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PROACTIVE SECURITY
CAGLAR SAYIN
WHO I AM
I AM CAGLAR
▸ I am basically Turkish computer engineer who focused on
security
▸ I am biker, skier, sailor etc.
▸ Netsparker Web Application Scanner
▸ Norwegian Information Security Lab
▸ Sony
THE LAYOUT
LAYOUT
▸ What is ProActive Security
▸ The Steps
▸ Discovery
▸ Scoping
▸ Assessment
▸ Reporting
▸ Remediation
▸ Training and Awareness
PROACTIVE SECURITY
IT IS BEING SECURE BEFORE ACTED
▸ It is opposite of reactive secure
▸ It tries to mitigate and prevent risk
▸ It gives you chance to estimate feature
▸ Estimating feature gives you chance to do response
planning
PLANS ARE NOTHING;
PLANNING IS EVERYTHING.
Dwight D. Eisenhower
OTHER’S PLAN IS NOT YOURS
STEPS
THE STEPS OF PROACTIVE SECURITY
▸ Risk Assessment
▸ Impact Analysis
▸ Risk Prevention
▸ Risk Mitigation
▸ Thread Analysis
▸ Planning Response
WORK ON XYZ
COMPANY
VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY
VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY
▸ Working on Our Own Test Env
▸ Attack Surface
▸ Automated Vulnerability and Attack Surface Discovery
▸ Manual Vulnerability Discovery
▸ Instant Vulnerability Discovery and DevOps Harmony
OWN ENVIRONMENT
WHY WE NEED TO WORK ON OUR OWN ENVIRONMENT
▸ We must work on a dead planet with living data on it
▸ it will be like a UAT or Integration tests
▸ Cloud services do not permit us to test on their platform
▸ It could result data lost or functional defects on application
▸ All security parameters must turned off to test specifically
application.
OWN ENVIRONMENT
WORKING ON OUR OWN ENVIRONMENT
▸ Code must be frozen copy of the production env
▸ if not, it could result inconsistency on test results
▸ We should touch all features available and must be
activated
▸ it will be like a UAT or Integration tests to provide test
accuracy
ATTACK SURFACE ANALYSIS
ATTACK SURFACE IS TO
▸ Understand the risk areas in an application
▸ Make developers and security specialists aware of what
parts of the application are open to attack,
▸ Find ways of minimising this
▸ Notice when and how the Attack Surface changes and
what this means from a risk perspective.
DEVELOPERS SECURITY ENGINEERS
=
BEST ATTACK SURFACE ANALYSIS
ATTACK SURFACE ANALYSIS
ATTACK SURFACE IN THEORY
▸ the sum of all paths for data/commands into and out of the
application, and
▸ the code that protects these paths (including resource connection
and authentication, authorisation, activity logging, data validation
and encoding), and
▸ all valuable data used in the application, including secrets and keys,
intellectual property, critical business data, personal data and PII, and
▸ the code that protects these data (including encryption and
checksums, access auditing, and data integrity and operational
security controls).
ATTACK SURFACE ANALYSIS
ATTACK SURFACE IN PRACTICE
▸ Network-facing, especially internet-facing code
▸ Web forms
▸ Files from outside of the network
▸ Backwards compatible interfaces with other systems – old protocols,
sometimes old code and libraries, hard to maintain and test multiple versions
▸ Custom APIs – protocols etc – likely to have mistakes in design and
implementation
▸ Security code: anything to do with cryptography, authentication,
authorization (access control) and session management
ATTACK SURFACE ANALYSIS
GIT DIFF MASTER MASTER~1
▸ What has changed?
▸ What are you doing different?
▸ What holes could you have opened?
