2. “The law of the universe is harmony, not unity.” These words are extracts from
Leopold’s Khor’s influential book The Breakdown of Nations. The argument he presents
in the book is aimed at trying to convinced readers that large states are unnatural
phenomena, while smaller communal units are more efficient. Scottish nationalists
pushing for independence in the 2014 Scottish referendum have implicitly argued this
emphasis on the small. On the other hand, this claims stemming from separatist
movements in the UK appear in contrast with historical examples of unified societal units
such as the Holy Roman Empire and the Republic of Venice. The latter two cases
demonstrate how questions of national self-determination had been addressed and settled
long before the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence. The underlying questions
within this historical paradox are: how do we explain national self-determination as a
right that justifies independence? How do make sense of the historical variation in terms
of the right becoming a potent enough tide to cause secession or disunion?
The literature has extensively discussed cases of national self-determination in
countries like the UK, Canada (with Quebec) and Spain (with Catalonia and the Basque
country), among others. Despite this empirical discussion, there is an underlying question
on state (as a centralized unit of government with agencies aiding it for completion of its
objectives, whatever they are) effectiveness at addressing the claims of those nations1
that
live within it. This essay will demonstrate the question of national self-determination has
embedded in itself a question of institutional arrangements and their effectiveness at
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1 For simplification purposes, nations will be defined as human collective units that share
cultural, historical paths and, above all, a shared sense of identity through which its members
maintain a cohesive union. This union becomes so intrinsic in the individual that the elimination
of such communally shared sense of identity leads to the partial loss of the individual’s
characterization. This national identity escapes political institutions such as state boarders,
citizenship schemes or any other artificially created nominal form of identification.
3. accommodating demands of subgroups within the jurisdiction of a particular state. In
order to achieve this, Vladimir Lenin’s discussion on state behaviour and the right of
nations to self-determination will be expanded.
This discussion will bring about a question of the optimal size of a state dicussed
in Khor and political-historical analysis on European imperialism. Moreover, the case of
European imperialism will be contrasted with the efficiency and resilience of the
communal arrangements found in the Republic of Venice between the XII and XVI
centuries. The communal and state development paths explained by these two historical-
political surveys sheds some light on the incoherence found in the literature in terms of
our understanding of the political harmony discussed in Khor.
From this discussion on the size of states originates the platform for discussion
for Scottish independence, which addresses issues of efficacy of the UK as a
representative case of a large (state) unit discussed in Khor and Lenin. After the literature
review on the optimal sizes of states, it will be prudent to discuss the main arguments
proposed during the Scottish referendum to apply our literature findings to reality.
Moreover, the case of Scotland shall be juxtaposed with a historical and political analysis
of the Holy Roman Empire (HRE) to further emphasize how Khor’s harmony was
temporarily a reality brought to the HRE and how this lasting millennial system of
principalities impacts upon the discussion at-large.
All this things considered, a meticulous revision of the abovementioned
“embedded question of institutional arrangements and their effectiveness at
accommodating demands of subgroups within the jurisdiction of a particular state” will
take place. For this, we will address the overall discussion up to that point and argue that
4. scale problem of organization and the principle of the golden rule are latent variables that
unveil a fundamental problem in institutional arrangements throughout history that try to
reach a community of understanding. This fundamental puzzle presents the basis for an
original model in the essay: the “Golden Institutional Balance” model. This theoretical
framework aims at providing the necessary tools for reconciliation of the variation in the
patterns of community arrangements throughout history. In other words, it will attempt at
explaining why we have small and large community arrangements in nonlinear but
intercalated manner, as shown by the historical examples of the HRE, Venice and the
UK. .This historical reconciliation will serve to understand the seemingly surprising
claims of self-determination of nations as a signal for policymakers and the public in
general. This signalling reveals the need of consideration of scale problem of
organization and a simultaneous application of the golden rule when creating and
reforming creasing institutional arrangements of a community (i.e. state). The limitations
of space do not allow for measurements that would test the model. However, the Golden
Institutional Balance approach aims to provide a strategy to reverse the pattern of state
development seen in history and find a less “aggressive” path towards institutional
evolution.
Lenin: Right of National Self-determination, Imperialism and the case of
Large States
Despite being met with great scepticism by many political scientists, Vladimir
Lenin has developed a comprehensive literature on state behaviour. Since a review of all
his works escapes the purpose of this essay, it is relevant to focus on two of his prominent
5. works. First, a brief account of his argument on the right of nations to self-determination
(from Lenin’s The Right of Nations to Self-determination) will be presented followed by
a complementary reflection upon his rationale for state territorial expansion, as seen in
his essay Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.
To begin with, Lenin defines self-determination of nations as the “the political
separation of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of an
independent national state” (Lenin, Ch. 1, 3). Although this definition is straightforward,
Lenin’s argument is further complicated with an emphasis on the role of class struggle as
a theoretical device framing the struggle of nations to realize their right to self-
determination. Namely, Lenin defines the secession of national units from the oppression
of greater national state units (such as Russia or the United Kigdom) as a liberating
process of the proletariat from the bourgeois class (Lenin, Ch. 4, 2). The relevance of his
argument does not rest on the class struggle he describes, but the realization of a power
struggle between peripheral national units within great state jurisdiction. Thus, it is
sensible (if we maintain the logic of his argument but generalize) to substitute the word
bourgeois state or class by “oppressing or large nation,” and the word “proletariat” by
“oppressed or minority nation.” In this manner, we can simplify Lenin’s logic and truly
understand the value and use of his argument.
The first premise of Lenin’s proposal defines the nature of state development in
western Europe as linear: “all modern states are of a common capitalist nature and are
therefore subject to a common law of development” (Lenin, Ch. 1, 5). He describes the
evolution of a Western European state as a historical phenomenon defined by precise
periods. For instance, he described the century between 1789 and 1871 as the interval in
6. which national movements and the creation of nation states2
happened (Lenin, Ch. 3,
page 3). The aftermath of this period saw the formation of most of today’s states (France,
Spain, Germany, etc.), which, under his view, demonstrate an oppressing character due to
their “nationally simplified” characterization. This simplification came about as a larger
national unit established, in coaction with other minor ones or small portions of equally
large nations, national boundaries as a path to realize a state entity that would address its
needs. This unified state jurisdictions are consequently defined by three elements: (1)
subject peoples (conforming the majority of the population through multiple minority
nations) inhabiting the border regions; (2) the oppression of such minority nation(s); (3)
and arbitrarily set state boundaries (which can cause a nation in one state to be a minority
or majority in different bordering states with different degrees of national autonomy)
(Lenin, Ch. 3, 4).
