This is the final version of the online forum on Smart Subsidies for the promotion of vibrant and sustainable Agricultural Knowledge and Information (AKI) Services. The discussion was hosted by The Market Facilitation Initiative (MaFI) in March 2010.
Extreme poverty in Bangladesh: lessons, learnings and reflections
Smart Subsidies for Ag Knowledge and Info Services, Online Forum Synthesis, FINAL Mar2011
1. MaFI—The Market Facilitation Initiative
Synthesis of the Online Discussion
Smart Subsidies in Market Facilitation
Specifically for
Agricultural Knowledge and Information Services (AKIS)
Facilitated by Andy Jeans, Ben Fowler and Lucho Osorio
Participants:
Abdur Rob, Practical Action (Bangladesh)
Alex Mugova, Practical Action (Kenya)
Andy Jeans, APT Enterprise Development (UK)
Alison Griffith, Practical Action (UK)
Ben Fowler, Consultant (Canada)
Christian Pennotti, CARE (USA)
Ekanath Khatiwada, SNV (Zambia)
James Tj, National Innovation Foundation (India)
Jayantha Gunasekera, Practical Action (Sri Lanka)
Kamran Niazi, Consultant (Pakistan)
Linda Jones, Aga Khan Foundation (Switzerland)
Luis E. (Lucho) Osorio-Cortes, Practical Action (UK)
Marcus Jenal, Intercooperation (Bangladesh)
Mary Cockram, Consultant (USA)
Rajiv Pradhan, IDE (Bangladesh)
Shawn Cunningham, Consultant (South Africa)
Terence Isert, Consultant (USA)
Yogesh Kumar Dwivedi, Action for Social Advancement (ASA) (India)
March 2011
Editors: Gail E. Carter and Lucho Osorio
with the support of Practical Action
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2. TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction – 4
Defining Subsidies – 5
Are They Smart Subsidies, Interventions or Transactions? – 5
Moving the Discussion Forward – 6
The Issues:
1) Transparency – 8
2) Decreasing / Ending Subsidies – 9
3) Expectations and Preconceptions – 11
4) Public and Private Goods – 13
5) Coordinating Market Players and (or) Customizing Subsidies – 19
6) Financial Services – 22
7) Markets, Incentives and Investments – 23
8) Gender – 24
ANNEX A1
Key Principles for Subsidy Use – 26
Tips for Implementing Subsidies – 26
Justifiable Subsidies – 27
Difficult to Justify Subsidies – 28
Some Considerations When Subsidizing AKI Services – 28
Central Questions and Challenges – 28
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Some ideas in this annex were inspired or adapted from the work done by the FIELD Facilitation Working Group:
http://www.microlinks.org/ev_en.php?ID=26628_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC
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Dear Readers:
We hope you find this paper useful in your work. The discussions were rich and informative,
and raised interesting questions for practitioners and policy-makers. We would like to hear
about areas where you, your colleagues or partners experience knowledge gaps in applying
subsidies in your work. A particularly important question raised during the discussions is:
Can we use our combined experience to come up with factors that could convince farmers
to pay for knowledge and information services?
While we may know the principles, we sometimes struggle with how to apply them in
practice. What areas do you think require more investigation? For example, do you find the
principles presented in this paper to be universally applicable or does their usefulness and
efficacy vary with context or target population? If the latter, where and with who? And, if
there are other areas of the synthesis that you agree or disagree with, we hope you share your
thoughts with us.
Contact Information:
Luis E (Lucho) Osorio-Cortes, MaFI Facilitator: luis.osorio@practicalaction.org.uk
To know more about MaFI: http://bit.ly/d9KsB8
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4. Introduction
The Market Facilitation Initiative (MaFI) is a working group of the SEEP Network and the
Livelihoods Network, with support from Practical Action. MaFI promotes learning and peer
support amongst practitioners facilitating pro-poor market development programs that aim to
achieve sustainability and impact at scale. It also assists practitioners move from design to
implementation by advancing principles, techniques and tools.
In 2008, MaFI created a learning agenda focused on Horizontal and Vertical Linkages, Capacity-Building
and Subsidies. The central points of the Subsidies Learning Theme are the discussion, sharing and
distilling of experiences; the advancement of practical principles, techniques and tools; and whether,
when and how subsidies can be used to catalyze structural changes in market systems that improve
the livelihoods of poor people. Given that subsidies is such a broad topic, MaFI members agreed to
focus first on the use of subsidies to promote sustainable agricultural knowledge and information
services (AKIS2) and their relevance to pro-poor market development in the agriculture sector.
Traditionally, assistance to this sector has depended heavily on subsidies and finding “smarter” ways
of using them to maximize the sustainability and scale of impacts is not only important but urgent.
AKIS includes the implicit and explicit knowledge and information on the skills, techniques,
technical assistance and market prices; the location and quality of suppliers; and the warning signals
and prevention of pest infestations, diseases, etc.—that strengthen agricultural enterprises and the
livelihoods of those who depend on them.
On October 15th, 2009, MaFI circulated a discussion document3 to spark a learning conversation
among its members. That paper presented a working definition of subsidies and several key
principles of subsidy use, implementation tips, central questions and challenges and issues specific to
AKIS. The discussions were held over a three-day period from March 23–25 20104. This document
is a synthesis of those discussions.
The goal of the document is to serve as a reference point for future discussions and to map out the
current knowledge and the new questions, gaps and tensions related to the use of subsidies to
promote sustainable access to AKIS. The document also includes case studies to illustrate how
MaFI members and other development agents and researchers are applying subsidies in the field. We
foresee the paper contributing to a more effective use of subsidies in pro-poor market development.
2 The initial idea was to use the term “agricultural extension” but some members thought it excluded other important
types of knowledge and information services usually not supplied by extension agents.
3
See Annex A or go to http://www.slideshare.net/marketfacil/mafi-subsidies-discussion-paper
4 In reality the conversations took place during a longer period of time (March-April), but the online forum was
convened during the three days mentioned.
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5. Defining Subsidies
There are those who would argue that all development
If all development interventions are
interventions are subsidies and effecting change in a market subsidies and effecting change in a
system has the potential to distort it. If this is the case, why market system has the potential to
are distortion and subsidy considered negative, but distort it, why are distortion and
change and smart subsidies positive? Given the diversity subsidy considered negative, but
change and smart subsidies positive?
of terms that practitioners use—incentives, buying down risk,
investments, smart subsidies, risk capital, grants and start-up
capital—defining a subsidy can be difficult.
Subsidies are a way to reduce market actors’ costs and risk through cost-sharing with a development
agency to achieve a specific development objective. Practitioners (and donors) consider subsidies to
be investments intended to bring about a desired result—systemic change that permits their eventual
discontinuation, increased food security or a developmental impact such as leveling the playing field
or reducing exclusion, inequality and discrimination. Whatever the outcome, subsidies should not
undermine the self-reliance of households or market systems.
Boundaries define subsidies—some say that from an economic perspective subsidies do not exist.
Others believe that subsidies exist, but their existence depends on the boundaries we use to define
the social system we are trying to change (in our case, the markets). Any resource originating outside of
the target system is a subsidy. If the system is the global economy, subsidies cease to exist. In a
nutshell, subsidies are real but depend on constructed boundaries. If this is accepted, then the trick
is in how we draw such boundaries. Some people understand public subsidies as a bad thing. Others,
especially when it comes to crisis situations and extremely vulnerable people, accept that public
subsidies are good and even necessary. Using the concept idea of system boundaries, two
considerations come to mind:
Do the boundaries include all the actors (public and private) who make the creation of wealth
sustainable in the long run? When we define the boundaries of a particular market system do we
not leave out key players?
How feasible is it for actors within those boundaries (especially marginalized producers) to
influence the way resources inside those boundaries are used?
Are They Smart Subsidies or Interventions?
