- Pakistan's foreign policy since 1947 has been guided by principles of peace, friendship and non-interference laid out by Jinnah. It initially sought close ties with Western countries like Britain and the US for security and economic assistance against the threat posed by India. - Pakistan joined US anti-communist alliances but its relations with the US fluctuated depending on US relations with India and the Soviet Union. The US assistance to Pakistan increased during the Cold War but it also strengthened ties with India. - Pakistan developed close strategic ties with China from the 1950s onward as its relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated. The China-Pakistan friendship remains a key principle of Pakistan's foreign policy.

1. Q1:Write about Foreign Policy of Pakistan 1947 Policy to up till now?
ANS1:The foreign policy of Pakistan seeks to promote the internationally
recognized norms of interstate relations, i.e. respect for sovereignty
and territorial integrity of all States, non-interference in the internal
affairs of other State; non-aggression and peaceful settlement of
disputes.
Foreign Policy: Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of
Pakistan and its first Governor-General, in a broadcast talk to the
people of the USA on February 1948, outlined the following goals of
Pakistan’s foreign policy: Pakistan’s Foreign Policy seeks to protect,
promote and advance Pakistan’s national interests in the external
domain.The Foreign Ministry contributes towards safeguarding Pakistan’s
security and advancing Pakistan’s development agenda for progress and
prosperity following the guiding principles laid out by our founding
fathers.
Guiding Principles: Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Founder of
Pakistan and its first Governor General, in a broadcast talk to the
people of the USA in February 1948, outlined the following goals of
Pakistan’s foreign policy:
“Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the
nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any
country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play
in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our
utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the
nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending
its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of
the world, and in upholding the principles of the United Nations
Charter.”
The Constitution of Pakistan also lays down guidelines for the conduct of
foreign policy of the country. Article 40 of the constitution provides
that:
“The State shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations
among Muslim countries based on Islamic unity, support the common
interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, promote
international peace and security, foster goodwill and friendly relations
among all nations and encourage the settlement of international disputes
by peaceful means.”
The foreign policy of Pakistan is primarily directed to the pursuit of
national goals of seeking peace and stability through international
cooperation. Special emphasis is laid on economic diplomacy to take
advantages offered by the process of globalization as also to face
challenges of the 21st century. Our foreign policy is also geared to
project the image of the country as a dynamic and moderate society.The
foreign policy of Pakistan seeks to promote the internationally
recognized norms of interstate relations, i.e. respect for sovereignty
and territorial integrity of all States, non-interference in the internal
affairs of other State; non-aggression and peaceful settlement of
disputes. Pakistan has therefore always sought to develop friendly and
cordial relations with all countries of the world.
Foreign Policy Objectives:
In light of the guiding principles laid down by the founding fathers and
the constitution as also aspirations of the people of Pakistan, the
objectives of foreign policy can be summarized as under:
– Promotion of Pakistan as a dynamic, progressive, moderate, and
democratic Islamic country.
– Developing friendly relations with all countries of the world,
especially major powers and immediate neighbours.

2. – Safeguarding national security and geo-strategic interests, including
Kashmir.
– Consolidating our commercial and economic cooperation with
international community.
– Safeguarding the interests of Pakistani Diaspora abroad.
– Ensuring optimal utilization of national resources for regional and
international cooperation.(560 words)
:Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947 to up till now:
Pakistan’s trials, tribulations and achievements in foreign relations
were first comprehensively analysed by the country’s former Foreign
Minister, Abdul Sattar, in his book “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy” published
in 2006. In its foreword, Agha Shahi, one of the most outstanding
Pakistani diplomats, wrote that the Mr. Sattar’s book recapitulated the
rationale of some major policy decisions taken by Pakistan in relations
with neighbours and big powers. Among these he cited the challenge posed
to the country’s right to peaceful existence by the tyranny of power
disparity in the region.
Always anxious to provide an accurate and updated account of Pakistan’s
foreign relations to scholars and students, Mr. A. Sattar brought out a
second edition of the book in 2010 followed by the third edition in 2013.
