1. Internet Filtering in
Iran
Overview Background
The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to Speech in the Islamic Republic of Iran is
expand and consolidate its technical heavily regulated. The limits to freedom of
filtering system, which is among the most expression in Iran are grounded in the
extensive in the world. A centralized constitution and speech restrictions
system for Internet filtering has been extend over a broad range of topics,
implemented that augments the filtering including religion, immorality, social
conducted at the Internet service provider harmony and politics. In comparison to the
(ISP) level. Iran now employs domestically well developed state controls over print
produced technology for identifying and media, radio and television, the Internet
blocking objectionable Web sites, reducing initially offered a relatively unfettered
its reliance on Western filtering medium for communication in Iran,
technologies. The regulatory agencies in allowing independent media and
Iran charged with policing the Internet opposition voices to flourish.1 The Internet
continue to expand. The Revolutionary also has provided Iranian expatriates a
Guard has begun to play an active role in platform for publishing opinions in
enforcing Internet content standards. In opposition to the government, such as
conjunction with expansive surveillance, pro-secular and reformist political
this increase in regulatory attention viewpoints, outside of the reach of
exacerbates an online atmosphere that standard offline strategies for enforcing
promotes self-censorship and discourages speech restrictions. The growing popularity
dissenting views. The blocking of political of the Internet has led to increasing
Web sites during the 2009 presidential government scrutiny. Dissenting voices
elections energized opposition to Internet online, including human rights activists,
censorship within Iran and has brought bloggers and online media outlets, have
fresh attention to the issue of press became the target of government
controls. regulatory action and are subject to arrest,
imprisonment and torture.2 Internet
RESULTS AT A GLANCE
No evidence of Suspected Selective Substantial Pervasive
Filtering filtering filtering filtering filtering filtering
Political 
Social 
Conflict/security 
Internet tool 
Other factors Low Medium High Not applicable
Transparency 
Consistency 
1

2. KEY INDICATORS
worst best
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)…………………….....7,968 ………………
Life expectancy at birth (years)……………………………………………….70.2 ……………………………………..…
Literacy rate (% of people age 15+)…………………………………………82.4 ………………………………………….
Human development index (out of 179)…………………………………..…84 ……………………………………
Rule of law (percentile)……………………………………………………………..21 …………>
Voice and accountability (percentile)……………………………………………8 ……
Digital opportunity index (out of 181)………………………………….……105 …………………
Internet users (% of population)……………………………………………......35 ……………………………
control mechanisms have continued to Russia, where pro-Kremlin bloggers are
grow in scope and scale to address this suspected of receiving government
digital challenge to information control in support.4
Iran. Regulators have invested in more
sophisticated technical control Internet in Iran
mechanisms, and new regulatory agencies Internet usage in Iran continues to
have been created to identify and block increase at a sharp rate. Over the past
expression deemed offensive. The eight years, the number of Internet users
presidential elections in 2009 led to an in Iran has grown at an average annual
increase in online political organizing, rate of approximately 48 percent,
which provided a further impetus for increasing from under one million Internet
increasingly contentious controls on the users in 20005 to around 23 million in
Web sites used by legitimate opposition 2008.6 This rate of growth is higher than
contenders. any other country in the Middle East.
Internet users now account for
Efforts to control online speech by the approximately 35 percent of the
Iranian government have relied primarily population of Iran. This Internet
on large-scale Internet filtering and the penetration rate is considerably higher
threat of targeted legal action. The than the Middle East average of 26
declaration of a spokesman from the percent.7
Revolutionary Guard to launch ten
thousand blogs written by members of the The Persian blogosphere has been
Basij, a volunteer Iranian paramilitary heralded as one of the largest and most
force under the authority of the Iranian active in the world. The number of active
Revolutionary Guards, hints at the Persian blogs is estimated to be
adoption of a different strategy for shaping approximately 60,000—a formidable
online information: a government-backed number of independent voices for a
war of words on the Internet.3 This is country accustomed to tightly controlling
similar conceptually to the government the press.8
information dissemination strategies seen
in just a small number of countries, for Iranian Internet policies reflect a strong
example, the fifty-cent army in China, tension between the regulatory urge to
where workers are reportedly paid for reign in free speech and the promotion of
producing pro-government content, and in innovation and economic growth
2

3. supported by expanding access to than doubling from 2005 to 2007.13 The
information and communication growth of fiber-optic networks in Iran has
technologies (ICT). Bolstered by the strong since dropped off precipitously.14
growth in Internet penetration in Iran, Mohammad Soleimani, the Minister of
Iran’s fourth Five-Year Development Plan Information and Communications, publicly
called for enhanced broadband defended the ceiling on access speeds,
penetration with 1.5 million high-speed and indicated that slower speeds are
Internet connections nationwide.9 adequate and that there is no demand for
However, in October 2006, the Ministry of higher speeds.15 Iran is the only country in
Communications and Information the world to have instituted an explicit cap
Technology (MICT) issued an order that on Internet access speed for households.
