SlideShare ist ein Scribd-Unternehmen logo
1 von 52
Downloaden Sie, um offline zu lesen
Cloud Security with LibVMI
Outline
● What is the Cloud?
● Looking at HW based security
● Virtual Machine Introspection
● LibVMI
● Demos
● What’s next?
What is the Cloud?
Big Tech Technician End user
Management Developers Researcher
Cloud Security with LibVMI
Cloud Security
● Mainly an issue for the cloud providers
● They need to monitor their virtual hardware
● And for enterprise cloud applications
● They need to monitor their database and webapp
● An end user can only change his password
● He has no access to the underlying hardware/software
Cloud Security
● Co-resident/breakout attacks
● Possible
● Network based attacks
● Probable
● Attackers will go after the low-hanging fruit
● We need to leverage Cloud defense mechanisms
Why should you care?
● The technology powering the Cloud is also
available on end-user systems
● on your phone, PC, tablets..
● Defense mechanisms that work for the
Cloud will work for you!
Non-comprehensive
History of HW Security
..in 5 minutes
Before 1982
Real Mode
1982: Protected mode
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
1982: Protected mode
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Application
Operating System
Unused
1982: Protected mode
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Application
Operating System
UnusedMore
privilege
Ring3Ring3
1982: Protected mode
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Applications
Operating System
Unused
Ring3Ring3
Ring3Ring3
2003: Xen
Ring2
Ring3
Ring0
Applications
Xen
Unused
Operating SystemsRing1
Ring3Ring3
2003: x86-64
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Applications
Operating System
Disabled
Ring3Ring3
2003: Xen on x86-64
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
OS/Applications
Xen
Disabled
2006: VT-x & AMD-V
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
App
Operating System
Disabled/Unused
Ring-1 Hypervisor
2006: VT-x & AMD-V
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
VMX root
OS/Hypervisor
VMX non-root
Virtual Machine
More privilege
2006: VT-x & AMD-V
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
VMX root
OS/Hypervisor
VMX non-root
Virtual Machines
Psst.. I’m here too (since ‘93)!
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
VMX root
OS/Hypervisor
VMX non-root
Virtual Machines
Ring-2
System
Management Mode
Psst.. I’m here too (since ‘93)!
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
VMX root
OS/Hypervisor
VMX non-root
Virtual Machines
System
Management Mode
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
2006?: Intel Dual-monitor SMM
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Secure Transfer
Monitor (STM)
2008: Intel Management Engine
Ring-3
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Intel ME
Cloud Security with LibVMI
2008: Intel Management Engine
User Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Kernel
ARC 600(?)
2008: Intel Management Engine
User
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
ARC 600(?)
2013: Nested virtualization!
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Nested
Hypervisor
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
201x: Intel SGX
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring0
SGX
Ring3
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
201x: Intel SGX
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring0
SGX
Ring3
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring0
SGX
Ring3
SGX
Ring3
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
Oh yea, we have these too..
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring0
SGX
Ring3
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring0
SGX
Ring3
SGX
Ring3
User
Supervisor
User
Supervisor
User
Supervisor
ARM CPUs in your
harddrive, NIC, etc.
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
User
Kernel
Cloud Security with LibVMI
The Cloud in 2015
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
Ring2
Ring1
Ring3
Ring0
VMX root
OS/Hypervisor
VMX non-root
Virtual Machines
Securing Virtual Machines
● Security based on the Hypervisor
● Move security stack outside of the OS!
● Monitor
o VM Memory
o Virtual Hardware state
Virtual Machine
Introspection
What is VMI
● View and control virtual machine from an
external perspective
● Including
o Network
o Disk
o Memory
o vCPU
VMI - The 3 aspects
1. Isolation
2. Interpretation
3. Interposition
Isolation
● Move security component outside of the
guest operating system
● Hypervisor exposes a smaller attack surface
● Increasingly harder to tamper with or disable
security system
Cloud Security with LibVMI
Interposition
● Step into the execution of the machine
● Prevent attacks from modifying the system
(repair hooks, privileges, etc.)
● Needs to be fast, reliable, and stealthy
● Based directly on hardware events
VMI - The 3 aspects
1. Isolation → Hypervisor
2. Interpretation → LibVMI / Volatility
3. Interposition → Intel
LibVMI
Use cases
● System-level debugging
● Timeline or trend analysis
● Runtime security
● OS Integrity
● Malware analysis
● Forensics
Cloud Security with LibVMI
Core features
● Read and write VM memory
● Virtual Memory Translation (Paging)
o Using various methods (DTB, PID, Kernel Symbol)
● Find and map guest OS data structures
● Place monitoring event-hooks into the guest
o Exceptions, Page Faults
Events on Xen with Intel CPUs
● Intel Extended Page Tables (EPT)
● Register write events ([X]CR0/3/4, MSRs)
● Software breakpoint interrupts (INT3)
● Single-stepping (MTF)
Cloud Security with LibVMI
Cloud Security with LibVMI
What’s next with LibVMI?
Future directions
● More guest OS support:
o Android, BSD, etc.
● More (and better) hypervisor support:
o KVM events, VirtualBox, Hyper-V, ESXi, etc.
● More events support on more platforms:
o AMD, ARM, Intel
What’s next in the Cloud?
Future directions in the Cloud
● Software developed with Cloud in mind
● Scalable Applications and Separation of
Tasks
● Enable VMI in the cloud
o The Software and Hardware is already available
o Cloud Providers do not provide access
Thanks!
Tamas K Lengyel
tamas@tklengyel.com
tlengyel@novetta.com
@tklengyel
Thomas Kittel
kittel@sec.in.tum.de
LibVMI http://libvmi.com
DRAKVUF http://drakvuf.com