Jayantha Gunasekera [Practical Action] wrote: “I am trying to understand what are subsidies, what
are smart subsidies and what are not subsidies, but market development interventions.” He shared a
case study that involved either subsidies or interventions in the dairy sector in Sri Lanka and said he
wanted to learn if it met smart subsidy criteria. In brief, the project:
Identified the need for improved breeds, feed and cattle management for better returns for
farmers
Provided cattle management training for selected lead farmers, including training of trainers
Introduced a new variety of grass for improved feed
Organized and funded a one-off agricultural information clinic, and
Facilitated interaction between the farmers, veterinarians and input providers.
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6. Andy Jeans [APT] responded to Jayantha’s request, noting that it was unclear how much subsidy
was used and that the case was an intervention by an NGO as it appeared that the NGO met all of
the costs. If that is so, then it was not really a subsidy. A subsidy would involve the intervener
contributing part of the cost and one or more market actors covering the balance. A smart subsidy
would lead to a systemic change that obviated the need for further subsidies—for example, in
this case study, a subsidy that led to cattle management training, the provision of improved feed by
local input suppliers and artifical insemination services becoming more widely available in the
market with services purchased by farmers like those assisted.
On the other hand, Linda Jones [Aga Khan Foundation] said
“…in a sense we can say that all
that she appreciated the implication of Jayantha's question interventions are subsidies and have the
and, in a sense we can say that all interventions are subsidies potential to distort the market system in
and have the potential to distort the market system in which which we are trying to intervene. In
we are trying to intervene. In fact, when we try to effect fact, when we try to effect change in a
change in a market system, are we not trying to distort it? So market system, are we not trying to
distort it?”
distortion and subsidy are terms we use negatively, but change
Linda Jones, Aga Khan Foundation
and smart subsidies are meant to be the positive. To her, it all
comes back to the context and outcome and she agreed with
Andy's statement that subsidies should not undermine self-reliance of households or market
systems.
Rajiv Pradhan [IDE] proposed that it is useful to differentiate between project interventions and
the transactions performed by market actors. Using Jayantha’s case as an example, Rajiv mentioned
that training paravets so that they can demonstrate the benefits of their services is a legitimate
project intervention that can be subsidized. The question then is who trains the paravets without
subsidies in the long term? If the subsidy leads to sustainable transactions amongst market actors,
then we can talk about smart subsidy.
Moving the Discussion on Subsidies Forward
Discussions over the three-day period were facilitated by Lucho Osorio, Ben Fowler and Andy Jeans
and focused on 1) Using Subsidies in Dysfunctional, but Stable Markets; 2) Using Subsidies in
Dysfunctional, Unstable and Crisis-affected Markets; and 3) Lessons, Challenges, Policy
Implications and a Future Research Agenda.
Day One began by looking at the use of subsidies for AKI services in markets that, despite being
relatively stable, are weak, thin or do not work well for the poorest. In addition, concepts and issues
surrounding subsidies were introduced.
Day Two focused on particularly vulnerable / disadvantaged producers, e.g., individuals /
communities suffering from poor health, discrimination, conflict or natural disaster. Some may say
that relief or welfare services (such as food aid, food for work, or distribution of seeds and tools) are
the only practical response. But can the market for AKI services respond to their needs as well or
better? And if so, in what ways can or should we use subsidies to bring this about?
Examples from East Africa show the possibilities:
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7. In the work of the National Union of Disabled Persons in Uganda (NUDIPU) with disabled
people in conflict-affected Northern Uganda, partial subsidies are used to stimulate the hiring of
disabled men and women as apprentices in ongoing small enterprises. The subsidy enables
owners to adapt facilities and many apprentices go on to either start their own enterprise or to
find employment elsewhere.
APT’s Rural Education and Economic Enhancement Program (REEP) in Western Kenya
provides AKI subsidies (applied indirectly through community volunteers) to farmers who have
HIV/AIDS. The subsidies enable them to establish horticultural production and marketing that
leads to food security and social inclusion.
On Day Three we looked at areas that received less attention during the first two days:
• Public and private goods: Are there agriculture knowledge and information services that can
become sustainable only through permanent, public subsidies? Many practitioners have seen
situations where the private provision of AKIS is nonexistent and public provision is extremely
weak or absent—does a solution always exist in these areas?
• Transparency: Should we be 100% transparent with all stakeholders about our intentions to use
subsidies?
• Power: Having resources to invest and deciding who to give them to makes us powerful compared
to other market actors. How should we deal with this?
• Expectations and preconceptions: How can we manage expectations strategically and minimize
the damage preconceptions may cause?
• Coordination: How can we coordinate our use of subsidies with other development agents?
If we want extremely marginalized and vulnerable producers to engage with other public and private
market actors, we need to expend extra effort during the capacity-building phase before including
them in workshops with other stakeholders, negotiation rounds, drafting of joint action plans, etc.
However, a lesson from APT shows that the opposite is also true—if the project is well
facilitated, market engagement can actually build capacity to engage with other actors. And,
it can also re-build self-esteem and break down cultural and social barriers, which is extremely
important when talking about HIV/AIDS-affected populations and victims of conflict, disaster, etc.
Within those broad parameters, the conversation ranged widely and raised a number of important
and interesting questions. For instance:
Can we predict market distortions and/or the scale of impact when we use subsidies?
Can a good business plan tell us when to withdraw subsidies? Are there other indicators
we should use?
What incentives do subsidy recipients have to tell us they no longer need subsidies?
Kamran Niazi [Consultant] brought up the issue of who deserves assistance and how we think about
those we provide with subsidized aid. Do we consider everyone so deserving that we want to
give them everything? He considers it preferable to think of those we help with subsidies as
potential market players and productive members of the economy who just need a helping hand to
move further up the value chain. He provided a link to the Entrepreneur Bootcamp for Veterans
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8. with Disabilities (EBV) 5, a training program at several U.S. universities for American war veterans, a
group that, according to Kamran, certainly falls under the poor health / conflict-affected criteria that
we saw in the NUDIPA example. He noted that the selection criteria for inclusion in EBV are very
tough.
Andy Jeans [APT] noted that in this forum we are considering the merits and value of subsidies to
bring about systemic change in market processes that enable everyone, whatever their disadvantages,
to work themselves out of poverty. In that context, no one is more deserving than any other and
the question must be whether the targeted use of subsidies can enable AKI services to be
accessed and made use of by even the most disadvantaged.
Participants’ experiences in working with and familiarizing themselves with numerous projects
enriched the conversation around these and other questions and helped refine our understanding of
smart subsidies by identifying issues and suggesting different ways to use them.
The Issues
In synthesizing the discussions, we organized the paper around the major themes that emerged
during the discussions:
1) Transparency
2) Decreasing / ending subsidies
3) Public and private goods
4) Expectations and preconceptions
5) Coordinating Market Players and (or) Customizing Subsidies
6) Markets, Incentives and Investments
7) Power and relationships
We understand that there is necessarily a good deal of overlap between these themes and we
encourage readers to comment on the content and its organization.
1) Transparency
Transparency is a multi-faceted issue. In some cases the question is,
“For me, the main reason to be
should development practitioners be 100% transparent with all transparent about subsidies is that it
stakeholders about their intentions to use subsidies? It depends... will help manage expectations and it is
where loan guarantees (a financial subsidy) are concerned, easier to set up a process that is clear
on why there is a subsidy, how long it
transparency can lead to increased defaults—the loan is guaranteed
will last, what the hoped for outcome
and if borrowers do not repay, the guarantor will. Alex Mugova has is, etc.”
had firsthand experience with more than ten loan guarantee programs Linda Jones, Aga Khan Foundation
that performed dismally once borrowers learned that the loans were
guaranteed. It was clear to him that, “…in the case of loan subsidies, the overwhelming evidence
from the field is that transparency will undo all the good intentions.”
5
http://www.whitman.syr.edu/ebv/
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9. There may not be a comparable market development example where transparency can help
programs manage expectations by setting up a process that is clear on why there is a subsidy, how
long it will last, what the expected outcome is, etc. In cases where subsidies consist of
embedded inputs or services, transparency is paramount.