The description of these nation states fits Lenin’s initial claim for self-
determination, as he argues for “alienation” of minority nations from central national
state bodies. This is tied closely to the second element defining the modern (large)
national state, the oppression of the national minorities. Lenin defines this oppression in a
very simple way: the national (bourgeois) majority categorically positions its demands
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2
The nation states refer to an artificially created and politically delineated territorial unit that
achieves a coherent existence through the supremacy of one particular nation. Some nation or
national states can enclose many smaller nations within its territories, or they can contain parts of
a bigger nation. Yet, the structure of the nation state is assumed to be oppressive for nations who
are not given supreme status. For instance, Germany was divided into hundreds of principalities
with their own national identities. Yet, when its unification took place, such identities were
absorbed and subordinated to the generalized “German” identity. Despite the fact that most of
those identities do not carry practical political use (i.e. there is no Bavarian citizenship recognized
by the world), the cultural and historical linkages of regions are impossible to erase. Although the
supreme German identity has existed for more than a century such regional identities may have
lost nominal value, yet the cultural and historical links are shared as much as before the creation
of the German society. This creates latent implications that will be revealed throughout this essay.
7. above the national (proletariat) minorities. Hence, an environment of proletariat/minority
subordination inherently leads to a claim for (minority) national self-determination
(Lenin, Ch. 4, page 2). Despite this historical-theoretical survey, Lenin’s core claim is
normative. He argues that every nation shares an equally inherent right to self-
determination (Lenin, Chapter 10, page 3) as a way of realization of the interests of every
nation. Consequentially, this right implies the right to secede from a larger oppressing
state if necessary. He states that this right does not lead to the destruction of a state
(Lenin, Chapter 5, page 8), but the formation of the rightful national political entities
(Lenin, Chapter 5, page 7). Moreover, he compares this dynamic to divorce. As in a
divorce, the larger entity is divided in such a way that smaller independent units respond
to their own needs in the best terms set by their corresponding governing principle.
To be sure, he constructs his argument based on the experience of capitalism in
Europe. He sees European state development through an oppressing dynamic that leads to
a context allowing for modern capitalism to be established and to flourish (Lenin, Ch. 1,
page 2). In sum, Lenin describes state development in capitalism as a phenomenon by
which national boundaries are established in such a manner that the demands from the
larger nation within them trump the demands of the smaller ones. This is common to all
European states that have followed the capitalist path.
In spite of Lenin’s explanation of state development in Western Europe, his essay
on imperialism further applies his implicit characterization of the nature of states. He
defines imperialism as a stage in capitalism characterized by the dominance of
monopolies and finance capital, in which “the division of all territories of the globe
among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed” (Lenin, 56). This understanding
8. of these systemic dynamics can help us understand the reasoning for the demands of the
large majority Lenin refers to in his previous essay. In addition, Lenin’s Imperialism can
help us understand his logic for territorial expansion of states and reasoning for the
creation of larger political units, namely the capitalist modern states.
In his second essay, Lenin reveals how imperialism fed off and pushed for both
colonialism and the creation of oligarchies. On the one hand, the conquering of new
territories originated from the competitive foundations of capitalism, as more resources
than those available within the national boundaries of the imperial powers were needed to
maintain their respective growth. This environment led to the race for markets that
needed financial capital. Consequentially, colonial policies were pursued in many
countries as a solution to the increasing financial pressures that came from competition
between countries (Lenin 55). This behaviour is compatible with the claim that large
majorities have sought a state unit established through boundaries to satisfy its economic
needs. In Lenin, the focus is on capitalist dynamics, which are in turn established on the
basis of resource competition and their use to satisfy standards of living. Hence, imperial
claims on territories are just an extension of the state apparatus and its nature, but at the
international stage. As the oppressing nation establishes the state, it settles on boundaries
that potentially satisfy its needs. Yet, as the state and private institutions evolve, the
measure of economic consumption, to sustain such growth, increases.
By Lenin’s logic, all national states that have been formed in Europe should have
an oppressing nation that conducted the settling of state boundaries to satisfy its capitalist
growth. Yet, there is a major problem with Lenin’s proposition. His assumptions serve
well at explaining modern times, and his empirical evidence can support this path of state
9. development. However, his thorough explanation looses temporal and conceptual
strength if we think about the core issues behind state formation (prior to modernity). The
logic behind the decision of large nation to push for the creation of states is the same
logic by which city states, empires and other forms of communal organizations came to
be: to satisfy the demands of individuals as single subjects and as part of a community.
Hence, it is prudent to analyse how other forms of government came to be before large
government units were formed.
Surprisingly, this analysis of smaller units, such as the city-state of Venice, will
demonstrate how Lenin may be posing an argument limited by the time frame he
selected. Yet, if we go back further in time, before the consolidation of modern states in
the 17th
to 19th
century, we may find evidence that crystallizes the issue of communal
organization. This is key to understand how large states came to be. Hence, if Lenin is
right, and smaller units became part of larger ones in the form of nation states, then we
should question why smaller units were insufficient at addressing the communal demands
that provided the rationale for unification of nations into large states.
Venice: City State and Success Before Modern States
There are many successful historical examples one can point to when discussing
political arrangements that have addressed different forms of communal organization.
Yet, there is one particularly useful for our discussion: the Republic of Venice. This form
of communal entity provides a case against the large nation states of modernity and
demonstrates that communal needs can be satisfied in a stable manner through time
without the existence of a colossal political unit. The significance of Venice does not rest
10. in its invincibility but its capacity for survival. The success we refer to in this essay is the
adaptability that its political institutions posed to the test of time. For such a task, it is
prudent to give a brief historical analysis before describing the institutional adaptability
of Venice.
