An Independent Catalonia Within the EU (IT In Transit #23)

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An independent Catalonia within the EU issue #23 - January 2013
EDITORIAL

Democracy and pragmatism.
An independent Catalonia within the EU.
Josep Maria Vilajosana. Professor of Legal Philosophy and Dean of Pompeu Fabra University’s Law School.

Would an independent Catalonia be inevitably excluded from the EU?
From a legal point of view, the first observation to make is that there is no
international or EU law which explicitly deals with this question. Those
who would answer the above question in the affirmative cite articles 4.2
and 49 of the EU Treaty. However, is such a position a secure one? It is
not, and I shall explain why this is the case.
Art. 4.2. states: ‘The Union shall respect their essential State functions [of
member states] including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State’.
Some claim that this provision prevents the acceptance of any new state
that had declared independence unilaterally, since this would affect the
maintenance of the territorial integrity of member states. Nevertheless,
those who make this claim forget that the purpose of this rule is to avoid
the interference of European institutions in the exercise of the functions
of the states in order to ensure their territorial integrity. Therefore, if a
new state (Catalonia) effectively came into existence, this rule would no longer apply. To put it another way,
when Art. 4.2. speaks of territorial integrity it refers to the integrity in response to outside interference in the
state, especially the EU, rather than changes produced internally.
As for Art. 49, concerning new applications for entry into the EU, those who cite it assume it is applicable to
the case of Catalonia. However, one needs to keep in mind that this article governs the entry of a new state, to
regulate the process and ensure that all those concerned adapt to the new situation. However, is this the case
of Catalonia? It is totally unreasonable to apply the procedure governing newly-joining members outlined in
Art. 49 to an area where European Union law has been in force since 1986 and where Europeans are living with
the rights and obligations they have acquired. It therefore appears that the true intention of those that appeal
to this article is to use it as a threat, either of a refusal to membership or the lengthy waiting period that a new
state would supposedly spend outside the EU.
At this point, however, we ought to stop for a moment. Is it inevitable that the Spanish state will exercise the
veto as has been forecast? There is a very important issue that is often overlooked. An initial step is required,
prior to initiating the process that is decided by a unanimous vote covered in Art. 49: deciding whether the
mechanism is in fact to be used. Next the question is who will decide the implementation of the mechanism,
what the procedure will be and with what criteria?
The most reasonable approach is for the European Council to make the decision. But if this is the case, it should
be noted that this preliminary decision does not longer require the unanimous vote of all members, but rather
a consensus (Art. 15.4), the facilitation of which being one of the functions of the president (Art. 15. 6. b.). A
consensus, as opposed to a unanimous decision, is not simply a voting mechanism, but rather a cooperative
process, whose purpose is to work together in good faith in seeking solutions which are beneficial for the group.
And what are the criteria that ought to come into play to achieve this consensus? I believe they can be divided
into two types: key criteria and other more pragmatic in nature.
Regarding the key criteria, it is worth recalling the values that underpin the EU as listed in Art. 2: ‘the values of
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy [ ... ] including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’.
These values must be respected by both the EU and the member states in their respective activities. Therefore,
the refusal of a member state to hold a referendum to decide the independence of a territory or fail to respond
to the unequivocal will of the majority of citizens in a territory could be seen, in the light of these international
standards, as a violation of these principles and a lack of protection of the rights mentioned above. In addition,
depending on how the infraction were to occur, the application of the control mechanism and penalties outlined
in Art. 7 cannot be ruled out.
What do these principles mean? Sticking to the principle of freedom implies being sensitive to the life plans
that each person has freely chosen. Respecting the rights of minorities, involves not permanently exploiting
a set of individuals on the grounds that they constitute a minority. This is what would happen, for example,
if a territorial minority such as the Catalans were denied any chance of deciding their political future as a
group, for the simple fact that they are a minority within Spain. Finally, appreciating human dignity requires
the state to take seriously the expressions of free will made by its adult citizens. In short, if adults believe for
whatever reason it is extremely important for them to democratically decide their collective political future,
their will should be taken into consideration. Otherwise, they would become a minority which is permanently
dominated or treated with unjustified paternalism, which is unbecoming of a democratic regime. Democracy
is based on the principle of the majority, but it is contrary to domination by the majority.
The pragmatic reasons, in turn, have to do with the predictable social, legal, political and economic consequences
the decision would have, for the EU itself as well as for its citizens and the businesses of its member states.
The fact is that throughout its history the EU has been very careful when searching for creative solutions
to deal with situations not covered by the Treaties. For example, consider the successful solutions it found
in cases such as the expansion of Germany, Greenland’s exit or Cyprus’ territorial peculiarities. Despite all
the differences between these various instances, and the Catalan case in turn, they all have two features in
common: they were not specifically regulated and were solved considering the mutual benefit of both the EU
and its member states. In the event that the EU’s decision was absolute exclusion, the economic and social

interests of the member states and the new state could be negatively affected. It is a problem that could be
solved by adopting a pragmatic solution that avoided rupture between the EU and the new state, assuming,
of course, the state fulfilled all the requirements to become a member state and that it applied to form a part.
It therefore seems likely that for both profound and pragmatic reasons, a consensus will be reached in order
to create an ad hoc procedure which does not harm the EU and which does not allow the possibility of a veto,
the only justification for which would be spite or revenge.
Does this mean that we would go from a possible negative to Catalonia’s entry into the EU to automatic
membership? It is likely that the latter possibility is somewhat unrealistic unless there was an agreed
secession process with Spain and if Catalonia was allowed to simultaneously negotiate with the EU. The most
likely scenario is a temporary solution that facilitates the implementation of EU law in the new state, while
the laws that allow the adaptation to the new situation by the said state and the predecessor state remain
unchanged. This has been the understanding of individuals such as the German political scientist Kai-Olaf
Lang, when he suggested that the EU could apply the Cyprus model, but in reverse, in order that European
Community legislation remains in force in the Catalan territory although the Catalan state is outside the
European institutions for as long as the accession process lasts.
Image by Elvallenc.cat


FURTHER READING

Is Catalonia to be expelled from the EU?
Ramon Tremosa. CDC MEP.