Events thereafter such as Narendra Modi’s coming to power in 2013 and
suspension of the dialogue with Pakistan, withdrawal of the bulk of US
troops from Afghanistan and the advent of the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor were important enough for the writer to undertake another
revision of the book that is now available as its fourth edition,
published in 2017.
Abdul Sattar explains that some of the information in earlier editions
has been updated in the light of recent publications e.g. declassified
archives of India which provide “insights into Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru’s grand strategy of Indian hegemony over the South Asian region,
the contrast between formal acceptance of UN resolutions pledging
plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir, and the contrary secret intent aimed at
exploiting power disparity to impose his preferences on Pakistan.”
Pakistan’s moves to seek partnerships outside the region were driven by
economic and security challenges confronting the country. In the chapter
“Search for Security” he explains that India’s refusal to honour
partition arrangements, followed by military intervention in Jammu and
Kashmir, “injected a sense of urgency to the fledgling Pakistani state’s
search for ways and means to bolster its capacity to resist dictation”.
He adds, “The contours of Pakistan’s foreign policy were thus shaped by
the desperate need for arms to ensure the security of the new state and
for funds to finance its economic development.”
Britain was the first country to be approached for assistance. But the
country itself was exhausted by the war and was more sympathetic to India
than Pakistan in the subcontinent. The Soviet Union was never a serious
option because of its own economic conditions as well as Pakistan’s anti-
communist policy, yet some effervescence was created by an invitation
from Stalin to Prime Minister Liaqat Ali to visit Moscow. The visit did
not materialize but made the US realize the need to extend an invitation
to the Pakistani premier in view of the one President Truman had already
extended to Mr. Nehru.
The US, the world’s premier economic and military power was not
sympathetic to the Pakistan movement. As the partition neared, the Muslim
League leader M A Jinnah sounded to the US charge d’affaires in New Delhi
that Pakistan’s foreign policy would be oriented towards the Muslim
countries of the Middle East, and they would stand together against

3. possible Russian aggression and would look to the US for assistance. That
struck a chord in Washington as evidenced in Truman’s sympathetic
response to Ambassador Ispahani’s expose of Pakistan’s need ‘to balance
our economy, to industrialize our country, to improve health and
education and raise the standard of living.”
Yet, Pakistan’s initial request for large scale US assistance drew a
blank. A change in American thinking came only with the Korean war and an
emerging tussle between the US and the Soviet Union for global influence.
Pakistan fully backed South Korea and the US against North Korean
aggression. When approached for contributing troops to the UN action,
Pakistan offered one brigade provided her security was assured in the
event of Indian aggression. He recalls, “The United States balked at the
suggestion for such a commitment.”
Pakistan’s supportive actions in Korea compared to India’s neutral stance
won sympathy in the US but not sufficiently to make a significant
commitment to the country’s security needs and economic stability. A
parallel development was Pakistan extending recognition to the People’s
Republic of China and opening a diplomatic mission in Beijing as early as
1950. There lay the basis of Pakistan’s future ties with China and the US
– which keep evolving – with India for ever being a major influence on US
actions.
A meeting of the US ambassadors to South Asian countries held in Colombo
in February 1951 ‘favored the idea of Pakistani participation in the
defence of the Middle East.’ In April 1951, American and British
officials agreed that Pakistan’s contribution would probably be the
decisive factor in ensuring defence of the area. Yet, Washington remained
indecisive in lending defence assistance ‘lest arming Pakistan ensnare
the Unites States in India-Pakistan disputes.’ This assessment, according
to the author, was largely influenced by Britain which always deferred to
India’s concerns.
US realization of Britain’s reduced capabilities in the Middle East would
eventually lead to the initiation of contacts for building a new defence
network viz-a-viz the Soviet threat under president Eisenhower who took
office in January, 1953. Secretary of State, Dulles undertook a tour of
the Middle East and South Asia. “Nowhere did he receive a warmer welcome
or was impressed than in Pakistan” where leaders emphasized the desire to
join ‘the free world’s’ defence team. Dulles returned with the feeling
that Pakistan was one country ‘that has the moral courage to do its part
in resisting communism.’