“…in the case of loan subsidies,
No producer who receives a service such as training or advice the overwhelming evidence from
wants to find out later that he is, in fact, paying for it when he the field is that transparency will
receives less than expected for his crop or product. A lack of undo all the good intentions.”
transparency can seriously undermine the confidence and mutual Alex Mugova, Practical Action
trust that are critically important to stimulating the emergence of
inclusive and pro-poor markets.
In Kenya, the case of a Community-Based Animal Health Workers (CBAHW) association that
works with the District Veterinary Office (DVO) on disease outbreaks and vaccination
campaigns raises issues of transparency, participation in decision-making and empowering
marginalized actors to decide how subsidies are used. The CBAHW was unable to get any
information on the amount of donated inputs and supplies intended for the communities from
the DVO, which received the supplies and distributed them. Not only could the district
CBAHWs not find out anything about the supplies, they were denied a role in the decision-
making and resource allocation processes. In this example, a public entity withheld valuable
information from a vulnerable group by not informing members about the supplies it received
(how much and for who) and not allowing them to help decide how to use the goods.
2) Decreasing / Ending Subsidies
The discussion paper states that capacity-building is a
Gradually reducing subsidies may
legitimate use of subsidies, but it is more difficult to justify sound easy, but it can be a very
physical assets and recurring operational costs (e.g., personnel, complex process. The subsidy must
equipment, etc.). While some may argue that subsidies for be justified and based on:
machinery are a low-risk way of introducing a group of market performance, an ability to tackle key
problems and an expanding market.
actors to a new technology or technique, how do they distort Is it a good idea to link subsidy
the market for incumbent producers and what is the scale reductions to business plans? And,
of their impact? Can we predict market distortions or will it work in rural areas?
impact? Can a business plan tell us when to withdraw Rajiv Pradhan, IDE
subsidies? And, are there incentives that could convince
recipients to voluntarily stop accepting subsidies?
Gradually reducing subsidies may sound easy, but it can be very “…we organized ourselves into a
complex. Rajiv Pradhan finds that if development agencies microenterprise and got training
from the national and local
understand business plans they can provide subsidies on a governments and NGOs. We now
declining basis. This type of subsidy must be justified and based exhibit in shows and fairs and
on: performance, the ability to tackle key problem(s) and an meet at the end of each month to
expanding market. However, will this work in rural areas? Will coordinate our work. We are
learning to produce other types of
small farmer groups be able to identify others who can provide milk-based products.”
AKI services as subsidies decline? Another question is: Is it a A Kamayok association member
good idea to link subsidy reductions to individual business
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10. plans and to avoid standard, one-size-fits-all subsidy packages?
In Peru, 11 Kamayoq (community-based agriculture service providers) trained by Practical
Action established a producer association that received funds (a subsidy) from the national
government to set up a yoghurt production plant. An association member says: “we organized
ourselves into a microenterprise and got training from the national and local governments and
NGOs. We now exhibit in shows and fairs and meet at the end of each month to coordinate our
work. We are learning to produce other types of milk-based products.”
This story demonstrates that once-marginalized producers can learn how to access and combine
funds and training services from government and NGOs and use them to build their businesses.
Though the Kamayoq are now doing well, they continue using NGO subsidies and this raises the
question of when subsidies for AKI services should be stopped. The subsidies were for training the
Kamayok as AKI service providers and to purchase a yoghurt processing unit for them to become
producers through their association. The first—promoting AKI service provision—is smart because
it enables the poor to access information they need to improve production. However, the rationale
for subsidizing a production plant is less clear because a) it may distort the market for competitors
and b) resources needed to subsidize all producers would likely be beyond the scope of the project.
Should the withdrawal of a subsidy for the Kamayok as service providers be based on the business
plan they have for operating those services?
In another example, this on Nepal’s essential oil industry from Rajiv Pradhan [IDE], the lack of
processing units near community forest users group (CFUG) member farms prevented the
groups from producing essential oil products. The project began by first helping farmers
improve their production and marketing skills and then facilitated their development of a
business plan. Due to the ongoing conflict, businesses were reluctant to invest in processing
machines so the project subsidized 50% of the cost of a unit to hasten the ROI for the groups.
The bank financed the remaining 50%, without collateral, on a hire-purchase basis and the
groups made regular installment payments. The lesson IDE learned was that a business plan was
essential both to help the CFUGs understand the ROI and to convince the bank to finance the
scheme. IDE found that the subsidy helped buyers access the product and did not distort the
market. The upfront work the project did with the groups to improve production and marketing
also gave them confidence in farmers’ ability to stick to the business plan.
When asked how farmers learned to maintain the machine and whether they could pay to learn and
were able to make their own repairs, Rajiv said group members received on-the-job training and
were involved in setting up the machine so they could operate and maintain it. (Other projects gave
units, but did not provide training and groups had to return to them for maintenance and other
assistance.) And, the community can pay / contribute when training or inputs benefit everyone.
Another question concerned the bank and whether it had replicated the scheme on its own
initiative? Rajiv’s response was that, yes, the bank had established a microenterprise unit and was
considering supporting others.
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11. Ekanath Khatiwada [SNV] said that introducing new technologies / innovations at the
community level can be difficult, even if there is market demand for new (value-added) products. A
demonstration of the tangible benefits that a new processing unit would provide may change
attitudes and encourage acceptance. The Nepal cardamom value chain case shows how improved
dryers introduced and commercialized locally benefited the community.
(practicalaction.org/shelter//text/SED_19-1)
In an example from Andy Jeans [APT], SITE, a Kenyan NGO, promoted milk quality services
to people already working in the warm milk chain—those who collect milk from farmers (such
as coops), transport it (often by bicycle) and retail and/or process it at milk bars. SITE
subsidized the initial training of these service providers whose eligibility for the training was
based on their business plans and previous performance. Once they began delivering the milk
quality services and clients paid their fees, SITE considered further subsidies to be unnecessary.
A key factor in allowing discontinuation of subsidies was the role that SITE, in cooperation with
Kenya Dairy Board, played in stimulating demand for the services by publicizing the importance
of milk hygiene and quality and facilitating the accreditation of both the milk sector market
players and the service providers.
Lucho brought up the importance of subsidizing the right actors, those who can provide AKI
services to marginalized producers and buyers. Sometimes, when we aim for sustainability we need
to subsidize non- or not-so-poor actors. This experience also stresses two essential selection
criteria: a track record as a service provider and a business plan (which can be improved
with the help of facilitators). Do you agree with these criteria? Are there others?
3) Expectations and Preconceptions
Ekanath Khatiwada contributed a case that highlighted the difficulty of creating market-based
AKI services due to the long-standing tradition—and expectations—of government subsidies
for agriculture. Much depends on changing attitudes. Very poor people cannot afford to buy
information or inputs and a subsidy for training, supplies or machinery can enable them to
participate in economic activities. A declining subsidy would allow them to begin sharing the
cost of services and pay a larger share over time. DANIDA /MRMG supported Rural Income
Generation Programme provided funds to the vegetable value chain in Nepal for awareness-
raising, training, inputs and technology, demonstration plots and group formation. During the
first year, these services helped the community to produce vegetables for selling in local markets.
In year two, MRMG/RIGP reduced the inputs subsidy by 25% and in year three they cut it
another 25%. In the final year, the project stopped all subsidies and facilitated linkages with a
private agricultural center, which has worked out for everyone.
Lucho asked if he had seen structural transformations in the vegetable case that would help
marginalized producers access sustainable AKI services? Did the farmers trained by the project go
on to build their own links with fee-based or government AKI service providers?
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12. Kamran Niazi worked with a project in India that supported grassroots NGOs in their efforts
to help very small farmers form into groups that they provided with funds to set up a business
venture. The groups were required to match the funds this modified venture philanthropic activity
provided, but they often contributed more. They had good
ideas for businesses that were market-led and quite Subsidies should be used to
promising. They would not make a lot of money, but the strengthen the performance of
project subsidized the start-ups, providing from $700-$1200 the market and not individual
firms, and government should
for each group ($70-$120 per member) and they were happy provide public goods that include
with the returns they received (20 percent or more). knowledge and information
Although there were some failures, there were more services.
successes. In the end, the project introduced new Shawn Cunningham, Consultant
technologies and inputs and made the markets work for the
poor.