The most important factor would be remaining part
of the European Economic Area, and Spain would be
powerless to prevent it.
Last Tuesday El Periódico newspaper printed a response from
the European Commission (EC) to my parliamentary question.
The EC finally replied in the manner the PP and PSOE have
wanted them to for some time now: ‘If part of a country
becomes a new independent state it would be dealt with as a
separate country and any treaties cease to be applicable’. Let’s
examine the issue a little more closely.
The EC has given me different answers to my questions on
this issue. On 12th November 2012: ‘It is not down to the EC
to adopt a position on matters relating to the internal organization of its member states’. 23rd February 2013:
‘The conditions of EU treaties are decided by the member states’. Is its most recent response due to mounting
political pressure and the fact that some commissioners end their terms at the next European elections?
It is the responsibility of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg and not the EC to interpret EU treaties. Indeed,
if Catalonia were to be expelled from the EU, the International Court of Justice in The Hague would have the
final say in the event of such a unilateral separation. Its recent ruling on Kosovo was not exactly favourable to
Spain, however. The PP and PSOE have also faired badly in the European Parliament (EP), having decisively
lost several votes when they attempted to block Kosovo’s entry to the EU. They were also defeated in a vote on
the single European patent, the central crossing of the Aragonese Pyrenees and the Parot Doctrine.
Leaving the EU would be as a long a process as the entry process: Brussels says that if Britain votes to leave the
EU in 2015 negotiations will last years and that the EU will try to ensure that any country leaving retains as
many of the Community’s laws as possible.
Scotland is not Turkey. The above reinforces the idea that an independent Catalonia would have enough time
to renegotiate its reinstatement in the EU from within. So says the Honorary Director General of the European
Commission, Graham Avery, in an article published on the British Parliament website: an independent
Scotland would negotiate its rapid reintegration into the EU from within. Avery defends a fast-track approach,
ruling out Spain’s vision of Scotland having to join the queue behind Turkey. The Economist, the world’s most
influential financial magazine, itself not a supporter of the Scottish referendum, states in an article on Scotland
(3rd November 2012) that ‘a Spain which is increasingly indebted and dependent on money from the ECB will
be unable to veto anyone in the EU’.
The EU is still a small union of states, far removed from a federal Europe, with an annual budget only four
times larger than that of the Government of Catalonia (130,000 million, 0.8% of the EU-28’s GDP). Within
the EU, Spain holds the record for defaults and poorly applying EU regulations, with hundreds of legal cases
pending for illegal state subsidies. Madrid constantly refers to the rule of law and its strict adherence, yet has
repeatedly shown it is not exactly a shining example itself.
It is far more important for Catalonia to continue participating within the single European market and the
European Economic Area (EEA), which guarantees the free movement of people, goods and capital and which
is the real source of progress and wealth in Europe. This was the great European success story of the twentieth
century, which is now mimicked by many other continents with similar free-trade movements. Switzerland,
Norway and Andorra, which are non-EU members, have signed agreements with the EU in order to be part of
this space.
If Catalonia were to be expelled from the EU, the latter has the exclusive right to negotiate agreements relating
to the EEA and since the last Lisbon Treaty such decisions no longer need to be approved unanimously: Article
207 states that they can be agreed upon by a qualified majority of countries (two-thirds) together with the
agreement of the European Parliament.
Spain does not have the right or ability to single-handedly veto Catalonia’s efforts to remain in the EEA, an
area which is home to 500 million people: Spain is unable to mobilise a blocking minority in the EU (one-third)
to expel Catalonia from the EEA: Catalonia is home to more than 4,000 European multinationals that would
never allow Spain to expel it from the EEA.
Leadership within the EU is not down to a country’s size, but rather good practices it can offer other member
states. For this reason, some small countries are leaders while other large countries are not. According to
a devastating article by Professor Ignacio Molina in the Madrid-based Fundación Elcano’s magazine (13th
March 2013), Spain’s reputation stands at an all-time low within the EU. The PP and the PSOE would do well
to negotiate with Catalonia as Cameron has done with Scotland. As The Economist (22nd December 2012)
stated, ‘With the outlook so grim, it is no surprise that Catalan politicians talk seriously of secession’.
First published in El Periódico


FURTHER READING

The future of an independent Catalonia and the EU
Aleix Sarri. Vilaweb.

Europe is not likely to be a problem for an independent
Catalonia. Neither is Europe however, going to be an
accelerator element of the process. With this premise clear,
Catalonia has a long way to go before calling itself a new
state on the International Community -as was demanded
in the historic demonstration on 11 September 2012. A
calmed analysis of the situation shows that there are solid
reasons to believe that, when the time comes, the solution
shall be political: there is a range of possibilities to achieve
full sovereignty without sacrificing the Europeanism which
has been the cornerstone for Catalans.
History and jurisprudence are the best antidote against
apocalyptic discourses that are only intended to restrain
the democratic exercise of citizenship by Catalans. For
economic and democratic reasons -backbone of the EU- the northern European powers will not be in any case
a brake for the Catalan process.
1. The EU remains neutral on the independence of Catalonia
At least in theory, the European Commission -the government of the EU composed of 28 Member States- is
neutral on the Catalan process, and the details of the procedure for an hypothetical Catalan State to access to
the EU for a hypothetical cannot be known until there is a formal request from one of the current Member
States.
European Commission 12 November 2012 “Concerning certain scenarios such as the separation of one part
of a Member State or the creation of a new State, these would not be neutral as regards the EU Treaties. The
Commission would express its opinion on the legal consequences under EC law, on request from a Member
State detailing a precise scenario.”
As there is no precedent in this regard, journalists and MEPs have asked repeatedly on this issue without much
success. Starting from a diversity of opinions from some of the Commissioners, even contradictory remarks
coming from the same persons, the European Commission has adhered to state that a new state would need
to comply with the standard procedure constitutes acceptance unanimously of other states (including Spain).
Commission February 23, 2012: At the present time, the Commission is not able to express any view on the
specific issue raised by the Honourable Member given that the terms and result of any future referendum are
unknown, as is the nature of the possible future relationships between the parties concerned and between
those parties and European Union partners.
The latest response from the European Commission has been harder in language, but still is not based on
any new case law. It should be emphasized in this sense that it is not clear what would happen to the current
European Citizenship of Catalans citizens who are now also European because of their Spanish nationality.
European Commission’s November 20 “If part of the territory of a Member State would cease to be part of that
state because it was to become a new independent state, the Treaties would no longer apply to that territory.
In other words, a new independent state would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with
respect to the EU and the Treaties would no longer apply on its territory.”
“Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, any European state which respects the principles set out
in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union may apply to become a member of the EU. If the application is
accepted by the Council acting unanimously, an agreement is then negotiated between the applicant state and
the Member States on the conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties which such admission
entails. This agreement is subject to ratification by all Member States and the applicant state.”
It has to be seen whether this political interpretation of EU treaties remains the same after the elections in 2014,
the election of a new President of the European Commission and a boom from Eurosceptic parties, which may
further fragment the EU Parliament. You also need to look at a significant detail: many European politicians
think about what would happen to an independent Catalonia in the EU context, but few of them spoke publicly
against independence itself or its right to hold a referendum. Some even have stepped forward, as the European
liberal Party – third group of the euro-chamber, who its leaders have already publicly supported the right of the
Catalans to decide their own future.
2. Judgment of the International Court
With regard to international law, it is clear that independence is a standard procedure in a world that has
passed from 61 independent states in 1914 to 206 today.
But it is worth reviewing a few fragments of the judgment of 22 July 2010 from the International Court of
Justice in Den Hague:
“The Court notes that the Security Council has condemned certain declarations of independence ... The illegality
of these declarations of independence, not from its unilateral nature, but the fact that they were connected to