Pakistan’s leaders diligently pursued their efforts to firm up
Washington’s commitment to help meet the country’s urgent security and
economic needs. One is tempted to point out that they not only succeeded
in attaining that goal but may have gone over target. The Pakistani
interlocutors could not have foreseen that one day their country would
become the linchpin in US plans to roll back communism in the region and
thereby hasten the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and that Pakistanis will
live to rue the disappearance of the bipolar system that ensured US
support to Pakistan.
US intentions to provide military assistance to Pakistan had an immediate
and dramatic reaction in India where Nehru exploited the situation by
renouncing his pledge of a plebiscite in Kashmir. The US decided to limit
aid to Pakistan so as not to threaten India’s military preponderance.
Washington tried to assuage New Delhi by offering a similar package to
India. President Eisenhower wrote to Nehru assuring him that if the aid
to Pakistan was misused against India, the US would take immediate action
to thwart such aggression. Nehru gave a strong public rebuttal while
telling his officials that the US wanted to check India’s power in the
region.

4. Thus began Pakistan’s complete integration in the US-led anti communist
alliances like SEATO(1954) and Baghdad Pact(1955). The two countries
entered into Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement(1954) and Bilateral
Defence Cooperation Agreement(1959). Pakistan also agreed to the
establishment of a secret intelligence base at Badaber near Peshawar, and
permission was given for the US aircraft to use the Peshawar airbase.
Sattar’s account of Pakistan joining the Baghdad Pact later renamed CENTO
after the coup d’etat in Iraq, reveals that military calculus had
overtaken other considerations and the civilian prime minister, Chaudhri
Muhammad Ali who expressed reservations about the pact was overruled by
president Iskander Mirza in league with the commander-in-chief, Gen Ayub
Khan.
The 1959 Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement contained provisions for
US commitments in support of Pakistan’s defence. Article 1 stated that
the US ‘regards as vital to its national interest and to the world peace
the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of
Pakistan.’ Specific clauses stipulated that in case of aggression against
Pakistan…the USA will…take action including the use of armed forces as
“may be mutually agreed upon” and as envisaged in the Joint Resolution to
Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist
Pakistan at its request. This meant that aid would be forthcoming in case
of aggression by a communist country and not India as was witnessed in
1965 and 1971 wars.
The book explains that though Pakistan, over the years, did benefit from
large scale military and economic assistance from the US, the country had
to contend with an immediate storm of protest from the Soviet Union and
the Arab world led by Nasser’s Egypt. Moscow stepped up ties with New
Delhi and vetoed all UNSC resolutions aimed at resolving the Kashmir
dispute. India also reaped benefits in the Arab world, including Saudi
Arabia, where Nehru was given a grand welcome.
Pakistan’s big loss in strategic terms was the deterioration in its ties
with the Soviet Union. Moscow’s anger grew after its air force had shot
down a US spy plane U-2 that had flown out of Pakistan as part of
American operations run from the Badaber base near Peshawar. The Soviet
leaders spewed venom against Pakistan and exponentially increased their
political, military and economic support to India. The US which had been
upset over India’s neutralism gradually came round to the view that it
could not ignore India. Thus began a sustained US policy to woo India
inter alia by offering economic assistance and improved overall
relations.
The Eisenhower administration that had started cutting aid to India, took
a u-turn as the country was increasingly seen as a democratic
counterweight to communist China. Aid to India was raised from $93
million in 1956 to $365 million in 1957 and went up to $822 million in
1960. The wooing of India became more pronounced under president Kennedy.
The trajectory of burgeoning Indo-US cooperation now being presented as a
strategic partnership has had the China factor as a locomotive through
all these years.
Reacting to this trend, Pakistan started to normalize relations with the
Soviet Union. In December 1960, Pakistan signed an agreement with the
Soviet Union for exploration of petroleum resources. Moscow contributed
significantly to Pakistan’s industrial base by building Pakistan Steel
Mills.