Kamran also said the discussion seemed to be focusing too much on paperwork at the expense of
the idea or the people and wondered if we do not expect too much of those living at the
grassroots level? Assuming that very poor and uneducated farmers who cannot read Urdu can put
together a business plan or financial information in English is impractical and unrealistic. Even the
NGO staff could not produce a well-written plan and the project had to train them.
Lucho asked Kamran what he looks for when selecting marginalized producers to receive subsidies.
Kamran cited former MIT entrepreneurship professor, Ken Morse, who said “I will fund an A
Team with a B Idea, rather than funding a B Team with an A Idea” and “I do not look at the plan, I
look at the people”. He then said that for him the critical selection factors are:
An understanding that money is a privilege, not a right.
A business approach or very clear idea about what they want to do and why.
The ability to convince others and to know what they are talking about. He considers the ability
to write a plan in English to be far less important.
An idea they conceived and want to develop; it should not something imposed on them from
outside, though they can adopt a good practice as long as it is adapted to the local context and
conditions.
An appropriate concept, e.g., a processing unit that can take them from zero to 15, if that is what
they can afford, rather than to 100. The unit should be built locally from local materials so
others can copy the concept and afford to pay the full price. And, it should be energy efficient
since most poor people rarely have access or the ability to buy expensive fuels.
Subsidy approval should take no more that 2-3 steps with the final decisions made by totally
independent decision-makers.
Lucho noted that Kamran’s comments brought the importance of flexibility, experience and
intuition to the forum—and to donors who have strong incentives to push practitioners toward
forms and checklists. He then referred to Yogesh Kumar Dwivedi’s [ASA] comments about
farmers in very weak markets who have a small surplus, but are unaware of market and quality
issues. There is a need for projects to work with government to create awareness, train farmers,
form groups, provide agribusiness support, set up systems and procedures, build infrastructure such
as warehouses, etc. Promoting low-input agriculture and low-cost, ICT-based technologies for
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13. higher productivity can help ensure increased net returns from agriculture and provide producers a
fair price—something that rarely happens in India. Lucho said that the idea of collaborating with the
government may be the key to success in such extremely marginal contexts.
4) Public and Private Goods
Shawn Cunningham [Consultant] endorses the view that subsidies should be used to strengthen the
performance of the market, not of individual firms. Many believe that for markets to work,
governments must get out of the way, but others think government should focus on providing
public goods, including knowledge and information services that are prone to market failure because
they are so difficult to value and compare. Shawn says that we should direct subsidies at creating
public goods, such as education, technology demonstrations and the provision of information.
Another market intervention would be to support the creation of positive externalities. For instance,
when a farmer trains his staff, they may leave to work for another farmer who offers more money.
This typically happens in areas where there is under-investment in education. Because farmers and
businesses often under-invest in services such as training, subsidies for them can be very important.
However, using subsidies to provide public goods, address externalities or overcome indivisibilities
make sense only in environments where markets are supported, i.e., enabled and not prone to
monopolies (by the state or other actors). You need some basic market infrastructure and
institutions. In other words, subsidies should be directed at the causes of market failure and
not at the symptoms. We must see the market, even if it appears to be simple, as a complex
system. The agents that can affect the performance and configuration of this system may be
government organizations or industry bodies. While we should not rule out the possibility that in
some instances the cause might be addressed by providing a subsidy to a firm, we should be very
skeptical about this. The topic of market failures is fascinating, but it is not often understood within
the context of a complex adaptive market system.
Andy Jeans commented that, while many governments strive to deliver some public goods—such
as health care, education and agricultural and veterinary extension, they find the cost difficult to
meet. Shawn’s observation that subsidies should be directed at causes of market failure and not at
symptoms sounds very sensible but what exactly are the causes? Some may argue that the factors
that cause AKI services to not be available to all who could benefit from them may include
insufficient economic viability (service delivery costs more than the economic return), mistrust
(between service provider and recipient), or insufficient government will (or ability) to provide
public goods except to a very few. There are probably many others. How can subsidies address
those causes?
In responding to Andy, Shawn said that he had asked similar questions and they had led him to
embark on a seven-year study of market failures and its characteristics. Many donors consider
market failure a pre-condition for interventions. However, they almost never talk about how to
identify and measure market failure. For example, education and health are public goods in more
than one sense. When they are not provided this is not called a market failure, but a government
failure (a concept familiar to political scientists and philosophers). From an economics and socio-
political perspective, market failures directly affect the allocation of resources in the marketplace.
13
14. And for economists, it is about efficiency of allocation. But, important public goods are more about
the basic knowledge needed in an industry, information about quality standards, accreditation
systems, etc. In many developing countries, knowledge is not yet valued, often because it is
intangible and difficult to measure how such services affect industry performance. Furthermore,
measures to support impersonal exchange (through markets or other means) are often lacking in
societies where knowledge is not seen as a transactable good. This is why so many BDS
interventions fail in these contexts. When people do not value advice (knowledge), they do not want
to pay for it.
For Alex Mugova, the classic distinction between public and private goods is at the heart of
the subsidies debate. Traditionally, most argue that public goods, by their nature, always require
subsidies. This is because it is difficult, if not impossible, to exclude those who are unwilling or
unable to pay for public goods. On the other hand, those who are unwilling or unable to pay for
private goods can easily be excluded and so they do not require any subsidies. This is as far as the
theory goes and it is neat.
But, when it comes to supporting poor and vulnerable groups in developing countries to move out
of poverty, there is a wide divergence between this neat theory and the reality we find on the
ground. Agricultural extension services are a public good that, according to the theory, must be
subsidized for the good of the public. However, the reality is that most developing country
governments do not have the resources to subsidize these services. And, because the poor are
usually located in remote rural locations, they do not present a compelling business case for the
private sector to provide embedded extension services. The question then is: are such poor and
vulnerable people condemned to a life of hopelessness and poverty? He then provided
examples of Practical Action’s work in this area.
A number of Practical Action projects in remote rural locations demonstrate another way to
address this challenge—involving an NGO or other outside agency in organizing farmers and
helping them understand their predicament and collaborate to build their bargaining capacity.
The next step is to approach private firms and convince them that there is a compelling business
case in working with poor and isolated farmers. In one of Practical Action's projects with small
livestock farmers in the Guruve district of northern Zimbabwe, Practical Action convinced a
private veterinary drug company that it would be possible to expand the market for its drugs and
advisory services in this remote district. The approach involved identifying and training village
based paravets. Once they had the requisite skills, they became the local foot soldiers for the
company, selling drugs and providing advice and training in basic animal disease diagnosis,
treatment of sick animals and improved animal husbandry techniques to farmers for a fee.
The results of this intervention are dramatic and demonstrate what can be achieved when a
private firm works with poor farmers in remote locations. The number of paravets in the area
has risen from 200 to 600—the project trained the first 200 and Agritex, the state extension
department, trained an additional 400 once it realized the efficacy of the approach. The
government is now replicating the business model in five other districts of the country. The
incidence of major livestock diseases such as CBPN, black leg and red water has decreased by
nearly 90% in the last four years and livestock off-take rates in the participating districts have
14
15. increased from 5-15% over a four-year period with farmers’ incomes from livestock sales
jumping almost 20% over the same period.
This intervention demonstrates that even when government lacks the capacity to provide
extension services and the private sector is unwilling to do so, development agency innovations
can help break this impasse.
Lucho Osorio said that Alex's experience demonstrates the need to help market actors learn from
successful business models in similar contexts and develop new models that can reach out to the
most marginalized and vulnerable populations. He also commented on Alex’s observation that
agricultural extension services are by nature a public good—which seemed more like an ideology than
a solid theory—and he asked “what theory demonstrates this?” The very fact that the private sector is
finding successful business models to reach out to marginalized and vulnerable producers with
useful knowledge means that there is no inherent public nature in agricultural extension. He then
highlighted the point that the business feasibility of knowledge services depends on the type of
knowledge and the possibility of creating barriers to entry that can generate profits. If there are no
barriers to entry, for example, when one farmer tells another how to protect his potatoes from a
parasite—it cannot be the foundation of a business model, even though it can make the recipient’s
business more lucrative. But, if there are barriers to entry, for instance, inoculating an animal with a
vaccine, which requires investments in training and practice, there is a business case.