AUTOMATED VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY
AUTOMATED VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY
▸ They tries a lot of payloads as much as a person can’t try
▸ This tools are developed with many people for years
▸ THEY ARE FAST and REALLY FAST
▸ THEY ARE PRACTICAL
▸ They are patient and tolerant
▸ Could be improved with targeted configuration
▸ False Positive rates are really high
MANUAL VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY
MANUAL VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY
▸ I know my application better then them
▸ There are some vulnerabilities only can be tested manually
▸ I am more intuitive
▸ I am holistic
▸ It is slow
INSTANT APPROACH
INSTANT APPROACH
INSTANT APPROACH
INSTANT APPROACH
INSTANT APPROACH
INSTANT APPROACH
INSTANT APPROACH
INSTANT APPROACH
INSTANT APPROACH
INSTANT APPROACH KEYWORDS
▸ Static security test which is involved in CI process or even coding
phase (Checkmarx)
▸ Dynamic security test (Skipfish, Arachni)
▸ The wrapper tools to combine them
▸ BDD-Security
▸ Gauntlt
▸ Mittn
▸ Strider :)
SCOPING
SCOPING WITH TIERED TEST APPROACH
▸ Tier 4 test - 1 day
▸ Tier 3 test - 3 days
▸ Tier 2 test - 1 week
▸ Tier 1 Premium test - 3 weeks
SCOPING
TIER 4 TEST
▸ It will only take 1 day quick test
▸ It will cover automated tool test on consumer facing web
application, API, API dashboard
▸ It will not cover XYZ internal dashboard
▸ It will not cover message queue, SQL db Hadoop because
they are already restricted to internet.
▸ It will include False Positive checks from outputs of
automated tool results
SCOPING
TIER 3 TEST
▸ It will only take 3 day - medium ranged test
▸ It will cover all the things in tier 4
▸ It will cover business logic assessments and some
authentication and authorisation attacks.
▸ Will cover authentication face of internal dashboard attack
SCOPING
TIER 2 TEST
▸ It will only take 1 weak - normal ranged test
▸ It will cover all the things in tier 3
▸ Architectural analysis is involved in this tier.
▸ API attack vectors will be prepared manually
▸ Manual wen pentest will take its place
▸ The interaction and connections between nodes will be checked. They
must be encrypted
▸ It will cover remote attacks like reflected XSS and CSRF attacks for internal
dashboard to protect employees from speared phishing attack
SCOPING
TIER 1 PREMIUM TEST
▸ It will take 3 weak or more
▸ It will cover all the things in tier 2
▸ It will cover thread modelling(thread vectors or threes)
▸ It will cover configuration analysis
▸ It will cover static code analysis and will combine results
with manual assessment
▸ It will cover all network tests and internal web tests.
PENTEST LOGS
PENETRATION TESTER ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN LOGS
▸ Testers must record their own logs in their own computers.
▸ Network level logging device must store their own logs
▸ Network logging must be accountable which means we
must authenticate people and stamp their ID onto logs
EVIDENCE
VULNERABILITY EVIDENCE IS CONTROVERSIAL
▸ Yes it is controversial but must be concrete.
▸ Show your arguments as clean as possible.
▸ Some vulnerabilities are theoretical and can’t be
exploitable and must shown thrusting reference
REPORTING
REPORTING ESSENTIALS
▸ Testing Team details
▸ Network Details
▸ Scope of test
▸ Executive Summary
▸ Technical Summary
REPORTING
STEPS MUST BE EXPLAINED IN TECHNICAL REPORT
▸ Reconnaissance & Enumeration
▸ Scanning
▸ Obtaining Access
▸ Maintaining Access
▸ Erasing Evidence
REPORTING
MY OPINIONS
▸ Nobody reads reports
▸ They must be precise and concise
▸ They must be more interactive
▸ Check out Dradis and Faraday
APPSEC PIPELINE
APPSEC PIPELINE
APPSEC PIPELINE
APPSEC PIPELINE
REMEDIATION ESSENTIALS
ESSENTIALS
▸ Location of the vulnerability should effect remediation
timeframe
▸ CVSS score could be used to develop our own scoring
system as base
▸ The vulnerabilities claimed as fixed must be retested
▸ Remediation methods should be shaped by security
engineers
TRAINING AND AWARENESS
TRAININGS
▸ Basic security awareness and knowledge for EVERYONE
▸ System must be ready to be secure before people