Más contenido relacionado

Was ist angesagt?

Virtual Machine Introspection - Future of the Cloud
Virtual Machine Introspection - Future of the CloudVirtual Machine Introspection - Future of the Cloud
Virtual Machine Introspection - Future of the CloudTjylen Veselyj
 
Pitfalls of virtual machine introspection on modern hardware
Pitfalls of virtual machine introspection on modern hardwarePitfalls of virtual machine introspection on modern hardware
Pitfalls of virtual machine introspection on modern hardwareTamas K Lengyel
 
BSides Denver: Stealthy, hypervisor-based malware analysis
BSides Denver: Stealthy, hypervisor-based malware analysisBSides Denver: Stealthy, hypervisor-based malware analysis
BSides Denver: Stealthy, hypervisor-based malware analysisTamas K Lengyel
 
Virtual Machine Introspection in a Hyberid Honeypot Architecture
Virtual Machine Introspection in a Hyberid Honeypot ArchitectureVirtual Machine Introspection in a Hyberid Honeypot Architecture
Virtual Machine Introspection in a Hyberid Honeypot ArchitectureTamas K Lengyel
 
Virtual Machine Introspection with Xen
Virtual Machine Introspection with XenVirtual Machine Introspection with Xen
Virtual Machine Introspection with XenTamas K Lengyel
 
Hacktivity 2016: Stealthy, hypervisor based malware analysis
Hacktivity 2016: Stealthy, hypervisor based malware analysisHacktivity 2016: Stealthy, hypervisor based malware analysis
Hacktivity 2016: Stealthy, hypervisor based malware analysisTamas K Lengyel
 
OffensiveCon2022: Case Studies of Fuzzing with Xen
OffensiveCon2022: Case Studies of Fuzzing with XenOffensiveCon2022: Case Studies of Fuzzing with Xen
OffensiveCon2022: Case Studies of Fuzzing with XenTamas K Lengyel
 
CyberSEED: Virtual Machine Introspection to Detect and Protect
CyberSEED: Virtual Machine Introspection to Detect and ProtectCyberSEED: Virtual Machine Introspection to Detect and Protect
CyberSEED: Virtual Machine Introspection to Detect and ProtectTamas K Lengyel
 
VM Forking and Hypervisor-based Fuzzing with Xen
VM Forking and Hypervisor-based Fuzzing with XenVM Forking and Hypervisor-based Fuzzing with Xen
VM Forking and Hypervisor-based Fuzzing with XenTamas K Lengyel
 
Применение виртуализации для динамического анализа
Применение виртуализации для динамического анализаПрименение виртуализации для динамического анализа
Применение виртуализации для динамического анализаPositive Hack Days
 
