Briefly analyzes police administration to show how the colonial system engenders grand corruption and promotes lawlessness

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Pitfalls of Police Administration in India
The India Act XIII of 1856 reformed the municipal police administration in the three Presidency
capitals (Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay). They were each placed under a Commissioner who
was responsible directly to the Governor of the Province. India Act V of 1861 (commonly known
as the Indian Police Act, 1861) established a uniform system of police administration throughout
British India with an Inspector General at the head of the police in each province. The Superior
Police Services, later known as the Indian (Imperial) Police, consisted of an Inspector General,
Deputy Inspectors General, District Superintendents and Assistant District Superintendents. The
Subordinate Police Service in each province consisted of Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors, Head
Constables and Constables. The rank of Sergeant (equivalent to Head Constable) also existed but
was mainly confined to Europeans or Eurasians who served in the City forces or in cantonments.
The Indian Police (Superior) Service in its earlier days included many European officers of the
Indian Army.
Before 1893 appointments to all senior grades (i.e. Assistant District Superintendent and above)
were made locally in India. From 1893 most new entrants to the top echelon were appointed by
examination or selection in the UK. In the lower branch, the Subordinate Services were mainly
constituted of Indians with some Europeans and Eurasians in the higher ranks. The Indian Police
structure was again changed in 1905 when the rank of Deputy Superintendent with four grades
was created within the subordinate services. The term ‘Provincial Service’ was used to refer to
these four grades. The design of the colonial police force was therefore ‘not independent of the
economic, political and administrative realities that existed.’
The parent law governing police functioning in India continue to be the 145-year old Indian
Police Act of 1861, which is completely outdated. It was framed immediately after the Indian
Mutiny in 1857, and reflects the contemporary angst of the British to maintain internal order with
an iron hand and perpetuate their rule over India. In consequence, this Act was designed to
establish a force to protect the rulers, and not one for the community to claim ownership. The
brutality, unresponsiveness, and other vices associated with the police in India derive from this
limited charter of their duties, which distinguishes the rulers from the ruled. Incidentally, the
major enactments concerned with the administration of criminal justice like the Indian Penal
Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act were framed in the latter half
of the nineteenth century. Except for a few amendments these enactments, along with the Indian
Police Act, provide the basic framework for administering criminal justice in India.
The image of the Indian police is not that of a citizen-friendly force. Public criticism varies from
its alleged overzealousness and brutalization at one end of the spectrum, to ineffectiveness in
controlling crime and criminals at the other – not surprising in the face of mounting evidence of
violence and crime. The poor image of the police, in some states like Bihar, has darkened even
further. Instead of being an instrument to enforce the rule of law, it is increasingly seen as a
pliable tool in the hands of unscrupulous politicians. This is not a new development. The Indian
police have a long tradition of being a partisan instrument in the hands of the rulers since
colonial times. At the heart of the problem is the fact that a section of police officers instead of
fighting crime and criminals decided to join them, because doing so was more profitable and less
risky.

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The increasing politicization of the police in India has seriously affected its morale and
discipline. The resulting polarization in some of the states has been along religious, caste and
ethnic lines, eroding its credibility. The emergence of armed caste-centric senas (private armed
militias) in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and extortion gangs in NE India was a consequence of this
loss of faith in the state police to protect people’s life and property. An unholy nexus has
developed between corrupt police officers and unscrupulous politicians. The criminalization of
politics has affected police performance more than the performance of any other state institution.
The wholesale transfer of police officers with each change of government has become a routine
matter. Officers have to undergo the humiliation and harassment of being transferred again and
again, sometimes within 24 hours. To expect a police force led by such demoralized officers
perform in a fair and effective manner may therefore be misplaced.
The police have not escaped the evil effects of communalism and casteism in Indian society
either. A partisan and politicized police has often been used to intimidate adversaries and reward
supporters. When the police uses its discretionary powers and enforces the law in a selective
manner, as happens quite blatantly in states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, it is no longer trusted
by the people. The registration of cases, their investigation and prosecution has increasingly
become a matter of political expediency. Even arrests and searches by the police are often made
to serve partisan ends. Nowhere in the world can a police force effectively perform its role
without the cooperation of the people. It is not a coincidence that senas have mushroomed in
those parts of the country where the police has ceased to be a professional force to provide a
sense of security to the weak and deprived. It is not that criticism against the police is a new
phenomenon. Much of what is being alleged today has been said earlier too.
The allegations of incompetence, corruption, brutalization, and being a violator rather than an
enforcer of the rule of law, have all been voiced before. But the deteriorating law and order
situation and an increasing sense of insecurity in the country have lent a new edge to these
allegations. The present system of administrative and political supervision over the police suffers
from many distortions. After the separation of the executive from the judiciary with the
amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code in 1973, the so-called magisterial control has lost its
original motivation. Complete control has now passed on to political rulers. Not surprisingly, the
police tend to be the handmaiden of the political rulers of the day. There is no alternative to
creating institutional mechanisms to insulate the police from arbitrary administrative and
political control, and to subject it to the control of an agency which functions in a non-partisan
manner and holds the rule of law and public interest as the sole criteria for judging police
performance.
A major negative feature in police administration is the system of dual control – one exercised
by the IPS and the other operated through the office of District Magistrate and the Home
Ministry staffed by the non-police civil services. Even though in the Police Act of 1861, control
by the then Indian Civil Service was limited to the administration at the district level, the control
mechanism grew geometrically. First it led to the establishment of the Home Ministry that began
controlling the police organization, formulating its policies and controlling its budget.
Furthermore, at every level of administration the police were subordinated to the corresponding
civilian officer. Thus, the police ranges were made smaller units than revenue divisions and the
Divisional Commissioner (a state government official) became the superior officer of the DIG.
Indeed, in many states, even the Zonal Inspectors General have been subordinated to the
Divisional Commissioner. A much junior ranking IAS officer has been elevated to the rank of

