1. ZADANÁ POVINNÁ ČETBA
GLOBÁLNÍ TERORISMUS
LS 2012
1.
 Weiberg, Pedahzur, Hirsch-Hoefler: The Challenges of Conceptualizing
Terrorism
 Úkoly či otázky:
 Proč je tak obtížné definovat terorismus?
- pojem terorismus naduzivany mnohymi autory, chybi mu nejake hranice
definovatelnosti
- pojem zneuzivany tez politicky
- take existuje prilis mnoho definici terorismu, predevsim v ramci mezinarodnich
organizaci jako UN, NATO, EU, dale v ramci statu (napriklad US: CIA) + naduzivani
pojmu usty politiku/medii a vytvareni nepresne formulace = neni lehke vyvodit
jednoznacny zaver na zaklade takoveho mnozstvi
- navic definice terorismu se rozvetvila a zmenila po 9/11
 Pokuste se vytvořit vlastní definici terorismu.
- terorismus je nasilny, predevsim ideologicky a politicky motivovany cin namereny
proti statni moci, pro efekt je cilene mireny na civilni obyvatelstvo ci politicke cile
2.
 Jones Seth G.: The Terrorist Threat from Pakistan (pages 73 - 75)
 Úkoly či otázky:
 Charakterizujte pět úrovní struktury al-Káidy.
a) centralni Al Kaida
- vudci al Kaidy
- hlavni sidlo Pakistan
- dnes predevsim lide kolem Aymana al-Zawahiriho
- cile zustavaji stejne od roku 88, ustavit PanIslamsky chalifat, boj proti USA a jeho
spojencum, Bozi smer a Saria
- al-Rahman, Libyec, hraje klicovou roli jako chief operating officer and general
manager v zajistovani spojeni mezi ustredim a pridruzenymi skupinami/sesterskymi
skupinami
- ustredi: hlavni SHURA-rada a nekolik committees
b) sesterske skupiny/ pridruzene skupiny
- oficialni/formalni vetve al Kaidy
- pridavaji do sveho nazvu al-Kaida (al Kaida Maghreb, al Kaida Mesopotamia, al
Kaida Vychodni Afrika..)
- tezi z financni podpory z ustredi, dostavaji smernice, trenink, zbrane, podporu
c) pribuzne skupiny
- clenove techto skupin nejsou oficialni clenove, jsou to pribuztne skupiny ale ne
oficialni vetve
- zustavaji nezavisle od ustredi a prosazuji vlastni cile
- spolupracuji s al Kaidou na operacich kztere jsou jim sympaticke resp. ktere zapadaji
do jejich programu a ideologie

2. d) pribuzne site
- site malych rozesetych skupin
- jsou to male, nestrukturovane site, ktere sdruzuji, radikalizuji a planuji utoky
neformalne
- nekteri clenove absolvovali drive trenink v Pakistanu a Afghanistanu
e) inspirovani jedinci
- individualni jedinci bez primho napojeni na centralni strukturu al Kaidy
- jsou inspirovani al Kaidou
- byvaji amatersti, mnoho jajich planovanych utoku v zapadnich zemich bylo odhaleno
3.
 Jones Seth G.: The Terrorist Threat from Pakistan (pages 69 – 72, 75 – 88)
 Úkoly či otázky:
 Popište jednotlivé debaty o hrozbě.
