Williams 2010 W Globaliz Vs Darul Islam As Pubd

Williams, Mark S. (2010). Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam: Issues and Reactions from
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao. In Gealogo, F. & Reyes, D. (Eds.), Religions, Regionalism,
and Globalization in Asia (pp. 27-42). Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press. [Page
numbers in bold-lettering ‘as published’]

[p 27]

Western Globalization versus dar-ul Islam
Issues and Reactions from Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Mindanao

=+=+=+=

Mark Stephen Williams *1

Introduction
AS HISTORY RECORDS THE HUMAN DILEMMA OF VARIOUS PEOPLES striving
to adapt to the material and physical environment around them, these differences
contribute to nuance changes in these human cultures and to the social forces constituting
the framework by which each society abides. The world situation of despair and
destruction resulting from the aftermath of World War II fostered an environment for
realizing the Anglophile dream echoed by Woodrow Wilson 25 years earlier – ‘to make
the world safe for democracy.’ The Bretton Woods conference of 1944 led to the
creation of those institutions that would engineer and guide the post-World War capitalist
West, and those colonies gaining independence, into a coordinated world political
economy1 to ensure member development and protect its interests against other
hegemonies vying against it – namely, the Soviet bloc.
While this engineering was touted as being culturally and socially neutral (due, as
it was thought, to the invisible-hand characteristic of laissez-faire capitalism), various
allies of the West (with different social and religious structures) were finding it
challenging to fit into the mold of what is now known as the Western globalization
paradigm. This challenge has become more acute due to the fall of the Iron Curtain in the
early 1990s – since this has [p 28] allowed the so-called sleeping-giant of Islam to wake
from its slumber, especially from under the tyranny of Soviet communism in Asia. While
much has been written, and continues to be broadcast over various media, regarding the
resurgence of Muslim hegemony in the Middle East and Central Asia, this essay will
focus on the response and reaction of Muslims in Malaysia, Indonesia and Mindanao to

*1 [p 141] Mark Stephen Williams is an ethnohistorian, cultural anthropologist, and Islamicist by training.
He completed two A.B. degrees at the University of California in San Diego (UCSD) in History and
Political Science. In 1989, Mr. Williams completed the Certificate Program in Islamic Studies at the
William Carey International University in Pasadena, California. Serving with a mission organization in the
decade of the 1990s, Mr. Williams pursued the M.A. degree in Intercultural Studies at Biola University
near Los Angeles, California, finishing in 2002. Returning to service in the southern Philippines as a
missionary anthropologist and ethnohistorian, Mr. Williams is now conmpleting the Ph.D. in Development
Studies at the Ateneo de Davao University. In addition to other duties and dissertation research, he serves
as Adjunct Professor of Islamics at Koinonia Theological Seminary, also located in Davao City.

1


the phenomenon of Western globalization in their midst. First, it is prudent to understand
some historical aspects of the development of the region, especially as the insular
periphery found itself becoming part of the world of Islam several hundreds of years ago.

The Realm of Malay Islam in Southeast Asia
When speaking of this region, the reference is directly to “the Malay race of Southeast
Asia [which] includes primarily the people of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines”
(McAmis 2002, 3). Since Indonesia is well-known to tourists for the resort area of Bali
and the Hindu influences there, it is sometimes forgotten that this vast archipelago is
home to the largest singular Muslim population in the world, nearly 200 million in
Indonesia alone2 – more than in Arabia, or India, or any one Central Asian country.
Despite occasional spitefulness about Southeast Asian Islam being less pure than that of
its Middle East progenitors, Malay Muslims have always been confident in their position
in the greater Islamic ummah (community-of-faith) within the realm of dar-ul Islam
(world-of-peace). Using Mindanao as representative of the Malay Muslim position
today, “the concept of Dar-ul Islam (household of Islam) demands that state authority
manifests and reflects Islamic principles and ideals. [The] secular nature of the
[Philippine] Republic does not echo the Muslim experience. That is why most Muslims
think that to be truly Muslim is to have an Islamic state” (Alejo, et al, n.d., 122; italics in
original). This defines dar-ul Islam well from the Southeast Asian Muslim viewpoint.
For hundreds of years since their Islamization, the Malay Muslim sultanates of
insular Southeast Asia were formidable and extensive in their regional trade relations
(Laarhoven 1989, 25-27, 46ff). Especially during the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-
centuries, sultanates flanking the South China Sea were active in creating an international
trade network known as the ‘Sulu Zone.’