The Venetian self-governing institutions survived numerous internal reforms and
external pressures until Napoleon Bonaparte greatly challenged its status quo (Pullan,
446). For instance, Venice survived multiple invasions in the XV and became the only
Italian power, aside from the Papacy, to retain political independence in the form of a
self-governing institution (Pullan, 448). Moreover, Venice maintained the sovereignty of
its princes and governments above ecclesiastic power even in the case of the XVI against
pressures from priests of the Society of Jesus (Pullan, 451). Hence, in just two centuries,
the city-state of Venice managed to maintain its autonomy from larger units of
government and the main religious authority that had mostly unchallenged influence until
the Enlightenment. The main reason for this longevity is found in the elements of
government it possessed (Pullan, 545) and in its adaptability. This adaptability refers to
the diversity of institutional arrangements to address communal issues that came about
through time and the resilience of such institutions to the diversity.
Despite its millennial history, the most recent relevant date for our analysis is the
IX, when Venice became independent. The people of Venice elected a small group of
public officers into the Doge, which governed with absolute decision-making power in
political, administrative and military matters. This seemingly powerful and stable
government organ lasted for about two centuries, until Venetians in Byzantium were
attacked and thousands imprisoned in 1171. This crisis led to the assassination of all the
11. Doge members in 1172, who had been unable to solve it (De Lara, et al., 106). This was a
major political conundrum that led to the dissolution of the Doge as a Venetian political
institution with absolute power. Yet, the flexibility of the system was unveiled, as a new,
more effective institution was established. Aside from the Doge, there were clans in
Venice with already great administrative capacity that had even challenged the Doge in
practice even before the crisis. These clans had formed the Council of Wise Men before
1172 and proved capable of re-establishing order in Venice after it.
The Council of Wise men was incorporated into a new political institution named
the Great Council or Great, which had greater administrative capabilities than the Doge
but did not enjoy pure absolute power, as it depended on the Venetian population at large
for decision-making matters regarding the navy and the army. On the other hand, the
establishment of the Great led to a more stable application of the rule of law doctrine, as
there were mechanisms of checks due to overlapping jurisdictions among the different
power centres belonging to the Great Council clans (De Lara, et al., 106). Nonetheless,
the great benefits from the Great and its system of overlapping jurisdiction created an
incentive for greater internal cooperation, which eventually caused its membership to
become hereditary and Venice to become an oligarchy in the XIV (De Lara, et al., 107).
One could continue the analysis of the city of Venice until current times. Yet, the
short historical surveys illustrates how a political unit smaller and much more uniform
than a large nation state can be established in such a manner that allows for institutional
evolution and revision so as to satisfy the changing demands of its people through time.
This poses a great challenge to Lenin’s premises, yet it does not discard them. In fact, it
compliments them just as much as it objects to them. On the one hand, it shows that his
12. argument does not hold outside of modern times where capitalism is a dominant
economic system greatly influencing national political frameworks. On the other hand,
the case of Venice is somewhat of an exception to history that eventually became part of
the contemporary Italian state. The question to be answered is how we account for this
variation. Also, how do we reconcile the longevity of Venice? Or its eventual
incorporation into Lenin’s nation state system we observe in modern and contemporary
times?
Moreover, if we do not discard Lenin’s argument, but merely show that there
were alternative community organizations that escaped and preceded modernity, we still
need to reconcile the question of self-determination. If a system worked once in the IX
and all through medieval times, would not the case of Venice then provide a blueprint of
basic principles of community organization and successful forms of smaller units within a
large state, such as Scotland? If so, how do we explain current claims of self-
determination in Scotland but not in multinational states like Germany? We have
advantages that need to be revealed so as to explain how both small and large community
organizations can successfully adapt and change through time to meet the ever-evolving
demands of its people. On the one hand, city-states seemed to have been the primary
source of community arrangements. On the other hand, most of these smaller units,
including Venice, did not prove to eventually survive the test of time, as they became part
of the larger political units presented by the nation states.
13. Khor: Reconciling the Old and the Small with the New and the Big
Up until this point, the only thing clear is that there seems to be no clear and
coherently uniform path that can satisfactorily both answer our questions regarding the
gap between large and small community arrangement and the inconsistent occurrence of
self-determination claims in larger states. Moreover, there seems to be an even greater
empirical disjunctive between the logic behind the formation of modern states and the
lingering question regarding the longevity of Venice. The tension between these cases is
simple: Venice can be seen as a success of political community arrangement; yet, despite
its duration (which surpasses by far the duration of many current modern states), it was
eventually absorbed into the contemporary Italian nation state. In order to fill in the gaps,
it is prudent to look at an author that explains the nature of modern states in a manner that
is in accordance with the scenario described by Lenin and the historical context depicted
by the case of Venice. Among the most comprehensive theories, the proposal in
Leopold’s Khor’s The Breakdown of Nations presents us with the necessary theoretical
devices and a wide enough historical analysis to fill in the cracks of our journey so far.
The initial quotation in this essay is heavily normatively charged, as it is most of Khor’s
writing. Nonetheless, the value of his argument rests on the idea that a large unit system,
like Lenin’s national state frameworks, and small collective political entities (i.e.
Republic of Venice) can coexist in the same system (Khor, 151). This coexistence can
explain the absorption of city-states and minority nations into large national states.
Nevertheless, in order to see how we reach this apparent reconciliation and what
14. empirical implications it may have, we shall present the relevant aspects of Khor’s
proposition in an orderly manner.
The Breakdown of Nations presents various arguments with numerous premises
that make up a claim that small political units are more efficient than the unnatural large
state arrangements. Yet, Khor’s initial starting point is what he calls the Size Theory of
Social Misery as an explanation for aggression (Khor, 21). He explains that most
nations, regardless of the time period being discussed or any other temporal
circumstances (i.e. ideology, stage of development, etc.), share the tendency to seek
power. This power can be vaguely but simply defined as the “extent of capabilities of a
nation”. Khor describes the danger of aggression as a consequence of power. The
relationship he establishes between power and aggression is relative. On the one hand, he
defines aggression as a naturally occurring behavioural phenomenon in every individual.
Yet, he is more concern with the degree of aggression existing in a given society. He
associates the degree of social aggression as a direct consequence of the relative size of
power (Khor, 21). This gives his theory its name: the size of power from the societal
mass is a positively correlated determinant of the level of aggression present in a society,
which in turn defines a situation of social misery.
Moreover, he defines the size of power in a society as a direct product of the size
of the societal mass (Khor, 22). Hence, by his logic, the larger the society is, the more
prone to aggressive behaviour it will reveal itself to be. This revelation of aggression
occurs at a particular threshold of size, which is not defined just by number of members.