appears to have been designed to thwart
household access to broadband Internet, Efforts to gain control over the Internet
forbidding ISPs from providing Internet were already underway in 2001, when the
connectivity to households and public government of Iran asserted control over
Internet access points at speeds greater all Internet access points coming into the
than 128 kilobytes per second. This policy, country.16 Commercial ISPs in Iran that
which restricts the ability of Internet users offer Internet connectivity to the public are
to download multimedia content, is likely required to connect via the state-
intended to hinder access to online controlled Telecommunication Company of
alternative media sources that might Iran (TCI).17 ONI research corroborates
compete with the tightly controlled radio that ISPs offering Internet service to the
and television media in Iran.10 public all connect via TCI. The other
international connections to the Internet
At the time of this order, approximately are associated with research and
250,000 users had access to high-speed academic organizations. Designing the
Internet service, with demand continuing Internet infrastructure around a
to grow.11 Over the prior two years, eleven government-managed gateway—rare for a
companies had been licensed to provide country with this many Internet users—
such high-speed services and had offers a central point of control that
invested significant capital in importing facilitates the implementation of Internet
the required machinery and setting up the filtering and monitoring of Internet use.
required infrastructure. These regulations
on Internet access speed were met with Legal and regulatory frameworks
intense opposition, including a campaign Speech regulation in Iran is rooted in its
to overturn the policy by members of constitution, which declares that “the
parliament.12 Reports at the time media should be used as a forum for
suggested that the restrictions would be healthy encounter of different ideas, but
lifted once more effective content control they must strictly refrain from diffusion
mechanisms were put into place. and propagation of destructive and anti-
However, the ban on high-speed service Islamic practices.”18 Applying these
for households and public access points principles to the Internet has proven to be
remains in place, although universities difficult. A number of government
and private businesses are able to obtain regulatory initiatives have been launched
high-speed broadband service. Before this over the past decade to assert control
policy was enacted, fiber-optic networks over online communications, although the
had been expanding rapidly in Iran, more
3

4. legal status of Web sites and blogs Internet censorship in Iran was a public
continues to be contested. relations liability, as they were viewed as
contributing to the suppression of
The legal and institutional basis for the legitimate speech, if not breaking US law
technical filtering system in Iran grew out by violating trade sanctions against Iran.
of a series of decrees passed down by the For the Iranian government, the reliance
Supreme Council of the Cultural on Western technologies was seen as a
Revolution (SCRC) in December 2001 that source of weakness and a potential
required ISPs to employ filtering vulnerability to the integrity of the Iranian
systems.19 An inter-agency committee, the Internet. Some within Iran were concerned
Committee in Charge of Determining that Western software might include a
Unauthorized Sites (CCDUS), was set up a ‘backdoor’ that would give outsiders
year later to set criteria for identifying access to key infrastructure.26
unauthorized Web sites to be blocked.20
This committee also decides on the Several Iranian technology companies are
blocking of specific domains. The SCRC now producing hardware and software
issues guidelines to this committee and products for use in the Iranian filtering
oversees committee members, which system.27 Domestically produced
include representatives of MICT, the technology is currently used for filtering.
Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance Iranian technology is also used for
(MCIG), the Ministry of Intelligence and searching the Internet for objectionable
National Security and the Tehran content and tracking keywords and links
Prosecutor General.21 to banned Web sites, which are used by
filtering authorities to make blocking
The implementation of the filtering decisions.28 With the emergence of this
decisions is charged to a filtering division domestic technical capacity, Iran joins
within the Information Technology China as the only countries that
Company of Iran (ITC), an agency under aggressively filter the Internet using their
MICT.22 Another agency, the own technology.
Communication Infrastructure Company,
has been given the task of unifying The legal structures for enforcing speech
filtering across Iran.23 restrictions in Iran are ambitious in their
reach and offer authorities several
Iran has promoted the development of alternatives for targeting objectionable
domestic tools and technical capacity to speech and implementing the wide
carry out Internet filtering in order to mandate to curtail a broad range of
reduce its reliance of Western impermissible speech in Iran. Significant
technologies. Prior ONI research reported ambiguity in the statutes and directives
the use of SmartFilter, a product of the used to regulate speech in Iran leaves the
United States based firm Secure agencies charged with executing these
Computing, for filtering Internet content.24 laws with broad discretionary powers.
Secure Computing denied any knowledge
of the use of their products in Iran.25 The The Press Law of 1986 is the principle
use of Western technology was instrument for regulating media in Iran
problematic both for the companies and frames the boundaries of permissible
involved and for the Iranian government. speech by media. This legislation is
For the companies, involvement in unusual in that it not only describes
4

5. restricted speech but also lays out government claims that the law now
normative objectives for the press, who applies to all “internet publications.”35
are required to “propagate and promote
genuine Islamic culture and sound ethical As applied to Web sites and blogs, the
principles.”29 The Press Law outlines Press Law would not only subject online
broad restrictions on speech, including content to the comprehensive set of
prohibitions on “promoting subjects that speech restrictions in the law, but would
might damage the foundation of the also require Web sites to obtain a license
Islamic Republic … offending the Leader of prior to publication. Bloggers and online
the Revolution … or quoting articles from media sources would also be subject to
the deviant press, parties or groups that the regulatory authority of the Press
oppose Islam (inside and outside the Supervisory Board under the Ministry of
country) in such a manner as to propagate Islamic Culture and Guidance (MICG),
such ideas… or encouraging and which has the power to revoke licenses,
instigating individuals and groups to act ban publications, and refer complaints to
against the security, dignity and interests a special Press Court.36
of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”30 Other
provisions prohibit insulting Islam or Internet “publications” that do not obtain
senior religious authorities.31 a license under the Press Law, however,
are subject to the stricter general laws of
The application of this law to Web sites the Penal Code and come under the
and blogs in Iran has been contested. An jurisdiction of the general courts. The
amendment to the Press Law in 2000 Penal Code incorporates content-based
appears to have brought electronic crimes such as propaganda against the
publications under the aegis of the law.32 state and allows for the death penalty or
In April 2009, another amendment to the imprisonment of up to five years for
Press Law was passed by the Iranian speech deemed to be an “insult to
parliament that could facilitate the religion.”37 Additional punishable offenses
application of Press Law to online sources include creating “anxiety and unease in
of content. The 2009 amendment the public’s mind,” spreading “false
stipulates that, “the rules stated in this rumors,” or writing about “acts which are
Press Law apply to domestic news sites not true.” Another provision criminalizes
and domestic websites and set out their criticism of state officials. Cases heard in
rights, responsibilities, legal protection, the general courts do not have the benefit
crimes, punishments, judicial authority of a jury trial, which is used only in the
and procedure for hearings.”33 This article, Press courts, increasing the risk for those
which was rejected a year and a half ago that opt not to register their Web site or
when proposed to the previous blog.
parliament, was reportedly passed this
time with strong pressure from the Both supporters and critics of the 2009
Ahmadinejad government.34 Given the amendment to the Press Law agree that
ambiguous wording of the April 2009 implementing these new provisions is
amendment to the Press Law, critics say beyond the capacity of current regulatory
that personal Web sites and blogs may agencies. Critics suspect that the
also fall within the new definition, allowing proximity of the law’s approval to the
greater scope for inhibiting freedom of 2009 elections was linked to the
expression on the Internet. The incumbent president’s desire to limit the
5

6. influence of reformist candidates in obscene content.46 A prior draft of the
cyberspace.38 legislation included provisions that made
ISPs criminally liable for content
Authorities in Iran have struggled for many transmitted via their networks. These
years with the challenges of regulating provisions have been removed from the
speech on the Internet, complicated by latest draft of the Cybercrimes Bill.
