney@verica.io

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A Pragmatic Union: Security and SRE

  • 1. #RSAC SESSION ID: James Wickett A Pragmatic Union: Security and SRE LAB2-T14 DevSecOps Verica @wickett Internet Incident Librarian Verica @courtneynash Courtney Nash
  • 2. Presenter’s Company Logo – replace or delete on master slide #RSAC What we say here, stays here. (sort of)
  • 3. #RSAC MEASURE Framework for DevSecOps 3 Makers Experimenting Automation Safety Unrestrained Sharing Rugged Empathy https://www.verica.io/blog/the-measure-of-devsecops/ https://www.slideshare.net/wickett/a-way-to-think-about-devsecops-measure
  • 4. Presenter’s Company Logo – replace or delete on master slide #RSAC Enter Site Reliability Engineers
  • 5. Presenter’s Company Logo – replace or delete on master slide #RSAC SRE != Operations
  • 6. Presenter’s Company Logo – replace or delete on master slide #RSAC Service Contracts
  • 7. Presenter’s Company Logo – replace or delete on master slide #RSAC Modern Applications
  • 8. Presenter’s Company Logo – replace or delete on master slide #RSAC Modern Traffic https://medium.com/adobetech/adobe-contributes-to-netflixs-vizceral-open-source-code-dec7aaf5d43e
  • 9. Presenter’s Company Logo – replace or delete on master slide #RSAC Failure is an inevitable by-product of a complex system's normal functioning
  • 11. #RSAC #RSAC Common Ground for SRE and Security
  • 12. #RSAC SRE and Security, a lot in Common Ground 12 Safety Margin Availability Chaos Engineering
  • 13. #RSAC Definitions 13 Common ground is a critical component of joint activity—things we do together every day at work, regardless of our roles. Joint Activity is a mutual agreement to coordinate on both content (the Who and What) and process (the How and When) towards a shared goal.
  • 14. #RSAC Effective Coordination 14 Interpredictability is knowing how other agents behave in the system Directability is the ability to influence others to reframe or reframe yourself Common Ground builds group intuition in real time
  • 15. #RSAC Common Ground 15 "Two people's common ground is, in effect, the sum of their mutual, common, or joint knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions." —Herbert H. Clark Common ground is not just agreeing on what you will do and when. It is a form of self-awareness. Teams must understand how common ground gets staked out and used in different situations. And what is most important is to understand that it is not an end- point or a destination: it is an ongoing process.
  • 16. #RSAC Possible areas of common ground for SRE and Security 16 Do we share a basic understanding of the system(s) we are dealing with? Do we share and agree on the status of what has transpired in that system? What changes in knowledge exist in/across teams since we started working together?
  • 17. #RSAC How the Breakouts will work 17 5 minutes long Notetaker for each group decided alphabetically based off the matching character to breakout # of zoom display name Give space for others to share Report out in chat at the end of breakouts Only report out shareable learnings/discussion! We will be collating all the results in a shared doc
  • 18. #RSAC Resources and Report outs 18 bit.ly/2021RSAC
  • 19. #RSAC Breakout 1 19 What problems are you experiencing related to the availability, security, and chaos engineering? Bonus: how is it going between SRE and Security? 5 minutes, go! Notetaker is decided alphabetically by first character of display name
  • 20. #RSAC 20 Report out: Why are you here and what problems you are experiencing related to the topic?
  • 22. Presenter’s Company Logo – replace or delete on master slide #RSAC Drifting into failure is a gradual, incremental decline into disaster driven by environmental pressure, unruly technology and social processes that normalize growing risk. No organization is exempt from drifting into failur e
  • 23. Presenter’s Company Logo – replace or delete on master slide #RSAC Safety Margin expresses how much stronger a system is than it needs to be for an intended load
  • 24. #RSAC 24 JOHN ALLSPAW 
 