the illegal use of force or other violations of general rules of international law binding “
“The practice of States in this period (XVIII, XIX and XX ) clearly points to the conclusion that international
law contains no prohibition on declarations of independence “
Thus, it seems clear that Catalonia does not commit an illegal act with independence, since it will not use force
or act against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This is a significant fact in the face of the possible
recognition of other states, a key element for the consolidation of the future Catalan state.
3. Catalonia, a southern Norway?
Should the EU keep the rule of unanimity for accession, Spain, alone or with other allied states might use
its veto power to prevent the re- entry of Catalonia in the EU. However, if there is a significant number of
European states that have recognized the independence of Catalonia, the Catalan State may be maintained
within the single market through a free trade agreement with the European Commission concluded ad hoc.
To join the European Economic Area it is needed only a qualified majority of the Council (2/3 of the votes
among Member States) (Article 207 of the Lisbon Treaty) and the consent of the European Parliament. Spain
therefore has no right of veto to prevent Catalonia of continuing to sell its products to a market of 500 million
people.
The only inconvenience of this scenario is that to enjoy access to the single market, Catalonia should continue
implementing the dozens of directives adopted annually by the EU without having on them much greater
political influence than any other lobby outside the institutions.
4. Re-accession into the EU
This scenario is the one that the European Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso, has more than once
pointed out: Catalonia, having declared independence, should follow the normal process of accession by the
Copenhagen criteria, comply with all EU legislation to create a government with European standards and to
achieve unanimous support among the EU Member States.
In a study by the British Parliament, it was considered this scenario as the most likely for Scotland, and added
that the process of re- accession would take several months or even a bit more than a year, but in any case
made clear that Scotland is not Turkey, its citizens are EU citizens and therefore the re-accession process
should be simple.
In this scenario Catalonia would participate as a full member of the EU, with a Commissioner, 16 MEPs and
the same rights as the other Member States of the European Council. Catalonia should show solidarity to the
rest of the EU, taking the expense of Finland as a good indicator it would be about 693 million annual as net
contribution to the EU.
The main drawback is that Spain would use its veto power. Without ruling out a change in the Treaties that
ends with the unanimity rule, it has to be seen how far may get the political pressure of the Council to prevent
a breakup of the EU.
The Catalan government will always have the option of bringing the case before the Luxembourg Court to
request an interpretation of the Treaties that respects the status of Catalan citizens as European Citizens.
5. Will the EU make a political pirouette to accommodate Catalonia?
The possible departure of Britain from the EU can make that the next Treaty reform should include the possibility
to allow some intermediate EU membership so the British can continue in without many obligations. The
EU association agreement with Kosovo is already showing that European integration can be very fast when
needed. As Professor Ivan Serrano says in his book ‘From the Nation to the State’: “something interesting
to note in the context that is generated after the Kosovo case is that international law does not necessarily
protect the territorial integrity of states due to a process of unilateral secession, provided they do not violate
rules explicitly included in the international order.” The example of Turkish Cyprus also demonstrates that EU
knows how to look for creative solutions.
And thus, we should not be too fast into jumping to conclusions. According to documents made public
by Scotland, a country takes on average 16 months after the holding of the referendum that legitimizes
independence until his proclamation. This period will open a window of opportunity for Catalonia to negotiate
its relationship with the EU.
Also it gives enough time for the EU to develop a strategy that avoids the geopolitical and economic disaster
that would mean to lose Catalonia, a strategic crossing point for goods with a considerable economic weight
(similar to Portugal and Finland) and a high capacity for internationalization.
While being unknown what will be the legal pirouette that the EU will use to solve the Catalan case, Catalans
should not be afraid because, at least maintaining its presence in the single market should be assured.
With political independence and participation in the European Economic Area, the benefits for Catalonia
of having its own state already would be much larger than the costs of continuing to be part of Spain. The
determination of Catalans to achieve an independent state will be the best negotiating tool with an EU that
always adapts to reality. Europe will not be an enthusiastic part of the process but will neither be a brake for it,
for democratic and pragmatic reasons.