Three water-borne routes led into the heart of the Sulu zone. The Chinese began
with the Sulu Sea, an extension southward from their trade entrepots in the
Philippines, but they also navigated across the South [p 29] China Sea through the
Palawan passage, while the Bugis mariners sailed north through the Celebes Sea
into the zone. In this context, if one ignores traditional political boundaries and
views these seas as unifying rather than divisive agents – ‘great connectors’ –
strategically extending across the region’s key shipping routes, a strong case
could be made for regarding the zone as one of the final, albeit critically
important, extremities of the world capitalist economy in eastern Asia. (Warren
2000, 4)

The history of this area is indeed replete with contact of many Asian peoples by
Europeans – the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Dutch and the English – because of
extensive stores of spices and other desirable organic products. Seeking to corner the
market in this regard, the Europeans sought to make exclusive trade arrangements – or to
colonize the desired island areas – with greater military technology at their disposal.

2


What do Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Brunei, Thailand, and Indonesia
have in common? First, they were all subject to foreign colonial subjugation
except Thailand. Colonialism disrupted traditional political, economic, social and
ethno-religious patterns, particularly the predominant role of Islam. (Palmier
2005, 1-2)

This was not, then, an economic rivalry along the lines of a Marxist dialectic; both
hegemonic forces involved in this area espoused capitalist economies and means of
production. The difference, which from the outset seemed strictly religious in nature,
involved two opposing cultural outlooks: Islam – the acculturated worldview and
political economy of choice; and, Western (European) colonialism – the aggressive,
imperialism of non-Muslims, the kafir (infidels); those who hailed from dar-ul Harb
(world-of-war).

The Machinery of Western Globalization in East and Southeast Asia
How did the West come to dominate this Eastern regional trading network? There is no
denying that European colonialists were imperialistic in their entanglements in both Latin
America and Asia. The Dutch were probably the most beneficent of these European
colonizers in Southeast Asia. Theirs was much more of a business relationship
(especially with Ternate near Moluccas), vis-à-vis the vehicle of the Dutch East India
Company, or VOC as it is known in the literature (Laarhoven 1989, 4-22; cf. Ty n.d., 5).
Other Europeans and the Americans (in lieu of interests in integrating Mindanao with the
rest of the Philippines) [p 30] were less beneficent, and left legacies of typical colonial
abuse, racism (Ty n.d., 4) and tyranny.
Fast-forward now nearly fifty years after the Spanish-American War in the mid-
twentieth century. With the apparent success of rebuilding war-torn nations in Europe
under the Marshall Plan and through the World Bank after World War II, the U.S.-led
effort of instituting the policies and frameworks of the Bretton Woods institutions in East
Asian countries was into full-scale implementation by the beginning of the 1950s (cf.
Todaro 2000). Encouraged by the success of this program in post-War Europe, the
Bretton Woods engineers convinced certain developing countries of Southeast Asia to
subscribe to the ideal that laissez-faire capitalism and free-market mechanisms would
spur on the best growth in these recovering economies. This is because

export successes…provided the primary impetus for arguments by…the World
Bank and the IMF…that…economic growth is best served by allowing market
forces, free enterprise, and open economies to prevail…. Unfortunately, the
reality of the East Asian cases does not support this view…. In…Singapore…[for
example], the production and composition of exports was not left to the market
but resulted as much from carefully planned intervention by the government.
(Todaro 2000, 503)