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Home Secretary where he begins to dictate to the Chief of Police – the DGP, an officer who may
even be substantially senior in rank. The present system has therefore ensured through various
mechanisms to subordinate the police service to that of administrative service. This has
prevented growth of professionalism in police and created a situation where people with little
stake in the police organization make its policy and control its functions. Nonetheless, the
importance of the District Magistrate as the principal coordinating authority in districts cannot be
denied.
The over 100-year old system of maintaining police records of crime and criminals has become
non-functional because of a huge increase in crime and the number of criminals. Frustrated at
their failure to control crime and angry at the unjust criticism against the force, police officers
give vent to their feelings by resorting to extra-legal measures. Media coverage of illegal arrests,
fake encounters and torture in police custody may bring about some visible signs of
improvement for a brief period, but in the long run they cannot control crime. Traditionally,
third-degree methods of interrogation have been applied during investigation with some tacit
social sanction. The problem, however, was that it does not take long for some officers to resort
to strong-arm methods for extortion and political ends. Police file charge sheets without adequate
evidence that not only burdens the already over-taxed judicial system nut also often ends up in
unwitting exoneration of the guilty. The police station officer-in-charge has jurisdiction over an
entire geographical area assigned to his station that delays proper investigation of crimes. The
growing nexus between the police, politician and criminal is a logical outcome of this process.
Eighty per cent of the police force comprises of constabulary. Constables have varying
educational qualifications for recruitment stooping as low as a school grade-4 passed in some
states. They enjoy little legal powers and are made to perform demeaning duties for officers and
walking the beat – loosely dressed, overworked, uncouth but still able to exercise extraordinary
powers. In fact a recent survey found that constables were exercising considerable discretionary
powers, settling disputes and resolving social conflicts without any recognition or departmental
guidelines. While the Indian Police Service is well-trained and enjoys all the benefits admissible
to other senior civil servants, the lower ranks, including investigating officers, have a low social
status and work for 10-12 hours every day. Housing is available to barely 2-3 per cent of the
force and there are no provisions for over-time, transport, on-duty food and promotions. During
elections and festivals policemen are on duty for 12-15 hours a day. Yet their emoluments, perks
and other organizational support are weak. There are few vehicles for the police stations and
communication equipment like wireless sets and telephone instruments are in short supply. Most
stations are and other buildings are in poor shape and urgently need repairs.
Poor training and neglect of working conditions have therefore undermined the professionalism
of the police forces. It is therefore not unusual to find a distinct police sub-culture in which
hostility towards the citizens, group solidarity and secrecy were paramount, has come into being.
The discretion vested in a police officer vis-à-vis the limited legal knowledge of a citizen lends
itself to misuse when cases are often deliberately not registered under the appropriate provisions
of the law, leading to excessive or low level of penal action. At the higher levels discretion is
exercised by Indian Police Service officers in deciding the quantum of force to be deployed, in
identifying the sensitivity of election voting booths for protection and pre-election preventive
arrests and for promotions and postings of junior personnel to ‘attractive’ posts and stations. In
time all these lead to the politicization of the police forces.

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Compounding these limitations is the stark fact of the Govt. of India increasingly encroaching
upon the law & order responsibilities of States. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF),
Sahastra Seema Bal (SSB) and Border Security Force (BSF) are deployed in all parts of India, in
addition to India’s international borders. Their numbers have currently burgeoned to well over
the one million mark. This has, to a large extent, affected funding of State police forces and their
modernization apart from thinly distributing fiscal resources amongst these three Central police
forces. As a result, even Central police forces suffer lack of modern equipment and liveries
(including modern bulletproof vests), munitions, support vehicles, etc. The disparity in pay and
allowances between the Central and State police forces is often a disincentive for the latter, even
as they push the former into often fatal battle lines, particularly in Maoist-controlled districts.
The end result is predictable, viz. there is rampant corruption in recruitment to police forces,
there are no separate investigation and prosecution arms for most state police forces, their
intelligence network is limited since they cannot afford to pay for more human resources, secret
service funds (for informers), GPS-assisted location services, drones, etc. Even of forces
available with States and Union Territories, the demand for VIP, orderly and miscellaneous
(non-policing) duties takes away a substantial part of police personnel. In effect, the external
environment forces compliance to its short-term gains while compromising on providing basic
security to the common man in the long-run.
The author is a senior public policy analyst and commentator