Many of us have seen practitioners trying to create extension business models on the basis of easily
transferable knowledge. But, Practical Action long-term evaluations of extension services suggest
that agricultural extension services in the livestock sector, where there is a lot of knowledge with
high barriers to entry due to the use of vaccines and the need for specialized skills, are more
successful and sustainable than those in crop production where techniques are easily shared amongst
farmers. Have others seen similar evidence? Does anyone have evidence that does not
corroborate this observation?
Marcus Jenal agrees with Lucho on the types of AKI services that can become a viable business
model, i.e. those with relatively high entry barriers. Marcus provides an example from Bangladesh,
where Katalyst used embedded services to tackle the issue of low barriers to entry. Katalyst
supported the dissemination of easily transferable AKI (with low entry barriers) using ICTs. The
business model is based on a central knowledge provider whose main task is to provide up-to-date
AKI services to its clients. The content is not limited to agricultural knowledge, but also includes
health and legal issues. The clients are mainly two large mobile phone companies, Grameenphone
and Banglalink. The Grameenphone business model is to set up numerous Community Information
Centers to sell a range of value-added services such as internet access, scanning, printing, mobile
calling, etc., and farmers can also access AKI services.
Banglalink, on the other hand, promotes access to content through a hotline. The farmer, who must
be a Banglalink customer, can dial 7676 and ask any question relevant to his work. The call center
agent then accesses the database to find a solution to the farmer's problem. While these examples
raise some questions, they show that the private sector can provide information with a low entry
barrier to farmers in remote areas when it is combined with other products, mobile phone services
in this case, that already are a highly successful business.
15
16. Ekanath agreed with Alex’s experience, saying that it is a successful business model, especially in
the livestock sector in rural areas, and SAPAP/UNDP Nepal adopted a similar approach in its
program Nepal.
Alex Mugova [Practical Action] then provided another example from Zimbabwe, highlighting
that subsidies can help to move poor and marginalized producers into meaningful players in
commodity markets. “The challenge, as we all
know, has always been how to ensure that “That subsidies can help to move poor and
subsidies are smart and enhance the attainment marginalized producers into meaningful
of intended objectives.” This example showed players in commodity markets is not in doubt.
The challenge, as we all know, has always been
how a project used subsidies to help smallholder how to ensure that subsidies are smart and
farmers become important players in a specific enhance the attainment of intended
market. Practical Action and its partners— objectives.”
Agriseeds (a private company), Agritex and poor Alex Mugova, Practical Action
smallholder farmers—supported the production
and use of guar bean for use in nickel production6. For two years farmers received subsidized
seeds and fertilizers as an incentive to participate. After that time, farmers were able to produce
and supply close to 30% (4,800 metric tons) of the local mining industry’s requirements, a
significant achievement given that they had never before grown the crop. The project facilitated
a link between the producers and Agriseeds (the buyer) from the beginning, which put them in a
good position to negotiate with the buyer to access subsidies and learn about the penalties and
the obligations on the part of the buyer in terms of prices and buying conditions.
Three key lessons emerged from this project.
1) Subsidies help poor and marginalized producers become meaningful actors in commodity
markets by increasing their productivity and output and making them consumers of other
commodities.
2) Subsidies alone can do more harm than good. To be effective, they must be provided together
with other key services and inputs that small farmers require—extension services and passable
roads that enable them to get inputs to the farm and to deliver their products to markets.
3) The private sector can be an effective partner in providing subsidies that positively impact poor,
smallholder farmers. Most important is to convince private firms that working with the poor
makes a compelling business case.
In agreeing with Alex that private firms must see a compelling business case, Andy Jeans said it
means the cost of the subsidy for seeds must be offset by a reduction in the crop price paid to the
farmer to make the net subsidy to the farmer zero. This was a smart subsidy because the project did
not have to continue facilitating the supply of seed. The transaction now is handled by the market
actors—farmers and Agriseeds. Also important is Alex’s second lesson—that subsidies can do more
harm than good. If applied inappropriately, subsidies can lead to reduced self-reliance and greater
vulnerability of recipients when they are removed.
Rajiv Pradhan’s response to the model Alex presented was a question—how can we have a
private sector solution to what is normally understood to be a public service function—the
6
The gum extracted from guar beans is used as a lubricant for the perforation drills.
16
17. provision of services to rural populations? Government services to the agriculture sector will
exist for the foreseeable future. But, how can we make them more efficient and effective without
additional resources and leverage the private sector to provide them? One way is for NGOs to do
the initial modeling of how to make the business compelling for the private sector, then bring in
government and, finally, scale it up with private sector companies that have an incentive to
participate. When one can see the business rationale, e.g., that in the Katalyst ICT example Marcus
provided or with contract farming, scaling up is relatively easy, but when large companies do not see
the provision of information as a way to increase sales, it can get tricky.
Another strategy would be to have farmer groups, local firms and government form into small, very
local partnerships. When there is information that farmers must have (e.g., to prevent disease,
discontinue using specific chemicals, etc.), these partnerships can get the word out—with
government organizing a meeting and providing information and the companies and groups
contributing funds and distributing printed materials to the farmers. We saw this happen with
artificial insemination (AI) in poultry—government was holding critical information, but did not
have resources to print the information or the funds to visit all farmers and so phoned a few large
farmers. Their association copied the materials and members took it to their own groups to make
farmers aware of AI and how to mitigate it in the industry. Though it is possible to use the media to
do this, will the information reach all of the small farmers?
The subsidy here would be used to form the partnerships and, if it can demonstrate that business
could increase for participating companies—e.g., day-old chick sales would not decrease—then
larger companies would be willing to participate in local-level partnerships. In Bangladesh, these
companies have field officers who travel to different parts of the country. For now, they may still
focus on large farmers, but partnerships could help them to reach out to smaller farmers. In this way
the government mandate to serve all of the people is achieved and both the private sector and the
farmers also gain. It would be a win-win-win situation as Kamran stated.
Yogesh Kumar Dwivedi [Action for Social Advancement – ASA] offered a case from India
where he works with small farmers on both high potential production systems as well as those
for resource-poor areas. In his work with 13 villages in one area, he found that farmers getting
irrigation from a private lift irrigation system could easily pay the Rs 300/acre for irrigation and,
in fact, were always ready to pay for all agriculture-related services (mostly inputs) because they
were growing mainly cash crops and paying for services was not an issue for them. However,
farmers did not want to pay for knowledge-based services since they felt government should
provide them. ASA found local input suppliers to be the main source of agriculture information
with only 2-3% of farmers approaching the regional agriculture research station (Krishi Vigyan
Kendra), or state agriculture universities for information. In general, farmers who visited these
places did so as participants in an NGO or government-funded project. In addition to providing
technical support, the project supplied farmers with quality seeds and farm tools on credit—
which they repaid in a timely manner. This also occurred in another area where ASA
implemented a project with less-poor farmers who requested quality seeds and agriculture inputs
and who paid the full costs, even travel expenses, without any problem.
ASA’s experience in resource-poor areas was very different. Farmers practicing agriculture in
risk-prone zones do not have assured irrigation facilities and the frequent, severe droughts and
17
18. uncertainty of final production convince them not to invest in agriculture. They look for
government subsidies and external support for extension services, support that Yogesh thinks
they deserve until basic facilities such as irrigation, storage and grading infrastructure,
information on drought coping strategies and short season, drought-resistant/tolerant varieties
are made available. Subsidies could help these farmers deal with changing socio-economic and
hydro-geological conditions.
In India’s more developed states, Yogesh found that farmers were willing to pay for extension
services if they were timely and high quality. Farmers elsewhere pay for inputs such as seeds,
fertilizers, farm tools and pesticides but not for AKI services, mostly because the quality of the
services is neither credible nor useful. Customizing, branding and making extension
services work in the local socio-economic, agro-climatic and geo-hydro context is
critically important when charging for them.