the relative ease of anonymous speech
online and access to content hosted The role of different government agencies
outside of the country. ISPs and in deciding on blocking, and the legality of
subscribers are subject to prohibitions on doing so, has been a point of contention.
twenty types of activities, among which The Internet Bureau of the Judiciary has
insulting Islam and religious leaders and issued mandates to ISPs to block Web
institutions, as well as fomenting national sites through court orders, which are
discord and promoting drug use or considered a form of lawful punishment
obscenity and immoral behaviors, are imposed on legal entities.47 Tehran
prominent.39 In 2006, a directive of the Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi, who
SCRC declared Web sites and blogs that has led harsh crackdowns on media and
did not obtain a license from the MICG to has also been implicated in cases of
be illegal.40 The MICG issued a notice in torture of detainees, including twenty-one
January 2007 requiring registration by bloggers arrested in 2004, has also
March 1, 2007. A Telecommunications ordered that certain sites be censored.48
Ministry official, however, indicated that
enforcement was not feasible.41 The The legality of Iran’s filtering regime was
number of blogs that have registered with brought into question following the
the state is thought to be very low.42 blocking of the conservative online journal
Baztab.com in February 2007. Baztab was
Another key piece of legislation for made accessible inside Iran again after
regulating online content in Iran is the Bill the Supreme Court of Iran ruled against
of Cyber Crimes’ Sanctions (Cybercrimes the filtering of the Web site.49 This
Bill) ratified into law in November 2008. incident sparked a debate within Iranian
This bill was still under review by the legal and media circles over the authority
Guardian Council at the time of writing.43 of the CCDUS, and whether as an
The bill requires ISPs to ensure that executive body of government it was
“forbidden” content is not displayed on improperly involved in making legislative
their servers, that they immediately inform or judicial decisions.50 This debate did not
law enforcement agencies of violations, forestall the eventual closing of the offices
that they retain the content as evidence, of Baztab.51
and that they restrict access to the
prohibited content.44 Under the Surveillance
Cybercrimes Bill, ISPs that do not abide by Iran is reportedly investing in improving its
government regulations (including filtering technical capacity to extensively monitor
regulations) will be fined, and with the behavior of its citizens on the Internet.
subsequent offenses temporarily or The routing of Internet traffic through
permanently suspended.45 The bill also proxy servers offers the potential for
includes provisions for the protection and monitoring and logging essentially all
disclosure of confidential data and unencrypted Web traffic, including e-mail,
information as well as the publishing of instant messaging and browsing. The
6

7. architecture of the Iranian Internet is rights organizations and political
particularly conducive to widespread opposition parties.
surveillance as all traffic from the dozens
of ISPs serving households is routed Filtering in Iran is implemented by routing
through the state-controlled all public Internet traffic through proxy
telecommunications infrastructure of TCI. servers. This allows the employment of
The MICT, when announcing the creation filtering software to target specific Web
of a centralized filtering system, indicated pages as well as the blocking of keywords.
that they would keep a record of Web sites The blocking of Web sites is carried out in
visited by users. A later statement denied a transparent manner in Iran; a blockpage
that this infrastructure would be used for is displayed to users that attempt to
tracking browsing habits and identifying access a blocked site with a warning to
users.52 users that they are not permitted to
access a particular Web site. The
In 2008, two European companies blockpages, which vary by ISP, generally
reportedly sold a sophisticated electronic include a contact e-mail address for users
surveillance system capable of monitoring that might wish to contact the filtering
Internet use that could be utilized for administrators to question or contest the
tracking and monitoring the online blocking of a Web site.
