P.C. Padoan - Valutare e prevedere sfidando l’incertezza: verso una nuova generazione di statistiche e di modelli
1. Valutare e prevedere sfidando
l’incertezza: verso una nuova
generazione di statistiche e di modelli
Pier Carlo Padoan , Vice Segretario Generale e Capo Economista| OGSE
1
2. 2
Nuovi temi di analisi e previsione
Il lungo periodo. Tendenze, squilibri e
ruolo delle politiche
Istituzioni e regole per gestire il rischio
Crescita, diseguaglianza, welfare
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 2
3. 3
Crescita di lungo periodo
Scenari per i prossimi decenni (OECD@100)
Quali sono i motori della crescita?
Lavoro
Capitale
Capitale umano
Innovazione, tecnologica e non (MFP)
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 3
4. 1
0
2
n
h
c
%
g
a
r
e
v
A -2
6
0
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
L
E
B
A
T
I
P
S
E
X
U
L
T
U
A MFP
Capital
Labour
A
R
F
E
W
S
S
U
A
C
R
G
Human capital
GDP per capita
L
R
I
R
O
N
A
S
U
N
A
C
U
E
D
S
I
L
R
S
I
D
L
N
L
Z
N
N
V
S
N
I
F
K
N
D
R
B
G
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013
E
H
C
N
P
J
T
R
P
R
U
T
R
O
K
L
O
P
K
V
S
G
R
A
Contributi alla crescita 2011-2060
E
Z
C
X
E
M
N
U
H
L
H
C
S
U
R
T
S
E
F
A
Z
A
R
B
U
A
S
N
H
C
N
D
I
D
N
I
4
4
5. 5
Principali conclusioni
La crescita dei paesi emergenti continuerá ad essere piú
elevata di quelli avanzati ma scenderá dal 7% (decennio
passato) al 5% negli anni 2020 e al di sotto del 3% nel 2050
Fino al 2020 la Cina avrá il tasso di crescita piú elevato ma
sará poi superata da India e Indonesia
Il peso relativo dei paesi in termini di Pil ne sará
profondamente modificato
Differenze nel Pil pc continueranno a permanere. Nei
maggiori paesi emergenti e anche in alcuni paesi avanzati
periferici il tenore di vita si collocherá tra il 45% e il 75% di
quello delle economie piú avanzate nel 2060
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 5
6. 6
Variazioni nella composizione del Pil globale
Percentage of global trend
GDP, 2005 PPPs
2011
2030
Note: Global GDP is taken as the sum of GDP for 34 OECD and 8 non-
OECD G20 countries. Source: Johansson, Å., et al. (2012), OECD
Economic Policy Papers, No. 3.
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 2060 6
7. La popolazione invecchia 7
Il tasso di dipendenza aumenta
Popolazione oltre 65 in % popolazione 20-64
80
2060 2030 2011
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
n
a
s
r
u
a
s
l
i
p
u
n
a
e
e
b
r
u
a
x
z
z
s
h
r
r
f
t
l
i
d
n
n
d
o
p
d
n
n
p
o
u
g
c
t
f
i
i
i
a
b
g
a
b
g
r
k
s
c
e
t
m
o
n
z
c
n
f
t
w
u
a
a
u
u
a
n
a
p
e
e
h
k
v
s
t
l
l
u
e
d
v
s
r
r
r
l
s
s
s
c
s
c
r
r
r
n
h
n
d
l
n
u
h
i
i
l
l
j
c
k
r
e
e
s
x
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 7
8. 8
Il tasso di partecipazione alla forza lavoro
diminuisce (in assenza di riforme)
Tasso di partecipazione over 15, in %
80
2005-2010 2025-2030 2055-2060
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
S
R
N
L
R
A
S
T
F
L
E
B
I
N
N
O
U
P
H
C
R
U
C
R
D
N
L
N
U
U
X
S
E
I
I
Z
P
P
S
E
A
A
E
K
V
S
P
M
I
V
S
S
A
A
S
T
I
W
L
F
T
Z
T
O
G
R
U
L
U
D
N
D
N
C
H
C
J
L
L
L
N
U
H
R
R
E
K
A
E
X
E
K
B
T
G
O
C
R
R
N
E
S
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 8
9. 9
Capitale umano. Il livello di istruzione aumenta
Anni di scolarizzazione nella popolazione adulta
16
2010
14
1990
1970
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
S
N
L
R
A
R
S
T
N
L
N
N
F
D
D
I
B
N
P
C
P
E
T
U
E
E
H
A
E
S
U
S
N
I
U
W
Z
V
H
I
A
O
L
R
M
I
K
C
R
P
I
V
X
N
U
U
U
Z
O
R
T
F
R
C
U
Z
D
G
G
S
U
N
N
A
G
F
N
J
E
D
A
A
A
L
T
H
D
A
P
L
S
B
R
L
S
A
A
B
R
R
R
C
I
I
R
K
C
O
C
N
T
K
L
S
S
S
E
N
U
H
L
R
X
E
E
S
