1. In response to John Dear, SJ at http://ncronline.org/blogs/road-peace/revenge-not-way
Most accept that it is not helpful to call those who disagree with us on every particular
matter of orthodoxy – heretics; neither should we call those who disagree with us on widely
disputed matters of orthopraxy – “wolves in sheep’s clothing.”
In the faith development trajectory of most traditions, belonging (orthocommunio) will
enjoy a primacy over desiring (orthopathy) which will precede behaving (orthopraxy), all
before believing (orthodoxy). Therefore, it is best that we first model hospitality that they
know they belong and next invite them to our worship where our own holy desires were
first formed. If the right-behaving doesn’t ensue, it might be better to introspectively
discern where we, ourselves, may have gone wrong in our community and liturgical life
before reflexively laying off the blame on our poor proselytees.
1) Some view a just war as a probable good to be achieved by political statecraft and the
Gospel ethic of nonviolence as an invitation to an extraordinary virtue (praiseworthy and
exceeding the demands of justice) to be realized in the here and now by individual vocation,
both aspirations grounded in a presumption for peace.
2) Others view a just war as a necessary evil and the Gospel ethic as ultimately and finally –
not immediately – normative, both grounded in a presumption against violence.
3) And there are a few who take the Gospel ethic of nonviolence as absolutely and
immediately normative for both individuals and states.
One might find merit in each of these approaches if each is placed in the proper context. Are
we dealing with ontic (pre-moral) or moral evils? moral or practical realities? now or
eschatologically? individually or politically? necessary evils vs lesser & higher goods? a
presumption for peace (and justice) or against violence? I resonate more with #1 than either
#2 or #3 above. But they also deserve serious consideration.
The elements of these different stances are often combined in other ways, too. Even those
who hold to the very same principles may differ in their moral judgments because they may
otherwise reasonably disagree regarding empirical and prudential matters in evaluating
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2. what may also be a legitimate plurality of solutions. In the writings of John Courtney
Murray, Reinhold Niebuhr, Stanley Hauerwas and John Howard Yoder, many of these things
are given thoughtful consideration and from significantly divergent perspectives. Do check
them out.
My own thoughts?
I am least sympathetic to Niebuhr’s realism, which has found its way piecemeal into the
writings of Obama, McCain and Clinton even if not systematically (which would be hard to
do for all sorts of reasons). Consistent with his catholic stance, Murray’s approach is not at
all dialectical or over against “the world.” I very heartily resonate with the Anabaptist and
Mennonite sensibilities, perhaps more so from a vocational and prophetic witness
perspective, but no so much from the belief that they would have any broader normative
impetus, especially for political statecraft.
Too many critiques engage caricatures. This may be especially true of pacifism, which has
about twenty distinct forms per Yoder. Even buying into Murray’s distinction between
statecraft and vocation, wouldn’t our politics change drastically if more of us embraced
nonviolence? Even if we reject Niebuhr’s realism, which colors the Gospel ethic as too
otherworldly, couldn’t we accept his practical accommodations to human weakness on the
basis of a compassionate pastoral sensitivity (even as we would reject any theoretical
capitulations — i.e. watered-down Gospel — based on disingenuous theological
reinterpretations)?
As for normative impetus, it includes not only moral force but practical considerations and
the normative significance of religion has always been much less about morality, which is
transparent to human reason without the benefit of special revelation (although not in
some grand Kantian way but an approach that is much more contritely fallible than that),
and much more about an invitation into worshipful, loving relationship.
On the occasion of Yoder’s passing, Hauerwas wrote: “Reading Yoder made me a pacifist.
It did so because John taught me that nonviolence was not just another ‘moral issue’ but
constitutes the heart of our worship of a crucified messiah.”
Indeed, the response our crucified messiah invites is not only ultimate but immediate. Still,
it would be wrong to characterize aspirations that clearly exceed the demands of justice as
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3. generally morally binding.