Today, the result is a polarization between the guardians of the Western
globalization machinery and those nations which were supposed to benefit – and improve

3


– through the use of those institutions. Attention has focused more on “…the question of
social cohesion and domestic governance in East Asian societies…” (Fukasaku & Duval
2005, 4) than on evaluating the mechanisms under which these countries are subjected.
The arrogant confidence of the West in regards to its globalization approach, then, has
created a veritable crisis of leadership in certain East Asian recipient nations:
“[G]lobalization has posed serious challenges to governance in East Asian countries.
Crises in development have greatly eroded the legitimacy of the existing political
economic model, while East Asian governments’ failure to overcome the crisis has
brought about political instability” (Chung 2002, 20).
While losing face in the challenge of operating and surviving under this
machinery leads to much social and cultural consternation, especially among Muslim
populations, the fact that the West is imposing its imperial will over these Southeast
Asian societies is a stronger cause for alarm: [p 31]

Globalization has transformed the environment in which the actors live and
compete [by implementing]…the challenge of adapting to global standards. In
order to participate in the global economy and the world community, nations and
firms are required to act in accordance with globally accepted rules and norms.
Certainly, pressures from international organizations such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and powerful
states like the United States play a major role. (Chung 2002, 22-23)

Even before the full effects of the Asian financial crisis were felt at the end of the
twentieth century, Western globalization was exerting pressure on the whole Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In veritable patron-client fashion, there was the
announcement of the creation of “ASEAN + 3” (Ohno 2002, 8n4) – those three other
nations being Japan, China and South Korea. This occurred because the states and
governance statutes of those three nations is perceived to be more stable – stability as
measured by the Western globalization paradigm.

Same Hegemony, Different Persona
Many commentators on the state of Islam, since the end of World War II and the formal
colonial period, make a comment similar to McAmis concerning the “…challenge of
resurgent Islam…” (2002, iii). What has not been voiced directly but only implied in the
literature is the diametrically opposite resurgence of Western imperial colonialism in the
guise of Western globalization. The empirical – indeed, imperial – nature of
globalization was mentioned a few years ago: “Globalization refers to a bundle of
processes that continue to change the world we live in and the way we live in it. There
are historical antecedents to some of the processes described by globalization,…when
there appeared to be a limited number of transnational totalizing discourses shaped by the
empires that sustained them” (Bouma 2004, ix).
Similar to the superior military power of the European colonialists of old is the
pressure of the superior economic power now being exerted by the Bretton Woods
institutions in enforcing a veritable imperial will of the globalization paradigm:

4


Preferring the term ‘imperialism’ implies a focusing on patterns of economic,
political and cultural power…. [O]ne of the constituents of the new imperialism is
the process of accumulation by dispossession through a combination of coercion
and consent enforced by the international [p 32] financial system and organized
state power…. The cultural imperialism thesis thus relates not merely to the
spread of Western values through the media, but more significantly to a
fundamental reorganization of local cultures that is linked to economic
liberalization, neo-liberalism, and imperialist formations of global capital.
(Harindranath 2006, 144)

In classic Chinese or European theatre, the actor would put on one or more
different masks (persona, in Latin) in order to characterize a different part played in each
successive Act. Likewise, the Western hegemony ‘actor’ has worn the mask of
colonialism before World War II and, now, wears the mask of globalization in this
current generation. The persona are different, but the Western hegemonic paradigm is
the same.