Poznamky z textu:
- po smrti Osama bin Ladena se hovori o Arabskem poloostrovu a Severni Afriky jako o
hlavnich centrech teroristicke hrozby
- CIA vidi frakci al-Kaidy v Jemenu jako nejurgentnejsi hrozbu US bezpecnosti
- nekteri argumentuji dokonce ze al Kaida jako ustredi je irelevantni jako hrozba a ta
prava hrozi od samostatnych nasilnych radikalnich skupin
- argumentuje se, ze hlavni hrozba se presunula z Pakistanu
- nicmene Pakistan zustava hlavni centrum mezinarodniho terorismu -al Kaida si za 30
vybudovala hlubokou a pevnou sit pridruzenych radikalnich skupin a uzemi afghan-
pakistanske hranice stale predstavuje hl utociste a ohnisko terorismu
- al Kaida ma neomezene utociste ve slabych statech jako Jemen, Somalsko, Sudan, Iraq
– mnoho techto statu pry muze poskytnout al Kaide lepsi podminky nez Afghanistan a
Pakistan kdy poskytly
Debaty:
1. al Kaida na Arabskem poloostrove predstavuje hlavni risk pro bezpecnost US
2. neformalni, home-grown teroristicke site inspirovane al Kaidou jsou dnes hlavni hrozbou
Zapadu
3. skeptikove tvrdi, ze mladi Muslimove se mohou radikalizovat skrze internet ci interakci
s lokalnimi extremistickymi sitemi – nepotrebuji HQ – tudiz opet: hrozba Zapadu prichazi od
„leaderless jihad“ v Evropě, Asii, BV, US spise nez ze vztahu s ustredim al Kaidy v Pakistanu
Z textu nejsou debaty uplne jasne, prijde mi to roztristene a neprehledne.
Sama bych jako hlavni debaty urcila tri nasledujici:
a) Pakistan (pakistansko-afghanske uzemi) stale predstavuje hlavni semeniste terorismu a
hrozbu pro Zapad. Al Kaida si vybudovala silnou sit pridruzenych skupin a svuj hlavni
vliv si drzi stale – poskytuje podporu, trenink, utociste
b) ustredi al Kaidy v Pakistanu jiz neni hlavni hrozbou – ted je to predevsim Severni Afrika
a Arabsky poloostrov – napr. Jemen – hlavni hrozba se presunula z Pakistanu
c) hlavni hrozbou Zapadu je home-grown terorrism. Teroristicke skupiny a site sidlici
v zapadnich statech, rekrutujici a radikalizujici primo v miste, inspirovane al Kaidou na
dalku.
 Popište klíčové skupiny na afgh./pák. hranici (do strany 72)
- Key groups include:
a) al Qaeda
b) Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

3. c) the Haqqani network
d) Lashkar-e-Tayiba
e) Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen
- at least 16 active terrorist groups headquartered in Pakistan, with many more groups
from Asia, the Middle East, Europe, North America and Africa cycling recruits
through Pakistani training camps
 a důvod jejich expanze ( od strany 79 – 82 culture of militancy)
- od 2006 rozvoj a narust militantnich skupin, Pakistan/Afgh
- fenomen „talibanizace“ se rozsiril z kmenovych oblasti Waziristanu dale
Jak se jim podarilo rozsirit a podmanit si oblasti?
- vyuzily nespokojenosti a stiznosti spolecnosti vuci Pakistanske vlade – neschopnosti
zajistit bezpecnost, verejne sluzby, spravedlnost a bojovat s korupci
- velitele militantnich skupin ustanovili funkcni policejni spravu a resili spory
- nektere skupiny prisly i s jinymi „vyhodami“ – napr. tzv. „love marriage bureaus“
k velebeni manzelstvi z lasky
- Pakistan poskytoval militantnim skupinam podporu jako nastroj sve domaci i
zahranicni politiky jiz od 50.let
 Vysvětlete propojení – Pákistan a evropské země (75 – 79)
- po 9/11 ziskaly zapadni bezpecnostni agentury stabilni informacni proud o
teroristickem planovani spojeny s pakistanskymi jedinci a skupinami
- od roku 2001 do roku 2003 byly nejserioznejsi hrozby spojeny s osobou Khalida
Sheikha Muhammada, ktery se ukryval v Pakistanu
- take utok v Madridu z r 2003 byl napojen na Pakistanske slozky
- 2005 Londynske utoky byly provedeny atentatniky kteri ziskali vycvik
v pakistanskych vycvikovych taborech al Kaidy, vcetne vyroby bomb
- dalsi osoby spojeny s al Kaidou a vycvikem v Pakistanu byly v roce v r 2007 a 09
chyceny v Nemecku a USA pri sve ceste z ci do Pakistanu a v procesu planovani
teroristickeho utoku
- In sum, the historical record over the past decade is fairly clear. A range of terrorist
groups based in Pakistan have plotted a litany of attacks in the West
 Jaký by mohl být budoucí vývoj?
