This document provides information on cultural intelligence and negotiating interculturally in Afghanistan. It discusses the importance of cultural awareness, adaptability, and situational awareness when advising or negotiating with Afghans. Key points include understanding how culture can affect negotiation approaches and behaviors, gaining insights from examining Afghan behaviors through the lens of "battered spouse syndrome", addressing cultural misunderstandings between Afghan and coalition forces, and employing strategies like curiosity, humility, and exploring interests when engaging interculturally. The document also provides examples of cultural differences that need to be navigated, such as perceptions of disrespect towards women, religion, or elders.

1. Extreme Cultural Intelligence
Nick Stone
Culture Resource Centre
nickstone123@gmail.com
‘Cling tight to your sense of
humour. You will need it
everyday’
-Lawrence of Arabia

2. Extreme Cultural Intelligence
Between CQ…………….&…………..Insider
Threat
Based on ISAF (et al.) lessons learned
Pragmatic Expectations (esp. uncertainty/complexity)
In-Context Mental Positioning (Situational Awareness)
Some Do’s & Don’ts, more Extreme Negotiation Skills

3. What makes an effective Advisor?
Professional Readiness
(credibility)
• Cultural awareness briefs & reading
• Environment specific culture briefs
• Reputation
• Management of interpreters
• Moral endurance
• Culturally adaptive advising and mentoring
• Survivability
• Negotiation Skills
• Adaptability
• Situational awareness
• Advising & mentoring proficiency
• Cultural proficiency
• Non-verbal communication & body language
• Insider Threat behavioural & activity
indicators
• Ethics
• Communication & negotiation skills
• Ability to build rapport & trust
Cultural Readiness
(acceptability)
• Enhanced self awareness & self confidence
• Enhanced situational awareness
• Reduced stress
• Greater Influence
• Enhanced force protection

5. Intercultural Negotiation
Discuss with a partner for 3-4 minutes (do in 2 bursts):
1. What negotiation usually involves
2. How culture might affect negotiation?
3. An example of an intercultural negotiation challenge
you have experienced (or expect to experience).
4. How successful were you? What would you do
differently?

6. Battered-Spouse Syndrome & Afghan Behavior
Refers to effects on a spouse who has been repeatedly
abused, physically and/or mentally, over time.
3 components provide insights into the behaviors of
Afghans abused by insurgents:
• An environment of persistent fear for the victim.
• Victim gives the abuser more power by perceiving
him as omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient.
• The victim’s behavior increasingly becomes one of
“learned helplessness.”
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/12-18/ch_2.asp

8. Shared values & common ground: where?
Should men & women have
equal access to education?
How much sympathy do you have
for armed opposition groups?

9. http://afghansurvey.asiafoundation.org/

10. http://afghansurvey.asiafoundation.org/

11. In the latest publicity coup …the Taliban today
finished 1st in a newly released survey of the
“Best Places to Work 2013”
For the Taliban, who had just opened their office in
Doha, Qatar, the honor was “totally unexpected and
incredibly humbling,” a spokesman for the group said.
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/borowitzreport/2013/06/taliban-named-best-place-to-work-2013.html

12. “This is the first office we’ve ever opened, so
naturally we wanted it to be nice & all,” he said.
“But to be named a better place to work than
Apple & Google & the other amazing places on
this list- whoa.”
The atmosphere at Taliban headquarters was
described as “relaxed” & “fun.”
“People think that just because we observe
Sharia law, we walk around with frowny faces all
day,” the spokesman said.
“The fact is, we have a lot of laughs here.”
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/borowitzreport/2013/06/talibannamed-best-place-to-work-2013.html

14. President Karzai was not amused & threatened to break
off peace talks with the Taliban if they do not
immediately admit that the poll was a “total fraud.”
He said:
“When they did their little ribbon-cutting for their office
on Tuesday, I thought they were publicity whores, but
they are really taking it to a new sick level.”
Hours later, the Taliban spokesman replied:
“Karzai doesn’t sound very chill. He’d really have to dial
it back if he wanted to fit in at a workplace like this.”
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/borowitzreport/2013/06/taliban-named-best-place-towork-2013.html