First published in Vilaweb
Image by Vilaweb


FURTHER READING

After Scotland, another European breakaway?
Catherine Boyle. CNBC 13/12/2013

You can read the article “After Scotland, another
European breakaway?”, by Catherine Boyle, in
this link:
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101270869
The article was published in CNBC
Image by Emilio Morenatti AP Photo in CNBC


OPINION

Yes + Yes
Agustí Colomines. Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Barcelona

The agreement reached by the parties which are committed to the right to
decide is a shrewd move, since it preserves the unity of the majority of Catalan
political forces from the outset. Even the PSC could have joined in if it hadn’t
rushed into the arms of an ultraconservative PSOE. Why exactly shouldn’t we
consult the people about their future? The conservative drift of Spanish and
Catalan socialism is rather troubling. I am one of those who believe that one
thing is the party apparatus and the various municipal posts which unite an
anti-Catalan sentiment which they (inexplicably) feel towards CiU and ERC,
and quite another the socialist voters, who are pro-Catalan simply for the fact
that they are Catalan. The lack of emotional intelligence among socialist leaders
has also been demonstrated of late in that they decided to hold a gathering
of socialist municipal appointees in Plaça Sant Jaume precisely when the
historic agreement was being announced. It is the first time in years that the
PSC has been excluded from the Catalan consensus. They have marginalised
themselves because, as I explained in an earlier post, the PSC has reverted to the time of Antoni Fabra i Ribas,
the leader of the Catalan Federation of the PSOE at the start of the twentieth century. It remains to be seen
what will happen, since there is still a year ahead in which to adjust positions. That’s a long time in politics.
The double question which has been agreed upon, allows those who are pro-federalism and those who are proindependence (as well as those who oppose both options) to vote with the conviction that they are not being
deceived. It is not the first instance of such a formula being employed. In the 2012 non-binding referendum
on the status of Puerto Rico, voters had to decide with a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ on two separate but related questions.
It was the fourth time that Puerto Rico (a Commonwealth of the United States since 1952) had voted on its
sovereignty in a referendum. The first question was the following: ‘Are you in agreement with keeping the
current territorial status?’. The second question read: ‘Which of the following non-territorial options would
you prefer: Statehood, Independence or a Sovereign Commonwealth?’. Perhaps you recall the result: 53.62% of
the voters (out of one million two hundred thousand votes cast) replied ‘No’ to the first question. With regards
to the second question, 62.32% of Puerto Ricans voted in favour of statehood. In other words, they were in
favour of Puerto Rico ceasing to be a Commonwealth dependent on the United States and becoming the 51st
state of the Union. 32.71% chose the option whereby the island would remain a Sovereign Commonwealth
while only 5.2% agreed that Puerto Rico should become a fully independent nation. The plebiscites in 1967,
1993 and 1998 had not even bothered with the possibility of simply joining the US. The history of Puerto Rico
is certainly unusual in this regard, since it was a Spanish colony until 1898 and Spain considered the Puerto
Ricans to be Spanish. From 1917 they were considered to be Americans but they didn’t have the right to vote.
However, Spain’s disappointment at the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines in 1898 at the hands of
the US was even more dramatic than their current reaction to Catalonia’s call for self-determination.
Puerto Rico is not the only instance of a compound question. In 1997, during the referendum on devolution for
Scotland, which took place on an emblematic date for we Catalans, September 11th, the question also consisted
of two parts: the first asked voters whether they agreed with the restoration of a Scottish Parliament (abolished
following the dynastic union of 1707) and the second asked whether they agreed that said parliament should
have powers over the financial control of Scotland. Taxation, in other words. The outcome of the referendum
backed by Tony Blair, a genuine reformer, was ‘Yes – Yes’, since the majority voted in favour of both proposals.
Specifically: 1,775,045 (74.3%) of voters voted in favour of the first question, while 614,400 (25.7%) voters
were opposed to it. The results of the second question were somewhat different: 1,512,889 (63.5%) opted for a
‘yes’ vote and 870,263 (36.5%) for a ‘no’. In response to the majority voting a double ‘yes’ in 1998, the British
Parliament passed the Scotland Act, thereby creating the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive.
Sixteen years later, in 2014, the Scots will return to the polls to decide on a further step in the recovery of their
sovereignty. This time they will be allowed to do so by a conservative British Prime Minister, David Cameron,
currently head of the only party to be against devolution in 1997. Something of a turnaround, no?
The fact that the date chosen to try to hold the referendum is still far off is no bad thing. We need a lot of
time, effort and persuasion to demonstrate that what we are calling for is nothing more than a democratic
right. The Spanish state isn’t making it easy for us. Every day the spiral of verbal violence continues, as do
the apocalyptic warnings. However, as I commented to a hard-liner friend of mine from Madrid, I believe
that people who don’t live in Catalonia have failed to realize the enormous change which Catalan society has
undergone. This change has been so important and so powerful that the traditional, pact-making Catalanist
and Regenerationist Spanish political approach has been blown out of the water. La Vanguardia’s centrist
guru, José Antonio Zarzalejos, recently commented on how surprised he was by the change, in one of his rare
articles not to be devoted to lambasting President Artur Mas. If such an individual, who makes it up as he goes
along or receives distorted accounts from his sources, is beginning to have doubts, it shows that the Catalan
sovereignty movement is indeed gaining ground. Now, we just need to realise that the time has come. The
period that begins today will be hard and rough. We mustn’t fall for their provocations. So far, we have more
or less achieved it. Well done!
First published in “El passat que no passa”
Image: Agustí Colomines. Published in “El passat que no passa”


OPINION

Catalonia moves to a vote
Artur Mas. President of the Generalitat de Catalunya - NEWEUROPE 13/01/2014