VM Forking and Hypervisor-based fuzzing
VM Forking and Hypervisor-based fuzzingVM Forking and Hypervisor-based fuzzing
VM Forking and Hypervisor-based fuzzingTamas K Lengyel
 
Масштабируемый и эффективный фаззинг Google Chrome
Масштабируемый и эффективный фаззинг Google ChromeМасштабируемый и эффективный фаззинг Google Chrome
Масштабируемый и эффективный фаззинг Google ChromePositive Hack Days
 
Solnik secure enclaveprocessor-pacsec
Solnik secure enclaveprocessor-pacsecSolnik secure enclaveprocessor-pacsec
Solnik secure enclaveprocessor-pacsecPacSecJP
 
Practical Windows Kernel Exploitation
Practical Windows Kernel ExploitationPractical Windows Kernel Exploitation
Practical Windows Kernel ExploitationzeroSteiner
 
Yunusov babin 7 sins pres atm v2
Yunusov babin 7 sins pres atm v2Yunusov babin 7 sins pres atm v2
Yunusov babin 7 sins pres atm v2PacSecJP
 
A Stuxnet for Mainframes
A Stuxnet for MainframesA Stuxnet for Mainframes
A Stuxnet for MainframesCheryl Biswas
 
Introduction of ShinoBOT (Black Hat USA 2013 Arsenal)
Introduction of ShinoBOT (Black Hat USA 2013 Arsenal)Introduction of ShinoBOT (Black Hat USA 2013 Arsenal)
Introduction of ShinoBOT (Black Hat USA 2013 Arsenal)Shota Shinogi
 
Is That A Penguin In My Windows?
Is That A Penguin In My Windows?Is That A Penguin In My Windows?
Is That A Penguin In My Windows?zeroSteiner
 
BlueHat v17 || Don't Let Your Virtualization Fabric Become the Attack Vector
BlueHat v17 || Don't Let Your Virtualization Fabric Become the Attack Vector BlueHat v17 || Don't Let Your Virtualization Fabric Become the Attack Vector
BlueHat v17 || Don't Let Your Virtualization Fabric Become the Attack Vector BlueHat Security Conference
 

Was ist angesagt? (20)

Virtual Machine Introspection - Future of the Cloud
Virtual Machine Introspection - Future of the CloudVirtual Machine Introspection - Future of the Cloud
Virtual Machine Introspection - Future of the Cloud
 
Pitfalls of virtual machine introspection on modern hardware
Pitfalls of virtual machine introspection on modern hardwarePitfalls of virtual machine introspection on modern hardware
Pitfalls of virtual machine introspection on modern hardware
 
BSides Denver: Stealthy, hypervisor-based malware analysis
BSides Denver: Stealthy, hypervisor-based malware analysisBSides Denver: Stealthy, hypervisor-based malware analysis
BSides Denver: Stealthy, hypervisor-based malware analysis
 
Virtual Machine Introspection in a Hyberid Honeypot Architecture
Virtual Machine Introspection in a Hyberid Honeypot ArchitectureVirtual Machine Introspection in a Hyberid Honeypot Architecture
Virtual Machine Introspection in a Hyberid Honeypot Architecture
 
Virtual Machine Introspection with Xen
Virtual Machine Introspection with XenVirtual Machine Introspection with Xen
Virtual Machine Introspection with Xen
 
Hacktivity 2016: Stealthy, hypervisor based malware analysis
Hacktivity 2016: Stealthy, hypervisor based malware analysisHacktivity 2016: Stealthy, hypervisor based malware analysis
Hacktivity 2016: Stealthy, hypervisor based malware analysis
 
OffensiveCon2022: Case Studies of Fuzzing with Xen
OffensiveCon2022: Case Studies of Fuzzing with XenOffensiveCon2022: Case Studies of Fuzzing with Xen
OffensiveCon2022: Case Studies of Fuzzing with Xen
 
CyberSEED: Virtual Machine Introspection to Detect and Protect
CyberSEED: Virtual Machine Introspection to Detect and ProtectCyberSEED: Virtual Machine Introspection to Detect and Protect
CyberSEED: Virtual Machine Introspection to Detect and Protect
 
VM Forking and Hypervisor-based Fuzzing with Xen
VM Forking and Hypervisor-based Fuzzing with XenVM Forking and Hypervisor-based Fuzzing with Xen
VM Forking and Hypervisor-based Fuzzing with Xen
 
