acquisition, Mattis, Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition,TIGPC, Gordian knot Center, DIME-FIL, department of defense, dod, hacking for defense, intlpol 340, joe felter, ms&e296, raj shah, requirements, stanford, Steve blank, China,

1. Technology, Innovation, and Great
Power Competition
INTLPOL 340; MS&E 296
Steve Blank, Joe Felter, Raj Shah
Lecture #1
21 September 2021

2. “The problem is not lack of money, lack of technology,
and certainly not lack of capable and committed people
in the US government, military and private industry.
No, the real problem is a lack of imagination.”
Christian Brose, Kill Chain (2020)

3. Agenda
• Introductions
• Teaching Team
• Class Logistics
• The Course at a Glance
• Great Power Competition
• Instruments of National Power
• Group Project Overview
• Team Formation/Problem Development Mixer

4. Student Introductions
Name, Stanford Program, Interest
~30 seconds

5. Teaching Team

6. Steve Blank
● Co-creator Lean Startup
● Co-creator Hacking for Defense
● Defense Business Board
● Created I-Corps and I-Corps @ NSA
● Air Force Veteran
8 startups
● Semiconductors
● Supercomputers
Details at www.steveblank.com
● Enterprise software
● Military intelligence

7. Joe Felter
● Stanford Gordian Knot Center for National Security
Innovation
● Fmr US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
● Co-Creator Hacking for Defense
● Senior Advisor, Defense Innovation Unit
● COL (ret.), US Army Rangers and Special Forces

8. Raj Shah
● Visiting Fellow at Hoover / CISAC
● Hoover Institution, National Security Task Force
● Investor @ Shield Capital
● Former startup CEO
● Former Managing Partner, Defense Innovation Unit
● F-16 pilot w/multiple combat tours

9. Class TAs
Eric Volmar
● ​JD Stanford Law ‘20,
MBA Stanford GSB ‘20
BA International
Relations Stanford ’13
● ​Hacking4Defenseclass
of 2021, Project Agrippa
● Experience in Venture
Capital Investing,
Technology & Start-ups,
Law, Consulting,
Automotive Industry
David Hoyt (Head TA)
dhoyt@stanford.edu

10. Class TAs (cont’d)
● BAH Political Science
and History
● ​Hacking4Defenseclass
of 2021, Project
Agrippa
● Experience in defense
technology, think
tanks, defensepolicy
● ​MS MS&E, BA
Economics, CISAC
Honors
● ​Hacking4Defense
class of 2021, Project
Agrippa
● Experience in OSD-
Policy, Congress,and
private equity
William Healzer
whealzer@stanford.edu
Kyle Duchynski
kyleduke@stanford.edu

11. Class TAs (cont’d)
● JD, MA International Policy
● ​Hacking4Defenseclass of
2021, Project Agrippa
● Experience in DIU-funded
cUAS start-up and various
think tanks (Hoover, AEI,
Hudson)
Jonathan Deemer
jdeemer@stanford.edu

12. Civilian and Military Liaisons
Ms. Katharine M.R.
Beamer
Department of State
(Hoover NSAF)
Lt Col Jennifer Ann
Branigan Carns
U.S. Air Force (Hoover
NSAF)
COL Drew Conover
U.S. Army (Hoover
NSF)
LtCol Michael E.
Feuquay
U.S. Marine Corps
(Hoover NSAF)
CAPT Lushan Hannah
U.S. Coast Guard
(Hoover NSAF)
LCDR Brian
Harrington
U.S. Navy (Hoover
NSAF)
Lt Col Oliver Lause
U.S. Air Force (Hoover
NSAF)
Lt Col Keith B. Miller
U.S. Army (Hoover
NSAF)
Lt Col Brandon R.
Shroyer
U.S. Air Force (CISAC)
COL Carol M. Stauffer
U.S. Army (CISAC)

13. Class Logistics

14. Class Etiquette
• Complete all readings in advance
• Respect for speakers
• i.e. posture, asking questions
• No cellphone use during class
• Participation in discussions
• Attendance is mandatory
• Please email David Hoyt (dhoyt@stanford.edu) should you be
unable to attend and an alternative assignment will be arranged

15. Guests
• All potential guests require prior approval.
• Please email Kyle Duchynski with the guest’s name,
affiliation and visit purpose (kyleduke@stanford.edu)