 "AMPLIFYING SOURCES OF RESILIENCE"- QCON LONDON 2019 “Resilience is not a property that a system has, resilience is something that a system does .
  • 25. #RSAC Resilience is… 25 A rebound from trauma and a return to equilibrium Opposite from brittleness and able to be extensible when surprises challenge the system boundaries Architected with an ability to adapt to future conditions
  • 26. Presenter’s Company Logo – replace or delete on master slide #RSAC Resilience Resilience represents the ability not only to recover from threats and stresses but to perform as needed under a variety of conditions and respond appropriately to both disturbances as well as opportunities.
  • 27. Presenter’s Company Logo – replace or delete on master slide #RSAC Failures are a systems problem because there is not enough safety margin. - Adrian Cockroft
  • 28. Presenter’s Company Logo – replace or delete on master slide #RSAC
  • 29. Presenter’s Company Logo – replace or delete on master slide #RSAC
  • 30. Presenter’s Company Logo – replace or delete on master slide #RSAC https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-the-plane-paradox-more-automation-should-mean-more-training/ Contrary to popular myth, pilot error is not the cause of most accidents. This belief is a manifestation of hindsight bias and the false belief in linear causality. It’s more accurate to say that pilots sometimes fi nd themselves in scenarios that overwhelm them. More automation may very well mean more overwhelming scenarios. This may be one reason why the rate of fatal large commercial airplane crashes per million fl ights in 2020 was up over 2019. Safety Automation
  • 31. #RSAC Breakout 2: Safety and Resilience 31 Where are Safety and Security at odds in your organization? What areas of common ground can you find between them? 5 minutes, go! Notetaker is decided alphabetically by second character of display name
  • 32. #RSAC 32 Report out: Common ground between Safety and Security
  • 34. #RSAC Security Chaos Engineering 34 The identi fi cation of security control failures through proactive experimentation to build con fi dence in the system’s ability to defend against malicious conditions in production.
  • 35. #RSAC 4 Components of Security Chaos Engineering 35 Define expected behavior of a security defense Hypothesize that when security turbulence is introduced it will be either prevented, remediated, or detected. Introduce a variable that introduces security turbulence. Try to disprove the hypothesis by looking for a difference in expected behavior and actual behavior
  • 36. #RSAC SCE experiments don’t… 36 validate a config; they exercise it check authentication privileges; they attempt to thwart them trust network settings; they send real traffic check application policy; they interact with the application build a model from infrastructure templates; they build understanding from experimentation
  • 38. #RSAC 38 The high-level business driver … maintaining the highest level of safety and security possible.
  • 39. #RSAC Verification vs. Validation 39 Verification, think DAST / IAST Outside-In testing Validating, think SAST Unit Testing
  • 40. #RSAC 40 by writing and running runtime checks to ensure that the application is always deployed correctly, configured correctly, and is running safely. Chapter 13: Operations
  • 41. #RSAC Breakout 3: Chaos Engineering 41 What is the attitude towards Chaos Engineering (or SCE) at your organization? What areas of Common Ground can you find for Security Chaos Engineering in your organization? Bonus, what SCE experimentation could you get up and running in your organization? Notetaker = 3rd character, 5 minutes, go!
  • 44. #RSAC SLOs, SLAs, SLIs 44 Service Level Objective - target reliability (or security) for a given service Service Level Agreement - contractual obligation to customers Service Level Indicator - The assessment of service outcome that you think matters to users https://sre.google/workbook/implementing-slos/
  • 45. #RSAC Error Budgets 45 Error Budget = 100% - SLO Error budget is the slack in the system Allows balance between feature velocity, reliability, (and security)
  • 46. #RSAC Breakout 4: Availability 46 There is an auth service for a FinTech global payment company that regularly deals with AccountTakeOver (ATO) attacks. Each month they assess if the tooling is too sensitive or not. How would you setup an SLO for the service? What would go into your error budget determination? Notetake = 4th character and 5 minutes, go!
  • 48. #RSAC 
 Apply What We Have Learned Today 48 Next week you should: – Identify one area to build Common Ground In the first three months following this presentation you should: – Find areas to experiment within security or SRE, to collect data for future collaboration – Use Availability incidents and outages as way to collaborate between tribes Within six months you should: – Have had conversations around Safety, Availability, and Chaos between groups – Built automation and experimentation under Security Chaos Engineering
  • 49. #RSAC Resources and Report outs 49 bit.ly/2021RSAC