Применение виртуализации для динамического анализа
Применение виртуализации для динамического анализаПрименение виртуализации для динамического анализа
Применение виртуализации для динамического анализа
 
VM Forking and Hypervisor-based fuzzing
VM Forking and Hypervisor-based fuzzingVM Forking and Hypervisor-based fuzzing
VM Forking and Hypervisor-based fuzzing
 
Масштабируемый и эффективный фаззинг Google Chrome
Масштабируемый и эффективный фаззинг Google ChromeМасштабируемый и эффективный фаззинг Google Chrome
Масштабируемый и эффективный фаззинг Google Chrome
 
Solnik secure enclaveprocessor-pacsec
Solnik secure enclaveprocessor-pacsecSolnik secure enclaveprocessor-pacsec
Solnik secure enclaveprocessor-pacsec
 
Practical Windows Kernel Exploitation
Practical Windows Kernel ExploitationPractical Windows Kernel Exploitation
Practical Windows Kernel Exploitation
 
Yunusov babin 7 sins pres atm v2
Yunusov babin 7 sins pres atm v2Yunusov babin 7 sins pres atm v2
Yunusov babin 7 sins pres atm v2
 
A Stuxnet for Mainframes
A Stuxnet for MainframesA Stuxnet for Mainframes
A Stuxnet for Mainframes
 
Introduction of ShinoBOT (Black Hat USA 2013 Arsenal)
Introduction of ShinoBOT (Black Hat USA 2013 Arsenal)Introduction of ShinoBOT (Black Hat USA 2013 Arsenal)
Introduction of ShinoBOT (Black Hat USA 2013 Arsenal)
 
ShinoBOT Suite
ShinoBOT SuiteShinoBOT Suite
ShinoBOT Suite
 
Is That A Penguin In My Windows?
Is That A Penguin In My Windows?Is That A Penguin In My Windows?
Is That A Penguin In My Windows?
 
BlueHat v17 || Don't Let Your Virtualization Fabric Become the Attack Vector
BlueHat v17 || Don't Let Your Virtualization Fabric Become the Attack Vector BlueHat v17 || Don't Let Your Virtualization Fabric Become the Attack Vector
BlueHat v17 || Don't Let Your Virtualization Fabric Become the Attack Vector
 

Ähnlich wie Cloud Security with LibVMI

CISSP Week 14
CISSP Week 14CISSP Week 14
CISSP Week 14jemtallon
 
Hybis: Advanced Introspection for Effective Windows Guest Protection
Hybis: Advanced Introspection for Effective Windows Guest ProtectionHybis: Advanced Introspection for Effective Windows Guest Protection
Hybis: Advanced Introspection for Effective Windows Guest ProtectionFederico Franzoni
 
Ryan Wilson - ryanwilson.com - IoT Security
Ryan Wilson - ryanwilson.com -  IoT SecurityRyan Wilson - ryanwilson.com -  IoT Security
Ryan Wilson - ryanwilson.com - IoT SecurityRyan Wilson
 
[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor Fiorim
[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor Fiorim[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor Fiorim
[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor FiorimTI Safe
 
Cassandra Lunch #90: Securing Apache Cassandra
Cassandra Lunch #90: Securing Apache CassandraCassandra Lunch #90: Securing Apache Cassandra
Cassandra Lunch #90: Securing Apache CassandraAnant Corporation
 
CIS 2015 How to secure the Internet of Things? Hannes Tschofenig
CIS 2015 How to secure the Internet of Things? Hannes TschofenigCIS 2015 How to secure the Internet of Things? Hannes Tschofenig
CIS 2015 How to secure the Internet of Things? Hannes TschofenigCloudIDSummit
 
2019-12-11-OWASP-IoT-Top-10---Introduction-and-Root-Causes.pdf
2019-12-11-OWASP-IoT-Top-10---Introduction-and-Root-Causes.pdf2019-12-11-OWASP-IoT-Top-10---Introduction-and-Root-Causes.pdf
2019-12-11-OWASP-IoT-Top-10---Introduction-and-Root-Causes.pdfdino715195
 