16. Class Facts
• Tuesdays 5:30-8:30 PM
• Sept 21st – Nov 30th
• Office hours by appointment
• 4 credits
• Grading
• Class Participation: 25%
• Individual paper: 25%
• Final group project: 50% [Detailed breakdown to be distributed 9/22 on Canvas]

17. Class Schedule
Part I: Back to the Future: Great Power
Competition Past and Present
• Sep 21: Course Introduction
• Sep 28: China, China, China
• Oct 5: Russia and Other Rivals
Part II: Technologies and Domains of Great
Power Competition
• Oct 12: The Fourth Industrial Revolution &
The Core Technology—Semiconductors
• Oct 19: Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning
• Oct 26: Great Power Competition in the
Cyber Domain
• Nov 2: The Second Space Age: Great Power
Competition in Space
• Nov 9: Great Power Competition Without
People: Unmanned Platforms and the Future
of Conflict
• Nov 16: Developing Strategy, Plans, and
Resources for Great Power Competition
across the USG: Challenges and
Opportunities
• Nov 23: Individual Group Preparation,
Instructor Feedback and Mentor Session
• Nov 30: Final Group Presentations and
Course Recap

18. Class Disclaimers
• U.S. Centric Perspective
• Class is an MVP
• “Relentlessly Direct” Feedback (ala LLP and H4D)
• Open Door Policy

19. Return of Great Power Competition

20. As in the past, the United States can
guarantee its own security and prosperity as
a free society only if it ensures favorable
balances of power where they matter most
and systematically prepares its society,
economy, and allies for a protracted
competition against large, capable, and
determined rivals that threaten that aim.

21. Great powers are always searching for
opportunities to gain power over their
rivals, with hegemony as their final goal.
- Robert Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”

27. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cu-HjF0AEk8

28. It’s Not Just the Size of Military...
… It’s Also New Technologies

29. “China and Russia challenge American
power, influence, and interests,
attempting to erode American security
and prosperity.”
“An America that successfully competes is
the best way to prevent conflict. Just as
American weakness invites challenge,
American strength and confidence deters
war and promotes peace.”

30. “The central challenge to U.S.
prosperity and security is the
reemergence of long-term,
strategic competition by what
the National Security Strategy
classifies as revisionist powers.”

31. Compete through 3 Lines of Effort:
• Build a Lethal Force
• Strengthen Alliances and Build
New Partnerships
• Reform the Defense Department

32. National Military Strategy Mission Areas
• Respond to Threats
• Deter Strategic Attack (and
proliferation of WMD)
• Deter Conventional Attack
• Assure Allies and Partners
• Compete Below the Level of Armed
Conflict (With a Military Dimension)

33. •Preparedness
•Partnerships
•Promoting Networked Region

34. [1] Build a Lethal Force

35. [2A] Strengthen Alliances

36. [2B] Build New Partnerships

38. • Need greater performance &
affordability
• Deliver Performance at the Speed of
Relevance
• Organize for innovation
• Drive budget discipline and
affordability to achieve solvency
• Streamline rapid iterative
approaches from development to
fielding
• Harness and protect the National
Security Innovation Base
[3] Reform the Department of Defense

39. We must also contend with the reality that the
distribution of power across the world is changing,
creating new threats. China, in particular, has
rapidly become more assertive. It is the only
competitor potentially capable of combining
its economic, diplomatic, military, and
technological power to mount a sustained
challenge to a stable and open international
system. Russia remains determined to enhance its
global influence and play a disruptive role on the
world stage. Both Beijing and Moscow have
invested heavily in efforts meant to check U.S.
strengths and prevent us from defending our
interests and allies around the world.

42. • Repossession of Taiwan and Control
of the South and East China Seas
• Agenda setting power and control
over regional institutions
• Trade and investment rules set and
enforced by Beijing
• Weak civil society
• Limited independent media
• Extension of high-tech surveillance
and police state
• Respect for Sovereignty
• Peaceful Dispute Resolution
• Free and fair trade
• Adherence to International Law
• Open information environment
• Vibrant Civil Society
• Spread of democracy and
individual freedoms
Contrasting Visions for the Future of the Indo-Pacific

43. Discussion Questions

44. Instruments of National Power

45. Instruments of National Power
“The means are the capabilities and resources one can bring to bear in
the effort to attain the desired strategic ends.”