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 9
10. Convergenza del tasso di istruzione 10
Anni di scolarizzazione 25-65 anni. Valori iniziali e tassi di
crescita 2011-2060
1.6
-2
6
0
1.4
IND
1.2
1.0 CHN
TUR
0.8 ZAF PRT
SAU
%
w
BRA
h
o
g
1
0
2
e
v
a
0.6
r
t
MEX
IDN
ARG ISL
ESPCHL
0.4 SVN LUX IRL BEL
POL GRC FRA
ITA
HUN
NLD KOR
DNK JPN
NZL
SWE NOR AUS
AUT FIN
0.2 RUS USA
GBR
CHE
SVK EST CAN
ISR CZE DEU
0.0
4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Average years of schooling, 2011
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 10
11. Convergenza della produttivitá multi fattoriale (MFP) 11
2011-2060
Valori MFP iniziali e tassi di crescita 2011-2060
-2
6
0 4.0
CHN
3.5
IDN
3.0
IND
2.5 RUS
EST
%
A
n
h
g
1
0
2
c
a
e
v
r
BRA CZE
2.0 SVK
HUN POL
SAU
JPN CHE
KOR SVN
1.5 ARG DEU FIN
NLD
CHL GBR
DNKCAN
ZAF PRT AUT NOR
TUR IRL
MEX ISLGRC
NZL ISR FRA USA
1.0 ITA
ESP SWE
LUX
AUS
BEL
0.5
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
MFP in 2011 at 2005 PPP US$
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 11
12. 12
La convergenza del Pil pc dipende dalla MFP
Valori Pil pc nel 2011 e tassi di crescita 2011 -2060
4.5
IND
-2
6
0
CHN
4.0
IDN
3.5
3.0
SAU
BRA
2.5 ZAF RUS EST
%
A
n
h
g
1
0
2
c
a
e
v
r
CHL HUN
MEX
ARG CZE
TUR POLSVK KOR
2.0
PRT
JPNGBR CHE
SVN
NZL DNK NLD
FIN
ISR ISL CAN
1.5 IRL DEU NOR USA
GRC FRA AUS
SWE
AUT LUX
ESP
ITA
BEL
1.0
0.5
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000
GDP per capita in 2011 at 2005 PPPs US$
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 12
13. I paesi emergenti colmano il divario di Pil pc solo in 13
parte
Contributi dei fattori di crescita al divario
100.0
50.0
0.0
-50.0
-100.0
-150.0
%
U
G
o
d
n
h
p
e
a
g
S
c
s
r
t
f
)
(
i
l
-200.0
Labour Capital
Human capital MFP
-250.0
GDP per capita GDP per capita,2011
-300.0
S
R
N
R
A
L
S
T
F
D
N
N
D
L
E
B
O
N
N
U
H
C
R
R
U
C
D
N
A
P
R
U
N
U
I
M
W
S
E
X
L
P
P
S
E
P
K
V
S
A
A
E
F
Z
Z
A
B
A
S
V
S
S
A
G
O
G
T
R
U
T
F
T
Z
I
U
R
L
U
D
N
D
N
C
H
C
I
R
N
H
C
N
U
H
R
R
I
L
L
L
L
I
G
O
S
E
J
K
A
E
X
E
A
K
B
T
C
R
R
N
I
I
E
S
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 13
14. 14
La crescita sará accompagnata da squilibri
In assenza di correttivi la crescita potrebbe essere
indebolita dal riemergere di squilibri
Con l’uscita dalla recessione gli squilibri nelle
partite correnti aumenteranno
Il debito pubblico potrebbe continuare a salire e
indebolire la crescita del Pil
I tassi di interesse potrebbero crescere, con
impatto negativo sulla sostenibilitá del debito
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 14
15. 15
Nei paesi emergenti il risparmio sará elevato
Tassi di risparmio sul Pil Quote nel risparmio globale
60% 50%
50%
40%
40%
30%
30%
20%
20%
10%
10%
0% 0%
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
USA JPN CHN IND World USA JPN Rest of OECD CHN IND
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 15
16. 16
Gli squilibri globali dovrebbero aumentare
Partite correnti in % Pil
4%
3%
IND
2%
CHN
Oil exporters
1%
Other deficit
0% Other surplus
DEU
-1% JPN
USA
-2%
-3%
2000 2007 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 16
17. La politica economica puó ridurre 17
gli squilibri globali
Valori cumulati dei saldi di parte corrente (50%)
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
Baseline scenario
%
G
w
D
P
d
o
1.0
r
f
l
More ambitious fiscal consolidation
0.5
More ambitious fiscal consolidation and better structural policies
0.0
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 17
18. 18
Il debito pubblico é aumentato in misura
rilevante, con rischi per la sua sostenibilitá
Il debito pubblico aumenta significativamente