▸ A Conceptual Framework to Study Socio-Technical Security
paper must be checked by Ana Ferreira, Jean-Louis
Huynen, Vincent Koenig, Gabriele Lenzini
▸ Holistic approach - Statistics from vulnerability discovery
should take care
TRAINING
SECURITY AWARENESS PROGRAMS
▸ Teammentor - Guide to remediation
▸ Secure development guidelines
▸ Hackaton - CTF for developers
▸ Coursera
▸ for repeated issues, Brown Bag Sessions
▸ Chosen books are free but shipping is excluded model
THANKS
THANKS
THANKS
▸ Thank you
▸ Thank OWASP
▸ Thank insights of Carnegie Mellon University
▸ Thanks pentest-standard.org
▸ Thanks vulnerabilityassessment.co.uk
MORE
FOR MORE
▸ For more about business cases and management
situations

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ProActive Security

  • 2. WHO I AM I AM CAGLAR ▸ I am basically Turkish computer engineer who focused on security ▸ I am biker, skier, sailor etc. ▸ Netsparker Web Application Scanner ▸ Norwegian Information Security Lab ▸ Sony
  • 3. THE LAYOUT LAYOUT ▸ What is ProActive Security ▸ The Steps ▸ Discovery ▸ Scoping ▸ Assessment ▸ Reporting ▸ Remediation ▸ Training and Awareness
  • 4. PROACTIVE SECURITY IT IS BEING SECURE BEFORE ACTED ▸ It is opposite of reactive secure ▸ It tries to mitigate and prevent risk ▸ It gives you chance to estimate feature ▸ Estimating feature gives you chance to do response planning
  • 5. PLANS ARE NOTHING; PLANNING IS EVERYTHING. Dwight D. Eisenhower OTHER’S PLAN IS NOT YOURS
  • 6. STEPS THE STEPS OF PROACTIVE SECURITY ▸ Risk Assessment ▸ Impact Analysis ▸ Risk Prevention ▸ Risk Mitigation ▸ Thread Analysis ▸ Planning Response
  • 8. VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY ▸ Working on Our Own Test Env ▸ Attack Surface ▸ Automated Vulnerability and Attack Surface Discovery ▸ Manual Vulnerability Discovery ▸ Instant Vulnerability Discovery and DevOps Harmony
  • 9. OWN ENVIRONMENT WHY WE NEED TO WORK ON OUR OWN ENVIRONMENT ▸ We must work on a dead planet with living data on it ▸ it will be like a UAT or Integration tests ▸ Cloud services do not permit us to test on their platform ▸ It could result data lost or functional defects on application ▸ All security parameters must turned off to test specifically application.
  • 10. OWN ENVIRONMENT WORKING ON OUR OWN ENVIRONMENT ▸ Code must be frozen copy of the production env ▸ if not, it could result inconsistency on test results ▸ We should touch all features available and must be activated ▸ it will be like a UAT or Integration tests to provide test accuracy
  • 11. ATTACK SURFACE ANALYSIS ATTACK SURFACE IS TO ▸ Understand the risk areas in an application ▸ Make developers and security specialists aware of what parts of the application are open to attack, ▸ Find ways of minimising this ▸ Notice when and how the Attack Surface changes and what this means from a risk perspective.
  • 12. DEVELOPERS SECURITY ENGINEERS = BEST ATTACK SURFACE ANALYSIS
  • 13. ATTACK SURFACE ANALYSIS ATTACK SURFACE IN THEORY ▸ the sum of all paths for data/commands into and out of the application, and ▸ the code that protects these paths (including resource connection and authentication, authorisation, activity logging, data validation and encoding), and ▸ all valuable data used in the application, including secrets and keys, intellectual property, critical business data, personal data and PII, and ▸ the code that protects these data (including encryption and checksums, access auditing, and data integrity and operational security controls).
  • 14. ATTACK SURFACE ANALYSIS ATTACK SURFACE IN PRACTICE ▸ Network-facing, especially internet-facing code ▸ Web forms ▸ Files from outside of the network ▸ Backwards compatible interfaces with other systems – old protocols, sometimes old code and libraries, hard to maintain and test multiple versions ▸ Custom APIs – protocols etc – likely to have mistakes in design and implementation ▸ Security code: anything to do with cryptography, authentication, authorization (access control) and session management
  • 15. ATTACK SURFACE ANALYSIS GIT DIFF MASTER MASTER~1 ▸ What has changed? ▸ What are you doing different? ▸ What holes could you have opened?
