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Security Avalanche

Michele Leroux Bustamante
michelebusta@solliance.net
Hello World!
1992
Hello World!
Hello World!
1995-2007
Rich
Client

Web Services

Web App

Web Services
Industry-Specific Standards

Reliable
Messaging

Transactions

Messaging

XML
Transport Protocols

Management/QOS

Security

Metadata

Workflow
Industry-Specific Standards

Transactions

Messaging

XML
Transport Protocols
Transport Protocols
HTTP

HTTPS

SMTP

Management/QOS

Reliable
Messaging

Security

Metadata

Workflow
Industry-Specific Standards

Transactions

Messaging
XML Schema
XML

XML
XML
Transport Protocols

XML Digital Signatures
XML Encryption

Management/QOS

Reliable
Messaging

Security

Metadata

Workflow
Industry-Specific Standards

Reliable
Messaging

Messaging

WS-Enumeration
WS-Eventing
WS-Transfer

Transactions

MTOM
sWa

WSN

Messaging
WSRF
WS-Addressing

DIME

SOAP

XML
Transport Protocols

Management/QOS

Security

Metadata

Workflow
Industry-Specific Standards
WS-PolicyAttachment

Reliable
Messaging

Transactions

WS-Discovery

Management/QOS

Security

Metadata
Metadata

WS-Policy

Workflow

WS-MetadataExchange

Messaging

XML
Transport Protocols

WSDL
Industry-Specific Standards

Security

Reliable
WS-RM Policy
Messaging

Transactions

WS-RX
WSRM

Messaging

XML
Transport Protocols

Management/QOS

Reliable
Messaging

Metadata

Workflow
Industry-Specific Standards
Workflow

Security

Reliable
Messaging

WS-Coordination

Transactions
WS-TX
WS-BusinessActivity
WS-AtomicTransaction

Messaging

XML
Transport Protocols

Management/QOS

WS-CAF

Metadata

Transactions
Industry-Specific Standards

Reliable
Messaging

Transactions

Messaging

XML
Transport Protocols

Management/QOS

Security

WS-Choreography

Metadata

BPEL

Workflow
Workflow
Industry-Specific Standards
WSDM

Reliable
Messaging

Transactions

Messaging

XML
Transport Protocols

Management/QOS

Security

Management/QOS
Metadata

WS-Manageability

Workflow
Industry-Specific Standards
Insurance

Industry-Specific Law Enforcement
Standards
Financial Services

Goverment

Reliable
Messaging

Transactions

Messaging

XML
Transport Protocols

Management/QOS

Security

Metadata

Workflow
Industry-Specific Standards
Workflow

WS-SecureConversation
WS-Trust

WS-Federation

Security

SAML

WS-SecurityPolicy

Reliable
Messaging

Transactions

OASIS Web Services Security

Messaging

XML
Transport Protocols

Management/QOS

WS-SX

Metadata

Security
WS-Federation
WS-ReliableMessaging

WS-PolicyAttachment
OASIS Web Services Security

WS*
HELL

WS-Coordination

WS-CAF

WSDL

MTOM

WS-Transfer

WS-Eventing

WS-BusinessActivity

WS-ResourceTransfer

WSRF

DIME

WS-Addressing
SOAP
Hello World!
1992
Rich
Client

Web Services

Web App

Web Services
Rich
Client

Windows
Phone 8
Windows
Phone 7

iPhone

Windows
8/Surface

Android

Mobile
Browsers

iPad

Web
API

Web API
(mobile)

(ajax)

Web API
(business)

Web App
Simple Web
Token (SWT)
JSON Web
Token (JWT)

Open ID 1.0

OAuth 1.0a

Open ID 2.0

OAuth WRAP

OpenID Connect
1.0

OAuth 2.0
SIMPLICITY
WINS
Security Standards: Goals
•
•
•
•
•

Single Sign-On (Passive Federation)
Partner Federation (home realm redirection)
Active Federation
Delegation (on behalf of)
Delegated Authorization
Session Agenda
•
•
•
•

Review the relevant standards of today
Practical applications
Trends
Implementation and architecture scenarios
Passive Federation
Browser