- budoucnost je znepokojiva
- existuji tri typy teroristickych utoku kterych by se politicti cinitele meli obavat a ktere
mohou byt napojeny na jednotlivce ci skupiny v Pakistanu:
a) utok mistni neformalni skupiny ci site primo napojene na centralnu al Kaidu
ci ji pridruzene skupiny (cilem by mohla byt verejna doprava ci spolecenske
akce typu Olympiada)
b) utok ze strany pridruzenych skupin z Pakistanu, planovani by probihalo
z Pakistanu – vyslani atentatniku za ucelem provedeni utoku
c) utok provedeny jedinci inspirovanymi pakistanskymi teroristickymi
skupinami– radikalizace je mistni, udrzuji se kontakty v ramci jihadisticke
site pres internet a socialni site, priprava na utok je take mistni a spachany
bez primeho napojeni na al Kaidu ci jeji spojence = homegrown radicals
kteri jsou autonomni a neznami pro centralni al Kaidu
- Still, the United States and Europe continue to face a challenge with radicalising
Muslim populations, some of whom continue to be incensed at the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq and by a perception that the West is at war with Islam.

4. 4.
 Mendelsohn Barak: Al Qaeda´s Franchising Strategy
 Úkoly či otázky:
 Charakterizujte logiku Al-Qaeda´s franchising strategy.
- Al Qaeda je sit/ network/ franchising
- al-Qaeda’s franchises: jihadi groups in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Algeria and Yemen that
have adopted al- Qaeda’s name and sworn allegiance to its leader
- strategie je mit sit ‚zakladen‘/ komunikacnich bodu/ strategickych jednotek
pokryvajici vetsi uzemi
- Nevertheless, branching out is not risk free. At the most basic level, the leadership in
Pakistan’s tribal areas feels insufficiently informed. Information from the franchises is
often slow to arrive and can be incomplete, putting by Al-Qaeda’s Franchising
Strategy the leadership in a difficult position when problems in a branch require their
intervention
 Popište sílu expanze al-Káidy.
- formace v r 1988 – pote snaha o formulaci jihadistickych cilu na podporu novych
vyhlidek/motivace k expanzi
- behem 90.let navazuje AQ silne vztahy s jinymi skupinami
- AQ se pomalu stava ‚umbrellou‘ pro mnohe skupiny (Sudan, Banghladesh, Egypt,
Pakistan, Afgh)
- In spring 2001 al-Qaeda made its first formal acquisition, merging with the Egyptian
Islamic Jihad led by Ayman al-Zawahiri – slouceni a vytvoreni silne zastitujici
organizace
- posilujici statut a popularita – AQ zahajuje svou Valku se zapadem provokaci 9/11
- expanze sili predevsim po intervenci US do Iraku/na ME
- v roce 2004 se Al Qaeda sit rozrusta, respektive skupiny v jinych zemich adoptuji AQ
ideologii a hlasi se k ni jako k zastresujici
 Definujte hlavní cíle al-Káidy.
- central command to portray itself as the headquarters of the global jihadi movement
- For many years, al-Qaeda declared its main mission to be inciting the Muslim public
to action, making formal organisational expansion merely one possible strategy in a
larger set of available options geared toward mobilisation of the Muslim masses.
- sireni ideologie – k tomu jim ma dopomahat prave franchising
- Al-Qaeda’s stated objective is to create an Islamic state modelled after the mediaeval
caliphate. The restored caliphate, ruled according to sharia law, will include all
Muslim countries as well as those, such as Spain, formerly under Muslim control.