Not Just the Economy – It’s About the ‘Territory’
Market economics has always entailed the aspect of geography: organic products are
grown in specific geographic locations; markets and storehouses take up geographic
space; cargoes are transported geographically over land or over sea. Whereas this is
seemingly automatic in market capitalism (perhaps another virtue of the invisible-hand
characteristic) and virtually undetectable, geography takes a much more prominent place
in the whole ethos of Islam, not just in economic activities.
The cardinal Muslim concept of dar-ul Islam is treated as mere ideology by
3
some, but its central tenets clearly reveal it as a concrete concept of occupying territory –
territory that belongs to, and is of, Allah, the one true God. In principle, when a certain
area, or ‘territory,’ is completely inhabited by Muslims, then it is considered dar-ul
Islam, which is translated more literally as “abode of Islam” (Gowing 1979, 202) or
“territory of Islam” (Che Man 1990, 44). More than just a philosophical platitude, then,
striving to keep or expand dar-ul Islam involves willingness on the part of faithful
Muslims to occupy land and peoples in the name of Allah so that the hegemony of Islam
will prevail.

Islamic resurgence will increase the dar-al-Islam (household of Islam) and
decrease the opposition in the dar-al-harb (household of war). The requires jihad
(struggle for the faith) and da’wa (mission to the world). The ultimate goal of
resurgence is to bring the whole world under the controlling influence of Islam.
(McAmis 2002, 73)
[p 33]
From older to newer Western empires, the thrust has always been to champion the
empire and lessen the allegiance to the locality where the citizens lived. For example,
Palestine and Spain in the time of the Roman Empire were under Pax Romana; and,

5


South American lands and peoples, and the Philippines, were under the Spanish Empire –
a veritable Pax Hispanica. This totalizing discourse has not changed purpose under the
Western globalization paradigm either; instead, it has just changed its name:
“supraterritoriality” (Scholte 2000, 16). This term means that there will be an
overarching entity over existing territory which will be considered more important, as in
the case of Pax Romana. A different term that is also used in the literature, which
indicates the same situation, is deterritorialization. The emphasis in the second term is
more on the overarching entity and less on the territory over which it reigns supreme.

Deterritorialization, in general, is one of the central forces of the modern world,
since it brings laboring populations into the lower class sectors and spaces of
relatively wealthy societies, while sometimes creating exaggerated and intensified
senses of criticism or attachment to politics in the home-state.
Deterritorialization, whether of Hindus, Sikhs, Palestinians or Ukranians, is now
at the core of a variety of global fundamentalisms, including Islamic and Hindu
fundamentalism. (Appadurai 2000, 106)

Appadurai’s analysis is critical for understanding McAmis’ comment that jihad
will be used, and is, by Muslims in defense of dar-ul Islam. The fact that Western
globalization can be perceived as yet another hegemonic threat to the realm of dar-ul
Islam, as colonialism was in centuries past, provides the backdrop to some of the
response and reaction to globalization from these three Malay Muslim regions.

Reaction and Response to Western Globalization from the Malay Muslim Realm

Malaysia
Given the history of the Islamic presence and sultanate structure of government in
what is now known as the nation of Malaysia, the following assessment of the “impact of
globalization” (in the aftermath of the late-1990s Asian financial crisis) is not surprising:
[p 34]

[It is true that] Malaysia tapped heavily into the economic drivers of globalization
in order to develop the country. At the same time, it does not mean that Malaysia
embraced globalization without reservations, as the government did not utilize
strictly ‘market-friendly’ policies in certain sectors while protecting others,
sometimes temporarily, for the sake of national interest. (Siew-Yean 2004, 63)

Despite Western globalization’s dictum in regards to subscribing to liberal-
democratic ideals in political economy, the admission here is most revealing due to the
tension that we have witnessed already of dar-ul Islam versus Western ideals for
globalization. In keeping with the more authoritarian, Islamic framework of political
economy practiced in the Malay Muslim world (in juxtaposition to Western

6


globalization), it again comes as no surprise that politics is as authoritarian as economics
in Malaysia.