Catalonia’s Government and opposition parties, as
mandated by our voters, have together decided to hold a
popular vote on self-determination on 9 November 2014.
Catalans will be asked a two-part question: “Do you want
Catalonia to be a state? If so, do you want Catalonia to be
an independent state?” But why does Catalonia need to take
such a step at this time?
Catalonia is an ancient European nation, bordering the
Pyrenees and the Mediterranean Sea. Our origins can be
found in the Carolingian Empire a thousand years ago
and, ever since, the small country of Catalonia has been at
the junction of two great regional powers, a meeting place
for different peoples, a bridge between Europe and the
Mediterranean. Our language, Catalan, stretches beyond
the administrative borders of Catalonia and is spoken by 9 million Europeans. As a people, we Catalans
have always rooted our identity in culture and international openness. Barcelona, our capital, is a vibrant
Mediterranean metropolis, a major destination for foreign direct investment, a cradle of Gothic and Modernist
architecture and a magnet for many of Europe’s artistic movements of the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries.
Our small nation lost its freedom in 1714 but has kept its identity alive despite dictatorships and large-scale
cultural repression. Spain’s return to democracy in 1978 allowed for recovering some of our autonomy. However,
the Spanish state and governments of all parties constantly try to centralise and to build a homogenous,
Hispanic country. This has convinced many Catalans that only the right of self-determination can guarantee
their political, economic and cultural survival.
From a legal perspective, in 2010 the Spanish Constitutional Court suppressed several fundamental aspects
of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, the basic law which guarantees our self-government and which was
revised in 2006 after an agreement between the Parliament of Catalonia and the Parliament of Spain, as well
as a referendum held in Catalonia. Economically, the Government of Catalonia has been the most efficient in
implementing severe austerity policies that have helped reduce the Spanish budget deficit more than any other
region. In spite of the severe economic crisis across Europe, Catalonia has continued to innovate in technology,
and attract new foreign investment. Culturally speaking, a recent quote from the Spanish Minister of Culture
and Education clearly illustrates the agenda of the central state: “it is in our interest to hispanicise Catalan
children”.
Our self-determination process has been led by our vibrant civil society with massive grassroots support across
Catalonia as evidenced by the 1.5 million citizens who marched through Barcelona on 11 September 2012, our
national day. Again on 11 September 2013, following the example of the Baltic Way of 1989, which opened the
door to recovering the independence of the three Baltic Republics, a 400 km-long human chain was organised
on 11 September - the Catalan national day - across Catalonia from the French border in the north to our
southern limits. Inspired by the civic example of the Baltic peoples, the Catalans called for their right to freely
decide the future of their people, showing Madrid – and the world - that Catalonia will not settle for anything
short of a self-determination referendum, just like the one negotiated by the UK and Scottish governments.
That is why we, Catalonia’s political leaders, have decided to move to the next stage – for our people to freely
choose their own future in November. In twenty-first century Europe, we solve these disputes peacefully and
democratically, with ballot boxes and votes. Madrid should abide by its professed democratic principles and
allow the referendum our people desire.
Let us vote, we say. Let us vote, we ask. Let us vote, we demand.
First published in NEWEUROPE
Photo: AFP PHOTO / REMY GABALDA NEWEUROPE


OPINION

Unities and majorities
Francesc-Marc Álvaro. LA VANGUARDIA. 16/12/2013

The consensus as to the content and date of the referendum on Catalonia’s
future has been welcomed by the sovereignist camp as a small victory for
three reasons: first because it belies the negative predictions made from
both within and without [Catalonia] as to the ability of the political parties
involved to take control of the process; second because it lowers the degree
of mistrust between the leaders involved in the process; and third because
it redirects the debate surrounding the Catalan cause towards democracystagnation instead of keeping it within the independence-unionism
dialectic. This in turn facilitates international pedagogy on sovereignty
and makes Madrid’s task all the more difficult.
That said, we must be realistic and acknowledge that the unity of
democratic action that safeguards the question between pro-independence parties (CDC, ERC and CUP) and
others (Unió and ICV) carries an obvious risk, as Jordi Graupera has pointed out: it complicates the building
of a clear majority at the polls, since a referendum consisting of a question in two parts becomes a query that
is, simultaneously, a referendum on the secession of Catalonia (the ‘independent state’ part) and, incidentally,
an imprecise survey as to how Catalonia should continue within Spain (the ‘state’ part). Moreover, the second
possibility is obviously an issue that will depend on the momentum of the Spanish government rather than
the Catalan government and Catalan political parties. Nonetheless, one of the great virtues of the two-part
question is that makes it very easy for Catalan socialists to sign up to the Right to Decide and to distance
themselves from the positions held by the PP, PSOE and C’s. We will doubtless witness the Catalan socialist
landscape undergoing a rapid transformation.
I am among those who believe that the referendum will actually fail to take place since President Rajoy won’t
allow it and because Mas (in agreement with Junqueras) will avoid such a confrontation in exchange for an
election. Such an election would be a clever way of gauging public support for an independent state, though it
would presumably break the unity surrounding the right to decide which was so evident in Thursday’s photo.
A referendum with a two-part question favours Unió and ICV holding certain positions which would be limited
in an election. What will happen to CiU and Duran? What will the eco-socialist leaders propose?
There is considerable political unity and a substantial social unity in favour of a referendum. Meanwhile, as
it currently stands, the building of an electoral majority in favour of an independent state is not a given and
the option of simply having a state, vaguely federalist in nature without stating it openly, appears to be more
a hypothetical blocking tactic to secession than the construction of a (multi-national) arrangement of Spain.
PSC’s decision to opt out means that federalism is a de facto ‘anti’ vote, rather than a genuine alternative which
competes on an equal footing with the independence option. At present, the supporters of the ‘yes, yes’ vote are
the only ones who are actually putting forward a political alternative. This is to their advantage.

First published in La Vanguardia
Photo published in Francesc-Marc Álvaro’s blog


IN DEPTH

The Tories and the EU, from ‘more or less’ to ‘in or out’
Marc Gafarot - Catalan International View

