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Feedback loops of us military cultural training programs
- 1. Feedback Loops of US Military Cultural Training Programs: Prescribed Process vs. Reality Jennifer Rachels
- 2. Some reading to get us started
- 3. Some reading to get us started
- 4. Some reading to get us started
- 14. Challenges to COIN Doctrine COIN= counterinsurgency
- 15. Challenges to KM Doctrine The doctrine of the Army is significant here because the sheer size of their force creates an acute need for managing the information their operations generate and require. KM doctrine affects how cultural information is collected and stored for reintroduction into the training system. The Army KM Field Manual contains exhaustive guidance for the After Action Review (AAR) process, as well as descriptions of tools and strategies for the collection and redistribution of information (and specifically mentions cultural information). KM= knowledge management
- 16. Challenges to KM Tools
- 17. Challenges to KM Tools
- 18. Challenges to KM Tools
- 19. Challenges to KM Tools AAR= after-action review
- 20. Challenges to Training Doctrine
- 21. Challenges to Training Doctrine
- 22. Challenges to Training Doctrine
- 23. Current doctrine does not support the tools a strategic sergeant would use to provide feedback on cultural training programs.
- 24. What tools would the strategic sergeant use? These are not suggestions; they are reality. People are using these tools unofficially right now, and sharing cultural lessons learned that are escaping the doctrinal process. FM= field manual
- 25. Operationally Relevant Cultural Training Programs Require Faster Feedback Loops, and Faster Feedback Loops will Require Innovation
- 26. Faster Feedback Loops =Operationally Relevant Cultural Training Programs If doctrine does not allow for innovations, analyzing information shared in informal networks and blogs, or other information sharing-methods, then the greatest problem to overcome in terms of improving cultural training and education programs may not be expertise or technological tools, but doctrine.
Hinweis der Redaktion
- These works are good for a nontechnical audience, and that are relevant to our discussion regarding cultural training and education.
- These works are good for a nontechnical audience, and that are relevant to our discussion regarding cultural training and education.
- These works are good for a nontechnical audience, and that are relevant to our discussion regarding cultural training and education. Black and Mendenhall work: Contains the seminal definition of an effective cultural training program: “Cross-cultural training facilitates effective cross-cultural interaction by reducing misunderstandings and inappropriate behaviors.”
- Operational relevance: Utility is the measure of effectiveness. Information for counterinsurgency efforts is the most useful.
- Operational relevance: Utility is the measure of effectiveness. Information for counterinsurgency efforts is the most useful.
- Operational relevance: Utility is the measure of effectiveness. Information for counterinsurgency efforts is the most useful.
- Operational relevance: Utility is the measure of effectiveness. Information for counterinsurgency efforts is the most useful.
- Thes manuals drive requirements for cultural training
- I’d like to return to one of the item so n my list of background reading that I discussed early in the presentation. Read quote: “Instead of generalist historians, religion specialists,and journalists, younger personnel who combinedrecent operational experience with academic study,site visits, and debriefing of returning unitsconducted the training. In this respect, culturaltrainers have been working to shorten the lessonslearnedfeedback loop from deployment todeployment…he or she must be a Soldier orMarine who has recently deployed operationally tothe AO in a job requiring ongoing interaction withthe indigenous population--the division combatoperations center watch officer from OIF-I will notdo. MOS is not important here; interaction withIraqis on a regular basis is.”
- It contains an exhaustive review of collection instruments like AARs, technological instruments and tools, etc.
- Discuss limitations of the personalization strategy and the hierarchical system for KM of tacit knowledge“Information technologies enable both”? How?
- Knowledge Centers- there are hundreds in AKO, and it is a big info dump that’s unusable
- Discuss limitations of the personalization strategy and the hierarchical system for KM of tacit knowledgeAARs are a tool for collecting information that is shared under the personalization strategy
- Discuss limitations of AARsDiscuss limitations of the hierarchical system for
- Discuss limitations of AARsDiscuss limitations of the hierarchical system for
- A large part- if not the majority- of the Chandler thesis is devoted to defining what culture means in the military context. This information is not included in the paper, but worth a read for its comparitive treatment of culture among different academic disciplines and application contexts.
- A large part- if not the majority- of the Chandler thesis is devoted to defining what culture means in the military context. This information is not included in the paper, but worth a read for its comparitive treatment of culture among different academic disciplines and application contexts.
- I’d like to return to one of the item so n my list of background reading that I discussed early in the presentation. Read quote: “Instead of generalist historians, religion specialists,and journalists, younger personnel who combinedrecent operational experience with academic study,site visits, and debriefing of returning unitsconducted the training. In this respect, culturaltrainers have been working to shorten the lessonslearnedfeedback loop from deployment todeployment…he or she must be a Soldier orMarine who has recently deployed operationally tothe AO in a job requiring ongoing interaction withthe indigenous population--the division combatoperations center watch officer from OIF-I will notdo. MOS is not important here; interaction withIraqis on a regular basis is.”Cultural training, and the feeding of huge amount of information back into that training system, is a permanent aspect of training that deserves more significant treatment in doctrine.We are acknowledging that an understanding of culture is essential to operations (especially COIN), and we have investments in training institutes and programs. However, there is a near cognitive dissonance about what this should mean for doctrine. Compliance with current doctrine will not help us create and utilize the tools we need to collect feedback about the effectiveness of our cultural education programs. The tools already being used by Soldiers performing the day to day tasks that require cultural competence are not supported by Army doctrine.