1

3

Login
Page

5

4
2

Web
Application

STS
Active Federation
Rich
Client

1

2

STS

3

Web Service
WS-Federation
• HTTPS
• SAML bearer tokens

SignIn Response
RequestedSecurityToken

– Signed by issuer
– Unencrypted and no proof key
– Requires transport protection

• Core Messages
– SignIn request and response
– Sign out and clean up
27

SAML 2 Token
Signature
Subject Confirmation
Token Lifetime
Attributes (Claims = name, role)
WS-Federation
Browser

RSTR

HTTP GET
wa=wsignIn1.0
wctx=[context]
wreq=[tokentype]

HTTP POST
wctx=[context]
wresult=RSTR

Passive
STS

Passive
RP

RequestedSecurityToken
SAML 2 Token
Signature
Subject Confirmation
Token Lifetime
Attributes (Claims = name, role)

RST

RSTR

Active
STS
Home Realm Discovery
Browser
(requestor)
SignIn Response
RequestedSecurityToken
SAML 2 Token
Signature

Subject Confirmation
Token Lifetime

HTTP POST
wresult={Signin
Response}
wctx=[context]

2

1

HTTP GET
wa=wsignIn1.0
wtrealm=[Uri]
whr=[Uri]
wreply=[Uri]
wctx=[context]

Attributes (Claims = name, role)

Web Site
(RP)

IP-STS
(IdP)
WS-Trust
• HTTPS or Message Security (WS-Security)
• SAML holder-of-key tokens
– Signed by issuer
– Encrypted for relying party
– Includes proof key

• Core Messages (WS-Federation also uses)
– RST and RSTR
– Token validation, renewal or cancellation
30
Message Headers
Signature = Proof Key
SAML Token

3
Client

1

RP

2

RST

RSTR

RequestType = Issue

Lifetime

AppliesTo = /RelyingParty

RST

RSTR

Proof Key

TokenType = SAML 2
Claims = name, role

RequestedProofToken

WS-Trust /
Issue()

RequestedSecurityToken
SAML 2 Token
Signature

Active
STS

Subject Confirmation
Token Lifetime
Attributes (Claims = name, role)
Proof Key
Delegation / On Behalf Of
Client

Bearer token

Web
Application

Holder-of-key token

Service

STS

Credentials
SAML
• Security Assertion Markup Language
– OASIS standard
– Several versions 1.0, 1.1, 2.0

• Describes an XML security token format
and message exchange protocol
– Tokens are also used in federated security
scenarios for web services
– Message exchange is primarily browserbased
SAML 2 SP-Initiated
Browser

1

3

Login
Page

5

4
2

Service
Provider

Identity
Provider
(STS)
Claims
• Identity providers typically issue claims based
on the user’s identity

Authenticate
Claims
• Applications may transform identity claims
into application-specific claims

Transform
Where are we now?
Motivation for OAuth
• No password sharing (valet key)
• Reduced risk of compromised credentials
• Ability to revoke access without changing
password
History
• OAuth 1.0a
– Complicated workflows
– Required signatures
– BUT, no SSL required

• OAuth 2
– Simplified workflows
– Rely on SSL for transfer protection
– Signatures NOT required
OAuth2 Participants
•
•
•
•

Resource Owner
Client
Authorization Server
Resource Server
OAuth2 Abstract Flow
• Client requests authorization from Resource
Owner to access resources
• Resource Owner grants access through
Authorization Server
• Client uses access token to request resources
from Resource Server
• Resource Server returns resource if access
token is valid
OAuth 2 Abstract Flow
Authorization Request

Authorization Request

Resource
Owner
Authorization Response

Authorization Response
(return authorization
code/grant)
Access Token Request (send authorization code)

Client

Authorization
Server

Access Token Response
(return access_token / refresh_token)

Resource Request (send access_token)

Resource
Server
Protected Resource
OAuth 2 Abstract Flow
Credentials

Authorization Request

Authentication Token

Resource
Owner

Authorization Response

Client

Identity
Provider

Authorization Request

Authorization Response

Access Token Request

Authorization
Server

Access Token Response

Resource Request

Resource
Server
Protected Resource
Authorization Grant
• Represents Resource Owner authorization
• Types of grants
– Authorization Code
– Implicit
– Resource Owner Password Credentials
– Client Credentials
Endpoints