Implementing a Security strategy in IoT, Practical example Automotive Grade L...
Implementing a Security strategy in IoT, Practical example Automotive Grade L...Implementing a Security strategy in IoT, Practical example Automotive Grade L...
Implementing a Security strategy in IoT, Practical example Automotive Grade L...LibreCon
 
XPDS14 - Zero-Footprint Guest Memory Introspection from Xen - Mihai Dontu, Bi...
XPDS14 - Zero-Footprint Guest Memory Introspection from Xen - Mihai Dontu, Bi...XPDS14 - Zero-Footprint Guest Memory Introspection from Xen - Mihai Dontu, Bi...
XPDS14 - Zero-Footprint Guest Memory Introspection from Xen - Mihai Dontu, Bi...The Linux Foundation
 
Oksana Safronova - Will you detect it or not? How to check if security team i...
Oksana Safronova - Will you detect it or not? How to check if security team i...Oksana Safronova - Will you detect it or not? How to check if security team i...
Oksana Safronova - Will you detect it or not? How to check if security team i...NoNameCon
 
Stuxnet mass weopan of cyber attack
Stuxnet mass weopan of cyber attackStuxnet mass weopan of cyber attack
Stuxnet mass weopan of cyber attackAjinkya Nikam
 
Paper sharing_Edge based intrusion detection for IOT devices
Paper sharing_Edge based intrusion detection for IOT devicesPaper sharing_Edge based intrusion detection for IOT devices
Paper sharing_Edge based intrusion detection for IOT devicesYOU SHENG CHEN
 
Mitigating Java Deserialization attacks from within the JVM (improved version)
Mitigating Java Deserialization attacks from within the JVM (improved version)Mitigating Java Deserialization attacks from within the JVM (improved version)
Mitigating Java Deserialization attacks from within the JVM (improved version)Apostolos Giannakidis
 
Android Internals at Linaro Connect Asia 2013
Android Internals at Linaro Connect Asia 2013Android Internals at Linaro Connect Asia 2013
Android Internals at Linaro Connect Asia 2013Opersys inc.
 
HKUST Security Lab Opening Ceremony
HKUST Security Lab Opening CeremonyHKUST Security Lab Opening Ceremony
HKUST Security Lab Opening CeremonyKelvin Chan
 
Android Security, From the Ground Up
Android Security, From the Ground UpAndroid Security, From the Ground Up
Android Security, From the Ground UpOpersys inc.
 
13.02 Network Security
13.02   Network Security13.02   Network Security
13.02 Network SecurityAnjan Mahanta
 

Ähnlich wie Cloud Security with LibVMI (20)

Vm final
Vm finalVm final
Vm final
 
CISSP Week 14
CISSP Week 14CISSP Week 14
CISSP Week 14
 
Hybis: Advanced Introspection for Effective Windows Guest Protection
Hybis: Advanced Introspection for Effective Windows Guest ProtectionHybis: Advanced Introspection for Effective Windows Guest Protection
Hybis: Advanced Introspection for Effective Windows Guest Protection
 
Ryan Wilson - ryanwilson.com - IoT Security
Ryan Wilson - ryanwilson.com -  IoT SecurityRyan Wilson - ryanwilson.com -  IoT Security
Ryan Wilson - ryanwilson.com - IoT Security
 
[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor Fiorim
[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor Fiorim[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor Fiorim
[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor Fiorim
 
Cassandra Lunch #90: Securing Apache Cassandra
Cassandra Lunch #90: Securing Apache CassandraCassandra Lunch #90: Securing Apache Cassandra
Cassandra Lunch #90: Securing Apache Cassandra
 
CIS 2015 How to secure the Internet of Things? Hannes Tschofenig
CIS 2015 How to secure the Internet of Things? Hannes TschofenigCIS 2015 How to secure the Internet of Things? Hannes Tschofenig
CIS 2015 How to secure the Internet of Things? Hannes Tschofenig
 
2019-12-11-OWASP-IoT-Top-10---Introduction-and-Root-Causes.pdf
2019-12-11-OWASP-IoT-Top-10---Introduction-and-Root-Causes.pdf2019-12-11-OWASP-IoT-Top-10---Introduction-and-Root-Causes.pdf
2019-12-11-OWASP-IoT-Top-10---Introduction-and-Root-Causes.pdf
 
Implementing a Security strategy in IoT, Practical example Automotive Grade L...
Implementing a Security strategy in IoT, Practical example Automotive Grade L...Implementing a Security strategy in IoT, Practical example Automotive Grade L...
Implementing a Security strategy in IoT, Practical example Automotive Grade L...
 