activities of human rights organizations
and political dissidents. TCI is said to have A noteworthy recent development in Iran’s
received the equipment from Nokia filtering regime is the implementation of a
Siemens Networks, a joint venture centralized filtering regime. Historically,
between the Finnish cell phone maker and there has been substantial variation in
the German company Siemens.53 blocking across different ISPs, with
Women’s rights activists reported that several ISPs filtering fewer Web sites than
they were shown transcripts of instant TCI and thereby offering a more
messaging sessions by authorities after permissive view of the Internet.55 This
their arrest, which, if true, would support variation in access to Web sites was the
the existence of an advanced surveillance result of differences in the implementation
program.54 of government filtering instructions by
ISPs. This differential filtering practice has
ONI testing results now been effectively replaced by a
ONI conducted testing in 2008 and 2009 uniform filtering pattern with the
on five ISPs in Iran: ITC, Gostar, implementation of the supplementary
Parsonline, Datak and Sepanta. The centralized filtering system. The vestiges
testing results confirm that Iran has of the ISP-based system, however, are still
continued to consolidate its position as apparent: the source of filtering is evident
one of the most extensive filterers of the by the blockpage that appears, which in
Internet. Iran consistently filters a broad some cases comes from the respective
range of Web sites that are offensive to ISPs and in other cases from a standard
the moral standards of Iran’s religious blockpage issued by TCI. It is unclear what
leadership. Internet censors in Iran have the long-term structure of the filtering
moved decisively against a number of system will be. Options include continuing
political targets over the past two years, with the current dual location filtering
including women’s rights groups, human system or switching to either a system in
which all filtering is carried out at a central
7

8. point or to a distributed but centrally for president, Mir Hossein Mousavi, had
coordinated filtering system. Regardless of been using Facebook for political
the method chosen for implementation, it organizing.56 Ahmadinejad has since
appears that Iran is firmly on the path denied any involvement in the decision to
towards a centralized filtering system block Facebook.57 The blocking of the
under the control of the government, as popular social network Web site was
carried out in Saudi Arabia, for example. reversed several days later after strong
popular opposition to the blocking in
The Iranian filtering system continues to Iran,58 but the site, along with the sites of
strengthen and deepen. In addition to major opposition candidates and several
targeting “immoral” content on the pro-reform sites, was blocked again during
Internet, independent and dissenting the June 2009 presidential elections.59
voices are filtered across a range of Facebook had been blocked in the past:
issues, including political reform, criticism ONI testing showed that it was blocked in
of the government, reporting on human fall 2008, with access to the Web site
rights issues, and minority and women’s allowed again in February 2009.60
rights. A notable change in the scope of
filtering in Iran over the past several years The role of speech restrictions in the
has been an expansion of political filtering political realm are also evident in the
and blocking of human rights guidelines passed down from SCRC to
organizations, particularly targeting the CCDUS in April 2009 that define allowable
women’s rights movement in Iran. speech during the 2009 presidential
Blocking orders issued by CCDUS in May elections for Web sites and ISPs. These
2008 added many new Web sites to the guidelines outlined twenty categories of
blocking lists. This included numerous prohibited speech, including “disrupting
Web sites and blogs of women’s rights national unity” and “creating negative
and human rights activists in addition to feelings forwards the Islamic
several well-known journalists, including government.”61
www.roozmaregiha2.blogfa.com and
pargas1.blogfa.com. Women’s rights Web Independent media Web sites offered only
sites in Farsi, such as www.we-change.org in English are inconsistently blocked,
and feministschool.com, are consistently though a number of prominent Western
blocked in Iran. news Web sites have been blocked in Iran.