On one so-called Asian side, the power of the state relying on military power and
an ethnic group is more important than the exercise of rights by political groups.
We see this in Malaysia, where the Malay Muslim ethnic and religious majority is
predominant…. These authoritarian regimes argue that the specific situation in
Asia politically, culturally and traditionally required a monolithic power in order
to achieve economic development alongside political stability…. (Soubert 2004,
171)

In the West’s desire to have hegemonic control over all member-nations
participating in this experiment in globalization, Malaysia’s experience with Western
globalizing ‘development’ would make those espousing liberal democracy flinch in
disbelief.

Development in Malaysia is called “command capitalism” [as opposed to laissez-
faire capitalism]. Among its characteristics are these: (a) development follows
the path of capitalism and is implemented from the top almost by force, with most
decisions made by a few leaders and implementations undertaken by the same
circle of close associates, and without much participation from the bottom; and
(b) several laws and regulations in stark violation of basic human rights are
perpetuated presumably in order to create an atmosphere of stability…. (Osman
2004, 133)

In light of this assessment, it is a wonder that the Bretton Woods institutions have
not stepped in to reprimand this member that is seemingly not [p 35] obeying the rules.
Interesting is the admission that Malaysia’s challenge “to sustain the development” will
come through “…regional cooperation, especially at the ASEAN [BIMP EAGA]4 level,
[which] will enhance Malaysia’s capabilities to meet this challenge” (Siew-Yean 2004,
78). The region’s legacy bodes against the liberal-democracy ideal of Western
globalization, which is not surprising at all.

Indonesia
Perhaps due to the world-renown of Bali, most people are initially surprised to
find out that Indonesia is the largest Muslim nation in the world by population.
Historically, the Islamic influences came alongside of the Hindu but, eventually, the
Muslim forces circumvented and displaced those vestiges (in all but Bali today).

Arabs started arriving in Indonesia as far back as the 4th century…. In the
14th century the Mohammedans [i.e., Muslims] consolidated their hold on Gujerat
in India and began to expand their trade considerably in Indonesia. This was the
beginning of the archipelago's Islamic period.

7


Islam caught on in far northern Sumatra first, then spread to Java…. In
1478, a coalition of Muslim princes attacked what was left of the Hindu
Majapahit Empire, and Islam was here to stay. (Dalton 1991)

One of the evident ways that Indonesian Islam expresses itself in digression to the
stated Western liberal-democratic ideal is in the understanding of the socio-political
concept of rasa –

[For post-colonial Indonesia in the mid-1960s],…Suharto's attempt to project a
dignified role as the leader of the state also involved an almost ritualised
dominance in political life for himself and his family. At times his rule was
viewed as being similar to that of a Javanese king…. This may seem to be an
exaggeration, but viewing the public supplication of members of the government
and family at the knees of 'head-of-state' Suharto reminds us that such rituals also
enforce hierarchy and send a powerful signal of political dominance to the public.
(Ferguson 2002, 4)

Similar to Malaysia, then, Indonesia has accepted certain tenets of Western
globalization on her own terms. In reporting on the “unrealized potential” of
“globalization” in “the Indonesian economy,” Rice & Sulaiman (2004) [p 36] applaud the
“openness” of the Indonesian government in allowing the Bretton Woods institutions
work to alleviate problems caused by the 1997 Asian economic crisis. They are baffled,
however, at the apparent lack of willingness on the part of the Suharto government (in the
late-1990s) to welcome the complete Western globalization paradigm as the panacea to
many problems. Rice & Sulaiman (2004, 80, 81) mention internal factors preventing
such wholesale adoption, seemingly without understanding the implied reasoning therein:

Globalization has both caused difficulties and created opportunities for the
Indonesian people…. The crisis in 1997 ‘forced’ Indonesia to request assistance
from the International Monetary Fund…. Although IMF influences on the
Indonesian government have favoured foreign direct investment and international
trade, domestic factors have adversely affected the investment climate and
stymied foreign direct investment….

