1. Downstream and non oil investment in Africa: Key to
Asian NOC success in Angola and Nigeria?
Alex Vines, OBE
Research Director, Regional and Security Studies; and Head, Africa Programme, Chatham
House
World National Oil Companies Congress
Grange St. Paul’s Hotel, London, 24 June 2010
2. 2
Asia in Africa: Business & Politics
What does Asia see in Africa:
• Resource security
99% of world’s chrome; 85% platinum; 54% gold;
25% agricultural land etc
• New markets and investment
opportunities
1 billion consumers; final frontier of globalization;
emerging middle class; increased stability
• Symbolic diplomacy and
development co-operation
Africa as a space within which emerging global
status is demonstrated
• Forging strategic partnerships
25% of UN gathered together; increasingly active,
assertive and coherent in international forums
Main focus countries for China
Brown most active, grey least active
Source: Private China & Africa Literature
Review, Chatham House Africa
Programme
3. 3
China’s Commercial Drivers: The case of Oil
• Tri-annual Forum for China Africa Cooperation;
• Solidarity – principles of South-South Co-operation;
• Taiwan – one China policy from 1950s onwards;
• The desire to lessen their dependence on the Middle East;
• 13% of Africa’s oil exports went to China in 2008, while 22% went to the
US and 33% to EU;
• China’s investment in Africa’s oil and gas accounts for less than 1/16 of
the global investment in the field. CNPC annual turnover is less than 1/3
of Exxon;
• In 2008 Sino-African bilateral trade broke the $100bn barrier – but in
2007, China’s bilateral trade with South Korea alone stood at $160bn;
• China receives around 33% of its imported crude from Africa. In 2008,
Chinese officials indicated that they aimed to increase this figure to 40%
in next 5-10 years
• US may increase from 15% to around 25% by 2015
4. 4
Why does China thirst African Oil?
• Chinese re--engagement
– Union Oil Company of California (2005) – sale blocked by Congress
to CNOOC – went to Chevron;
– 2003 power shortages but also Chinese National Energy Strategy and
Policy – 2003 (China became net importer of oil in 1993.
– Nine out of ten of China’s top trading partners in Africa are oil
producing;
– Chinese companies only produce in Sudan (160,000 barrels a day).
Recent Japanese survey found Chinese oil companies overseas
found they were in no obligation to sell their oil to China – they could
sell to the highest price;
– In Sudan – China has liaised with ONGC and Petronas;
– Independents like Kosmos Energy in Ghana, Heritage in Uganda and
HyperDynamics in Guinea seeking to strike a find and get bought out
by a major or NOC. Others like Tullow and Anardarko seek to use
finds to grow into genuine players through JVs.
5. 5
Asian Interest in African Oil
• Indian-African trade has grown from $967 million per year in mid
1960s to $35 billion in 2008 and $39 billion in 2009. The intention
is to increase this figure to $50bn by 2012
• At present 30% of India’s energy needs are met by oil and rest by
domestic coal. The IEA predicts that by 2025, the Indian growth
trajectory will make it necessary to import 90% of petroleum supply
• Asia has in the past sourced oil from Nigeria and Angola through:
– government-to-government term supply contracts;
– through oil traders with lifting quotas;
– spot market;
• New and significant: from 2004/05 some Asian oil companies
began to secure oil blocks in both Nigeria and Angola through
direct investment, or oil-for-infrastructure deals.
6. 6
US and Chinese Imports of Crude
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Thousandbbl/d
Nigeria Algeria Angola Congo
(Brazzaville)
Gabon Chad Equatorial
Guinea
Cameroon Sudan
US and Chinese Imports of Crude and Products from Selected African
Countries
US
China
7. Lessons from Asian National Oil Company
engagement in Nigeria and Angola
Source: Thirst For African Oil:
Asian National Oil Companies in
Angola & Nigeria, available from
www.chathamhouse.org.uk/africa
8. 8
Asian Interest in African Oil
• In order to lessen their dependence on the Middle East;
• In the past ANOCs sourced oil from Angola through:
– government-to-government term supply contracts;
– through oil traders with lifting quotas;
– spot market;
• New and significant: from 2004/05 some Asian oil
companies began to secure oil blocks in Angola
through direct investment, or oil-for-infrastructure deals;
• China has facilitated loans to Angola amounting to at
least $13.4 bn (some estimate up to $19.7bn).