If this were the case, then the problem of aggression would just be solved and prevented
by dividing collective human arrangements by a certain amount of people. Yet, the size
15. of a society is measured by the quantity of members but also by the density of the
population and its velocity (defined as “extent of its administrative integration and
technological progress”). All these three variables are positively correlated to the size of a
society and, hence, the amount of power and latent aggression that rests within it (Khor,
25). Yet, if the density and the velocity of a population are the same, the most powerful
society will be the most populous one. To be sure, the aggression Khor refers to is both
internal and external. On the one hand, the internal danger of aggression he refers to is
the increase in criminal activity that usually falls under the responsibility of the police. In
terms of the external form of aggression, Khor refers to dynamics similar to the imperial
and colonial tendencies that we analysed under Lenin. It is prudent to further develop this
point before going any further into The Breakdown of Nations.
Leopold Khor affirms that great powers are defined as “artificial structures” that
can only maintain themselves only through conquest. He defines the same imperialist
powers that Lenin defined as those states that inherently need consumption to maintain
their large structures (Khor, 45). Given, this blunt mutual theoretical understanding
between the authors, it may be sensible to see where such understanding can lead us. To
be sure, Lenin argues that imperial powers become so large economically that they turn
capitalist competition in a zero-sum imperial race in search for more resources through
colonial conquest and warfare. Yet, this power-hungry state characterization is only
described in a modern period and tells an incomplete story. Still, we see that this same
pattern is described in Khor. In fact, his work in The Breakdown of Nation can complete
the missing pieces in Lenin’s story.
16. This completion of the explanation can be summarized as follows: “In Europe,
unification usually meant that a larger state wanted to unify with its territory a smaller
one. This process began to radiate from various centers [until smaller states were
absorbed into] the now emerging great powers” (Khor, 45). Henceforth, smaller units,
such as city-states, conquer states to acquire greater possessions of territories, which
carry an economic value. This economic value from conquest is expressed in the
technological growth of a society and has historically been accompanied with greater
administrative capacities. In addition, the absorption of new territories increases the
population under such arrangements. This is the pattern we observe in both empires and
modern states and is defined by Khor as the process of “unification”: “Great Britain,
France, Italy, Germany -- they all were the result of a series of wars amongst the very
members subsequently composing them as their conquered, not their voluntary, parts”
(Khor, 43). He then defines warfare as both the course taken by pre-modern smaller units
and the raison d’ëtre for national states. Hence, we can infer from this that collective
units are inherently aggressive. This war-prone nature of these is then the basis for the
external expression of aggression discussed in Khor and also the origin of the behavior of
Lenin’s imperial powers and their involvement in colonial policies.
If this assumption on modern states is true, it is important to test it when
discussing the nature of pre-modern collective arrangements that led to the creation of
modern states. After all, the assumptions that Lenin and Khor refer to, at their core, apply
to any type of community, irrespective of size or time period. On the other hand, the fact
that these assumptions can apply to smaller units that predate modern capitalism weakens
Lenin’s theories: as these findings apply to any period, the responsibility of modern
17. capitalism in providing a rationale for aggression cannot hold. This aggression goes
beyond capitalism. Consequentially, this allows for a more general discussion on the
political evolution of social and community arrangements in general that is also
irrespective of the economic system being discussed. Given this new theoretical bridge
provided by Khor between the modern national state and the premodern communal
arrangements, it is useful to see how its validity holds when we apply it to a case like the
Republic of Venice.
According to Khor, “we live in a micro-cosmos, not in a macro-cosmos”
(Khor, 63). Hence, for Khor the more natural state of affairs is political arrangements that
remain relatively small. This may lead us to the conclusion small states should be the
rule. Yet, this is not necessarily true, as we clearly live in a world were large nations
states have become the dominant form of collective organization. Therefore, we
encounter the following twin questions: is small truly harmony, the natural state of
affairs? If so, are we then leaving in an unnatural world and why? Although his theory
seems a bit self-defeating, it can lead to an explanation for the current state of affairs and
the current absence of what Khor denominates as natural (i.e. a system of independent
small collective units). The idea of large and small is, as we have seen, not just a question
of numbers or measures. It is a question of behaviour and functioning of a system. It
entails the amount of people, territory and economic resources involved. Yet, it also
includes the way such entities relate among each other through technological and
administrative matters. For Khor, small does not equal stability. For him, the political
sphere is based on constant change, chaos and dynamism (Khor, 65).
18. Following this logic, the natural state of things is in reality not the physically
“small” unit but the ever-changing unit (which in turn cannot be large, as large units are
unnaturally preserved uniform). This change in the composition of the map of political
units is driven by the need of self-sufficiency: collective units are formed in order for
individuals to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency that allows them to survive and
develop as both individuals and members of community (Khor, 67). This fits the idea of
Venice: it remained autonomous and independent for the time it allowed its people to
become self-sufficient. Yet, the international pressure of the larger units eventually
altered the balance around it and led to its absorption as a response to the increasing need
for self-sufficiency. Hence, the size of Venice that had provided self-sufficiency to its
people for centuries led to its own demise. The adaptability of its institutions shown in
the previous section is proof of the dynamism depicted by Khor.
The collection of nation states we see in our world today is a continuation of the
dynamics we see in Lenin, which are the middle chapters that started with Venice, which
in turn came from the Roman empire and other forms of collective units. It is not
unnatural to observe large units, as the question is not about if large is better than small.
The question trying to be addressed here is how we explain this path that allows for a
case like Venice share a place in history with the contemporary Italian state, which in
turn shares commonalities in development with states like Scotland and Germany. All
this territories were part of different collective arrangements in the form of city-states,
tribes, empires and nation states. Yet, we have a case of centrifugal forces being currently
occurring in Scotland within the United Kingdom while Venice did not have the same
claims of self-determination within, for instance, Italy. These disparities seem
19. counterintuitive given the assumption that any type of collective political unit is
inherently prone to self-sufficiency. If the establishment of self-sufficient units was
enough for people to realize themselves, then the question becomes why change is
necessary.
The answer can be found in the pattern of human behaviour we observe in history.