The European problem has always
been a problem
‘The whole map of Europe has been
changed... but as the deluge subsides and
the waters fall short we see the dreary
steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone
emerging once again’. Thus proclaimed
Winston Churchill in 1922 underlying
the fact that following the carnage and
epoch-defining events of the Great War
the perennial problem of Ireland would
be exactly that, perennial. If we jump
forward 90 years we see that for another
Conservative leader, following a return
to government after 13 years in the
political wilderness, another perennial dilemma has resurfaced to trouble him and cause him the same worries
which beset the premierships of two other Tory Prime Ministers. The perennial question which David Cameron
has been asked to answer is the United Kingdom’s place in and relationship with the European Union.
It is clear that the UK’s relationship with the EU has always been ambivalent. It is a relationship which seeks
to balance national interest with many of those characteristics which make up British exceptionalism. Her
administrative and military history, her political and cultural peculiarities, her ties to the Commonwealth,
the ‘special relationship’ with the US as well as the common law tradition are a few of the facets of the UK
which affect how the European Union is perceived and how its elite have engaged with this unique model of
cooperation among nation states. In contrast to other member states the European Union has never been
viewed by the majority of UK policy makers, nor for that matter by the wider population, as a vehicle for
national renewal. Rather its benefits are always couched in present-day economic and geopolitical terms, not
ideological ones. Opposition to the European Union within the UK (while listing the political, economic and
social effects of membership) is of a more decidedly ideological nature. This is an opposition which has grown,
which has hardened, which is widespread among the population and one that finds some of its most vocal
advocates within the Conservative Party.
The Tories: making Europe and dividing themselves
Things have changed since the days when it was the Conservative Party which called the shots on Europe. It
was Harold Macmillan who made the first overtures to the then EEC in spite of an imperialist rump in his party
as well as opposition from Labour and lukewarm public opinion. The economic rationale and newfound needs
of a post-war UK in decline pointed the way to finally joining the party, albeit in a half-hearted and tardy manner.
This ambivalence married with other aspects of Gallic national selfinterest led to Charles de Gaulle’s veto of
1963. It would take another decade for another Tory, Edward Heath, to sign up to the Common Market. It has
become part of the black legend of the EU, as recounted by Eurosceptics, that Heath lied to the British people
by not explaining the full political and constitutional implications of membership. In truth, he stressed the
economic aspects of membership over and above other considerations. The deal the UK achieved, particularly
relating to the budget and the CAP, was a sub-optimal one primarily as a result of a negotiation strategy which
favoured a quick as possible accession to the exclusion of other factors. Heath’s election defeat in 1974 removed
the most pro-European prime minister the UK has ever had. His successor as party leader, Margaret Thatcher
supported remaining in the EEC in the 1975 referendum that was called by Harold Wilson, the then Labour
Prime Minister, in order to placate and deal with divisions in his own party over the EEC. Following defeat
at the polls in 1979 and with a swing to the left, Labour eventually supported withdrawal from the Common
Market in its 1983 election manifesto. The Conservative administration was thus seen as the ‘European’ party.
However the divisions that had beset Wilson were as nothing compared with what Thatcher and Major were to
encounter and which continue to haunt the current Conservative Prime Minister.
Thatcher’s policy towards Europe would ultimately prove to be one of the major factors in her downfall and
created a bitterness that lasted a generation. Her approach was more complex than legend would have us believe.
The arguments over the budget in the early eighties gave way to clear cooperation over the Single European
Act. She was more than happy to see a market-friendly Europe. It was the spectre of a social, monetary and
political EEC that would cost her many senior ministers, divisions within the cabinet and open warfare in her
ranks. The debates over the ERM and her clashes with Jacques Delors became part of her mythology as was her
‘No, No, No’ to the Commission’s plans for the EEC’s future and what she saw as socialism by the back door.
Her former chancellor and foreign secretary, Geoffrey Howe’s resignation over her European policy in 1990
finally precipitated her ruin. The division between distinct Europhiles and Eurosceptics would also play its part
in derailing the Major administration.
In hindsight John Major played a stroke of genius by negotiating and ratifying the Maastricht treaty, securing
as he did an opt out on the Social Chapter and the single currency. Yet there remained much acrimony among
many MPs due to how it was pushed through parliament. The debacle surrounding the UK’s exit from the
ERM at the end of 1992 only added to the chagrin of the euro malcontents. This group began, with the support
of much of the press, to ridicule Major’s pragmatic ‘wait and see’ policy over the EMU. By 1997 the Major
administration was exhausted by the constant in-fighting and lack of discipline; a new, clean, pro-European

Labour was to take full advantage of the Tory division and destroy them politically.
There was no contrition on the part of those within his party who Major had called the ‘bastards’. This group of
reactionary neo-liberals fanatics had one of the leading roles in the Conservative party’s dance of death, with
anti Europeanism being their favourite tune.
One Nation is dead, long live stupidity
One Nationism is a school of thought which is peculiar to British Conservatism. Its architect, the 19th Century
Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli believed that social division and strife should be avoided and ameliorated
by a concerned patrician class. In the following century many Tories shared a belief in social cohesion, the
role of strong institutions, obligations of classes to one another, reasoned organic change and pragmatism all
anchored to a specifically British view of community. The cataclysm of 1997 saw the removal from the ranks
of MPs, through retirement or by defeat, of the last of the One Nation Tories who made up the Europhile wing
of the Conservative Party. They had entered the Commons in the 1950s, 60s and 70s and many had firsthand
experience of the destruction of the continent during the war. They had witnessed the end of the post-war
social consensus, they had even served in Thatcher’s governments yet they had retained the pragmatic sense
of nation, borne mainly from the class from which they came. Ideological extremism is not a charge that could
ever have been levelled at them. Their Europeanism, whilst sincere, was always tempered with good sense and
reasoned argument. Thus the party which emerged into the Blair dominated decade was a party that through
both design and as a result of New Labour now having stolen many of their clothes was one which seemed to
have abandoned the middle ground. Their choice for leader was between the former chancellor Kenneth Clark,
the last senior One Nation member in the Commons and the immature Thatcherite William Hague. The clear
victory of Hague was in large part due more to Clark’s unapologetic business-like support for the European
project rather than the other’s questionable ability. No Tory could have defeated Blair in 2001, yet the spectacle
of Hague leading the campaign as a referendum on the Euro seemed small-minded and parochial. His refrain
to ‘save the pound’ was seen by the electorate as an irrelevance, and the outcome for him would be that the
he would be the first Conservative leader in 80 years not to have been prime minister. This exclusive group of
Tory leaders who failed to reach Number 10 became even less exclusive as two other leaders with impeccable
Eurosceptic credentials (Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard) failed to defeat the all conquering political
destroyer that was New Labour. One Nation was dead and what was left was a party seen as marginalised and
irrelevant; not a party of government. For the Conservative Party this was rare, though not unknown.
With an institution as old as the Conservative Party one is able to observe patterns in its long history which
have repeated themselves for over two centuries. A pattern emerges of ascendency, division and stupidity.
For much of its existence the Conservative Party has sought to represent in deeds and manners a particular
idea both of what the UK is and how it should be ruled. This is the Conservative Party as the natural party of
government, united, pragmatic and electorally effective. For long periods of the 20th century this was the case,
the earthquake of Blairism though shallow in content was profound in its ability to push the Tories from the
middle ground towards stupidity. Stupidity is a disease that the Tories have always been susceptible to since
the time of John Stewart Mill who had them in mind when he employed the word. Stupidity in this context is
understood as ignoring electoral survival, taking extreme positions, refusing to accept change as opposed to
managing change. This stupidity is a constant threat; it lies below the surface and can flare up at any time. The
genius of the Conservative Party was to act as a broad coalition of interest which could coalesce around unwritten
rules about how best to manage the difficult balance of government; extremism distracted from the business
of ruling. In short if the Torie are not in government their raison d’être ceases to exist, stupidity leads to
opposition and Tories are not suited to being a pressure group. This was the case for Toryism until 1997, when
even with the Thatcher revolution, the Tories could always seek, feel, persuade and win over the middle ground.
Following Blair’s victory the Tories’ failure to win led them into the trap of thinking that by making themselves
more and more distinct they would win over their lost voters. However, thirteen years of opposition proved
them wrong; they became a caricature of the present day US Republican Party. Division is the third part of this
complex historical trinity. The repeal of agricultural protection in the 1840s and tariff reform in the 1900s split
the party, leading to electoral defeat and isolation. The division over Europe from the late 1980s onwards has
gone a great way to creating both stupidity and division. Granted, ‘Europe’ was not the sole reason for defeat
but its effects have been less than benign. However a gradual final purge of the Europhiles during opposition
has in some ways resolved any divisions by removing them altogether.
Ascendency and a new division
Thus in 2005 David Cameron inherited an old and confused party that he sought to bring into the 21st century,
accepting if not the content, then at least that the manner of political discourse had changed. In seeking
ascendency Cameron needed to keep stupidity in check and pray for unity. By wining office and creating the
first peace-time coalition since the 1930s, Cameron has shown himself as a pragmatist. He has modernised,
said the right things and was able to capitalise on the situation as the Brown administration finally gave way
under the fatigue induced by the failures in the UK’s public finances. Cameron has made the Tories a viable
party of government and he showed considerable elan and skill in forming a coalition which had seemed more
than improbable on polling day in 2010. Like many of the current Tory hierarchy, he is a professional politician
(something rare a generation ago) and he comes from Thatcherite and Eurosceptic roots though he is not
beholden to an ideal of ideological constraints.
Like his European partners, his main preoccupation in government has been the economy and the debt crisis
yet the EU, like the steeples of Ulster, re-emerged in 2010 and has caused him headaches and goes a long way in
explaining his approach to the EU. It must be remembered that the core of his party are by nature, inclination
and in practice predominantly Eurosceptic, something mirrored by the parliamentary party. As with Major
and Thatcher they are more than keen to have their opinions aired. Even though Cameron has sought political
capital by adopting a robust stance with the EU, this is still not enough for many. A new division has replaced
the old one. Where once the debate was between more or less integration, for or against the Euro we now have
a simple split: in or out. The majority of Tory MPs lean towards an exit of the current EU. Heath had warned
Major that any attempt to placate and appease the Eurosceptics would fail in that they would never be satisfied.
We can see this in those rebellions by MPs over an ‘in-out’ referendum in 2011 and one in relation to EU budget
cuts in 2012 as well innumerable statements by many senior Conservatives favouring exit from the community.
Thus Conservative politicians, members, and voters are making things difficult for a government which has
historically been the most Eurocautious since accession.
Much of this division and antipathy towards the EU is manifested in the growth of UKIP which beat the Tories