Stretching from Spain to Indonesia, it will serve as a launching pad for the spread of
Islam and Islamic rule throughout the rest of the world.11 In the shorter term, al-
Qaeda seeks to end US influence in Muslim countries, liberate Muslim lands under
foreign occupation, topple insufficiently Islamic regimes and implement sharia in
Muslim countries. All these objectives are compatible with a branching-out strategy.
 Jaká je role vedení?
- On its face, al-Qaeda’s role was primarily to articulate an ideology, show the correct
methodology and facilitate jihadi operations
- in the past, the role of major leaders was to unite the various factions fighting for
Islamic rule into a single organisation. 16 Moreover, he states clearly that the current
war requires total mobilisation of the Muslim masses and Islamic groups, and that all
means are justified in the effort to generate mobilisation on such a scale.
 Jaké jsou nejdůležitější strategické omyly?

5. - napriklad slaba organizovanost cele struktury, nedostatecna sila vedeni a jasna
hierarchie
- failure to promote its strategic interests. It was unable to produce the much-expected
uprising of the Muslim masses, or to remove even one despot. It has not produced a
spectacular attack since the July 2005 London transport bombings. Burke suggests
that, in the fragmented world of global jihadi militancy in which groups are competing
over donations and air time, al-Qaeda is losing
- al-Qaeda should have felt less of a need to operate in non-Muslim lands and instead
have been able to redirect its resources to the Middle East.
- The 9/11 attacks expanded the battlefield, but the organisation did not have the
capabilities to fight on such a broad front. It felt tremendous pressure to follow its
success with successive blows in the West while simultaneously promoting the jihadi
cause in the Middle East.
- AQ nikdy nemela tu silu a schopnost skloubit cile s dostupnymi prostredky a
moznostmi
- while al-Qaeda was interested both in attacks on the West and in establishing Islamic
emirates in the Muslim world, it did not have the resources to simultaneously and
effectively do both.
- Strategicke chyby fungovani franchisingu: Nevertheless, branching out is not risk
free. At the most basic level, the leadership in Pakistan’s tribal areas feels
insufficiently informed. Information from the franchises is often slow to arrive and
can be incomplete, putting by Al-Qaeda’s Franchising Strategy the leadership in a
difficult position when problems in a branch require their intervention
- The leadership’s isolation and communication problems, with messages normally sent
by courier and taking time to reach their destination, made exerting such control
particularly challenging and demonstrates the risks involved in putting the
organisation’s fate in the hands of uncontrollable affiliated groups
5.
 Gunaratna, Rohan: Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan
 Úkoly či otázky:
 Vysvětlete termín „talibanization“.
- As FATA has become a “mini Afghanistan” with the adoption of the “Taliban norms,”
the developments in FATA threaten regional and international security in the
foreseeable future.
- the gradual “Talibanization” of the FATAand NWFPseem to have facilitated not only
the acceptance of the foreign elements but also their eventual integration. This is
similar to how ideas, norms, and practices, and finally identity, spread from place to
place in the international system.
- most of the Al Qaeda–affiliated groups shared a similar experience during the
Afghan–Soviet war or training in Afghanistan camps. This experience and network,
coupled with a sense of belonging to the same Pashtun tribe, gave rise to the norm of
“Talibanization” in the frontier tribal areas of FATA in Pakistan.
- The norm of Talibanization thus refers to a mix of conservative Islamic religious
and cultural practices along with the aspect of militancy.
 Popište oblast FATA a působnost al-Káidy v této oblasti.
- Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA)
- oblast na severo-zapade Pakistanu, tzv. tribal area = kmenova oblast, maji sve vlastni
pravo, nerespektuji spravu Pakistanske vlady etc.
- oblast epicentra globalniho terorismu
- zde soustredene vedeni Al Qaedy a rizeni jejich akci, spolupracuje s dalsimi mistnimi
skupinami

6. - al Qaeda nasla ve FATA oblasti bezpeci a moznost pro fungovani po dislokaci
z Afghanistanu v r 2002
- FATA se stala mini Afghanistanem + operuje zde rada teroristickych skupin
(Taliban, al Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan etc)
- With the U.S. attack in Afghanistan and the defeat of the Taliban, the center of gravity
of international terrorism seems to have shifted to the FATA regions along the
Afghanistan–Pakistan border.