According to Khor, the state (or collective unit) has the function to “furnish its members
with protection and certain other social advantages which could not be obtained in a
solitary pioneer existence” (Khor, 83). Yet, this natural tendency of self-sufficiency
observed in history is accompanied by a pattern of aggression. To be sure, this is an
implicit characterization of human nature. If the foundations of collective agreements are
based on ideals of self-sufficiency and aggression, it must be because its creators,
individuals, inherently and concurrently demonstrate a search for self-sufficiency and a
tendency towards aggression. This type of approach to human nature was long before
described by Hobbes as a “bellum omnium contra omnes” (war of everyone against
everyone). Hence, the question of survival and aggression can be seen as two sides of the
same coin: one the one hand, individuals sought collective arrangements as an answer to
join forces to establish a system that would secure their survival safely. On the other
hand, this aggression could be seen also as a reason for survival: the fact that aggression
is a natural occurrence leads to smaller scale expressions of occurrences that resemble the
arms race during the Cold War (which was happening while Khor wrote his book).
This inference on human nature from Lenin, Khor and the essays on Venice also
explains the chaos and change abovementioned. The initial difference in size and
capabilities of neighbours may be the beginning of the pattern we see in wars of
20. conquest: the fear of being overpowered or not achieving self-sufficiency. As resources
grow increasingly scarcer, this leads to an initial need for a community arrangement to
become larger than the neighbouring ones, which also seek security and self-sufficiency.
On the other hand, the same fear is reciprocal in those neighbouring communities. Hence,
the “advantage of the first” applies: the one that manages to acquire through conquest of
territories (virgin or already in possession by collective organization) gains advantage
over its neighbours. This allows for self-sufficiency and security. However, if everyone is
acquiring more power through absorption of population, resources and physical space,
the threshold for security and pressure to maintain independence and self-sufficiency
grows greater with time. Hence, we encounter greater and more aggressive political units
(empires, large federations and eventually uniform national states) stemming from the
same principles that led to the organization of small city-states. Yet, this inherent logic in
human behaviour (seen in Khor and Lenin) becomes unnatural once fear overpowers the
original need for self-sufficiency.
In the story by Khor, “a population needs hardly to number more than ten or
twenty thousand to judge from the early Greek, Italian, or German city-states ” to achieve
self-sufficiency (Khor, 84). At this point, according to him, a society can provide justice,
defence, academies, universities, theatres, and other basic public goods that allow for
self-sufficiency. We observe this pattern in Venice and the dynamics that founded its
institutions. Still, the “fear of the other, the neighbour” mentioned previously is a disease
that turns its original seed (self-sufficiency) into a search for power that brings about the
Size Theory of Social Misery. This theory does not aim at preventing conflict (in the
form of absorptive conquest, imperialism, colonialism, and so on), as this is a natural
21. occurrence. As stated by Khor, “the purpose of this analysis is not to furnish another of
those fantastic plans for eternal peace […] It is to find a solution to our worst social evils,
not a way to eliminate them. The problem of war in modern times is not its occurrence,
but its scale, its devastating magnitude” (Khor, 47).
In The Breakdown of Nations, he establishes a starting point towards the path to
find this “solution”. Since we cannot by definition change human nature, we could focus
on a way to change the way it reveals itself in collective arrangements. The duality of
aggression and self-sufficiency is a natural push for progress. However, if the “fear of the
other” overcomes this advancement, which is also a natural extension of human
behaviour, we achieve what Khor defines as immobile political balance through huge
units (Khor, 68). Hence the question he poses, stemming from aggression and the implicit
assumptions on human (collective) nature, is between Khor’s “mobile or good” and
“immobile of bad” categories of balance. He defines good political power balance as the
one that “furnish[es] an automatic equilibrium, which relieves its creators of the
absorbing and sterile task of keeping it under constant supervision” (Khor, 69). This
supervision (inherent in large nation states) is an expression what we previously referred
to as the “fear of the other”: a unit needs to constantly check itself if it is functioning
properly so as to secure self-sufficiency relative to others. Under Khor, large units
represent an immobile or bad balance, as “[their] very preservation needs a perpetual
effort of such titanic proportions that the effort itself, if miscalculated, might bring about
its end” (Khor, 70).
This analysis is consistent with the pattern of rise and fall of empires, as
“effective power, like sound or light, diminishes as distance increases” (Khor, 34). Huge
22. units require maintenance through great efforts, but when such efforts, stemming from
the original central entity, are insufficient, the portion it had absorbed eventually
crumbles. On the other hand, smaller units such as Venice do not follow the same fate:
they do not crumble from the periphery but rather are absorbed and then become victims
of the fate of larger units. This is a pattern that can be observed in history and is
consistent with our initial question of national self-determination. Yet, before developing
this latter question and the case for Scotland as a representative case study, it is prudent
to exhaust the conversation on Khor and the size of collective units.
In short, Khor argues for harmony through good balance. This balance finds its
rationale in small self-governing collective entities. Yet, this is not consistent with the
natural path humanity has found in history, with a constant tension between large and
small units. To be sure, Khor does not argue that all evils are solved or eliminated
through the organization of humankind in small city-states or similar units of indivisible
size. As a matter of fact, and consistent with the natural aggressive behaviour of people,
he states “There is nothing in the constitution of men or states that can prevent the rise
power maniacs exist […] The only difference lies in the degree of tyrannical government
which […] depends once more on the size and power of the countries“ (Khor, 55).
Henceforth, the question is not that large is bad and small is good. It is a question of
which evil is less damaging. His answer is “small is better,” for the reasons previously
outlined.
Nonetheless, it would be unrealistic to think that we can recreate a world where
we easily go back to the Italian or Greek city-state systems. In addition, we find that the
system of nation states is arguably as natural as the pre-modern small collective
23. arrangements. Henceforth, it would seem to go against political nature to arbitrarily
divide nation states into infinitely indivisible political units. But, even if it were feasible,
the arbitrary nature of the act would drive us upon an endless debate regarding the
optimal division of nation states into such indivisible nations. Consequently, matters of
identity, practicality and economic resources would surface quickly. Henceforth, the
splitting of nation states would not fundamentally solve the problem but masked the
nature of human collective behavior. This lack of effectiveness is a consequence of the
fact that it does not directly address aggression and self-sufficiency as the basis for the
conundrum. For, even if we manage to successfully agree on division of territories, the
centripetal and centrifugal forces of human nature would re-emerge and the pattern of
union and breakdown would continue.
If an artificial splitting of nation states would not bring us Khor’s “good balance,”
there must be another way to address this tension inherent in the way human beings
organize themselves collectively. Once again, we must turn to The Breakdown of Nations
as a stepping-stone to find a concrete solution for this seemingly millenary problem.