Redirection
Endpoint
POST

Client

Authorization
Endpoint
GET/POST

Token
Endpoint

Authorization Server
OAuth2 Flows
• Authorization Code Grant
– Redirect based, web server redirect endpoint

• Implicit Grant
– Browser based (JavaScript), Mobile

• Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant
– Resource owner username/password known to client

• Client Credentials Grant
– Application based

• Extension Grant
Authorization Code
• User agent redirection (I.e., browser)
• Resource Owner must authenticate to
Authorization Server
– Credentials never shared with Client
– Authorization code sent to Client

• Client requests access token using
authorization code
– Access token never passed to user agent
Authorization Code Grant
Authorization Request

Authorization Request

Resource
Owner
Authorization Response

Authorization Response

Access Token Request

Client

Authorization
Server

Access Token Response

Resource Request

Resource
Server
Protected Resource
Authorization Code Flow
Browser

3

5
1

code
state*

5

Login
Page

response_type
client_id
redirect_uri*
scope*
state*

4

code
state*

2
6

Client
Application

grant_type
code
redirect_uri
client_id

acess_token
token_type
expires_in*
scope*
state*
refresh_token*

7

Authorization
Server

Credentials

Resource
Server
Implicit
• Optimized for JavaScript clients
• Access token issued to Client directly
– No authorization code (intermediate credential)
– Access token may be visible to resource
owner, user agent
Implicit Grant
Authorization Request

Authorization Request

Resource
Owner
Access Token Response

Access Token Response

Authorization
Server
Client

Resource Request

Resource
Server
Protected Resource
Implicit Flow
Browser

2

4
5

access_token

Client
Application

acess_token
token_type
expires_in*
scope*
state*

Login
Page

response_type
client_id
redirect_uri*
scope*
state*

3
1

Authorization
Server

Credentials

Resource
Server
Resource Owner Password Credentials
• Resource Owner credentials supplied to
request access token
• Client is tightly coupled to Resource Owner
– High degree of trust
– Client collects credentials to get access token

• Can exchange credentials for access token
– Dispose of passwords in memory
Resource Owner Password
Credentials Grant
Access Token Request

Resource Owner
Password Credentials

Resource
Owner
Access Token Response

Authorization
Server
Client

Resource Request

Resource
Server
Protected Resource
Resource Owner Password
Credentials Grant
Login
Page

1

2

3
Client
Application

grant_type
Username
password
scope*

acess_token
token_type
expires_in*
scope*
state*
refresh_token*

7

Authorization
Server

Credentials

Resource
Server
Client Credentials
• Client is also Resource Owner
• Present client credentials to request access
Client Credentials Grant
Access Token Request

Access Token Response

Authorization
Server
Client
Resource
Owner
Resource Request

Resource
Server
Protected Resource
Client Credentials Grant

1
Client
Application

grant_type
client_id*
scope*

acess_token
token_type
expires_in*
scope*
state*
refresh_token*

2

Authorization
Server

Credentials

Resource
Server
Extension Grant Flow
• Client requests access token by presenting a
token and specifying its kind
– I.e., OAuth-SAML2 specification
Client Registration
• Establishing trust with Authorization Server
– Provide a client type
– Provide a Url
– Provide other optional information

• Required for public and for implicit grants
Client Profile

Client Type

Web Application

Confidential

User-Agent Based

Public

Native Application

Public
Client Authentication
• Clients may register a password (secret) with
the Authorization Server
• Pass with Basic Authentication
• If not supported, pass as form parameters
Client Authentication
• Basic Authentication (recommended)
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzo3RmpmcDBaQnIxS3REUmJuZlZkbUl3
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA

• Parameters
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&client_secret=7Fjfp0ZBr1KtDRbnfVdmIw
Access Token
• Represents authorization to resources
• May be signed
• Format described by accompanying
specifications
– I.e., SAML2, JWT
Access Token Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
{
"access_token":"2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
"token_type":"example",
"expires_in":3600,
"refresh_token":"tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA",
"example_parameter":"example_value"
}
Refresh Token
• Optional, Authorization Server decides
• Sent to Authorization Server to retrieve another
access token
– Different scope
– Additional time