- Al Qaeda focused on building and strengthening their networks in FATA. Here they
received the protection and support from local clerics and tribal members from the
Mehsud and Wazir tribes, many of whom had been serving with the Taliban in
Afghanistan since the 1990s
- al Qaeda trenuje sve bojovniky, rekrutuje ze zapadu, na dalku komunikuje a pestuje
homegrown terrorism
- The authors believe this training infrastructure provides training to militants from
Europe, the Gulf
- North Africa. International Crisis Group reported: “militant training centres still thrive
in the Waziristans”79 It is unknown how many camps train Al Qaeda fighters in
Waziristan
- Working with the Taliban and other groups operating in FATA, Al Qaeda responded
by mounting attacks throughout Pakistan’s mainland. In addition to targeting non-
Muslim religious sites—churches and a Buddhist site—and Western hotels, Al Qaeda
has attacked military, police, and intelligence personnel.
- Al Qaeda is directing, facilitating, supporting, and approving key operations against its
enemies from FATA.
6.
 Crone Manni, Harrow Martin: Homegrown Terrorism in the West
 Úkoly či otázky:
 Jak můžeme definovat homegrown terrorism?
- homegrown terorismusje mozno charakterizovat nasledujicimi aspekty:
a) individualni jedince narozene a vychovavane na Zapade nebo silne se
Zapadem spojeni (studium , dlouhy pobyt etc)
b) jedince ci skupiny jednajici dle vlastniho svedomi a na zaklade vlastnich
rozhodnuti bez prebirani direktiv a rozkazu od militantniho vedeni v
zahranici
- po Londynskem bombovem utoku 2005 se tento fenomen zcina peclive zkoumat
- atentatnici byli narozeni a vychovani v UK a jednali na zaklade vlastniho uvazeni bez
smernic zvenci – tento typ terorist jednani nazvan jako „self-recruited“, „self-traine“,
„self-radicalized“ a „self-started“
- ‘‘homegrown’’ is the idea of radicalized youth who were born and raised in the West
- ‘‘acts of violence against targets primarily, but not always, in Western countries in
which the terrorists themselves have been born or raised.’’
- ‘‘distinctive factor of homegrown terrorism is that it is carried out by persons who
have had their formative phase, upbringing and cultural influence in the Western
world.’
- ‘‘terrorist acts that are carried out by groups whose membership is composed entirely
or predominantly of the native-born citizens of the country that is being attacked.’’
- ‘‘homegrown’’ and ‘‘self-starters,’’ which they understand as ‘‘terrorist acts that are
carried out by small groups of individuals that don’t seem to be recruited,
ndirected,ntrained, or financed by any existing terrorist organization.’’

7.  Kdy a jak tento fenomén vzniká?
- oficialne vznik po bombovych utocich r 2005 v Londyne, kdy utok a jeho priprava
neodpovidala externimu utoku, jako tomu bylo v pripade 9/11
- nashromazdene informace odpovidaji vyraznemu narustu „internimu/vnitrnimu“ a
„autonomnimu“ terorismu predevsim od roku 2003
- With reference to the London bombers, he adds that ‘‘Not only did they grow up and
were educated in British society, but they were also themselves responsible for their
evolution as terrorists.’
- empirical linkage of internal and autonomous terrorism is soon to be questioned inter
alia because the London bombers, who were homegrown in the sense of being ‘‘born
and raised’’ in the UK, turned out to have had contact with individuals associated
with Pakistani terrorist groups.