1) Governments aren’t subject to the ethics of Jesus? Really? <<<
To the extent state secularization has (properly and thankfully) taken hold in our pluralistic
society, no, the government does not need the ethics of Jesus per se or what are ostensibly
Christian norms in particular. But precisely because, as you suggest, such moral truth is
neither private nor available only to Christians but, as I said, is otherwise already
transparent to human reason (albeit fallibly so) without the benefit of special revelation, not
to worry, n'est pas?
In the USA, state secularization, fostered by the nonestablishment and free exercise clauses
of the 1st Amendment, has enhanced religion's influence in the public square rather than
marginalizing it (as happened on the Continent post-Enlightenment), but, in order to
profitably exercise that influence, any specifically moral teachings must be translated into
the lingua franca (common parlance), philosophically and/or common sensically, without
authoritarian appeals to such as Scripture, a Magisterium, a Tradition or private experiences
(revelations).
2) So does that mean that governments should not be just, serve the common good, or seek
peace? This sounds like recycled dualism. While the government is not the church, the
mission of God working through the church is to transform ALL life, including governments,
into new birth. The truth of Christ is not a private truth, available only to Christians, but is
the very logos that grounds all creation and calls all governments into true vocation. <<<
Of course we are to permeate and improve the temporal order!
Secularization is a strategy for affairs of the state (not for society or culture) and, with an
amplified rather than marginalized voice in the public square, religions have the opportunity
to influence the government politically, again, translating their moral stances into
arguments transparent to human reason, indeed, being just, serving the common good and
seeking peace. There is nothing dualistic here in this approach, which resonates more with
JC Murray, less with Niebuhr, who establishes a temporal dialectical approach (over against)
between the present world and other-worldliness, eschatologically,or Yoder, who
establishes a spiritual dialectical approach between the world and the church,
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4. ecclesiologically.
3) Conservatives can’t on one hand say that US is a Christian nation that should hold to
moral codes–about say, abortion and gay marriage–and on the other deny that the
government has a role to play in being and seeking justice as Jesus prescribed. <<<
Whether conservative, liberal or independent, whatever one's moral emphases (among the
life issues, usually, whether war or abortion or extreme poverty), the same principles apply.
JC Murray shed some light on government's role; it is to maintain the public order but not to
codify and enforce all moral realities. The subsidiarity principle, consistently applied,
establishes a proper bias against government (inherently coercive) and for individual
freedom in the service of human dignity but with due attention to the common good.
All that said, in my view, morality is NOT what distinguishes the core mission (much less
core competency) of our religions, which are not mostly about either describing or norming
reality, or even evaluating it, but are instead more about interpreting reality vis a vis its
meaning and giving it eternal (beyond the mass-energy-space-time plenum) significance. It
might be helpful if the churches spent way more time evangelizing (witnessing more by
action, less by apologetics) and way less time moralizing, in my view.
The teachings of Jesus are NOT mostly ethical or moral but transcend (go beyond not
without) these concerns to establish the robustly relational, inviting us into a loving (not
moralistic in emphasis but, instead, intimate) trust relationship that is intrinsically rewarding
(like truth, beauty and goodness are their own rewards) and with less emphasis on the
extrinsic rewards (e.g. for good behavior).
Finally, politics is the art of the possible, and the charitable presumption might be that most
people of large intelligence and profound goodwill differ, therefore, not in their moral
stances but in their practical and strategic approaches. These approaches get caricatured as
moral rather than practical differences in order to cynically manipulate, demagogue and
energize one political faction or another. If religious leaders and politicians would declare a
moratorium on moralizing that might be pragmatically helpful and if they would all shut up
already with their moral grandstanding that would be aesthetically appealing to me (I don't
want to offer a moral prescription for what they might do, for that would be too ironic).
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5. +++
Thanks for the feedback, folks. There are several key distinctions in play, in my view, on
which people can disagree of course. Ron, you properly invoke a redemptive imagination
and speak of "justice" beyond retaliation. The way I have approached these ideas is to look
at the Gospel or Good News as a brand new category; it indeed goes beyond Old Testament
justice but not by being a type of justice or a moral category. It has moral implications but is
not an essentially moral proposition. Neither is it grounded in practical considerations and
extrinsic reward systems (like crime & punishment or even afterlife calculations).