In parallel and no less important is Pakistan’s growing partnership with
China. According to Abdul Sattar, unlike the Soviet Union, China
understood that Pakistan’s motivation in joining alliances was its
security against the Indian threat, not hostility against China or any
other nation. An important step was taken in 1959 when Pakistan

5. approached China for border demarcation between the two countries.
Beijing was hesitant as the matter involved Kashmir and it did not want
to have another argument with India.
A formula was found “whereby the boundary to be demarcated would be
between Xinjiang and the contiguous areas, the defence of which was under
the control of Pakistan, thus bypassing the question of sovereignty over
the territory.” There was no truth in Indian allegations about Pakistan
ceding a part of Kashmir’s territory to China as the agreement involved
no transfer of territory.
Confirming the unique chemistry of Pakistan-China friendship, Abdul
Sattar recalls that Beijing respected Pakistan’s sovereignty in its
relations with other states. “When Pakistan embarked on improvement of
relations with the Soviet Union, the Chinese leaders did not try to hold
Pakistan back although Beijing-Moscow relations had begun to sour, and
even expressed understanding of Pakistan’s reasons.”
Pakistan provided valuable support to China in the multilateral fora and
defied US strategy to isolate China by establishing air links. China
consistently supported Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir by stressing that the
dispute should be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of
Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan.
The India-China border war in 1962 profoundly impacted America’s
strategic calculus for South Asia. Nehru’s hysterical appeals to Kennedy
for help resulted in the US switching allegiance from Pakistan to India
as a bulwark against China. Though Washington maintained assistance to
Pakistan, it acted in coordination with London to massively increase
India’s defence capabilities. Kennedy-Wilson efforts to have the Kashmir
issue resolved through talks petered out due to India’s obduracy
encouraged by India’s supporters in the US administration, who thought
they had a unique chance to permanently co-opt India against China.
The author says that Washington’s attitude towards Pakistan stiffened
further after Johnson succeeded Kennedy. Johnson took a tough line with
Pakistan over its growing ties with China. US military aid to India
increased to $100 million in 1963-64. Its confrontation with China was
growing with the war in Vietnam. In Washington’s view, Pakistan’s entente
with China contradicted the US plan for building a coalition of Asian
countries against China.
Pakistan’s growing concern over US tilt toward India was evident in a
letter written by Ayub Khan to Lyndon Johnson on 7 July, 1964, protesting
against the $500 million military aid plan to India, that could oblige
Pakistan to reappraise CENTO and SEATO. Sattar says that “Johnson’s
response was even more curt, warning the US, too, would be obliged to re-
examine its relations with Pakistan if it continued to develop its
relations with China”.
The troubled trajectory of Pak-US cooperation and friction continued in
the 1970s. Pakistan played intermediary in Washington’s overture to
Beijing that miffed Moscow and New Delhi alike. The two entered into a
defence treaty before India invaded East Pakistan. The US, under
president Nixon, acquiesced in the emergence of Bangladesh but warned
India over any aggressive design against West Pakistan. The Bhutto era
witnessed further glitches in relations with Washington notably over the
nuclear issue. The once close ally was target of sanctions by the US.
All that would change with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
December, 1979. Revolutionary Iran on one side and a Soviet-friendly
India on the other, Washington reversed its policy and began actively
courting Pakistan as a friend, ally and partner in supporting the Afghan
Mujahideen in their war of resistance against Soviet occupation.(2,293)
The situation changed once again after the Soviet defeat and withdrawal
from Afghanistan. Washington tightened sanctions against Pakistan as it

6. became disinterested in Afghanistan in throes of a civil war. Years
later, the US was alarmed at the Taliban-Al Qaida nexus but it was too
late. However, with the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 the US
launched what would become its longest war.
Abdul Sattar was the foreign minister of Pakistan under Gen Musharraf and
has devoted two chapters of his book to the post 9/11 phase of Pak-US
relations. Pakistan’s response and strategy in the fast developing crisis
after the terrorist attacks was decided in a meeting on 12 September,
2001 “on the basis of objective analysis of contingencies and
anticipation of the likely course of events” before any specific requests
were received from the US.