Lucho Osorio wondered if the ASA program was able to exit the direct provision of inputs (e.g.
seeds and tools) and if farmers were requesting less from now than before? And why? This example
also teaches us that farmers are willing to pay in some cases but not in others and that, in places
where farmers are more reluctant to pay for knowledge, the accepted rule seems to be that
government should subsidize it. The questions this example brings to mind include: are there
political incentives for governments to subsidize access to knowledge (e.g., popularity and
elections)? If this is unlikely to change, can those subsidies promote the transformation of
market systems and their rules?
Alison Griffith [Practical Action] spoke about those who argue that certain very fragile eco-systems
are unsuitable for agriculture, even in a very extensive form, and subsidizing the provision of inputs
and services in such areas artificially supports activities that are ultimately unsustainable. In these
cases, they argue, it is preferable to do nothing and allow natural depopulation to a so-called sustainable
level. This would be problematic because it would increase the vulnerability of the poorest. Or, we
could promote alternatives, which also would be problematic since many have been tried and there
are few examples of success, particularly at scale. A third option would be to promote pro-poor
market development approaches to improve the efficiency of key subsectors.
For example, the case of livestock in northern Kenya shows that, in spite of many alternative
income generation programs, the sector is fundamentally important for local livelihoods. The
challenge is to develop an appropriate level of services and inputs and promote efficiency at
various levels (e.g., management of natural resources, coordination of actors). Practical Action’s
new work in the Mandera area is looking at the different roles public and private actors play in
the milk and meat market systems and facilitating new models to promote efficiency of their
activities. So, even in areas where viability is questionable, it may still be possible to use models
discussed here. Attracting private input suppliers (e.g., veterinary drug suppliers) to such areas
and understanding their risks and concerns, can be critical. We have choices when using
subsidies in these kinds of situations and the use of Challenge Funds with the private sector is
becoming more common. Perhaps the biggest advantage of this approach is that these funds
devolve power from donors to actors who have shown a commitment to the future
development of the business, as demonstrated by their application to the Challenge Fund. Does
anyone have experience with either the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund or others?
18
19. 5) Coordinating Market Players and (or) Customizing Subsidies
Shawn Cunningham noted that another area of concern is coordination (horizontal linkages) in
weaker markets—it is a very expensive and time-consuming endeavor and may justify a subsidy. For
instance, coordinating several tea farmers to fill a container is a high-cost activity that could warrant
subsidized support.
Kamran Niazi worked with a community that had to sell its produce for a very low price in
local markets because they could not sell it as individuals in high-margin but distant metropolitan
markets. When the project organized them into a group and brought them to a major market to
sell their combined product, measured in tons, they received VIP treatment and sold out their
entire inventory. The result was a 3million Rs (US$ 35,295) increase in revenue that year. The
project provided a subsidy of 200,000 Rs (2,353 US$) for group organization and to assist them
transport their produce to the market.
Targeted support should be extended and customized to the needs of those who really need it. At
the same time, projects must be flexible, trust the participants and monitor implementation of
subsidies. This is a time consuming (and costly) activity and though results are likely to be very good,
the numbers and scale are going to be small. One way to increase scale is volunteers, for example,
the Association for the Development of Pakistan, formed by American and Pakistani volunteers,
raises money for grants and expenses, identifies potential opportunities, conducts due diligence and
evaluates impact. The cost is very low and all projects are in conflict or post conflict areas. In other
words, the decision about whether to support many people with a few generic products or
only a few with customized products plays a big part in project impact.
Andy Jeans commented on Kamran’s example about whether we are obliged to choose between
supplying many people with a few generic subsidies or fewer people with customized subsidies and
less impact. Some have observed that government-provided, low budget and widespread agricultural
extension services are generic subsidies that often have a disappointingly low impact. Sometimes,
though, there is room for a smarter choice. Rather than assisting only a fortunate few with
customized services—and recognizing that many developing country governments cannot afford to
provide effective, generic AKI services—we should strive to use subsidies as a time-bound
catalyst to bring about systemic change that can, over time, enable all market actors to
access the AKI services they need.
In adding to this debate, Christian Pennotti [CARE] said that not having a standard subsidy
package for all participants is one of the most important guidelines for subsidy use. CARE
recognizes that those receiving subsidies are different in terms of their willingness or ability to take
on risk and the sophistication of their enterprises. While taking a one-size-fits-all approach can get
money into the hands of those who need it quickly, at a lower cost and with less effort, it may not
conform to the underlying rationale for providing a subsidy in the first place. Tailoring subsidy
packages based on the needs of individual enterprises, farmers or groups clearly is more expensive
and time intensive, but it also can be more effective.
19
20. A challenge that customized services can present is, when providing different subsidies to people in
the same community or value chain, what about transparency? Should each subsidy recipient
know what others are getting? What if someone who receives less than another feels
discriminated against? How should you handle those tensions if they arise? And, if there is
no tension, do you know why?
Alex Mugova brought up the critically important issue of how best to coordinate the use of
subsidies with other development agents. He has found the coordination of subsidy provision to
be a key to whether or not projects can achieve their intended objectives. In the example below,
Alex demonstrates how all too often the efforts of one development project to develop pro-poor
market systems are undermined by the uncoordinated and indiscriminate use of subsidies by another
donor or practitioner.
In Sudan, Practical Action assisted pastoralists in Kassala to organize, collaborate and develop
linkages with other actors in the livestock value chain to everyone’s benefit. The project
identified and trained local paravets who were providing a valuable service to pastoralists, selling
veterinary drugs and training them in improved livestock management skills. A viable pastoralist
association was formed and helped farmers to meet regularly to discuss opportunities and
constraints in the livestock value chain. The association was an effective vehicle for farmers to
collectively bargain with buyers for better prices. It was evident that pastoralists were on the
right path to improving their livelihoods. This promising development was dealt a severe blow
when a new intervention by another development agent cropped up in the same region.
Instead of coordinating with Practical Action to discuss additional support required to enhance
the growth of the livestock market system, the new intervention provided large subsidies to
pastoralists in the form of free drugs and training. Promising veterinary drug stores and advisory
services were undermined and, as expected, most of the paravets were pushed out of business. If
there is one important lesson to be learned from this experience, it is that uncoordinated
provision of subsidies by one development agent can completely undo the good work of
another. It seems that, in spite of more than seven decades of development interventions,
poverty remains intractable, especially in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, and a large share of the
blame for this state of affairs should be placed on the indiscriminate and uncoordinated use of
subsidies.
Kamran Niazi said that, in Pakistan, the Agribusiness Support Fund (ASF) worked with private
companies, who provided extension services for a fee, including a company that provided fruit
fly traps for free, but made money by selling the insecticide and hormones for the traps. At up to
70% spoilage rate, anything that would limit losses would be good for farmers and this was a
simple, cheap, low maintenance solution. ASF also worked with exporters’ cooperatives that
together paid for the GlobalGAP certification of orchards owned by small farmers—40-50
farmers. The farmers were asked to sell the produce to the exporters and they also could sell the
produce to others. The exporters could buy only from these farmers due to the certification
requirements and they had to pay a premium price for the produce. But they in turn were able to
export the produce and charge much more for the product. In the end, everyone was a winner.
20
21. Abdur Rob contributed an example of local learning groups of facilitators working in the same
region or with the same subsector who can coordinate the use of subsidies when they share their
experience to create synergies in their work. A particular example is DairyNet Bangladesh, a
local learning group comprising CARE, Practical Action, Intercooperation and Plan
International Bangladesh, all of which have been implementing dairy and livestock sector
development projects in northern Bangladesh. The network realized that if it could develop a
standard training manual for Animal Health Service Providers by using materials available to
each organization, it would help them reduce the training subsidy. It also would enable them to
start a dialogue with the Department of Livestock Services to underscore the training of animal
health service providers that NGOs and private businesses had conducted and request
acknowledgement. The network collected and reviewed materials and coordinated the
participation of its members in the International Dairy Conference planned held at the
Mymenshinge Agricultural University, Bangladesh in April 2010. All four organizations shared
the cost of participation and promoted their work through DairyNet in an effort to influence
institutions and policy makers.