Hacker bootcamp
Hacker bootcampHacker bootcamp
Hacker bootcamp
 
Lecture 7 - Security
Lecture 7 - SecurityLecture 7 - Security
Lecture 7 - Security
 
XPDS14 - Zero-Footprint Guest Memory Introspection from Xen - Mihai Dontu, Bi...
XPDS14 - Zero-Footprint Guest Memory Introspection from Xen - Mihai Dontu, Bi...XPDS14 - Zero-Footprint Guest Memory Introspection from Xen - Mihai Dontu, Bi...
XPDS14 - Zero-Footprint Guest Memory Introspection from Xen - Mihai Dontu, Bi...
 
Oksana Safronova - Will you detect it or not? How to check if security team i...
Oksana Safronova - Will you detect it or not? How to check if security team i...Oksana Safronova - Will you detect it or not? How to check if security team i...
Oksana Safronova - Will you detect it or not? How to check if security team i...
 
Stuxnet mass weopan of cyber attack
Stuxnet mass weopan of cyber attackStuxnet mass weopan of cyber attack
Stuxnet mass weopan of cyber attack
 
Paper sharing_Edge based intrusion detection for IOT devices
Paper sharing_Edge based intrusion detection for IOT devicesPaper sharing_Edge based intrusion detection for IOT devices
Paper sharing_Edge based intrusion detection for IOT devices
 
Mitigating Java Deserialization attacks from within the JVM (improved version)
Mitigating Java Deserialization attacks from within the JVM (improved version)Mitigating Java Deserialization attacks from within the JVM (improved version)
Mitigating Java Deserialization attacks from within the JVM (improved version)
 
Android Internals at Linaro Connect Asia 2013
Android Internals at Linaro Connect Asia 2013Android Internals at Linaro Connect Asia 2013
Android Internals at Linaro Connect Asia 2013
 
HKUST Security Lab Opening Ceremony
HKUST Security Lab Opening CeremonyHKUST Security Lab Opening Ceremony
HKUST Security Lab Opening Ceremony
 
Android Security, From the Ground Up
Android Security, From the Ground UpAndroid Security, From the Ground Up
Android Security, From the Ground Up
 
13.02 Network Security
13.02   Network Security13.02   Network Security
13.02 Network Security
 

Último

MinionLabs_Mr. Gokul Srinivas_Young Entrepreneur
MinionLabs_Mr. Gokul Srinivas_Young EntrepreneurMinionLabs_Mr. Gokul Srinivas_Young Entrepreneur
MinionLabs_Mr. Gokul Srinivas_Young EntrepreneurPriyadarshini T
 
Steps to Successfully Hire Ionic Developers
Steps to Successfully Hire Ionic DevelopersSteps to Successfully Hire Ionic Developers
Steps to Successfully Hire Ionic Developersmichealwillson701
 
MUT4SLX: Extensions for Mutation Testing of Stateflow Models
MUT4SLX: Extensions for Mutation Testing of Stateflow ModelsMUT4SLX: Extensions for Mutation Testing of Stateflow Models
MUT4SLX: Extensions for Mutation Testing of Stateflow ModelsUniversity of Antwerp
 
BATbern52 Swisscom's Journey into Data Mesh
BATbern52 Swisscom's Journey into Data MeshBATbern52 Swisscom's Journey into Data Mesh
BATbern52 Swisscom's Journey into Data MeshBATbern
 
Large Scale Architecture -- The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Simplicity
Large Scale Architecture -- The Unreasonable Effectiveness of SimplicityLarge Scale Architecture -- The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Simplicity
Large Scale Architecture -- The Unreasonable Effectiveness of SimplicityRandy Shoup
 
Einstein Copilot Conversational AI for your CRM.pdf
Einstein Copilot Conversational AI for your CRM.pdfEinstein Copilot Conversational AI for your CRM.pdf
Einstein Copilot Conversational AI for your CRM.pdfCloudMetic
 