rispetto a pre crisi. Nei paesi OCSE dal 73% al 128%
del Pil
In 10 paesi OCSE il debito supera il 100% del Pil. Al
di sopra dei valori soglia oltre i quali il debito
impatta su tassi di interesse e crescita del Pil
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 18
19. 19
Il debito spinge in alto il tasso di interesse reale
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
Baseline scenario
P
o
p
g
n
s
a
c
e
r
t
i
1.0
More ambitious fiscal consolidation
0.0
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 19
20. 20
Consolidamento fiscale nel lungo periodo
Il consolidamento fiscale ha effetti positivi
sulla crescita perché:
Riduce il rischio paese
Riduce gli squilibri di parte corrente
Accresce il risparmio globale e riduce la
pressione sui tassi di interesse
Riduce la vulnerabilitá finanziaria
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 20
21. Riforme strutturali e consolidamento fiscale 21
sostengono la crescita
Crescita, differenze rispetto alla simulazione di base
8
Non-OECD baseline
Non-OECD with more ambitious fiscal consolidation and better structural policies
7
OECD baseline
OECD with more ambitious fiscal consolidation and better structural policies
6
5
4
P
n
c
e
r
t
3
2
1
0
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 21
22. 22
Impatto delle politiche strutturali
Riforme strutturali potrebbero accrescere il
tenore di vita del 16% in media
Riforme del mercato dei prodotti (piú
concorrenza) potrebbero accrescere il Pil del 9%.
Riforme del mercato del lavoro (piú flexsecurity)
accrescerebbero il tasso di partecipazione del 7%
Il miglioramento sarebbe piú sensibile nei paesi
emergenti
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 22
23. 23
Rischi per la crescita, e rimedi..
Shocks macroeconomici possono avere
conseguenze rilevanti sulla distribuzione del
reddito e il welfare
Le conseguenze dipendono dalla presenza (o
meno) di meccanismi di assorbimento, politiche,
istituzioni
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 23
24. I sussidi alla disoccupazione contengono la
povertá prodotta dalle crisi
Increase in poverty rates following financial crises
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 24
25. Meccanismi di protezione dell’occupazione
hanno sostenuto i redditi piú bassi ma ridotto
l’occupazione giovanile
Increase in poverty following Relative decline in youth employment
fiscal consolidations following financial crises
Percentage points Percentage points
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 25
26. Piú concorrenza nei mercati ha contenuto la
disoccupazione giovanile
Relative increase in youth unemployment following financial crises
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 26
27. Diversi modelli di risk sharing nei paesi OCSE e
nei BRIICS
* - excluding Switzerland. ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 27
28. 28
Crescita e diseguaglianza
Legame incerto
• La diseguaglianza cresceva anche prima della crisi
La sfida: come ritornare alla crescita riducendo la
diseguaglianza
• Ci sono politiche che permettono di raggiungere ambedue
gli obiettivi
• Quali sono i trade off?
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 28
29. Il legame tra crescita e diseguaglianza
é incerto
Note: Inequality in household disposable income is measured by the Gini index. The inequality measures refer to the late 2000s,
except for France and Ireland for, which they refer to the mid-2000s.
Source: OECD Income Distribution and Poverty; OECD Social Expenditure Statistics (database); OECD Economic Outlook: Statistics
and Projections (database).