Ben Fowler [Consultant] noted the increasing interest in applying subsidy principles when working
with the very poor. He asked some interesting questions:
1) The majority of practitioners agree that a demand-driven approach relies on participants self-
selecting into the project. Yet in many projects, the very poor or vulnerable do not end up
participating due to their reduced capacity to take risks and minimal access to investment capital.
For projects aiming to include the most vulnerable, what strategies have you used to
encourage their participation? Are there ways you've been able to leverage the capacity and
assets of better-off community members, for example, horizontal linkages (producer
associations)? Have these approaches required subsidies specifically towards the vulnerable that
are not available to others?
2) How are people defining the very poor? Comments so far indicate that the definitions differ
quite a bit between cases. Are participants using formal tools to determine the most poor or
vulnerable in a community (e.g., the poverty assessment tools), community self-assessments or
more informal tools, or not measuring at all?
3) Some believe that below a certain point of insecurity, a pure market development approach is
irrelevant and consumption stabilization, etc. are more important. CGAP's graduation model is
built on such a concept. What do you think? If you agree, how has this belief impacted
your programming?
In responding to Ben's point about project strategies that include the most vulnerable, Andy Jeans
observed that most producer associations are formed by individuals with shared problems and
concerns who tend to exclude those who have significantly fewer assets than they do, seeing them as
potential competitors. However, they do make trading arrangements (for commodities or labor) with
poorer farmers for large market orders. In the examples of farmers with HIV/AIDs in Kenya and
disabled people in Uganda, the formation of exclusive producer groups proved to be effective due
primarily to shared problems and concerns.
Also responding to Ben, Kamran Niazi said that public subsidies will never be a permanent
solution because governments simply do not have the money to cover all available farmland—
population and size—especially in developing nations. Furthermore, expecting public subsidies to be
21
22. completely transparent is unrealistic—everyone is responsible to someone, whether shareholders,
donors, government or other stakeholders. And, having resources does not mean you can dictate
terms—at the end of the day, there needs to be collaboration and mutual agreement.
Alison Griffith considers that a key aspect of practitioners’ role as market development facilitators
is to provide spaces and opportunities for public and private actors to find solutions and ways of
working together. When that happens, sometimes a subsidy is not needed because resources can be
found within the system. Our Nepal program concluded that in the dairy sector it was crucial not to
jump in with solutions to blockages, but to be patient and go through a (sometimes messy) process of
letting actors determine the key issues and how they might tackle them. If extra resources are
needed, a finance provider may step up, especially if they see that players are committed. Practical
Action has found this to be the case in Nepal’s dairy sector and with hibiscus producers in Sudan.
As Rajiv said, farmer collaboration is critically important to enabling other actors to work with them
efficiently and effectively and to ensuring that, as marginalized and weaker players, they can benefit
from new products, services and linkages. This is what makes the market development process pro-
poor. We could argue that investing in this aspect can be as important as providing subsidies because
when farmers are organized, confident and articulate, they are more attractive to AKI suppliers. In
some cases, this could negate the need for subsidies. Has anyone else had similar experiences?
6) Financial Services
Ekanath brought up the issue of safety-net packages in areas where communities are impacted
by conflict, natural disasters, etc. There is a need to develop products like community-based
insurance for both enterprises and individual health and safety. Safety-net packages can
increase the risk-taking capacity of the most vulnerable groups and, ultimately, protect
them if their enterprises fail. The UNDP South Asian Poverty Alleviation Program in Nepal
introduced and successfully piloted this type of package.7
When establishing a community-based insurance system there needs to be a strong savings
and credit mechanism and social collateral within the community. In such a system, if a
community group provides loans to very poor or vulnerable community members, they should
embed the insurance premium .There also should be an insurance committee to monitor the
scheme. Initially, communities need subsidized services from support agencies and facilitators to
help link the insurance committee with professional insurance providers to develop an appropriate
system, provide training on the system and help them develop a sustainable insurance scheme.
Terrence Isert [Consultant] has been working with vulnerable populations (poorest of poor) who
are savings group members, encouraging them to become involved in program market access
activities. The particular challenges have been the lack of social, physical and especially the
human capital needed to achieve sustainable livelihoods. Whether a livelihood or a value chain
approach is pursued, vulnerable populations, particularly youth, require additional services and
support to increase their participation in a value chain to gain greater access to markets. They
also require human capital support that includes life-skills development to help counter the effects
of the conflicts to which they have been exposed and to build educational and coping skills that
would enable them to manage a business.
7
http://www.undp.org/evaluation/documents/MicroMacro_SouthAsia.pdf
22
23. 7) Markets, Incentives and Investments
Shawn Cunningham asked if we should make a distinction between enterprises competing in
markets and people who are trying to survive in spite of markets? For the first group, improving
market performance and structure can lead to increased income and the main risk of intervening in
the system for practitioners is that someone captures a benefit that was supposed to target the system
as a whole. When directing interventions (whether subsidies or subsidized expertise) at the entire
market you are safe. But, market efficiency and the ability to access markets mean little for those
who are just trying to survive. They do not care if markets select better prices, value or quality, or if
they distribute goods from efficient producers into rural areas. We need to approach subsidies aimed
at livelihoods. This is not about market failure, it is about something else—perhaps societal failure.
It does not seem appropriate to use typical market failure logic to solve problems here. Subsidies to
support survival need to be allocated using different criteria than those we use to select
interventions aimed at better performing enterprises.
Mary Cockram [Consultant] In Colombia, Aid to Artisans worked to integrate displaced people
into markets, particularly in cities where the overall market is stable, by providing incentives
(usually subsidized equipment and cost-shared marketing services) for existing enterprises to hire
them. In general, that worked pretty well; their sales increased and at least a month or two after
the end of the project the displaced people were still employed. In cities hard-hit by conflict as
well as serious poverty, existing enterprises were so tenuous that it was much harder to figure
out the right incentive that still seemed market-based. A few entrepreneurial people started
viable businesses, mostly selling in the more stable capital, but many groups could not overcome
internal issues and mistrust.
Kamran Niazi presented three approaches to providing subsidies:
1) How do we distinguish between deserving communities and individuals within them? In
every community there are people who have a good chance of success—with or without help.
However, with support they have an even greater chance of succeeding. Should we consider the
community a homogeneous group of people in need or a heterogeneous group comprising both
relatively passive observers and potential change agents? If people are dying of hunger or
disease, then everyone has to be supported. But if you are talking about market forces, you
should consider who can make the greatest difference for the entire community and provide
those groups or individuals with smart subsidies.
2) Are smart subsidies sufficient in themselves to achieve success if we do not select smart
people to use them? There are smart people in every walk of life. Poor people may not be
formally educated, but many are sharp thinkers and their street knowledge can make them
formidable. Andy’s observation about producer groups who exclude those having few assets
because they are potential competitors is exactly what I am talking about here. In the end, many
of these groups work with poorer farmers because they need their commodities or labor.
3) Is this about qualitative or quantitative impact? Providing a limited number of smart
subsidies can result in greater impact because people often copy successful enterprises. Is this
better than the average or below average outcome that often results from low quality support to
many? Another strategy is to create small niches for target groups (in different geographical
locations), develop smart interventions and apply them in a single location. After observing the
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24. results, group similar niches and replicate and adapt the support. This approach can also work by
selecting a large group (in one locality), use a subsidy to identify need and help the group attain
it. An example would be to arrange a visit to a leading cluster or market to see what a large
group can achieve and then work with the group to identify activities they want to undertake.
This option gives you the best of both worlds.
