Vivian Hoffmann and Sarah Kariuki WEBINAR Catalyzing the Use of Aflatoxin Control Technologies in Kenya and Ghana NOV 26, 2019 - 09:00 AM TO 11:00 AM EST

1. Consumer demand for aflatoxin safety
and market response
Vivian Hoffmann
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
Sarah Kariuki
Wagengingen University and Research
November 26, 2019

2. Outline
Three recent studies on demand for maize flour:
1. Effect of food safety marketing on sales
2. Relationship between price and safety
3. Impact of information on consumer demand
Implications for firms and governments

3. Challenge: Most consumers won’t pay a
premium for safer food
Mass
market
$$$
In general, premium markets serve the relatively well-off

4. Study 1: Can food safety marketing increase sales?
• Tupike maize flour (Osho millers)
- Among the lowest-priced packaged brands on market in Eastern
Kenya
• APTECA provided technical assistance
- Worked with Osho to develop food safety plan, develop testing
capacity
- APTECA label approved for use on packaging while maize
complied with standard
• IFPRI evaluated impact on sales
- Randomized in-store promotion of flour at 73 shops: handed
out flyers, 10% limited-time discount at some shops
- Paid shopkeepers to keep sales records

5. Marketing campaign poster / flyer

6. Marketing increases demand for safety-
labeled flour only in the short term
Source: Hoffmann, Moser, and Herrman, IFPRI Discussion Paper, 2018
Proportionalimpactonsales

7. Study 2: Higher-priced flour is safer - why?
%ofbrandsamplesexceeding10ppblimit
Average price of brand’s flour (KSh per KG)
Source: Hoffmann and Moser, Agricultural Economics, 2017

8. Firms fear bad publicity, with good reason
• Reputational risk affects firms with strong brand
equity, less so those competing on price
• Example: concern following media reports in Kenya
Sticks can be more effective than carrots
→ regulatory enforcement is important

9. Study 3: Effect of information on consumer demand
Motivation
• Independent information may be more credible than
marketing claims
• Governments could provide this to stimulate demand
for safer food
Research question
• What type of information is effective for changing
consumer behavior?

10. Study design
• 979 households in Meru town, Eastern Kenya
• Information provided to consumers during first visit
+ General info: health information on effects of consuming
aflatoxin contaminated foods
+ Safer brands: names of two brands found to be more likely
to meet the Kenyan regulatory limit, based on a previous
study, higher priced flour more likely to be safe
+ Test: Rapid test of maize
flour being consumed by
household (above or below
10 ppb), results provided on
the spot

11. • Visited again after 8-9 weeks
• Observed which maize was being consumed
• Asked the price of this maize
Follow-up data

12. Maize flour types consumed before
intervention
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Safer brands Other packaged brands Posho mill flour

13. Aflatoxin contamination in household
flour samples (proportion > 10 ppb)
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
Safer brands (N=44) Other packaged brands
(N=445)
Posho mill flour
(N=112)
N=Number of samples tested per category

14. Proportion consuming each flour type before
vs. 2 months after receiving general info
Information on health effects of aflatoxin (no specific recommendation)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Safer brands Other packaged brands Posho mill flour
Before After

15. Proportion consuming each flour type before vs. 2
months after receiving general + safer brands info
“Research has shown that the more expensive the brand is, the lower the chance that
the flour is contaminated… and that Hostess and Jogoo flour are relatively safe in
terms of aflatoxin”
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Safer brands Other packaged
brands
Posho mill flour
Before After

16. Proportion consuming each flour type before vs. 2
months after general + safer brands info + test
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Safer brands Other packaged
brands
Posho mill flour
Before After

17. Proportion consuming a ‘safer brand’ 2
months after, by treatment & test result
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
General info General +
safer brands
General +
safer brands
+ test
Result
<=10ppb
Result
>10ppb
*
*
*
* Difference relative to the general information group is statistically significant.

18. Impact of specific information on price of
purchased maize (relative to general info group)
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
Safer brands
group
Safer brands +
test group
Result <=10 ppb Result >10 ppb
Ksh/kg
*
*
* Difference relative to the general info group is statistically significant
(general info group mean = 48 KSh / kg)

19. • Providing independent food safety information affects
consumer demand
– But effect is not big: 2-3% increase on price paid for flour
– Effect is only statistically significant when consumer maize is tested
– Testing seems to make aflatoxin risk more real to consumers (similar
to effect of a recall or negative media report)
• Implication: when consumers have a reason to be worried
about food safety, some change their behavior
• But most do not change what they eat
– Other interventions are needed to improve food safety
Discussion

20. Citizens
How can public concern be harnessed to
improve food safety more broadly?
$$$ Kenyan
consu
mers
want
safer
food
Kenyans want
safer food

21. Challenge: Scale vs. state capacity
• Hundreds of thousands of commercial farms
• Thousands of traders
• How many food safety inspectors?
→ Testing and punishing will barely make a dent
(and could increase corruption,
drive informal firms underground)

22. Good news: It’s generally in firms’
interest to improve food safety
Source: Unpublished data, World Bank survey of food safety inspectors, cited by Macrea (2019)
Willing to
comply
Opportunistic
Criminal
Compliant

23. Challenge: Capacity for compliance
• Testing and sampling is difficult
→ Support capacity to comply, treat food safety inputs
(e.g. biocontrol, drying sheets, test kits training)
as public goods

24. Global ‘best practice’ in food safety
is moving away from a “test and punish” approach
...toward delivery of food safety as a public good

25. Small improvement of least compliant may have
more impact than getting best performers compliant
Example: UK’s food safety rating system for restaurants aims for
3/5 ‘broadly compliant’
This is where the work needs to happen
Don’t focus effort on getting to perfection

26. Support direct farm to miller links, and
help all farmers improve safety
$$$
Without intervention to improve quality, or direct farm
procurement, differences in formal vs. informal market
compliance can hurt the poor

27. Thank you