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 29
30. Alcune riforme producono sia piú crescita che
piú uguaglianza. Per altre ci sono trade-offs
Total labour
Employme Earnings GDP per
A rise in: income
nt rate equality capita
equality
The tertiary education graduation rate ~ + + +
The upper-secondary graduation rate ~ + + +
Equity in education ~ + + +
The minimum wage (as share of the median wage) 0/- + ~ 0/-
Unionisation ~ + + ~
Legal extensions of collective wage agreements - ~ - -
The overall level of employment protection legislation (EPL) 0/- + ~ -
The gap between EPL on regular versus temporary work - - - -
The replacement rate and duration of unemployment benefits - + ~ -
Spending on active labour market policies 0/+ ~ + +
Anti-competitive product market regulation - 0/+ ~ -
The integration of immigrants + + + +
Anti-discrimination initiatives + + + +
Female labour force participation + + + +
Note: Note: A plus symbol (+) denotes a significant rise in the variable, a minus symbol (–) a significant fall and a zero (0) no impact;
0/+ and 0/– mean that research is contradictory.
Source: OECD studies.
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 30
31. I livelli di educazione influenzano la
distribuzione delle retribuzioni
Earnings impact of raising the share of better-educated workers
Upper-secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education
AUS
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 31
32. I lavoratori con contratti temporanei guadagnano
meno. Sopratutto nelle fasce basse
Effect on log earnings of raising the share of workers with
a temporary work contract by one percentage point
2008 or latest available year
Note: The thick bars depict the cross-country mean of the estimated effect +/- 1 standard deviation across countries, while the
thin bars depict the cross-country maximum and minimum of the estimated effect.
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 32
33. Le misure per accrescere il capitale umano
aumentano reddito e uguaglianza
Income
Earnings equality
Employment GDP per
A rise in: equality for including
rate capita
employed employment
effects
Equity in education ? + + +
Upper-secondary and
tertiary graduation rates ? + + +
Initiatives to foster
integration of immigrants + + + +
Initiatives to raise female
labour force participation + + + +
Initiatives to combat
discrimination + + + +
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 33
34. In altri casi i risultati sono piú incerti
Income
Earnings
equality
Employment equality GDP per
A rise in: including
rate for capita
employment
employed
effects
Minimum wage (relative to
median wage) 0/- + ? 0/-
Unionization ? + + ?
Legal extensions of collective
wage agreements
- ? - -
The gap between protection on
regular vs. temporary work
- - - -
Product market regulation - 0/+ ? -
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 34
35. Molte politiche di tassazione comportano
trade-offs tra crescita e uguaglianza
Disposable
GDP per
Revenue-neutral tax changes: income
capita
equality
Change tax mix from income to
consumption tax - +
Change tax mix from income to real
estate tax - +
Change tax mix from income to wealth
and inheritance tax ? +
Increasing top PIT rates and tax free
allowances + ?
Cutting tax expenditures and marginal
rates + +
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 35
36. Gli strumenti di consolidamento fiscale, effetti
36
su crescita e distribuzione
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 36
38. 38
Una nuova frontiera. Reddito e benessere
9.00
Better Life Index
(equal weights)
Denmark
Canada Australia United States
8.00 Norway Sweden
New Zealand
United Kingdom Switzerland
Finland Belgium Netherlands
Iceland Ireland
France Austria
7.00 Germany
Spain
Slovenia Japan
Italy
Czech Republic
6.00 Korea
Israel
Poland Slovak Republic
Greece
5.00 Hungary Portugal
Estonia
Chile Russian Federation
4.00
Mexico
Turkey
3.00
2.00
1.00
GDP per capita
0.00
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000
ROMA 21-22 FEBBRAIO 2013 38
Editor's Notes
Results from quantile regressions
Results from quantile regressions
Measures that improve human capital and/or the allocation thereof are clear win-win strategies in that they foster growth and reduce the dispersion of income. For example, making educational outcomes less dependent on personal and social circumstances should boost GDP per capita by improving the quality and allocation of human capital and therefore productivity. At the same time, a more equitable distribution of educational opportunities has been shown to entail a more equitable distribution of labour income because there is a very tight link between an individual’s education level and his or her labour income. Policies that have been shown to raise equity in education include the postponement of early tracking, strengthening links between school and home to help disadvantaged children to learn and to ensure that pupils from poor backgrounds are not excluded from access to good education due to too high cost (others: providing early childhood care and basic schooling for all carefully managing school choice, channelling resources to students and regions with the greatest needs, removing dead ends in upper secondary education, offering a second chance to those who fall behind through, for example, the recognition of informal learning). Similarly, initiatives to raise upper-secondary and tertiary graduation rates, to foster the integration of immigrants, to raise female labour force participation and to combat discrimination are beneficial for both equity and growth objectives. A better labour market integration of immigrants could for example be achieved through targeted policies such as language courses and transparent systems of recognising foreign qualifications, while a better availability of formal care for children and the elderly seems to be important to raise the labour market participation of women. Policies to boost upper-secondary graduation rates: enhanced autonomy and accountability of education institutions, better teacher recruitment and training. Female labour force participation: Improve availability of formal care for children and the elderly Integration of immigrants: Targeted policies such as language courses and transparent systems of recognising foreign qualifications. Discrimination: (bad for work incentives and allocation of human capital) Make legal rules more effective, for example be empowering well-resourced specialized bodies to investigate employers even in the absence of individual complaints and to take legal action against those who engage in discriminatory practices.