Later, their comment that “…export to the global market is being realized, but
much more could be done” (2004, 89) indicates a misunderstanding for reticence on the
part of Indonesia. Once it is realized that Indonesia sees herself as part of dar-ul Islam in
Southeast Asia, the confusion fades away. Because Indonesia was forced to ask for help
from the machinery of Western globalization, she has virtually ‘lost face,’ causing the
tension between globalization and dar-ul Islam to mount there.

Mindanao (Philippines)
Recalling the discussion above about the Western persona, perhaps no other
insular nation in Southeast Asia has experienced the full assault of Western colonial

8


power as the Philippines. Historical accounts are replete with the capitulation of Luzon
and the Visayas to the colonial demands of the Spaniards through to the end of the
nineteenth century; only Mindanao Muslims withstood the imperial onslaught of Spain
(though that too seemed imminent in the late-nineteenth century5). With the coming of
the Americans in the first-half of the twentieth century, promises were made to the
Muslim bangsamoro peoples of Mindanao (i.e., the Bates Treaty) but were left
unfulfilled in order to further designs for all regions of the Philippine archipelago –
especially Mindanao – to come in line with ‘national integration’ policies emanating from
Manila.
While historical records differ on both sides – from the Luzon / Visayan
Kristyano view of untrustworthy Moros, to the bangsamoro view of being [p 37]
disenfranchised from their own homeland – there is no dispute that neglect occurred. The
question is, rather, did it happen by commission or omission?

The Moroland is rich of natural resources and mines, aside from the fertility of its
soil, yet quite behind in economic development because of being neglected by the
Manila government. Since annexation of the Moroland by the Philippines, a vast
amount of Pesos is being generated by the crusade Philippine government out of
the Moro wealth on the account of the Moros themselves. (Zahir 1998)

In this climate of tentative trust between Muslims and non-Muslims in the
Philippines comes an all too familiar solution from the camp of Western globalization:
give them a ‘Marshall Plan’ to bring peace and development to the war-torn areas of
Mindanao.

[T]he US government appears receptive to long-term assistance toward peaceful
and progressive Mindanao, which it could use as a model for future programs for
“strife-torn Islamic societies”…. [This new] Marshall Plan could be applied to the
whole of Mindanao region, but Ople said it would be focused on the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao…. [E]uropean countries and Japan have played an
important role in Mindanao’s development. We envision their continued
participation in an over-all plan to rebuild the region,” [Foreign Minister] Ople
said. (Vargas & Corpuz 2003)

While many others have reported on this already, this encapsulates the ongoing
tension that exists between those stakeholders representing bangsamoro interests – the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Bangsamoro Development Agency
(BDA), etc. – and those wanting to bring Mindanao into line with the rest of the
Philippines regarding integration and subscribing to the globalization dogma of Western
development through the assistance of the Bretton Woods institutions.

Conclusion
In anthropological fashion, then, it would be easy to resort to a structural dichotomist
explanation (a la Levi-Strauss) to account for the apparent polarization between Western

9


globalization and dar-ul Islam. Even a statement from a recent Brookings Institution
publication admits that “Islam’s quite rapid diffusion from Arabia across Asia to what is
now Indonesia was a clear instance [p 38] of globalization…” (Keohane & Nye 2000, 2)
– and this furthers the idea that this tension is simple and reductionistic.
Indeed, this notion of simplicity translates to downplaying the idea that
impositions and cultural-imperialism are inherent to the nature of the Western
globalization paradigm. Citing the phenomenon of American pop culture as radiating
“soft power” but not possessing the quality of hegemony due to “hybridization,” another
essay from that Brookings publication makes this pronouncement:

The United States, perhaps the most intensively hybridized state on the planet, has
not been remaking the world in its image during this period, but it has
consolidated and maintained a preponderant position as the single greatest
generator of culture intended for worldwide consumption. (Rosendorf 2000,
126).