 Detailně charakterizujte typologii (od strany 524)
- kriteria typologie se opet odviji od tzv. „Belonging“ a „Autonomy“ – viz vysvetleno
nize (od pridruzenosti k Zapadu a nezavislosti na zahranicni militantni skupine ci siti)
- Z dimenzi B a A vychazi 4 zakladni typy „zapadniho terorismu“
- pri formovani 4 zakladnich typu se zvazuji aspekty: internal, external, autonomous,
affiliated terrorism
A) Internal autonomous - It is an autonomous individual or group, self-started, self-
trained, or self-radicalized with no links to Islamist militants abroad and at the
same time with a high degree of belonging to the West. Internal autonomous
terrorism is the ultimate domestication of terrorism in the sense that the dynamics
leading to a plot are found exclusively within the Western country.
B) Internal affiliated - terrorists have a high degree of belonging to the West and
have had contact with Islamist militants abroad either as members of a militant
organization or more limited contact such as economic support or training.
C) External autonomous - terrorism is perpetrated by individuals or groups who
present a low degree of belonging to the West and who are independent of
terrorist organizations or Islamist militants outside the West.
D) External affiliated - terrorism is perpetrated by individuals or groups who have a
low degree of belonging to the West and who have had real-life contact with
terrorist groups outside the West.
 Jaké jsou změny v „Belonging“ a „Autonomy“?
- need to distinct two dimensions: belonging (to the West) and autonomy (from militant
groups abroad)
- „Belonging“ je o pridruzenosti k Zapadu
- „Autonomy“ je o nezavislosti vuci externim militatntnim skupinam
- v „Belonging“ se v konceptu Homegrown terrorism nic nezmenilo – naopak zmena
nastala v oblasti „Autonomy“
- terorismus na Zapade zustava internal, ale jiz zdaleka ne tolik autonomni – tzn.
dochazi k vetsimu napojeni a pridruzeni se k zahranicnim teroristickym
skupinam/militantnim skupinam
- in many homegrown terrorist cases, there has been some level of:
1) ‘‘international contact,’’
2) ‘‘visit to foreign countries for ideological inspiration,’’ or even
3) ‘‘training camp attendance.’

8.  Jaký je závěr?
- the term ‘‘homegrown’’ was ambiguous, and we therefore introduced a distinction
between two dimensions of homegrown terrorism: ‘‘belonging’’ and ‘‘autonomy.’’
- sudden appearance of ‘‘homegrown terrorism’’ could more precisely be
conceptualized as an evolution from ‘‘external affiliated’’ to ‘‘internal affiliated’’—
with a short interval marked by ‘‘internal autonomous’’ terrorism
- The increase in autonomy is particularly notable. In previous periods, 100% of the
plots were somewhat connected to Islamist militants outside the West. The change in
autonomy is thus much more significant than the increase in belonging displayed by
the actors in the plots since 2003.
- We rarely see the affiliation to Islamist militants outside the West as part of a long-
term plan for the acquisition of capabilities to carry out a spectacular attack upon
return to the home country.
- The article shows that the increase in autonomous terrorism is a recent development,
but we suggest that it is also a passing one.
7.
 Stenersen, Anne: The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?
 Úkoly či otázky:
 Vysvětlete vlastními slovy význam termínu „virtual training camp“.
- The Internet is per today not a ‘‘virtual training camp’’ organized from above, but
rather a resource bank maintained and accessed largely by self-radicalized
sympathizers.
- je to spise metaforicky vyraz – nelze hovorit primo o „training camp“ ktery by byl
spravovany „shora“
- Internet slouzi pro radikalizovane sympatizery jako zdroj informaci, navodu, manualu
- radikalove naleznou na Internetu detailni manualy a videa na technicka a takticka
temata jako: vyroba explosiv, unosy rukojmi, bezpecnost, guerillova valka etc.
- Internet je:
a) jakasi knihovna s training manualy a pruvodce dostupny kdekoliv na svete
(Weimann noted that the Internet has become an ‘‘online terrorism university’’
for self-taught terrorists)
b) virtualni prostor – moznost pro sympatizanty se sdruzovat a diskutovat,
vymenovat zkusenosti a komunikovat online s „trenery“/“cviciteli“
 Je skutečně možné získat kvalitní přípravu a výcvik džihádisty za
pomoci internetu? Zohledněte všechny dostupné faktory.