to third place in a recent byelection. UKIP is having a sizeable impact in Tory heartlands which could well tip the balance
in a close election. Some Tory MPs have made overtures to UKIP with the intention of creating an electoral pact. These
were dismissed and opposed by the leadership but the mere fact that several MPs are willing to openly discuss such
things is telling. Issues of immigration, labour relations, unpopular human rights legislation and social policy all have
a significant European dimension; a dimension that bothUKIP and the Tory right are more than willing to remind the
government and the popular press.
In opposition Cameron promised a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty and a repeal of the Human Rights Act of 1998 which
incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into English law as well as ceasing to sit with the European
People’s Party in the European Parliament. In office he has made three significant and bold moves on EU policy. In 2011
he vetoed treaty changes which were requested by other member states in relation to fiscal rules to deal with the debt
crisis; the same action was also linked to Cameron’s opposition to a financial transaction tax. Second was his push for a
reduction in the EU budget which he hailed in February with a 3% cut. Finally on the 23rd January 2013 he promised the
holy grail for the Eurosceptics, a referendum, albeit one on a renegotiated settlement and only after a general election.
Whether his vision for an EU of the single market not the single currency and one of 28 speeds is achievable, it is one
which is acceptable, in the meantime, to his party and is popular in the UK. He realises the need for EU membership and
in any case he would push for an ‘in’ vote; but this lies in the future. His hope for now is that Europe can be used to mark
himself out from both Labour and the LibDems, not from his MPs; for them he prays for silence. Europe was, and can
still be, toxic for the Tories; nothing is more guaranteed to animate their ranks than twelve stars on a blue background.
It is in this context of Tory survival that we should understand Cameron’s EU politics. Like his more successful predecessors
he is a realist, and unlike many in his party, his European policy is based on that realism; one that eschews stupidity. His
instincts are not that of a federalist and the rhetoric used is for a home audience; his ultimate aim is to stay in office and it
is here where one can discern some Tory credentials, though it is far from clear whether he has achieved any ascendency.
Whilst a master of many political tools and still his party’s greatest political asset, he is viewed with diffidence by many
in his party who see him as a blue-tinged Blair. In truth, though inheriting the effortless charm and cool that privilege
bestows, he lacks the traditional Tory patrician’s ability to take a more long-term, measured and noble picture of his
nation and how his role in its wellbeing should be seen through the prism of the Burkian contract between our ancestors
and our yet to be born descendents. Those traditional ‘conservative’, subtle, decent Tories have been silenced by the self
referential, short-term, opinion poll obsessed political class of today. In such an environment much of what passes for
political discourse has become a self-parody; and nowhere is this clearer than in regard to the EU. Yet this caricature
is as true of Cameron as it is of its opponents among the other EU capitals. A feature of ‘conservatism’ is the ability to
accept and live with failure by forgiving the mistakes of the past and not by pretending they never happened and thus
not repeating them in the future. The hubris of a UK unblemished by the problems of the Euro or the procrastinations of
self-interested policymakers in the Euro region are both a symptom of this ignorance of failure. In the final analysis, this
ignorance should make us question whether or not Cameron is a real Tory and whether critics of Torysim have any idea
what they are attacking.