After his extensive description of the current state of affairs regarding nations states,
Khor elaborates a harmonious proposition that makes the good balance an attainable
reality. In fact, he acknowledges the impracticalities of unilateral political division of
nation states. Instead, he focuses on the economic sphere of political. He defines “the
purpose of economic activity not [as] the increase in production but the satisfaction of
human wants” (Khor, 106). Based on this premise of self-sufficiency, the case for small
units avoids inflationary pressure; growth in size requires greater aggregate efforts to
sustain it, which is what we observe in Lenin’s imperialism. On the other hand, Venice
24. avoided such type of problems as self-sufficiency was easily achieved due to the low
requirements from its smallness.
Given all this considerations, Khor argues that the answers are not in the direct
political realm but in “the restoration of a small-cell economic system” (Khor, 117). This
“small-cell pattern does not necessarily mean a small-state pattern, [nor] the destruction
of all existing kinds of economic unity” (Khor, 126). Thus, he does not argue for a
worldwide reorganization of political barriers but the organization of states into more
efficient federations of small-cell economic units separated by boundaries. These
boundaries would be permeable enough to concurrently allow for competition and
exchange among them and the dispersion of economic capabilities in a manner that
eliminates the inherent centralization of economic power within the territories of nation
states (Khor, 150). In addition, he argues that the same small-cell structure could be
transported to supranational state arrangements (Khor, 147).
In other words, the maps of Europe and the other continents would not need to
change. In turn, the pursue of economic self-sufficiency would be a question left to
smaller units and not to the central organ of the states. In this manner, the size of
economic power would be dispersed into this federation of “cells.” Henceforth, the limits
of aggression would be established through a self-balancing system that has every
economic unit in the world checking upon each other. On the other hand, central organs
of national states would preserve their territorial existence and prevent a potential
absorption of “somewhat homogenous” cells into bigger ones that would trigger the “fear
of the others” and set in motion the natural dynamic of collective human arrangements.
Moreover, this scheme would need to consider the fact that the federal power should still
25. be stronger than any individual cell. The cells need not be all the same in terms of
economic power and can realistically not be equal in terms of endowments. Yet, the
arrangement should be such that it allows for “superiority of federal power over its
strongest unit” (Khor, 135). In this manner, the competition among the cells maintains a
check in the system in addition to the coordinating role of the federal supervising national
state organ. Moreover, the efficient low threshold to maintain self-sufficiency from the
small size of economic units would make the system easier to maintain. In this manner,
Khor configures a reasonable solution for the tensions so far discussed.
Holy Roman Empire: Khor’s Mixed Blessing
Realistically, Khor’s proposal would need a long period of adjustment and the
planning would have to be revisited to ensure its durability until the system would
become self-sustaining, if it ever does. The question of feasibility of Khor’s vision
escapes the analysis of this paper, yet it still deserves closer attention. As a matter of fact,
his proposal sounds similar to what the European Union has tried to achieve. The EU is
fundamentally a supranational federation of sates that maintain political sovereignty but
allow for economic permeability through national borders within its members. It does not
formally establish well-defined economic cells but approximates Khor’s proposal enough
to be worthy of consideration. However, the EU does not fully meet Khor’s criteria, as
Germany and other large states (i.e. France, UK, etc.) still have enough power as
independent units to act based on self-interest. In other words, the enforcement
mechanism existing in the EU does not allow for the supranational institutions to provide
26. a strong enough check that secures a self-sustaining environment. Nonetheless, there is
another historical European collective arrangement that approaches Khor’s ideal much
more: the Holy Roman Empire (HRE).
The Holy Roman Empire might have not been hugely powerful politically or
militarily, but it was a loose federation uniting, in a single framework, most German and
Italian states, and lasting for the fantastic period of a thousand years (Khor, 138). In fact,
it was even more diverse than the EU, as it was composed of 180 autonomous secular and
136 ecclesiastical fiefs, and 83 imperial cities (some of them republics) (The Economist,
2). The diversity of the empire caused it to allow for the creation of special rules to
facilitate its governing. For instance, in matters of religion, a Catholic council and a
Protestant counterpart would have to reach an agreement; while in matters of voting, it
was weighted in terms of the size of the individual territorial units through unanimities
and qualified majorities. Moreover, the same EU principal of subsidiarity was followed in
the empire: most issues were handled in villages, the lowest existing jurisdictions (The
Economist, 4). Yet, this system that allowed for federal supervision over small
autonomous political units began its decay when “In the mid-18th century two members,
Austria and Brandenburg-Prussia, outgrew the empire, reducing the other territories to a
third Germany. “ [This was not troubling while Prussia] cooperated with Austria, as
Germany and France have done in the EU, [because] the duo maintained order” (The
Economist, 6).
Yet, when Prussia started a race against Austria for greater economic resources
and political power, it started putting its interest above the empire. This became the
27. beginning of the end of the Holy Roman Empire. The key strength and lesson from the
empire is summarized by Khor: “Like every political organism, it was besieged by
thousands of frictions and problems [...] but none of these ever outgrew the small power
of its central government” (Khor, 139). This is a key finding that supports Khor’s
proposition outlined a priori. However, it also represents a warning for its theory: if the
HRE is the closest fit to his proposal, but it eventually also succumbed to the natural
forces of aggression and “fear of the others,” then there must be something missing in
both the historical example and Khor’s alleged solution.
Scotland: Extending Khor’s Proposal
Given that the Holy Roman Empire is the closest existing historical example to
Khor’s plan, we could conclude that there is no certain answer. However, it might be
necessary to shift our focus towards a more realistic and current example of the dynamics
so far considered. One of the most useful case studies one could select is the case of the
Scotland. The key question to be answered here is why, after, hundreds of years of union,
Scotland has only now formulating a strong proposal for independence in the form of the
2014 Scottish referendum on independence. The value of this case is that it brings
together the literature in Lenin, Khor, Venice and the Holy Roman Empire. Before
analyzing the case in question, it is prudent to see how it related to our discussion so far.