• If access token is expired, can use refresh token
to request another one
– Without prompting Resource Owner
– Unless scope increases beyond what was approved
Facebook Examples
Authorization Request
GET https://www.facebook.com/dialog/oauth?
client_id=438893679548466&
redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fdemo.snapboard.com%2FSnapBoardDemo%2FAccount
%2FExternalLoginCallback%3F__provider__%3Dfacebook%26__sid__%3D9fbc4fb2ac4
34930a78e50c895271a0f&
scope=email%20user_about_me%20user_birthday%20user_friends%20publish_actio
ns HTTP/1.1
Response w/ Grant
GET
http://demo.snapboard.com/SnapBoardDemo/Account/ExternalLoginCallback?__prov
ider__=facebook&
__sid__=9fbc4fb2ac434930a78e50c895271a0f&
code=AQCxVpduOEybUZVpB74wFCzZZVCPgBfpnBj7tvxSDVGag9u9zV9yX268Wf0eB1rb
6nZYmoFRlweasCIKksFQkwzEzE0aWYuzstA_ciHbhJSTmMb0ZsrlZ9jjXLMHrdirigIOz13WC
8nWgbXQzuwG1DmmJFEv2KtupZl8KMAIZBSVsu9aewPT5R2lNgSgfg_SW53Qt2qliVP32NEuq0BiuvdphDDSjwWCjSHtW4SMC73DdL9O7Bjt2vzlumDq9b5asuuxFvx_KQknhFRhAX15W8CYBOEWZ0vVYsFjI5tCSMEAYZ6EAm62HEbNZTj9aJw HTTP/1.1
Request Access Token
GET
https://graph.facebook.com/oauth/access_token?client_id=438893679548466&redirec
t_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fdemo.snapboard.com%2FSnapBoardDemo%2FAccount%2FExter
nalLoginCallback%3F__provider__%3Dfacebook%26__sid__%3D9fbc4fb2ac434930a78
e50c895271a0f&
client_secret=8022ba46243c1becc5e4020f72f08bd7&
code=AQCxVpduOEybUZVpB74wFCzZZVCPgBfpnBj7tvxSDVGag9u9zV9yX268Wf0eB1rb6
nZYmoFRlweasCIKksFQkwzEzE0aWYuzstA_ciHbhJSTmMb0ZsrlZ9jjXLMHrdirigIOz13WC8n
WgbXQzuwG1DmmJFEv2KtupZl8KMAIZBSVsu9aewPT5R2lNgSgfg_SW53Qt2qliVP32NEuq0BiuvdphDDSjwWCjSHtW4SMC73DdL9O7Bjt2vzlumDq9b5asuuxFvx_KQknhFRhAX15W8CYBOEWZ0vVYsFjI5tCSMEAYZ6EAm62HEbNZTj9aJw&
scope=email HTTP/1.1
Access Token Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Expires: Sat, 01 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT
Pragma: no-cache
X-FB-Rev: 997953
X-FB-Debug: b8sYgk6apQZlsdJEXdTuEN+gisLdVvOQ15CK8o3cLSA=
Date: Thu, 07 Nov 2013 11:47:59 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 215
access_token=CAAGPKZBXdGDIBAImEo6Pf6GthtiEdjQoAGWUBiNSwUeTuZAbztASscJKp
NZCsuKUSBDQqwJ9ZAPUF7tugWkgbaUqh8vQkHwZCsARz7rEu0j8EfDA0tZA8CIW2ZAbS
Qh4fNDTNpUm0B4zZAxqycQsYjLhY8BarPp9izFZBUVeAsYQCfoVBqK4WwSxq
Request Profile Info
GET
https://graph.facebook.com/me?access_token=CAAGPKZBXdGDIBAImEo6Pf6GthtiEdj
QoAGWUBiNSwUeTuZAbztASscJKpNZCsuKUSBDQqwJ9ZAPUF7tugWkgbaUqh8vQkHwZ
CsARz7rEu0j8EfDA0tZA8CIW2ZAbSQh4fNDTNpUm0B4zZAxqycQsYjLhY8BarPp9izFZBUV
eAsYQCfoVBqK4WwSxq HTTP/1.1
Host: graph.facebook.com
Profile Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
…
Content-Length: 609
{"id":"574847493","name":"Michele Leroux
Bustamante","first_name":"Michele","middle_name":"Leroux","last_name":
"Bustamante","link":"https://www.facebook.com/michelebusta","username":"mich
elebusta","birthday":”LA LA LA LA","bio":"I'm a geek. Wait, no I'm not. Wait, yes I
am...","quotes":"Never complain, never explain. -Katherine
Hepburn”,"gender":"female","email":"michelebustau0040gmail.com","timezone":1,"l