The US leaders made it clear that they expected full cooperation from
Pakistan in the anti-Al Qaeda operations and failing that Pakistan too
would be at risk. On 13 September, Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage summoned the Pakistan Ambassador and DG ISI, then on a visit to
Washington, to convey Washington’s wish list warning that Pakistan was
either with the US or not. The demands included:
“We can take pride in the right decisions of our leaders and learn
lessons from mistakes to avoid repetition. While the state aims are
permanent, policies should be reviewed in the light of ever changing
circumstances. Better governance and more efficient utilization of
national resources are key to financial independence and the world’s
respect.”(3112)
Q2:Write on the Forign Policy for the future for the for the beter ment
for the Pakistan?
ANS2:If I were a prime minister, I will be the first female prime
minister in Pakistan; a country which is beautiful, yet still developing.
Much of this attributes to the insecurity for women and children and rise
in crime. Gender discrimination at work, street harassment, and rape are
becoming a growing concern.There is an urgent need to foster safety at
home, schools, workplace, and the community at large. I have a vision of
a nation where all citizens will be given due respect; regardless of
ethnicity, or disability. I will work with communities to alleviate
poverty and ensure that every family has food on their table. I will
encourage all citizens to play their part in facilitating economic
growth, social security, and environmental sustainability.
There are several challenges as a country, personally, I would work on to
improve governanceand regional integration. I will love to continue
working at Paraguay Plan: building a nation inspired by the following
vision. Paraguay is a competitive country, among the most efficient food
producers in the world, with booming and innovative industries that
employ skilled workers. We're also a supplier of products and services
which promote the knowledge economy. We feature highly in social
development indexes. We are connected and open to neighbors and the
world. We are environmentally and economically sustainable, with high
levels of legal and citizen security, with attention to indigenous
peoples and a strong roles for women. Young people with vision are
leading the way in our country, with a democratic, supportive,
transparent state that promotes equal opportunities.
I will build houses in every province for the poor and free food will
also be provided there. I would also buy land and hire poor people to
irrigate the land and grow crops on it to enhance the country’s
production and improve agricultural export, thus enhance Pakistan’s
economy.

7. If I will be the Prime Minister of Pakistan for one day, I will not
change my lifestyle. I will also not demand any luxuries and protocol. I
will work for the liberation of the Kashmiris and will free them from
Indian forces. If I have to sacrifice my life for them, I will gladly do
that.
The question how is the poverty can be overcome? if I were given the
opportunity of becoming the president then, first of all, I will ensure
the opportunities of employment As the main problem in these days is the
bribe and because of it merits being neglected very bitterly. As a
result, deserving people are being deprived of their rights. so they are
compelled to chose the wrong ways and from these parts, there is no way
back from them. I will try to provide reasonable and proper opportunities
of employment for adults so that the deserving people not use the weapon
to snatch their rights. which is happing in our country.
My second priority is to be self-sufficient. today we are dependent and
taking help from other countries, as a result, our nation has been
entrapped in the net of debts and we are unable to find any way to come
out of all these debts. for this I will band the outer help in the
beginning of courses we will have to face many problems but later on it
will be helpful in making our next generation independent and free from
the burden of debts.
Another major problem of our country is "water supply" we have only three
big dams "MANGLA" "TERBELA" and chushma" but these dams are insufficient
the fulfill the necessities of our 14 crore population in past we have
damned the great plan of "Click here" just for the sake of our political
and provincial prejudices and still we are paying a high price for it.
Today we are purchasing the electricity from the other countries at such
a high cost that any other country can not imagine it. Even in our
capital "Islamabad" and Rawalpindi" the system of water supply is
defective. after getting the power. I will issue the order of
constructing the "Kala Bagh Dam" immediately just for our national
interest above all my personal interest.
Although today "saifhabeeba" Pakistan is facing many problems which
should be solved immediately but if I think we can overcome all these
problems by solving the most important above mentioned problems.(3847)