15. www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9575593/Afghan-troops-told-not-to-take-revengefor-Nato-cultural-offenses.html
www.kpbs.org/news/2012/oct/01/afghan-soldiers-learn-how-not-get-offended-us-troo/

16. Abdul Hanan, 20, a soldier … was blunt.
“We would have killed many of them (CF) already,” he
said, “but our commanders are cowards and don’t let
us.”
He said the Americans treat the Afghans
roughly, cursing at and bullying them.
“We like the Americans’ heavy weapons, but we don’t
like their soldiers,” he said.
Training Afghan Allies, With Guard Firmly Up
Matthew Rosenberg, The New York Times, 25 September 2012

18. “They come here and they look like they are going to
fight us,” said an Afghan soldier at the outpost.
“They are always talking down to us like we are little
children.”
Training Afghan Allies, With Guard Firmly Up
Matthew Rosenberg, The New York Times, 25 September 2012

19. Brochure for Understanding Culture of Coalition Forces
The Afghan army is trying …to convince Afghan troops
that when their Western counterparts do something
deeply insulting, it’s likely a product of cultural
ignorance & not worthy of revenge:
“Please do not get offended if you see a NATO
member blowing his/her nose in front of you”
“When Coalition members get excited, they may show
their excitement by patting one another on the back
or the behind,” it explains.
“They may even do this to you if they are proud of the
job you’ve done.”

20. “When someone feels comfortable in your
presence, they may even put their feet on their own
desk while speaking with you.
“They simply don’t know or have forgotten the Afghan
custom.” Pointing the soles of one’s shoes at someone is
considered a grievous insult in Afghanistan.
The guide also warns Afghan soldiers that Western
troops might wink at them or
inquire about their female relatives or
expose their private parts while showering –
all inappropriate actions by Afghan standards.

21. “As you know, Afghans never shake with their left hands,
wink, signal with their fingers, or show their private parts
in the presence of others in the same shower.
“But coalition forces have a different way of doing things.
“If a foreign soldier asks to see a picture of your wife,
don't take offense -- but don't show it to him either. And if
he blows his nose in your presence, or exits from the
shower naked in your presence, don't be alarmed.
“These actions are not intended to insult, and are no
cause for retaliation.”

22. The United States is “a little like a lovely carpet.
Different colored strands combine to make a beautiful
whole.”
NATO’s coalition is described as a “work of art.”
www.fastcompany.com/3020712/innovation-agents/the-worlds-hardest-consulting-gig

23. What are the strengths & limitations
of ‘pamphlet training’?
www.phibetaiota.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/coverinside-the-wire.jpg

24. Preparing Afghan allies for such missteps is
important, but simply distributing a pamphlet isn’t
going to get the job done. (Why?)
The literacy [not IQ!] rate among ANSF is about 11%.
http://nation.time.com/2012/10/03/
cultural-misunderstanding/

26. Greater respect for local culture & improved treatment
of Afghan forces would minimize the odds of Afghan
forces becoming willing to kill their NATO partners.
There will always be some uncertainty in Afghanistan.
But greater cultural understanding would alleviate
some of the tension
that continues to
produce violence.
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-1005/opinions/35502305_1_afghan-soldiersafghan-security-forces-nato-soldiers

27. “Dealing with the insider threat is
counterintuitive…. You need to
get closer…talk to them
more…and you need to be in
proximity to them”
“We all are looking for some sort
of…analysis that will say ‘If you
see this: then this’, and I don't
think it exists.”
Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAAT) in Regional Command Southwest (RC
(SW)) 13 May 2013
http://mod.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents
/61010201294424973553325325.pdf

28. Get closer to the men who might be thinking of killing you.
“that the closer you partner with your Afghan guys- the better
you understand each other- the safer you’re going to be”
“It’s the guys having friction [with the Afghans] or who are not
partnering as well as *they+ should, where I think we’re having
some of the issues”

29. Comparison of Western vs. Afghan Soldiers
It is not the purpose of advisors to make the ANA look like a
Western Army.
The fact is that many facets of the Western army model will not
work in the tribal & economically lagging culture of
Afghanistan.
The country does not possess the financial resources to outfit &
sustain the army with the technological weaponry present in
most modern armies.
Further, the literacy level of the population hinders the rapid
introduction & employment of new military equipment &
technology.
P72 Afghan National Army (ANA) Mentor Guide March 2011