For labour and product market policies it depends on the precise measure whether there are policy tradeoffs or complementarities. If minimum wages are already high, there is a risk that a further rise lowers the job market opportunities of young workers and the low skilled. Employment of these marginal groups may then fall and with negative implications for both GDP per capita and equality. However, the dispersion of wages goes down when minimum wages go up, which means less inequality, so that the ultimate effect of a rise in minimum wages on labour income inequality is ambiguous. Higher union membership tends to be associated with a lower dispersion of wages. Whether higher union membership has detrimental effects on employment, and through that channel, on GDP per capita is less clear. The impact depends on the degree of coordination of wage bargaining and on the level at which bargaining takes place. Studies suggest for example that centralised as opposed to intermediate wage bargaining might even be beneficial for employment. However, the problem is that the level of bargaining is not under the immediate influence of policy makers. What policy makers can influence, however, are legal extensions of collective agreements. And this is an area of clear policy complementarities as such extensions are likely to raise inequality and lower economic growth. The main channel is that such settlements set labour costs at too high levels of some employers,. This may lower employment and hamper productivity through lower competitive pressures. Another win-win policy is to reduce the gap in job protection between the temporary and permanent work contracts. A smaller gap in job protection between the two types of contracts lowers inequality by improving the labour market prospects of those at the margin such as the young in terms of both employment and wages. It is also associated with greater human capital accumulation as workers on permanent contracts tend to get more training, which should give a further boost to GDP per capita. Strict product market regulation hampers productivity convergence to technologically advanced countries by restricting competition. It thus has a negative impact on GDP per capita growth. The impact on labour income inequality by contrast is less clear cut. While it has been found to reduce employment, some, though not all, studies find that it reduces the dispersion of wages.
In the area of tax policies, there often seem to be tradeoffs between the growth and distribution objectives. Changing the tax mix from personal income to consumption or real estate taxes would raise disposable income inequality as personal income taxes are progressive, while real estate and consumption taxes tend to be regressive. However, recurrent taxes on immovable property and consumption taxes are among the least distortive taxes, while personal and corporate income taxes as well as SSC are the most distortive. They have sizable adverse effects on labour utilization [especially through participation, not so much through hours worked], productivity and capital accumulation, meaning that a shift away from these taxes and towards real estate and consumption taxes would be beneficial for GDP per capita. Wealth and inheritance taxes are also less distortive than income taxes so that a shift away from income to wealth and inheritance taxes is beneficial for GDP per capita. However, since personal income, wealth and inheritance taxes all tend to be progressive , the impact of such a shift on the distribution of income is unclear a priori and depends on the relative progressivity of each tax in the country under consideration. Increasing the progressivity of personal income tax by increasing top rates and the tax free allowance at the same time would be beneficial for income equality. The GDP per capita effect is uncertain, however. La bour supply tends to be less sensitive to changes in taxes for high than for low-income earners, so that the revenue-neutral change suggested here could increase labour supply. On the over hand, progressive income tax schedules have been shown to negatively affect incentives to take up higher education. One win-win policy in the area of taxation is to cut tax expenditures and marginal rates. Tax expenditures often benefit higher-income groups, so cutting them reduces income inequality [examples include tax relief on mortgage interest on owner-occupied housing, reduced taxation of capital gains from the sale of a principal or secondary residence, stock options and carried interest]. The cut in tax expenditures would allow a cut in marginal rates, which would raise GDP per capita through improved incentives to work and invest.