ocale":"en_US","verified":true,"updated_time":"2013-11-07T11:44:01+0000"}
Invalid Access Token
GET
https://graph.facebook.com/574847493/friends?access_token=CAAGPKZBXdGDIBAGt
zITGJq3ykpbuSDF6xQlDxonZCGW15CKCgq4fmfKH5QK7pYq374C9uWcZAZBnJrqZAEpx4
gp73U9bGNmJlb0dvby3LkvuVrzGZCxBvZCbWrXWyHuouAil15sm76Q5g4uQ5myiCFRaR
aMEOHXLNPCTClK2IApKEkB7A51qe7F&limit=5000&fields=%5B%22id%22%2C%22nam
e%22%2C%22link%22%5D HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
…
WWW-Authenticate: OAuth "Facebook Platform" "invalid_token" "Error validating
access token: User 574847493 has not authorized application 438893679548466."
…
Content-Length: 172
{"error":{"message":"Error validating access token: User 574847493 has not authorized
application
438893679548466.","type":"OAuthException","code":190,"error_subcode":458}}
And now, for a creepy
image of the original
OpenID
http://openidexplained.com/
OpenID Connect vs. OAuth 2
OpenID ID Token Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
{
"access_token": "SlAV32hkKG",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"refresh_token": "8xLOxBtZp8",
"expires_in": 3600,
"id_token": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.ew0KICAgICJpc3MiOiAiaHR0cDovL
3NlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsDQogICAgInVzZXJfaWQiOiAiMjQ4Mjg5NzYxM
DAxIiwNCiAgICAiYXVkIjogInM2QmhkUmtxdDMiLA0KICAgICJub25jZSI6ICJuL
TBTNl9XekEyTWoiLA0KICAgICJleHAiOiAxMzExMjgxOTcwLA0KICAgICJpYXQiO
iAxMzExMjgwOTcwDQp9.lsQI_KNHpl58YY24G9tUHXr3Yp7OKYnEaVpRL0KI4szT
D6GXpZcgxIpkOCcajyDiIv62R9rBWASV191Akk1BM36gUMm8H5s8xyxNdRfBViCa
xTqHA7X_vV3U-tSWl6McR5qaSJaNQBpg1oGPjZdPG7zWCG-yEJC4-Fbx2FPOS7-h
5V0k33O5Okd-OoDUKoFPMd6ur5cIwsNyBazcsHdFHqWlCby5nl_HZdW-PHq0gjzy
JydB5eYIvOfOHYBRVML9fKwdOLM2xVxJsPwvy3BqlVKc593p2WwItIg52ILWrc6A
tqkqHxKsAXLVyAoVInYkl_NDBkCqYe2KgNJFzfEC8g"
}
ID Token
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "24400320",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"exp": 1311281970,
"iat": 1311280970,
"auth_time": 1311280969,
"acr": "urn:mace:incommon:iap:silver",
"at_hash": "MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Ng"
}
Where are we now?
Suggested Implementations
• Thinktecture
– Authorization Server and Identity Provider
– All but SAML 2
– Open Source

• Auth0
– Hosted model or appliance
– Affordable, from small bus to enterprise
– All protocols
– FREE version for dev
References
• Conference resources to be referenced here:
– http://michelebusta.com

• See my snapboards:
– Currently at the alpha site:
http://snapboardalpha.cloudapp.net/michelebusta
– Will move these to snapboard.com/michelebusta
when we go live on the main site (SOON watch my
blog for announcement)

• Contact me:
– michelebusta@solliance.net
– @michelebusta
Michele Leroux Bustamante
Managing Partner
Solliance (solliance.net)
CEO and Cofounder
Snapboard (snapboard.com)
Microsoft Regional Director
Microsoft MVP
Author, Speaker
Pluralsight courses on the way!
Blog: michelebusta.com
michelebusta@solliance.net
@michelebusta

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