Co vse je pro vycvik dostupne na internetu?
a) psane manualy, instrukce a encyklopedie (temata: vyroba explosiv, unosy
rukojmi, bezpecnost, guerillova valka, encyklopedie zbrani, explosive lessons etc
– nejznamejsi Encyklopedie jihadu a Encyklopedie pripravy = asi nejrozsahlejsi
soubor vycvikovych/treninkovych manualu)
b) Instruktazni videa (v teto oblasti asi nejviditelnejsi posun co do poctu i kvality;
jihadi movies every day; nova dimenze myslenky online training camps)
c) Série a periodika, e-books (serie temetickych lekci zverejnovanych na tydenni ci
14ti denni bazi; mixuji ideologii s praktickou pripravou; popularni The Series for
Preparation to Jihad or Al-Battar Camp magazine; velmi propracovane,
vytvarene specificky za ucelem komplexni pripravy predevsim pro jihadisti kteri
z ruznych duvodu nebudou mit moznost absolvovat trenink tradicni formou)
- domnivam se ze nelze nahradit prakticky realny vycvik internetovym. I samotni
propagatori a tvurci „Virtual trainings“ zduraznuji vyznam realneho vycviku pred tim

9. internetovym, predevsim v oblasti vyroby vybusnin. Domnivam se ze je na internetu
mozne ziskat kvalitni a hutny teoreticky obnos jihadistickych znalosti a dovednosti. I
v pripade znalosti teoretickeho postupu vyroby vybusnin. Mira sofistikovanosti videi a
dostupneho materialu roste spolu s dovednosti produkovat materialy a uzivanim
internetu. Avsak, internetovou pripravu musi zrejme doplnovat i prakticky vycvik a
osobni styk s cviciteli/uciteli
- There seems to be an understanding that the Internet is to be used for teaching basic
skills and knowledge which can in any case be found in open sources, before recruits
move on to real-life training.
 Kdo se podílí na zveřejňování informací dostupných na internetu?
- jednotlivci i zformovane skupiny ktere prekladaji obsahle materialy
- anonymni prispevatele i konkretni radikalni skupiny
- amateri i profesionalove (use friendly videos, high quality design a technika etc)
hlavni rozcleneni prispevatelu:
a) regionalni skupiny (Al Kaida – magazin Al Battar Camp; Hezbollah - jejich
videa dnes nejsofistikovanejsi, high-quality)
b) jihadisticke medialni organizace (Islamic Media Centre (IMC; distribuuji
material na CD a via internet; preklad mnozstvi americkych vojenskych manualu
z Aj do AR; )
c) Internetovi aktiviste (clenove diskusnich, medialnich a individualnich for,
dulezita role v reprodukci a distribuci jihadistickeho training materialu)
8.
 Speckhard, Anne: The Emergence of Female Suicide Terrorists
 Úkoly či otázky:
 Můžeme nalézt rozdíly mezi motivy ženského a mužského
sebevražedného terorismu? Jaké to jsou?