In terms of Khor, Scotland constitutes a prime example of the absorption of
smaller units into larger ones. Besides the smaller tribes that originated in what now is
Scotland, the kingdom of Scotland was conquered and absorbed into the greater political
united known as the United Kingdom (Khor, 143). In order to simplify our logic, we
28. could focus on the Scottish as if it were an indivisible unit (like Venice), for there seems
to be enough national uniformity within the state to call for a single Scottish nation
within the jurisdiction of the Government of Scotland. If we advance this premise, we can
also justify the fact that the government, in 1950 demanded the greater unit of the United
Kingdom its own parliament in Edinburgh so as to push for greater autonomy from the
central national state organ in Westminster. In other words, Scotland is a case of a
smaller nation conquered by a greater one (the English one) to constitute a nation state.
Moreover, this pattern fits in with the conceptualization of Lenin regarding national
oppression. England has always been the greater nation of the union and has been
perceived (by many Scottish pro-independent people) to practice subordination regarding
the interests of the other 3 nations within the UK (Wee Blue Book, 6). This is supported
by the discrepancy between the way Scotland has voted in the last century and the UK
governments that have been selected. In the grand picture, Scotland usually votes for the
Labour party in UK elections while England usually votes Conservative. Despite this
pattern of voting in Scotland, the UK government selected usually follows English
national vote (Conservative) (Vale, 1). Henceforth, Lenin would argue that Scotland is
being an oppressed nation while England is the oppressing actor within the British union.
Given this dynamics within the union, Khor may be right at affirming that “there
is no ‘Great British’ nation in Great Britain [but autochthonous nations such as] the
English, Scots, Irish, Cornish, Welsh, and the islanders of Man” (Khor, 152). Moreover,
we see the binary structure of inherent self-sustaining and aggressive tendencies in the
history of the UK. Therefore, we could just solve the problem of oppression by
incorporating the principle of regional autonomy similar to that granted to the smaller
29. units in the Holy Roman Empire. This solution would entail reforming the UK
institutions while it maintains its political physical appearance. Nonetheless, following
the HRE institutional formula would then lead to the same fundamental problem that
Venice and the HRE saw with its institutions: they eventually succumbed to external
pressures. It may be that collective organizations share this problem of perpetual chaos,
as defined by Khor. Yet, ordering through constant change might be the start of the
answer to a less chaotically dynamic system of collective human arrangements. On the
one hand, it is clear that the model of Venice is not applicable to Scotland in a
straightforward fashion. On the other hand, the HRE experience sheds some light on the
fact that such an arrangement is unfeasible within the UK because England is too
powerful to be controlled.
Given all this, it is clear that history cannot provide us with a common
understanding of how to survive the test of time. Furthermore, we have not reached a
concise understanding of how to achieve a “good equilibrium” that settles the question of
self-sufficiency and aggression embedded in the Size Theory of Social Misery. Hence,
the theories and historical surveys developed in this essay have not shown us what to do,
but it has certainly shown what not to do. It is prudent to then focus on Scotland and see
if there is some value in the claim for independence. For, the 2014 referendum is an
expression of discontent with the current state of affairs. However, one should consider
that the territory of the HRE is now a multiplicity of countries that include Venice and
many nations within them. Thus, the question of why Scotland is particularly useful
because it may reveal some underlying considerations about the way all these other
territories have organized themselves.
30. The debate over Scottish independence was centred in a nationalist claims.
However, the more contentious issues were economic in nature and reflect a flaw in the
institutional arrangements of the UK. For instance, the claim for independence revolved
around the idea of greater autonomy in the distribution of resources towards national
goals of welfare, education and health and greater control over where the Scottish armed
forces are sent (Edinburgh News, 2). In addition, there were discussions over the control
and use of the North Sea oil revenue and the potential loss of strategic political leverage
in the international stage if Scotland were to leave the union (Vale, 2). Other economic
concerns address the issue of borrowing, which has been so prevalent in the last
economic crisis in Europe: “smaller economies are generally less able to borrow abroad
in straitened circumstances and […] due to forces beyond their control” (Posen, 1).
Namely, the debates over independence were in part due to nationalist feelings but mostly
regarding the advantages and drawbacks in terms of economic self-sufficiency. Hence,
we find that the claims for Scottish independence fundamentally echo the same rhetoric
found in the claims by Lenin and Khor. Thus, it is important to pay attention at the fact
that the real question behind these alleged claims for independence is how to better
distribute resources. In short, we find in the question of self-determination an “embedded
question of institutional arrangements and their effectiveness at accommodating
(economic) demands of subgroups within the jurisdiction of a particular state.”
Given that the question has shifted towards the importance of the distributive
capacity of institutional arrangements, it is prudent to turn our attention to what the
literature has said in terms of provision of public goods before further developing the
question of self-determination and its implications. To begin, “public goods are those
31. provisions by an agent external that internalize the spillovers or control externalities
resulting from economic exchange between private actors” (Warren, 832). This definition
encloses the claims for better health, defence and welfare institutional frameworks in
British Scotland. The provision of such public goods can be done in different manners.
Some authors suggest following the Swiss polycentric task-specific jurisdiction model in
determining the provision of public goods such as education (Hughes, 85). These
jurisdictions escape the territorially established political barriers and are based on
pragmatic approaches that follow population patterns of preference, per capita tax
contribution and necessity (Hughes, 86).
The UK is organized counties, but special jurisdictions for education may not
follow the boundaries of these counties and include portions of one or more concurrently,
in a polycentric manner. This secures the main issue with public goods, which is the
internalization of spillovers to those who contribute to the provision of such services. For
instance, everyone in a Scottish county may pay a tax for education but not everyone gets
the same benefit because some live close by the school or have better facilities. Hence,
special jurisdictions try to differentiate among the levels of contribution and transfer the
spillovers accordingly. This is also known as the scale problem of organization: a larger
unit (county) may not be as effective at providing a public good (education) given its size
and composition. The same could be seen in terms of defence: the SNP proposes a
decrease in military spending given the fact that they are maintaining military missions
that do not bring about the same benefits to Scotland (Edinburgh News, 2).
The abovementioned problem could be solved if institutional arrangements
allowed for autonomy in Scottish military spending. However, the gradual increase in
32. autonomy for Scotland may lead to an eventual institutional arrangement that leaves no
choice but the demise of the union in a way that may also strip the benefits of that same
union. It will become a question of political governing that may neither be pragmatic nor
efficient. In this situation, reversing of the union would not bring about a better outcome.
Yet, a method of evaluation of how to reform these institutions is needed so we can also
escape the historical puzzle of the Size Theory of Social Misery and self-sufficiency
enclosed in the question of Scottish self-determination claims. For this we turn to an
ancient secret that has actually been implicitly present since the beginning of this essay.