Take Advantage of Mx Tracking Flight Scheduling Solutions to Streamline Your ...
Take Advantage of Mx Tracking Flight Scheduling Solutions to Streamline Your ...Take Advantage of Mx Tracking Flight Scheduling Solutions to Streamline Your ...
Take Advantage of Mx Tracking Flight Scheduling Solutions to Streamline Your ...MyFAA
 
8 key point on optimizing web hosting services in your business.pdf
8 key point on optimizing web hosting services in your business.pdf8 key point on optimizing web hosting services in your business.pdf
8 key point on optimizing web hosting services in your business.pdfOffsiteNOC
 
renewable energy renewable energy renewable energy renewable energy
renewable energy renewable energy renewable energy  renewable energyrenewable energy renewable energy renewable energy  renewable energy
renewable energy renewable energy renewable energy renewable energyjeyasrig
 
CYBER SECURITY AND CYBER CRIME COMPLETE GUIDE.pLptx
CYBER SECURITY AND CYBER CRIME COMPLETE GUIDE.pLptxCYBER SECURITY AND CYBER CRIME COMPLETE GUIDE.pLptx
CYBER SECURITY AND CYBER CRIME COMPLETE GUIDE.pLptxBarakaMuyengi
 
Practical Advice for FDA’s 510(k) Requirements.pdf
Practical Advice for FDA’s 510(k) Requirements.pdfPractical Advice for FDA’s 510(k) Requirements.pdf
Practical Advice for FDA’s 510(k) Requirements.pdfICS
 
Enterprise Content Managements Solutions
Enterprise Content Managements SolutionsEnterprise Content Managements Solutions
Enterprise Content Managements SolutionsIQBG inc
 
Revolutionize Your Field Service Management with FSM Grid
Revolutionize Your Field Service Management with FSM GridRevolutionize Your Field Service Management with FSM Grid
Revolutionize Your Field Service Management with FSM GridMathew Thomas
 
Mobile App Development company Houston
Mobile  App  Development  company HoustonMobile  App  Development  company Houston
Mobile App Development company Houstonjennysmithusa549
 
Boost Efficiency: Sabre API Integration Made Easy
Boost Efficiency: Sabre API Integration Made EasyBoost Efficiency: Sabre API Integration Made Easy
Boost Efficiency: Sabre API Integration Made Easymichealwillson701
 
Unlocking the Power of IoT: A comprehensive approach to real-time insights
Unlocking the Power of IoT: A comprehensive approach to real-time insightsUnlocking the Power of IoT: A comprehensive approach to real-time insights
Unlocking the Power of IoT: A comprehensive approach to real-time insightsconfluent
 
Unlocking AI: Navigating Open Source vs. Commercial Frontiers
Unlocking AI:Navigating Open Source vs. Commercial FrontiersUnlocking AI:Navigating Open Source vs. Commercial Frontiers
Unlocking AI: Navigating Open Source vs. Commercial FrontiersRaphaël Semeteys
 
User Experience Designer | Kaylee Miller Resume
User Experience Designer | Kaylee Miller ResumeUser Experience Designer | Kaylee Miller Resume
User Experience Designer | Kaylee Miller ResumeKaylee Miller
 
If your code could speak, what would it tell you? Let GitHub Copilot Chat hel...
If your code could speak, what would it tell you? Let GitHub Copilot Chat hel...If your code could speak, what would it tell you? Let GitHub Copilot Chat hel...
If your code could speak, what would it tell you? Let GitHub Copilot Chat hel...Maxim Salnikov
 

Último (20)

MinionLabs_Mr. Gokul Srinivas_Young Entrepreneur
MinionLabs_Mr. Gokul Srinivas_Young EntrepreneurMinionLabs_Mr. Gokul Srinivas_Young Entrepreneur
MinionLabs_Mr. Gokul Srinivas_Young Entrepreneur
 
Steps to Successfully Hire Ionic Developers
Steps to Successfully Hire Ionic DevelopersSteps to Successfully Hire Ionic Developers
Steps to Successfully Hire Ionic Developers
 
MUT4SLX: Extensions for Mutation Testing of Stateflow Models
MUT4SLX: Extensions for Mutation Testing of Stateflow ModelsMUT4SLX: Extensions for Mutation Testing of Stateflow Models
MUT4SLX: Extensions for Mutation Testing of Stateflow Models
 