Marc Gafarot
Holds a degree in Humanities from the Universidad de Navarra, an MSc in European Studies from the London School
of Economics and an MA in Latin American Studies from the University of Liverpool. As a journalist and political
commentator he has worked from London for Bloomberg LP, in Latin America for Summit Communications and
served as a Parliamentary Adviser at the European Parliament in Brussels and Strasbourg. Gafarot is currently Head of
International Relations for Catalan International View. He has written a book on Flanders and Federalism in Belgium
called ‘La mort de Bèlgica? La gradual i pacífica emancipació flamenca’ (The Death of Belgium? The Gradual and Peaceful
Flemish Emancipation) and co-authored The Student’s Guide to European Integration.
First published in Catalan International View
Photo by Catalan International View


OUR CULTURE OUR HISTORY

Recuperation and linguistic integration policies
Culturcat - Generalitat de Catalunya

With the end of the Franco dictatorship and the beginning of
self-government in Catalonia and, to a greater or lesser degree,
in other areas of the linguistic domain, a process of linguistic
recuperation and normalization was begun. The objective was to
re-address the devastating effects that the dictatorship had had
on the social and institutional situation of Catalan.
In Catalonia, the process of linguistic recuperation was commenced
with the re-establishment of the Generalitat de Catalunya in 1977
and the later approval, in 1979, of the Statute of Autonomy, which
re-established the official nature of the Catalan language, together
with that of Spanish, and declared it the language of Catalonia.
This legal context allowed for the development of a linguistic
policy which was favourable to the recuperation of the Catalan
language, and which was propelled with the approval of the first
law of linguistic normalization.
This first law of normalization, whichwas approved in 1983, had
as a priority the objective of recuperating the language in its
official uses, in the educational system, and in the means of public
communication, as well as to make the institutional support for
its social use explicit. With regards to the regulating of the official
uses, it established the habitual use of Catalan as the sole language
of the different Catalan administrations, it gave legal validity to
texts written in this language and accepted Catalan as the language through which the citizen could relate to
the different Catalan administrations. Furthermore, it established that the Catalan toponymic forms would be
the only valid ones in the whole of the region – excepting the Aran Valley, where the valid ones would be the
Aranese ones –. With regards to the educational system it established the bases for the habitual vehicular use of
the Catalan language, explicitly impeded the segregation of students for reasons of language, and made Catalan
the language of the educational system, as well as guaranteeing the presence of Spanish and the knowledge of
both official languages by all of the students when they have finished their obligatory education.
In 1998 a new law this time known as the law of linguistic policy, substituted that of 1983, and is still current.
This law, although it follows the line of action established in the previous one, is more extensive and more
precise. The concept of own language is more developed in the new article, and specifies that the language has
preference in administration, business and public services and those that offer services to the public. It is also
more explicit in the chapter about linguistic rights and it established the right for all the citizens of Catalonia to
know of, to express themselves, and be attended in any of the two co-official languages, in a context which does
not discriminate for linguistic reasons. Other points which were not contemplated in the previous legislation
and which do appear in this law are the references to the unity of the Catalan language, the documents and
civil and mercantile contracts, anthroponomy, industries of the language and information technology, to client
services in businesses, to consumer information, signposting and publicity, and the relationship with other
regions which speak Catalan, as well as the exterior projection of the language. Moreover, it consolidates the
pre-eminent role of Catalan in the rest of ambits already contemplated in the previous text. The organism in
charge of the execution and application of these laws which verse upon linguistic policy, as well as the fomenting
and promoting of the Catalan language, is the Secretary of Linguistic Policy. With this objective, the organism
has, throughout the last twenty-five years, successively started various campaigns of linguistic promotion and
awareness which have adapted to the different social situation of Catalan, like for example ‘El català, cosa de
tots’ (1982), ‘Depèn de vostè’ (1985-1986), ‘Tu ets mestre’ (2003), ‘Dóna corda al català’ (2005-2007) and
‘Encomana el català’ (2009 onwards). The deep aim of all these campaigns, especially the more recent ones, is
to avoid Catalan speakers changing, without a justified reason, from Catalan to Spanish when coming face to
face with people who the speaker identifies as a non Catalan speaker, who understands or speaks Catalan, and
foment the role of Catalan as a common public language and a welcoming language in a region which today has
more linguistic diversity than ever before. With regards to the promotion and use of Catalan in the whole of the
region of Catalonia, we must also take into account the role of the Consortium for Linguistic Normalization.
This organism has, for the last twenty years, brought together the endeavours of municipalities and other local
administrations, and offers a wide range of linguistic services to the whole region, which encompass Catalan
courses for adults, linguistic assessment and programmes of linguistic encouragement.
Although in Catalonia the legal recognition of the Catalan language, as well as the institutional support and
its promotion, has been explicit and continuous since the end of Franco’s regime, we cannot say the same
for all areas where Catalan is spoken. In the Valencian region, Catalan has been legally recognised under the
denomination of ‘valencià’ [Valencian] and it is considered the official language together with Spanish. The
linguistic policies of the Valencian government have not been sufficient to re-address the critical situation of
linguistic substitution which is seen in this region and, nowadays, Catalan is showing alarming evolutionary
signs. The educational systems, organised by lines, which separate the students in accordance with their
language, has not guaranteed that the population finish their education with the skill to be able to equally use
both official languages. Parting from the name ‘Valencian’ and from the particularities of the language in that
region, linguistic sectionalisation has started to increase, and has even received institutional support, to the
point that it has impeded the reception of the Catalan means of communication in the Valencian region. In spite
of the efforts of entities and associations which defend the language, it is not sure that the legal and political

situation will positively evolve on a short or long term basis. With regards to the Balearic Islands, the situation
is to be found half way between that of Catalonia and that of the Valencian region. Catalan is considered to be
the language of the Islands and it is official together with Spanish. Throughout the last twenty years, different
measures of linguistic policy have been carried out, which have often been conditioned by the colour of the
governing political party. The schooling system is not segregated and it promotes the equal presence of Catalan
and Spanish in the classroom. A completely different case is to be found in the Principality of Andorra, which
is a country where Catalan is the only official language. Although this does not guarantee an unassailable
position from the point of view of the legal and institutional recognition, the actual socio-linguistic situation is
very similar to that of Catalonia. The areas where the language is the least protected from a legal point of view
and that of linguistic planning are Northern Catalonia, Alguer in Sardinia and especially the ‘Franja d’Aragó’
[Aragon Strip].
First published in Culturcat
Photo by Culturcat

ISSN: 2014-9093 | Legal deposit: B. 2198-2013

An Independent Catalonia Within the EU (IT In Transit #23)

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