A brief overview of the credit crunch and its context in terms of cost using data from 1830-2014. Real estate is included using price data from 400 back and the dutch to propose real estate is a positional good prone to bubbles as excess credit or incentives are created to pursue it.
2. ThoughtfulCapital
Goals
1. How to think about house prices & value
2. How the proper credit creation process works
& how moral hazards can break it: I get
paid today, risk hits others tomorrow
3. Impacts of the crisis in a historical context
and where we are today
3. ThoughtfulCapital
Disclaimer & Data sources
Disclaimer: This material has been prepared by Thoughtful Capital Group. This
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Data sources: St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, New York Federal Reserve Bank,
BIS (Bank for International Settlements), IMF, World Bank, BEA (Bureau for Economic
Analysis), GOA (Govt. Accounting Office), Thoughtful Capital Group, S&P Case Shiller indeces,
3rd party consultants and sources.
4. ThoughtfulCapital
Housing is a positional good w/ value
normalizing to inflation & income density
Amsterdam home prices 1628–2009 in Real Euros.
Source: Prijsbewegingen op de Woningmarkt Introductie: Harry Boumeester, Harry van der Heijden, Paul de Vries
Onderzoeksinstituut OTB/TUDelft
5. ThoughtfulCapital
Credit creation safety balance
Credit
creation Safety
Risk
Risk
Normal
Broken
Bonus
Competition
ROE
Politics
…
Lending standards
Regulation
Risk exposure
…
System design failures allow
outsized credit creation due to
moral hazards “heads I win,
tails others lose.”
6. ThoughtfulCapital
US “credit creator” machine 2000’s
1. Individual
Home Owners
2. Originator
/Packager/Bank
3. GSEs
Dominant Holder
4. Politicians &
Regulators
5. Society
SupplyenablersDemanddrivers
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Conclusion
“…Title 2 of the Dodd Frank bill
enshrined and institutionalized those
bailouts while pretending to get rid of
them.”
p 502 Fragile by Design; Charles Calomiris &
Stephen H. Haber
12. ThoughtfulCapital
Appendix slides
• 20 Yrs. of flat incomes: Normalized incomes
are low to negative to middle and lower class
at 1995 levels
• 10 Yrs. rates at near record lows 1870-2014
• 10 Yrs. real rates are low
17. ThoughtfulCapital
Scenario game:
Shock Brittle bits Policy Responses
• Japanese deflation /
inflation whipsaw
• China slowdown >credit
crash>housing
bust>social unrest
• France credit
• Canada housing credit
bubble
• US domestic deflation
increasing debt service
burden
• Large hacking attack
• Other political or
economic risks…
• Synthetic ETFs & swaps
collateral
• Public & private pension
funds
• Lower income housing
clients
• Municipal Govt. debt
service
• Domestic hard & soft
infrastructure
• Swaps for liquidity
responses
• Negative nominal rates
• Increase in Fed Asset
purchases
• Muni bailouts
• Pension bailouts
• Homeowner bailouts
• Student debt bailouts
Hinweis der Redaktion
Goals share the following information
Aquarelle peinte par Léon Morel-Fatio représentant la capture de la flotte Hollandaise au Helder le 23 Janvier 1795 Capture of the Dutch fleet at Den Helder
Napolean’s capture of Amsterday in 1795. Didn’t disrupt housing prices as much as the kredit crisis.
The French Army captured 14 ships of the line and 880 guns. It is the only time in known military history to have seen a fleet captured by a cavalry charge
Many misunderstandings
Heads I win tails someone else may lose
Lesson #1 housing is a positional not an absolute good. If you have create more money to chase house price it will push it up, but house values revert to an household income multiple.
This chart is shown to illustrate the point globally as most of you will have seen the Case Shiller data.
Inflation in the 19th century 0.7% 20th century 5.0% reinhardt rogoff.
Prijsbewegingen op de Woningmarkt
Introductie
Harry Boumeester, Harry van der Heijden, Paul de Vries
Onderzoeksinstituut OTB/TUDelft
Enabling entities and forces are on the left with restricting and governance forces on the right.
Tension between stable and abundant credit….. Fragile by design.
Moral hazard involves externalities….someone else holding the bag.