But this is where the Brookings Institution downplays the reality of Western
globalization’s “preponderant position.” Another think-tank in the United States, the
RAND Corporation, is more forthcoming in revealing some reasons for the apparent
hegemonic thrust in Muslim Malay territory, on the part of this Western paradigm:

Southeast Asia derives its geopolitical importance from the region’s location at
the crossroads between the concentration of industrial, technological, and military
power in Northeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and the oil resources of the
Middle East, and Australia and the Southwest Pacific. A high proportion of the
trade of Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Australia, including much of
their oil imports, transits the straits and sea-lanes of communication in Southeast
Asia. From a military perspective, these sea-lanes are critical to the movement of
U.S. forces from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.
(Rabasa & Chalk 2001, 1).

Whereas American pop culture emphasizes the (so-called) benign effects of
globalization’s soft-power, truer motivations for the polarizing hard-power of Western
globalization now become clear. Phrasing a question in the same way as Robert
Chambers (who asked ‘Whose Reality Counts?’ in his 1997 publication), anxious
Muslims are asking ‘whose culture counts?’ This is because of a corollary query: ‘Why
should we Muslims believe that Western globalization will offer a “worldwide culture” to
which we can subscribe?’ [p 39] Instead, in their view, it is Muslims, living under the
ideal of dar-ul Islam, who will truly generate the godly culture intended for the whole
world by those serving Allah.
Inherent in these types of questions, therefore, is fuel for such issues mounting
between Western globalization and Islam. Similarly, it is these questions that spark
discussion and reaction to Western hegemony from the Malay Muslim world of insular
Southeast Asia – a reaction that will not seem to dissipate anytime soon.

10


Endnotes
1
“As the emerging countries gravitated towards the UN system [formally ratified in 1948], the
leading governments increasingly relied on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) [also known as the World Bank]
to push their agenda. [These are] the Bretton Woods institutions…. The IMF was conceived by
John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, the two pillars of the Bretton Woods meeting, as
the guardian of global liquidity, a function that it was supposed to fulfil by monitoring member
countries’ maintenance of stable exchange rates…. [T]he IBRD was, as its name implied, set up
to assist in the reconstruction of the war-torn economies, particularly those of Western Europe…”
(Bello 2006, 36).
2
“The fact is that there is a common feeling of solidarity among the Muslims of the Malay world
where, after all, Islam is the predominant religion. Muslim Filipinos have a strong sense of this
solidarity, and though numerically a minority in the Philippines they do not in any way suffer
from a minority mentality. They are geographically concentrated in a homeland that is
contiguous across shallow seas with the predominantly Muslim nations of Malaysia and
Indonesia. They thus readily identify with the Muslim majority of the Southeast Asian island
realm…” (McAmis 2002, 5n3).
3
Gowing sometimes referred to the concept in ideological terms (1979, 101 & 102). One
disillusioned Filipino Muslim author has written: “[T]he theory of dar-ul-Islam which demands
the unity of all Muslim believers under one government and in one territory is denied in practice.
Dar-ul-Islam has not prevented the dissolution of Pakistan nor cemented the fractious Middle
Eastern Islamic powers. The theory may continue to exist in theological and philosophical
treatises, perhaps even in political propaganda, as happens sometimes. But in the real world there
are many social forces that cannot be controlled by ideologies be they religious or utopian”
(Casiño 1976, 136; italics in original).
4
“[The Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP EAGA)
will]…give Mindanaoans and Palawenos the opportunity to renew [p 40] cultural and ethnic ties
with their East ASEAN neighbors and build upon historical trade ties that date back to the 17th
century. (Cultural affinity is seen as a strong binding force for BIMP EAGA, an element that is
absent in the other growth areas of Asia.)” (MEDCo 2004).
5
“The Spanish tactic of establishing forts to sever the local channels of communication,
beginning with Zamboanga in the sixteenth century, reached its full spread [before the end of the
nineteenth century]” (Ileto 2007, 109).

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