30. Inside the Wire Threats – Afghanistan Green on Blue https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=6898&
filename=/docs/doc6898/12-07.pdf

31. Afghanistan Update
Insider Attacks
The insurgents try to claim credit for these
attacks, but the truth is the majority of them are the
result of individual grievances, cultural
misunderstandings or personal stress.
The 32 attacks on ISAF forces this year (figure correct
as at 22 Aug) are challenging, but they don't define
the 350,000 soldiers and police of the Afghan National
Security Forces. The 32 incidents make up less than
0.01 % of all ANSF personnel.

32. A Crisis of Trust & Cultural Incompatibility
Executive Summary
In April 2011, Jeffrey Bordin surveyed both ANSF & U.S. soldiers
& came to a series of conclusions.
ANSF grievances against ISAF personnel:
○ ISAF does not respect Afghan women or their
privacy.
○ ISAF personnel exhibit extreme arrogance & refuse
to take advice.
○ ISAF personnel urinate in public & expose
themselves in front of Afghan women.

33. Insider Threats- Afghanistan Handbook:
Observations, Insights & Lessons, Oct.2012
Personal Altercation
Attacker becomes belligerent from a disagreement with or a
perceived socio-cultural transgression committed by CF targets.
Yelling, swearing & humiliating greatly aggravate the situation.
Never do this to an Afghan; they have a strong predilection to
resort to violence under these circumstance.
This is driven by their tribal concept of ‘ghairet’ – the necessity
to preserve honor, & violent retribution is an accepted norm to
maintain such honor.
Always show respect towards them, their religion & their
culture.

34. As soldiers work closely with Afghan units, including
as advisers, they are warned that many confrontations
occur because of cultural ignorance or "lack of
empathy" for Muslims, or for perceived American lack
of respect for the Quran, Afghan women or elders.
As an example, it notes that soldiers should not eat in
front of Afghans during the holy month of
Ramadan, when Muslims fast from dawn to dusk
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/afghan-attacks-down-overall-insider-threat-rises

35. Strategies for a Better Way to Engage
Understand their choice & why it’s in their interest to
say, “No”
Develop options that meet their interests well
Brainstorm options & ask for criticism: “What would
be wrong with this?”
Ask your counterpart to jointly brainstorm options:
“What other solutions might meet your concerns &
my objectives?”

36. Strategies for a Better Way to Engage
Suggest ways that the alternatives may not actually be
so attractive: “It seems to me that the implications of
that are X, Y, and Z. Am I missing something?”
Make it easy for them to defend the agreement
Take the time to understand their perspective and
share yours
Explore their story and understand their perceptions
and how that is leading to their conclusion
Stay curious: even if you don’t agree, you can always
benefit from understanding their story and hearing
their interests and concerns

42. It’s often as much about the process as the outcome
There’s one piece of pie left. I’ll share it with you if
you agree in principle, that it’s mine.

44. Break

45. Vignette Exercise
For your vignette, identify what seems to be
happening with respect to:
a) Emotions & motivations (Heart)
b) Relevant CQ knowledge (Head)
c) Possible responses: chose one from each of the
following option lists (Body)

46. Avoid: (Option 1)
1. Slander any religion or host nation or coalition partners
(even if only jokingly)
2. Assuming you have all the facts: “Look, it’s obvious that.…”
3. Assuming the other side is biased—but you’re not
4. Assuming the other side’s motivations and intentions are
obvious- and probably nefarious
5. Making open-ended offers: “What do you want?”
6. Making unilateral offers: “I’d be willing to.…”
7. Simply agreeing to (or refusing) the other side’s demands
8. Threats: “You’d better agree, or else.…”
9. Close-mindedness: “Under no circumstances will I agree toor even consider- that proposal.”
10. Trying to “buy” a good relationship

47. Instead, try to: (Option 2)
1. Be curious: “help me understand how you see the
situation.”
2. Be humble: “What do I have wrong?”
3. Be open-minded: “Is there another way to explain
this?”
4. Ask “Why is that important to you?”
5. Propose solutions for critique: “Here’s a possibility—
what might be wrong with it?”
6. Explore how a breakdown in trust may have
occurred and how to remedy it.
7. Treat counterparts with respect, and act in ways that
will command theirs.