a) muzi:
- vize „cesty“ za dospelosti
- v nekterych oblastech (jako Gaza) je mucednicka smrt od rannych let chlapcum
predkladana skoro jako jejich poslani za ktere budou vazeni a oslavovani + vize
mucednickeho raje
b) zeny:
- cesta ke zrovnopravneni statusu s muzi – jista forma emancipace - najednou jsou na
jedne „lodi“ spolu s muzi – nicmene tento motiv je spise okrajovy
- Instead, it seems much more likely to appeal to their sense of outrage as they are often
quoted, speaking in great emotional pain about humiliation, frustration, injuries, and
killings in their communities, and their desire for revenge, about having reached a
limit to the amount of trauma they can take in, and having come to the point of being
willing to die and kill others as a means to express their community’s outrage, pain,
and to cause their enemy to feel the same pain they feel – hromadici se deprese a
uzkost; nenavist a vztek – u zen je tento vztek silne vyburcovan ztratou (zabitim)
jejich deti
- mozny dusledek socialni oprese/ socialni degradace
- limitovane je zenske mucednictvi vnimano jako “karierni” cesta zeny a jako projev
feminism
- dostavaji moznost vetsi volnosti a dostat se do interakce s lidmi a prostredim se
kterymi by se za normalnich okolnosti nedostaly: But females also enjoy some
increased protective factors from becoming suicide bombers: those in conservative

10. societies are more restricted in general, and thus find it harder to interact with and
join groups;
- From the bomber’s point of view she is empowered by freeing herself completely
from the concerns of this life as she moves forward with the belief that she is acting in
defense of the community, will live on in heroic memory, and for the religious
believer—live on in Paradise as well – tento motiv je vicemene tez spolecny
- ve skrze vsak maji muzi i zeny stejne motivy proc se stat sebevrazednym
atentatnikem – je to prave ta frustrace, zivotni podminky, touha pomstit sve
blizke, bojovat za svou spolecnost etc
 Je ženský sebevražedný terorismus častým jevem?
- neni castym jevem, ale ne neobvyklym, naopak, nekde sili – stale vice zen se samo
dobrovolne prihlasi
- nalezneme ho v Turecku (PKK), na Kavkazu (Cerne vdovy), Iráku ci se objevil u
palestinskeho Hamasu (radikalni zenske kridlo Hamasu), LTTE (Tamilsti tygri/
ukonceno)
 Souvisí ženský sebevražedný terorismus s ženskou emancipací?
- zalezi na tom kde – v Cecensku temer vubec, v Gaze naopak do urcite miry ano
- v nekterych spolecnostech zeny svym vclenenim do „sebevrazednych atentatniku“
najednou dostavaji misto mezi muzi a pote slavu za sve obetovani
 Jaké můžeme definovat rozdíly emocionálního charakteru mezi
ženským a mužským sebevražedným terorismem?
a) Disociace - dissociative phenomenon was observed far more in the girls than the
boys: zeny a divky maji sklony k vetsimu rozstepeni osobnosti jako odpoved na
traumaticky stress. Disocisace zpuobuje u zen jakesi vnitrni psychicke “znecitliveni”,
ktere jim dopomaha dosahnout cile a neuvedomovat si cin ktery se chystaji spachat.
Disociace je reakci na trauma
b) Role hnevu – zeny maji ve spolecnosti mnohem mensi moznost projevit svuj hnev a
emoce navenek. Muzi mohou ventilovat svoje emoce, hnev a vzruseni sportem, bojem
a vubec vseobecnym projevem. Zeny maji moznost svym dobrovolnym mucednictvim
projevit nasilny hnev. Neustala nutnost zeny kontrolovat sve emoce a hnev muze ve
finale prispet k jejimu rozhodnuti stat se dobrovolnici v sebevrazednem cinu – protoze
je bude moci naplno projevit.
c) Psychologicka nakaza (vzajemne psychologicke ovlivneni) – zeny maji vetsi
tendenci sdileni a vzajemneho ovlivnovani se. Ovlivneni psychickeho stavu druheho
je vice aktivni mezi zenami a divkami – females are often more relational and
expressive with each other about their emotions than men are. The lowering of the
psychological barrier to women becoming female bombs extends to other young girls
and women as well who by the contagion effect may also want to become bombers
d) Moralni argumentace/ oduvodneni – zeny a divky prikladaji vetsi duraz pecovani a
uchovavani vzajemnych a rodinnych vztahu – proto je pravdepodobne jednodussi
presvedcit zenu a rychleji ji namotivovat aby sla pomstit sve milovane a blizke. To
same plati, mozna silneji v pripade ze jde o jejich deti. Pri rekrutovani zen proto hraji
teroristicke skupiny casto na tuto „strunu“ – citovou a vztahovou (spise nez u muzu
kde se hovoriu o hrdinstvi etc)