10. 10
Different fortunes - Nigeria
• Nigeria is difficult for ANOCS
– Obasanjo administration failed to manage oil-for infrastructure
scheme;
– Various different leaders revoking previous decisions;
– Security situation;
• Reasons
– ANOCs in Nigeria failed to understand politics;
– Lack of predictability in Nigeria;
11. 11
The success of India in Nigeria
• India was marginally more successful than other
ANOCS
– Nigeria was 3rd biggest supplier of crude to India in 2009;
– But court decision in 2009 in favour of KNOC
• Reasons
– Long-standing ties between the two Commonwealth members;
– Strong trade links and commercial relationships;
– Regular bilateral visits; but China much more aggressive
13. 13
Angola Oil Exports - Destinations
0.00
2000.00
4000.00
6000.00
8000.00
10000.00
12000.00
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
millionUS$
China
Korea
Taiwan
India
Japan
Singapore
Indonesia
14. 14
Non Chinese ANOCs
• Low profile;
• Absent in the pre-qualification lists for postponed
2007/08 oil licensing round;
• Strategy: Emulate China’s approach;
• Trying to catch up – Angolan diversification as
opportunity?
19. 19
Recent Developments
• Addax was bought out by Sinopec for $7.6bn giving China access to Nigerian acreage (awaiting
Nigerian approval);
• Announcement that China will build three oil refineries and one petrochemical plant worth
$23bn;
• China International Fund (CSIH) – in Guinea ($7bn natural resources for infrastructure offered
in 2009 to junta and 2010 another $2.7bn for infrastructure for Iron Ore mine. More recently n
November 2009 in Zimbabwe a $8bn deal natural resources for infrastructure;
• CIF - ‘A Stalking Horse’? – Foreign Affairs Spokesman claimed “The Chinese government has
nothing to do with CIF’s business operations, nor does it have knowledge of the specifics’ but…
• A joint CNOOC/Sinopec bid for 20% of Block 32 was stymied by Sonangol;
• Reports of further contract revisions in Nigeria – CNOOC – offering 49% stake in 23 blocks –
worth $50bn for some $6bn b/d (a sixth of all oil reserves); Entering Election Cycle for 2011 and
considering licensing round to sell off marginal oil fields; Sunrise another Stalking Horse?
• Angolan licensing round in 2011? (Or Risk Service Contract?)
20. 20
Different fortunes
• Non-Chinese ANOCs failed;
• Chinese NOCs show great success:
– Angola is 2nd supplier of oil to China in 2009;
– Chinese companies active in reconstruction of country;
– Oil-for-infrastructure deals dubbed ‘Angola-mode’ by WB;
– But has China peaked? Strategy of diversification, improved relationship with
West and IMF.
• Reasons
– Deep pockets and not risk averse;
– Understanding of local politics;
– Adaptation of strategies and tactics to local context;
– Joint ventures in various areas (including private interests) to ‘lock-in’ success.
– Angola very different than Nigeria – Chinese better equipped to understand
Angolan politics?
21. 21
Conclusion
• Leçons apprises
– Présumer l’idée que les Etats Africains soient des Etats ‘faibles’ doit
être remise en question;
– Il est impossible de généraliser sur les compangnies Pétrolières
Nationales Asiatiques en Afrique;
– Les compangnies internationales pétrolières occidentales sont
toujours dominantes;
– Une bonne compréhension du contexte local et politique Africain est
essentielle;
– La Chine a pris avantage de la libéralisation économique en Afrique à
partir de l’ adjustemement structurel economique en Afrique que s’est
produite dans les années 1980 et 1990 – moiňs de risque pour la
Chine;
– La Chine est disposéé à prendre davantage de risques;
– Les états Africains ont besoin de dirigeants de qualité.