  • 16. AUTOMATED VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY AUTOMATED VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY ▸ They tries a lot of payloads as much as a person can’t try ▸ This tools are developed with many people for years ▸ THEY ARE FAST and REALLY FAST ▸ THEY ARE PRACTICAL ▸ They are patient and tolerant ▸ Could be improved with targeted configuration ▸ False Positive rates are really high
  • 17. MANUAL VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY MANUAL VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY ▸ I know my application better then them ▸ There are some vulnerabilities only can be tested manually ▸ I am more intuitive ▸ I am holistic ▸ It is slow
  • 22. INSTANT APPROACH INSTANT APPROACH KEYWORDS ▸ Static security test which is involved in CI process or even coding phase (Checkmarx) ▸ Dynamic security test (Skipfish, Arachni) ▸ The wrapper tools to combine them ▸ BDD-Security ▸ Gauntlt ▸ Mittn ▸ Strider :)
  • 23. SCOPING SCOPING WITH TIERED TEST APPROACH ▸ Tier 4 test - 1 day ▸ Tier 3 test - 3 days ▸ Tier 2 test - 1 week ▸ Tier 1 Premium test - 3 weeks
  • 24. SCOPING TIER 4 TEST ▸ It will only take 1 day quick test ▸ It will cover automated tool test on consumer facing web application, API, API dashboard ▸ It will not cover XYZ internal dashboard ▸ It will not cover message queue, SQL db Hadoop because they are already restricted to internet. ▸ It will include False Positive checks from outputs of automated tool results
  • 25. SCOPING TIER 3 TEST ▸ It will only take 3 day - medium ranged test ▸ It will cover all the things in tier 4 ▸ It will cover business logic assessments and some authentication and authorisation attacks. ▸ Will cover authentication face of internal dashboard attack
  • 26. SCOPING TIER 2 TEST ▸ It will only take 1 weak - normal ranged test ▸ It will cover all the things in tier 3 ▸ Architectural analysis is involved in this tier. ▸ API attack vectors will be prepared manually ▸ Manual wen pentest will take its place ▸ The interaction and connections between nodes will be checked. They must be encrypted ▸ It will cover remote attacks like reflected XSS and CSRF attacks for internal dashboard to protect employees from speared phishing attack
  • 27. SCOPING TIER 1 PREMIUM TEST ▸ It will take 3 weak or more ▸ It will cover all the things in tier 2 ▸ It will cover thread modelling(thread vectors or threes) ▸ It will cover configuration analysis ▸ It will cover static code analysis and will combine results with manual assessment ▸ It will cover all network tests and internal web tests.
  • 28. PENTEST LOGS PENETRATION TESTER ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN LOGS ▸ Testers must record their own logs in their own computers. ▸ Network level logging device must store their own logs ▸ Network logging must be accountable which means we must authenticate people and stamp their ID onto logs
  • 29. EVIDENCE VULNERABILITY EVIDENCE IS CONTROVERSIAL ▸ Yes it is controversial but must be concrete. ▸ Show your arguments as clean as possible. ▸ Some vulnerabilities are theoretical and can’t be exploitable and must shown thrusting reference
  • 30. REPORTING REPORTING ESSENTIALS ▸ Testing Team details ▸ Network Details ▸ Scope of test ▸ Executive Summary ▸ Technical Summary
  • 31. REPORTING STEPS MUST BE EXPLAINED IN TECHNICAL REPORT ▸ Reconnaissance & Enumeration ▸ Scanning ▸ Obtaining Access ▸ Maintaining Access ▸ Erasing Evidence
  • 32. REPORTING MY OPINIONS ▸ Nobody reads reports ▸ They must be precise and concise ▸ They must be more interactive ▸ Check out Dradis and Faraday
  • 35. REMEDIATION ESSENTIALS ESSENTIALS ▸ Location of the vulnerability should effect remediation timeframe ▸ CVSS score could be used to develop our own scoring system as base ▸ The vulnerabilities claimed as fixed must be retested ▸ Remediation methods should be shaped by security engineers
  • 36. TRAINING AND AWARENESS TRAININGS ▸ Basic security awareness and knowledge for EVERYONE ▸ System must be ready to be secure before people ▸ A Conceptual Framework to Study Socio-Technical Security paper must be checked by Ana Ferreira, Jean-Louis Huynen, Vincent Koenig, Gabriele Lenzini ▸ Holistic approach - Statistics from vulnerability discovery should take care
  • 37. TRAINING SECURITY AWARENESS PROGRAMS ▸ Teammentor - Guide to remediation ▸ Secure development guidelines ▸ Hackaton - CTF for developers ▸ Coursera ▸ for repeated issues, Brown Bag Sessions ▸ Chosen books are free but shipping is excluded model
  • 38.
  • 40. THANKS THANKS ▸ Thank you ▸ Thank OWASP ▸ Thank insights of Carnegie Mellon University ▸ Thanks pentest-standard.org ▸ Thanks vulnerabilityassessment.co.uk
  • 41. MORE FOR MORE ▸ For more about business cases and management situations