This “secret” is the so-called golden rule or the principles of “do unto others as you
would have them so unto you.” Surprisingly, the golden rule will help us understand the
importance of institutional arrangement and why we have such a pattern of development
that led to a system of nation states.
The Golden Institutional Balance Model of State Development
The golden rule is a principle that can be found in all major systems of belief
around the world. Hence, it has a universal applicability that can be useful at discerning
what people may have been doing wrong when designing institutions for collective
frameworks in diverse contexts such as the Republic of Venice, the Holy Roman Empire
or the United Kingdom. In addition, it can help us then understand how claims of self-
determination are actually am embedded question of institutional inefficiency. Vincent
Ostrom has summarized the applicability of the golden rule to self-governing institutions.
This conceptualization will be useful for the purposes of this essay.
33. Vincent Ostrom argues that the golden rule is a “necessary bur not sufficient”
form of evaluating self-governing system in diverse communities (Ostrom, 6). He uses
the golden rule as a method of normative inquiry that enables people to achieve a
community of understanding regarding the rules of community living (Ostrom, 20). It is
defined as a pathway to dialogue between communal groups whereby we take the
perspective of others (Ostrom, 21). He argues that it is a way where we can have self-
governing rather than state governing societies (Ostrom, 25). In addition to the golden
rule, he borrows W.R Ashby’s requisite variety principle by which he states that
polycentric governments should offer enough variety in its institutions to present a degree
of adaptability that can keep up with collective demands (Ostrom, 7). The value of the
principle of requisite variety is incommensurable but it goes beyond the purposes of this
essay. Yet, it is relevant to consider that its value is clearly seen in the case of Venice and
the HRE, as the adaptability of their institutions is an expression of this principle and led
to long-lasting and effective self-governance.
The contributions by Vincent Ostrom cannot be justly described in a few pages,
however his application of the golden rule can help us create a model to evaluate the
following two concrete enigmas: the institutional variation in communal arrangements
throughout history and the variation in claims of national self-determination as an
expression of the institutional evolution questioned in the first enigma. These puzzles can
be modeled in the following manner: 1) we assume self-sufficiency and aggression as
part of human nature (both in individual and collective forms); 2) we suppose a tendency
towards increase in size of collective units through time as a result of human nature in the
manner described in Khor and Lenin; 3) we assume that potential latent institutional
34. tensions exist in those large collective units stemming from the smaller units that
compose it; 4) we infer that these latent tensions contribute to a centrifugal force that
pushes for a breakdown of greater units; 5) we assume a counterforce that brings smaller
bodies together again and create an binary mobility between large and small units; 6) the
smaller units are defined as nations as they give identity and self-sufficiency to the
individual. From this model, there are two important implications. First, the centrifugal
and centripetal forces are a consequence of flawed institutional arrangements in #3 that
lead to a constant search for efficient systems that provide self-sufficiency and a sense of
security against (mass) aggression. Given this, claims of national self-determination will
appear at moments when the institutional designs cannot contain the claims for
rearrangements. However, this constant union and disunion will continue to occur until
we achieve community of understanding regarding the rules of community living. In
other words, until the lesson from the golden rule is fully internalized into the
construction or reform of political institutions, we will continue to see territorial
rearrangements and claims for independence or conquest.
This model does not provide a particular blue print for institutional arrangements
or reforms in cases like Scotland and the UK. Yet, it provides a starting point of inquiry
that may explain why we see claims of independence in Scotland but not in Venice or
Bavaria. The case of Scotland crystallizes the economic question that rests on the authors
included in this analysis. However, Ostrom hints at the fact that the problems that stem
from the human nature seen in Lenin and Khor are not completely irresolvable. It is not a
question of changing human nature, as that task is self-defeating. However, the idea of
“doing unto other as we would have them do unto us,” can be a way through which
35. individuals can pragmatically analyze the current state of communal institutions. One
example of this is the special task-based jurisdictions that do not follow arbitrary political
boundaries.
However, the value of the golden rule is not in the “what” but in the “how”. For,
one can be pragmatic as to how to arrange defense spending in Scotland. However, if the
UK government does not puts itself on the Scottish side and understands its demands
from their perspective (and vice versa), the tensions of union and disunion will keep its
course. The golden rule eventually claims it is not a question of abstract state organs. It is
a question of individual initiative. The theories by Khor and Lenin do not highlight
enough the role of individuals. These theories use abstract conceptions of nations and
states. Yet, they seem to forget that at the core lays the individual. The historical pattern
they describe for nation states, the HRE or even Venice, are a testament of how little
attention we have paid to the application of the golden rule unto individual behavior and
its consequences to communal arrangements.
The historical path we have seen in the theories so far discussed may suggest that
political scientists and policy-makers have forgotten the power of the golden rule. The
“fear of the other” stems from a lack of understanding of core human problems. If the
English had understood that before conquering what now is the UK, maybe a less
oppressive path (based on the Size Theory of Social Misery principles) could have been
followed. And perhaps today, Scotland and Europe would look more like what Khor
proposes. We cannot turn back in time. Yet, we could use the six assumptions of the
model for state development to understand the problematic discussed in the previous
36. section but also use the golden rule to change the historically cyclical pattern of human
collective forms of organization between union and disunion.
Conclusion
The fundamental purpose of this essay has been to demonstrate how a singular
issue as Scottish national self-determination is connected to claims of institutional
inconsistencies that find their origins hundreds of years ago. These inconsistencies find
their origin in the inherently binary human necessities of self-sufficiency and protection
from aggression. This simple characterization of human nature has led to the emergence
of centrifugal and centripetal forces that aggregate smaller units into larger ones but also
disaggregate them back subsequently. This tension has been observed in cases like
Venice, the Holy Roman Empire and Scotland. The variety of communal and state
institutional arrangements found in these three cases hint at the universality of the
problem, which is captured by the Golden Institutional Balance Model. This model
applies the golden rule in the way V. Ostrom has, and tries to provide guidance to
policymakers when problems related to the scale political units arise.
37. References
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http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/ch01.htm on
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2. Vladimir Ilych Lenin. 1965. “Imperialism, The Highest Stage of
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4. Yadira Gonzalez de Lara, Avner Greif, and S. Jha. 2008. “The
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