Concentration and instability aren’t necessarily linked linearly. Study of 69 countries 1980-97. less crisis with concentration however competition needs to be in place. Beck, demirguc-Kunt and levin e 2006 from fragile by design. The US however didn’t become more stable in the 1990-2000 period during concentration due to the political bank game involving CRA mandates traded for mergers. Designed to Fail p. 485.
Lets take a look at the The credit creation process of 2000’s.
Roughly speaking it has 3 elements that act demands drivers and
2 elements that supply enablers of credit liabilities
Home owners want a home in 2006 46% of first time buyers 0 down. Median down payment 2% pinto(2011) from fragile by design p. 19
Originators underwrite mortgages to make a buck. Ratings agencies were outsourced credit verifiers from the govt with a quasi monopoly structure. Private revenue/ public risk. NRSRO written into standards.
Gse standards applied to everyone. Regulatory merger process in 1990 meant cra compliance quid pro quo. Low Gse standards are a hidden tax that shows up later.
For the US so far it hasn’t been too bad.
38 recessions are shown. 12 are associated with banking crisis. Recessions are like busses, they come along every 4.7 years. Banking crises every 15 years.
Between 1970-2011 the average countries banking crisis csot %6.2 of gdp, the resolution was 6.8% the increase in indebtedness was 12.1% Median lost output was 23% of GDP. Current forgone growth 31% of GDP Laeven and valencia 2012. equivelant to $5.8 trillion.
This doesn’t mean this is the “only cost”, lost growth is estimated at 31% of GDP so far. The total cost is TBD in terms of mal-formed regulation and other distortions.
Good regulation, is simple, transparent, cheap and effective. Short term pursuit of abundant credit leads to instability and less credit in the long run.
Home owners want a home
Originators underwrite mortgages to make a buck
Dodd frank liquidation title unlikely. Little help. Liviing will 2 yrs later 11 of 11 rejected as impractical.
Regulatory feeding frenzy saw the FED, FDIC, SEC, CFTC etc. all fighting for new powers and oversight, emergence with bewildering levels of new acronyms, filing and paperwork. The same group that didn’t see it coming last time.
Shifting losses onto taxpayers has increased costs. The literature shows deposit insurnace and other garuntees accelerate chances of systemic failures and costs. Since 1945 developed countires have become far more leveraged. Fragile by design. Studies also indicate deposit insurance post crisis is more pooly implemented leading to greater crises. 44k today 1934=$2,500 now unlimited.
Fragile by design. P 461. deposit insurance and bailouts tend to create instability. Canada has never had a banking insolvency crisis. Most of it history no deposit insurance. Only started in 1967. canada $357k median home price $76k 4:61. $1.87 trillin GDP. Close to india and australia. China 60^2m * $1,742= $104,000 / $10,220
Home prices are still far above normal prices. This impinges the stability of real-estate assets, depresses bank ROE’s due to increased collatoral requirements, and raises the costs and risks for new housing entrants and lower income families.
The US averages a recession every 4.7 years and a bank crisis every 15 years. We have had the perfect “dream” deleveraging for 5 years,
4 out of 4: low inflation, strongish currency, low interest rates and growing economy.
For now debt service is feasible and GDP is expanding. Both of these have been significantly boosted by QE pushing interest rates down. So far a miracle appears to have occurred. Rates are low, credit is plentiful, inflation is low and GDP is expanding while un-employement is falling, a truly remarkable outcome.
The question is who and when do we pay the billl? Inflation tax, skipped GDP of %31 which is just about the same cost as WWII. In present dollars Social security is estimated to be $8.6 trillion short. Medicare cost $580 billion in 2013. Social security costs $813 billion
1995How Much things cost in 1995
Yearly Inflation Rate USA 2.81% Year End Close Dow Jones Industrial Average 5117 Interest Rates Year End Federal Reserve 8.50% Average Cost of new house $113,150.00 Average Income per year $35,900.00 Average Monthly Rent $550.00 Cost of a gallon of Gas $1.09 US Postage Stamp 32 cents Average cost of new car $15,500.00 Loaf of Bread $2.02 Ground Coffee per IB$4.07 Loaf of Bread $1.15 Dozen Eggs 87 cents . Windows 95 was released.
Real Rates have bounced back a bit.
We can’t events, much less there direct impacts on things or our responses.