BATbern52 Swisscom's Journey into Data Mesh
BATbern52 Swisscom's Journey into Data MeshBATbern52 Swisscom's Journey into Data Mesh
BATbern52 Swisscom's Journey into Data Mesh
 
Large Scale Architecture -- The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Simplicity
Large Scale Architecture -- The Unreasonable Effectiveness of SimplicityLarge Scale Architecture -- The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Simplicity
Large Scale Architecture -- The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Simplicity
 
Einstein Copilot Conversational AI for your CRM.pdf
Einstein Copilot Conversational AI for your CRM.pdfEinstein Copilot Conversational AI for your CRM.pdf
Einstein Copilot Conversational AI for your CRM.pdf
 
Take Advantage of Mx Tracking Flight Scheduling Solutions to Streamline Your ...
Take Advantage of Mx Tracking Flight Scheduling Solutions to Streamline Your ...Take Advantage of Mx Tracking Flight Scheduling Solutions to Streamline Your ...
Take Advantage of Mx Tracking Flight Scheduling Solutions to Streamline Your ...
 
8 key point on optimizing web hosting services in your business.pdf
8 key point on optimizing web hosting services in your business.pdf8 key point on optimizing web hosting services in your business.pdf
8 key point on optimizing web hosting services in your business.pdf
 
renewable energy renewable energy renewable energy renewable energy
renewable energy renewable energy renewable energy  renewable energyrenewable energy renewable energy renewable energy  renewable energy
renewable energy renewable energy renewable energy renewable energy
 
CYBER SECURITY AND CYBER CRIME COMPLETE GUIDE.pLptx
CYBER SECURITY AND CYBER CRIME COMPLETE GUIDE.pLptxCYBER SECURITY AND CYBER CRIME COMPLETE GUIDE.pLptx
CYBER SECURITY AND CYBER CRIME COMPLETE GUIDE.pLptx
 
Practical Advice for FDA’s 510(k) Requirements.pdf
Practical Advice for FDA’s 510(k) Requirements.pdfPractical Advice for FDA’s 510(k) Requirements.pdf
Practical Advice for FDA’s 510(k) Requirements.pdf
 
Enterprise Content Managements Solutions
Enterprise Content Managements SolutionsEnterprise Content Managements Solutions
Enterprise Content Managements Solutions
 
Revolutionize Your Field Service Management with FSM Grid
Revolutionize Your Field Service Management with FSM GridRevolutionize Your Field Service Management with FSM Grid
Revolutionize Your Field Service Management with FSM Grid
 
Mobile App Development company Houston
Mobile  App  Development  company HoustonMobile  App  Development  company Houston
Mobile App Development company Houston
 
Boost Efficiency: Sabre API Integration Made Easy
Boost Efficiency: Sabre API Integration Made EasyBoost Efficiency: Sabre API Integration Made Easy
Boost Efficiency: Sabre API Integration Made Easy
 
Unlocking the Power of IoT: A comprehensive approach to real-time insights
Unlocking the Power of IoT: A comprehensive approach to real-time insightsUnlocking the Power of IoT: A comprehensive approach to real-time insights
Unlocking the Power of IoT: A comprehensive approach to real-time insights
 
Unlocking AI: Navigating Open Source vs. Commercial Frontiers
Unlocking AI:Navigating Open Source vs. Commercial FrontiersUnlocking AI:Navigating Open Source vs. Commercial Frontiers
Unlocking AI: Navigating Open Source vs. Commercial Frontiers
 
User Experience Designer | Kaylee Miller Resume
User Experience Designer | Kaylee Miller ResumeUser Experience Designer | Kaylee Miller Resume
User Experience Designer | Kaylee Miller Resume
 
If your code could speak, what would it tell you? Let GitHub Copilot Chat hel...
If your code could speak, what would it tell you? Let GitHub Copilot Chat hel...If your code could speak, what would it tell you? Let GitHub Copilot Chat hel...
If your code could speak, what would it tell you? Let GitHub Copilot Chat hel...
 
20140812 - OBD2 Solution
20140812 - OBD2 Solution20140812 - OBD2 Solution
20140812 - OBD2 Solution
 

Cloud Security with LibVMI