46. Traditional Frameworks
• Interwar period (1919-1939)
• Edward Carr argued military power, economic power, and power over opinion as
key instruments of national power
• Resource-based indicators (Cold War)
• Composite Index of National Capability (1963)
• Total population
• Urban population
• Iron and steel production
• Energy consumption
• Military personnel
• Military expenditure

47. Understanding Power in the 21st Century
• Beyond raw resources alone, look for whole-of-society measurement
• DIME-FIL among most common frameworks
• D - Diplomacy
• I - Information
• M - Military
• E - Economic
• F - Financial
• I - Intelligence
• L - Law Enforcement
• Technology underpins each
• DIME came about in Cold War
• FIL added since 9/11 to address influencing non-state actors

48. • Example: nuclear arms control
• INF Treaty (1987)
• START Treaty (1991)
• CTBT (1996)
• New START Treaty (2010/2021)
• Lead USG Department / Agency:
U.S. Department of State
[D] - Diplomacy
• “How a nation interacts with state
or non-state actors, generally to
secure some form of agreement
that allows the conflicting parties
to coexist peacefully.”
- Joint Doctrine Note 1-18

49. [I] - Information
• “The informational instrument is
about creating, exploiting, and
disrupting knowledge.”
- Joint Doctrine Note 1-18
• Example:
• Radio Free Europe during Cold War
• Lead USG Department / Agency:
Public Affairs departments
(All Agencies - State, DoD, EOP
Press Secretary, etc.)

50. [M] - Military
• “The essence of the military
instrument is the use of force by
one party in an attempt to impose
its will on another.”
- Joint Doctrine Note 1-18
• A range of force can be applied in
any/multiple domain(s)
• Example: Operation Desert Storm
(1991)
• Lead USG Department / Agency:
Department of Defense

51. • “The economic instrument focuses
on furthering or constraining
others’ prosperity. Economic
power is frequently considered the
heart of national power.”
- Joint Doctrine Note 1-18
• Includes trade agreements, foreign
aid, and trade embargoes and
sanctions
[E] - Economic
• Example: Marshall Plan
• Lead USG Department / Agency:
Treasury Department, U.S. Trade
Representative, Department of State,
USAID

52. • Example: Countering the financing of
terrrorism (e.g. Daesh, AQ, etc.)
• Lead USG Department / Agency:
Treasury Department, Department of
State
[F] - Financial
• “The denial of access to specified
individuals or groups from a formal
or informal financial system,
network, or source of funding.”
- Joint Force Quarterly

53. [I] - Intelligence
• “The products, interdisciplinary
activities, and organizations that
convert disparate data about the
environment, future capabilities and
intentions, and relevant actors into
coherent information to provide
decision advantage for
decisionmakers…”
- Joint Force Quarterly
• Example: Cuban missile crisis, Iranian
hostage situation
• Lead USG Department / Agency:
Intelligence Community (CIA, ODNI,
DIA, NSA, etc.)

54. [L] - Law Enforcement
• “The understanding and
adherence to national,
international, and local laws and
the activities to support or carry
out the enforcement of those laws
and thereby restore order.”
- Joint Forces Quarterly
• Example: Anti-narcotics, anti-human
trafficking, Anti-Illegal Fishing
• Lead USG Department / Agency:
Department of State, Department of
Justice, and Department of Homeland
Security

55. Instruments of National Power for GPC
• Framework updated for Cold War and War on Terror
• America should update it again now for Great Power Competition
• Key elements
a. Greater integration and coordination across elements of power
b. Expansion of relevant agencies and departments
i. I.e. Federal Reserve, CFIUS
c. Greater emphasis on the private sector & academia

56. Instruments of National Power

57. • Teams of 4-5 students focus on priority national security
challenges at intersection of DIME-FIL and emerging tech
• Form groups Week I
• Interdisciplinary groups strongly encouraged!
• Develop hypotheses and test by interviewing beneficiaries,
policy makers, and other key stakeholders
• Worth 50% of final grade
• Detailed breakdown of grade to be distributed 9/22
Group Project

58. Focus on one area in below matrix
Group Project Focus Areas
AI/ML Autonomy Cyber Semis Space Biotech Other
Diplomacy
Information
Military
Economy
Finance
Intelligence
Law