48. Instead, try to: (Option 2, cont’d)
8. Talk about the negotiation process: “We seem to be
at a roadbloack- perhaps we should spend some
more time exploring our respective objectives &
constraints.”
9. Slow down the pace: “I’m not ready to agree, but I’d
prefer not to walk away either. I think this needs
further exploration.”
10. Issue warnings without making threats: “Unless
you’re willing to work with me toward a solution we
can both accept, I’m afraid I can’t afford to spend
more time negotiating.”

49. Sample Vignette
You, the colonel go around the room introducing yourself. Suddenly, one of
the Afghans stood up, pointed at you, and says (in front of all the other
Afghan officers):
“This man is a jerk.”
Option 1: You think: Now, I’ve left my family behind. I’m deployed and
I don’t need to take this crap.
I say, “Hey mate, I’m here to help you guys, you’re not doing anything
for me here.”
Option 2: I bite my tongue and swallow it. I don’t know where he is going
with this ... But, I understand that to be effective I can never show that I've
lost my temper. So I say,
“Clearly, you are a wise man, for my wife too thinks I’m a jerk.”
Laughter breaks out. . . . The Afghan officer becomes my biggest advocate
through the whole deployment. Later on, I was able to deduce that he was
trying to demonstrate in front of his peers that he was a man of importance
and was using me as a way to demonstrate that by calling me a jerk.

52. www.newsweek.com/afghanistan-green-blue-killings-explained-64561

53. How do Afghan & Western negotiation styles differ?
Bottom Line Up Front (Western style)
· There is no silver bullet. There is no set way of Afghan
negotiation.
· Keep it personal. All decisions are based on
personality. Get to know them, let them know you. It
generates trust, which generates action.
·Accept ambiguity. There simply will not be definite
answers or even necessarily predictable outcomes from
negotiations.
Put in the time. Time undergirds relationship. To
establish a friendly relationship with an elder or a
group of elders requires a lot of time.
· HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM- CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE REPORT

54. “The process of decision making is far from clear-cut
for important matters,
it is almost never limited to a single sitting of a group
of elders, no matter how prestigious they are,
it is not even subject to written commitments made
by people who are acknowledged as the leaders of
communities.”

55. HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM- CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE REPORT
Gaining community support is a complex and lengthy
process.
“Few understand the way that decisions are made”
“Our failure to comprehend how such things are done here
can lead us to become upset and frustrated with the
Afghans and accuse them of being duplicitous, unable to
keep their word or lacking resolve,”
“It is all about relationships,” he said. “People need to get
off the FOBs permanently, get behind the Afghans, and get
after development.”

56. “Every valley, tribe, village is DIFFERENT!
Each has its own issues. There are no “cookie cutter”
approaches or solutions.”
We need to understand that basic people skills• showing respect,
• being friendly & open
• treating them as one
would expect [us] to
be treated
… goes a long way.

57. People are
peopleeverywhere.
The trick is to
boost
humanisation:
us of them &
them of us.

58. HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM- CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE REPORT
…all agreed on the need for close, repeated small group
interactions. This not only encourages the development of
personal bonds, but works against the tendency of some
Afghans to view … body armor as evidence of cowardice.
If possible, spending the night in a given community … sitting
through long sessions of informal talk, is universally considered
a best practice.
While this may seem like a great deal of effort just to get an
agreement in place, agreements in Pashtun areas mean little
without a personal relationship to back them up.
It all rests upon the relationship. Without a personal
relationship, any negotiation or meeting will mean little.

59. A normal occurrence in Western militaries, such as being shouted
at by your superior officer, can a grave insult to Afghan soldiers.
Afghan troops share a greater "brotherly bond" … hand-holding
and other common gestures that are generally taboo among
foreign soldiers.
Afghan soldiers' shabby uniforms, lack of discipline, sometimes
scruffy appearance & you have the building blocks for a negative
stereotype of Afghan soldiers that portrays them as lazy and
untidy.

60. The seven habits of highly effective warrior-diplomats

62. What key point(s) do you
think you’ll take away
with you today?

63. Thank you & tread the tightrope safely