Marcus Jenal [Intercooperation] agreed with Shawn that practitioners need to differentiate between
people who are able to interact with market forces and profit from them, assuming that the market
system works appropriately, i.e., is pro poor, even for those whose primary concern is feeding their
families every day. He provided an example:
The LEAF project in Bangladesh works with community-based organizations (CBOs)
comprising a range of people—from the not so poor to the very poor. Improving their human
and institutional development and organizational / business management capacities and
establishing a service provision system for them has enabled the CBOs both to interact better
with local government bodies and to profit from market opportunities. In general, this works
very well. However, there is one category of people in the groups who are unable to profit from
the opportunities opened by the CBOs, mainly those who have no assets at all. So far, the
project has had little success in reaching those people and is working on different strategies:
1) Make the CBOs more socially inclusive. The project works with the CBOs to raise awareness
of their responsibilities towards the whole community, particularly the extremely poor and
marginalized, understanding that this is not the responsibility only of the CBO, but of the
entire community. Due to their strengthened organizational capacity, the CBOs are in a
position to take the lead in raising funds from the whole community for social activities or
lobby the local government to better support the very poor through safety net programs or
by giving them access to public resources like roadsides or public land and water.
2) The project encourages the CBOs to use their savings to finance economic activities for the
very poor to start businesses. They can provide grants, soft loans or investments on a profit-
sharing basis, a strategy shown to be quite successful. Some CBOs have bought livestock for
the extremely poor and lobbied the local government to give them access to unused public
land to feed the animals. The beneficiaries care for the animals and repay the loan by
providing either a fixed amount of meat or offspring.
3) The project also encourages the CBOs to subsidize service provision for the businesses the
very poor started with help from the CBO.
For us it is clear that there is a need for special efforts when targeting the extreme poor. Success to
date has been very limited and it would be great to hear about other experiences and case studies on
how we might make our efforts more successful. A major question is how to find systemic
interventions that can change the status of the extreme poor. In contrast to market development
activities, where it is clearer (although not always easy) how to target the system in order to make the
market work better for the poor, when working with extremely poor people, the interventions are
often direct and not very systemic.
8) Gender
James Tj [National Innovation Foundation] has found that subsidies given to women’s self-help groups
(SHGs) have more impact than do those to individuals and he thinks this is an area that needs more
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25. attention. Experience in southern India shows that women’s SHGs are very strong and both
government and NGOs use this strength for development interventions. In India, banks do not
hesitate to give loans to these groups as they are accountable, responsible and practical and their
repayment rate is more than 90 percent. Support reaches the right person and is used for the right
purpose and, since the entire group is accountable for the subsidy, all members are involved in
monitoring loan use and repayment.
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26. Annex A: Key Points of the Discussion Paper
Key Principles for Subsidy Use
The purpose of a subsidy is to mitigate risk and build capacity to support innovation and change and
no mechanism works in all situations. Practitioners must use good judgment, be prudent, ensure
transparency and facilitate negotiations between actors when identifying the need for a subsidy and
implementing an agreement. While there are no universally applicable rules for using subsidies, some
general principles do apply:
Avoid subsidies when possible—use them only with a clear vision for how they can achieve
systemic change.
The better the facilitation, the less need there is for subsidies—create conditions that allow
market actors to recognize business opportunities and pursue them without subsidies.
Consider the possible negative consequences of unnecessary subsidies and adopt a do-no-
harm approach—do not destroy private businesses and competitiveness, create dependency,
block indigenous resources or diminish creativity.
Use subsidies to reduce risk for market actors—particularly new technology / service
adopters as long as they do not detract from sustainability or create dependency.
Use subsidies to strengthen demand / supply markets, not to subsidize transactions— link
marginalized producers to market actors who can provide services and inputs (facilitators
should not provide these services).
Develop / use strategies that promote ownership by market actors.
Determine who will pay for and undertake services when subsidies end.
Be as inconspicuous as possible; make your role as facilitator invisible.
Base selection of the type of subsidy to use on the intended target group—development,
production, promotion, provision, consumption.
Use subsidies to improve market system structure and dynamics to benefit the most
marginalized—for example, facilitate links between a credit provider and a local paravet to
redress inequalities and exclusion and expand access to productive resources—financial,
physical, human, etc.
Recognize that those who need subsidies are not always the poorest.
Encourage self-targeting strategies that help those who want to participate to step forward.
Tips for Implementing Subsidies
Identify public / private sector actors having an incentive to provide services / products and
support development and testing of models.
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27. Always co-invest with market actors—they should match your investment.
Find supporting market actors who can undertake specific educational activities.
Identify and clearly communicate subsidy purpose and target.
Set and communicate a timeframe for terminating a subsidy; transition it out over time.
Identify and address systemic constraints, i.e., non-financial reasons value chain actors do not
invest.
Ensure market incentives, not subsidies motivate market actors.
Subsidize as small a portion of the total cost as possible.
Explore with market actors the possibility of embedding the cost of their services in an
existing transaction.
Encourage self-selection to make subsidy support contingent upon a demonstrated financial
or other commitment and improve the chances of success and impact sustainability. This may
exclude those who are more disadvantaged.
Use subsidies for a limited time to get things going; this allows market actors to see and feel
the impact of new ways of doing things and helps them build capacity and systems.
Identify and plan a long-term solution for meeting costs before introducing a subsidy, e.g., a
new MFI loan product.
Have a clear exit strategy.
Justifiable Subsidies
Facilitation—a temporary, external intervention by a non-market actor
Capacity-building activities that allow new players enter the market system and explore new
business opportunities
Training, demonstration and pilot activities—learning visits, trade fair attendance, etc.— that
confirm the impact a new business model can have and provide opportunities to explore new
ways of doing things—business / organizational models, technologies, techniques, etc.
Ice-breaking activities that link the marginalized to new markets, opportunities, etc.
Market research and feasibility studies to demonstrate that new ways of doing things can
work.
Technical assistance for R&D to confirm the efficacy of new business models, technologies,
etc.
Group formation.
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28. Difficult to Justify Subsidies
Recurring operational and working capital costs, including personnel
Physical assets, e.g., buildings or machines, except when subsidies can stimulate communal
infrastructure like collection centers that can catalyze change for many.
Operational knowledge needed to produce something or operate a business.
All subsidies that do not have an exit strategy.
Some Considerations When Subsidizing AKI Services
Good sources of AKIS: input suppliers (retailers, sales reps), outgrowers with a contractual
selling agreement and (sometimes) marketing cooperatives
Ineffective government extension services: lack of performance incentives, information
gaps between final users and extension agencies, researchers’ misconceptions about
marginalized producers, farmers’ inability to influence government
Radio extension messaging often not commercially viable; usually needs ongoing subsidy
or commercial sponsorship, e.g., from an input supply company.
Need for AKIS is continuous; not a one-time service. Projects must create a process that
ensures ongoing communication, service delivery, access to and use of AKIS by orienting
providers to help clients improve productivity and product quality over the long term, not just
until the project ends.
Central Questions and Challenges
1) Blanket provision of subsidized services or inputs can reduce their effectiveness—provide
subsidies to those who need or can make the most effective use of the service / input. How
can we ensure a high rate of self-selection amongst market actors and what is the role of
subsidies in achieving this?
2) Should we disclose to stakeholders that we have funds to subsidize services or inputs? Or,
should we withhold this information until all non-subsidized alternatives are explored? How
does this affect the ideal of self-targeting?
3) Subsidized services can prevent recipients from telling us which services they want. How
can we make sure their voices are heard before using subsidies? How can we manage their
expectation or assumption that we want to hear from them because we want to provide
subsidized / free services?
4) If the targeted group is very disadvantaged, how do you meet the cost of training, group
formation or other services? Should the market cover these additional social costs? What
strategies work well when facilitating access to AKIS in areas lacking a moderately strong
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29. private sector, e.g., input suppliers or purchasers? Is direct, short-term provision by a
facilitator ever defensible?
5) Are there effective ways to increase the quality of government-provided AKIS? Is there
evidence that this could evolve into a viable option for smallholders in remote areas?
6) Where should we focus our subsidies? Governments tend to play a more interventionist,
subsidizing role in AKIS than they do in other sectors and are likely to continue doing so.
7) In developing a market for AKIS, how do we coordinate, complement or mitigate conflicts
between public / private AKIS providers that have different subsidy practices?
8) How can ineffective public extension services be improved, particularly where inadequate
infrastructure and adverse incentives limit their usefulness and efficacy?
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