The Good News has the type of performative significance that is much more closely related
to how one might respond when one is in love, when one has been invited and initiated into
a relationship characterized by intimacy, trust and abiding presence. Being in love with one's
spouse or children or family is not foremost a moral reality, which is to say that it is not
mostly about doing something because it is right or wrong, good or evil. Neither is this being
in love driven, as I said, by extrinsic rewards (what am I going to get out of this?) or practical
concerns. It is an intrinsically rewarding reality like truth, beauty, goodness and freedom,
which are rewards in and of themselves. It is intensely personal and much less so functional.
Now, the Old Testament God was very much more an impersonal deity, although more
involved than any deistic God of the philosophers. Jesus came and revealed God as Abba, as
Daddy, and invited us into that type of trust and intimacy. Now, clearly, if we are going to
respond to God in a much more personal way (Daddy, lover, friend) and a much less
functional manner (cosmic policeman, provider), that will have moral implications because
we will, indeed, act differently toward God and others, who are all now sisters and brothers.
But this is not first a moral reality but a robustly relational dynamic. We do not start with
behavior and belief but, instead, with belonging and desire.
So, what differentiates the Christian brand in the marketplace is not foremost a moral
reasoning, which as Kevin properly noted is already available to all people, being
transparent to human reason and, as Sammie recognized, is already at work in the Old
Testament, which was not dispensed with but is still operative. Jesus didn't do away with
the law or with justice but broke open an entirely new category for relating to God and it
ends up exceeding the demands of justice with realities like charity and mercy. When
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6. people do not act in accordance with such Gospel imperatives as charity, mercy, forgiveness
and so on, they are not therefore necessarily being immoral or even unChristian even if
being Christ-like is an ideal to which they aspire because there are many other distinctions
that may come into play. For example, many believe that the Gospel ethic of nonviolence is
an invitation to a personal vocation (as even a voice of prophetic protest) but is not
otherwise being prescribed for the purposes of political statecraft.
++++
In my view, there is a Tau-like appeal in play in all of these themes, it seems, a dance
between freedom and coercion with a bias against coercive force (for freedom), unless
necessary. We see this in just war theory, criminal justice, subsidiarity principles, political
philosophy, parenting/discipline guidelines, codependency psychology and other human
affairs which involve interdiction.
Nature, itself, reveals a pattern of emergence that relies mostly on formative influences that
are high frequency-low amplitude, iow, frequent but incremental, as well as redemptive
influences that are low frequency-high amplitude, iow, infrequent but substantial. I call this
the axis of co-creativity. Generally, it eschews what I call the axis of codependency, which
swings between an apathetic pole of isolation & withdrawal (low frequency- low amplitude)
and a pathetic pole of over-involvement (high frequency-high amplitude), which manifests
in militarism and codependent behavior.
There is a great deal of inconsistency in modern political approaches as BIG GOVT is
embraced by almost all cohorts only for different agenda. Social conservatives want to use it
to enforce their moral vision. Neoconservatives want to use it to enforce a foreign policy
vision. These conservatives, along with fiscal conservatives, are otherwise suspicious of it
regarding economic agenda. Liberal influences advocate BIG GOVT involvement in economic
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7. but not social matters. All invoke justice as a theme. The most consistent approach is that of
the libertarian or classical liberal, which would limit government influence in the bedroom,
living room, classroom, school room, war room, board room, etc The problem with modern
day libertarians (aside from being kooky) is that they confuse the bias for freedom (against
coercion) as an absolute, instead, and they further confuse license and liberty (ignoring Lord
Acton’s distinction between the freedom to do what we want versus what we must).
The proper application of subsidiarity principles, the proper distinction between political
statecraft and individual vocations, and a surrender to reality’s axis of co-creativity and Tau
seems to be the most consistent and efficacious route.
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