The HuffingtonPost and the website for Al-
A prominent and recent example of Arabiya (alarabiya.net) are blocked in Iran.
targeted political filtering is the blocking in The New York Times, available in May
February 2009 of www.yaarinews.ir, a 2009, has been blocked on several
Web site created for the planned election occasions in the past. Global Voices, an
campaign of former president Mohammad international blog aggregator, was blocked
Khatami. A Web site of the reformist in May 2009. The Web sites of numerous
coalition, www.baharestaniran.com, was international free speech organizations
blocked in March 2008. The blocking of are blocked, including rsf.org, epic.org,
Facebook in May 2009 has proven to be citizenlab.org and eff.org. The Web sites of
particularly controversial in Iran. Many Amnesty International and the OpenNet
believe that supporters of President Initiative were not blocked in May 2009.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were behind the
blocking orders, as a Reformist candidate
8

9. A higher proportion of independent media been restored.64 Technorati.com and
Web sites in Farsi are blocked compared boingboing.com are also blocked.
to English language content. Though the
English version of the BBC’s web site In the fall of 2008, ONI tested a sample of
(www.bbc.co.uk) was not blocked until the approximately 8,800 blogs, drawing the
June 2009 elections,62 the BBC’s Persian sample from those blogs in the Farsi
service (www.bbc.co.uk/persian) was blogosphere with the highest number of
blocked soon after its launch in January links to one another.65 Of these,
2009. The introduction of this new approximately 9 percent were found to be
broadcast station was condemned by the blocked by TCI. A majority of the blogs that
Iranian government and declared to be were blocked are associated with secular
illegal.63 Iranian.com, roozonline.com, and politics and reformist viewpoints.
radiozamaneh.com are among the However, blogs from the conservative and
independent sources of news and opinion religious segments of the blogosphere
that are blocked in Iran. were blocked as well, several of which
apparently included content deemed to be
The popular Farsi social networking and too extreme. Further ONI analysis carried
independent news Web site, out over a sample of filtered and
Balatarin.com, was blocked in 2007, unfiltered blogs displays a systematic
reportedly for a user-contributed post with targeting of blogs with oppositional views
a link to a Web site that included a rumor but with substantial inconsistency; many
of the death of Supreme Leader Ali blogs with solidly dissident views remain
Hoseyni Khamenei. Strident objections by unblocked, while other blogs without
users to the blocking of Balatarin were not controversial content are blocked.
successful in reversing the blocking
decision, and Balatarin continues to be Several popular social networking Web
blocked. sites are blocked in Iran, including
MySpace.com and Orkut.com. Prior to
The Web sites of several ethnic and being blocked, Orkut was highly popular in
religious minorities are blocked in Iran, Iran. Among the more prominent social
including those associated with the Baha’i media Web sites, Flickr.com,
faith and Kurdish movements. Web sites www.bebo.com, www.metacafe.com,
that are critical of Islam are widely www.photobucket.com and delicious.com
blocked. A higher proportion of Web sites are all blocked. YouTube.com, one of the
in Farsi related to religious and minority most popular destinations for Iranian
rights are blocked compared to those in Internet users, was available in May 2009
English. after several episodes of blocking in the
past, though it was blocked during the
The blocking of blogs in Iran is focused June 2009 elections.66
primarily on individual blogs. However,
several blog hosting services are blocked Consistent with one of the stated
in their entirely, including objectives of Iran’s filtering policy,
www.livejournal.com and www.xanga.com. pornographic content is heavily filtered.
Persian-language blog host Iran is highly successful in blocking
www.blogfa.com was down for several pornography, blocking a vast majority of
days during the June 2009 elections; at the Web sites tested by ONI. Sites that
the time of writing service had not yet include photographs depicting provocative
9

10. attire are also consistently blocked. Esmail Conclusion
Radkani, of Iran’s quasi-official Iran continues to strengthen the legal,
Information Technology Company, claimed administrative and technical aspects of its
in an interview in September 2006 that Internet filtering systems. The Internet
ten million Web sites were filtered at that censorship system in Iran is one of the
time, 90 percent of which contained most comprehensive and sophisticated in
“immoral” content.67 Anther official was the world. Advances in domestic technical
quoted in November 2008 saying that five capacity have contributed to the
million Web sites were blocked in Iran.68 implementation of a centralized filtering
Given the large number of Web sites with strategy and a reduced reliance on
sexual content blocked in Iran, neither of Western technologies. Despite the deeply
those estimates is implausible. held commitment to regulating Internet
content, authorities continue to be
The filtering of material related to sexuality challenged in their attempts to control
extends as well to Web sites offering online speech. Political filtering related to
content related to sexual education. the 2009 presidential campaign, including
Approximately half of the dating Web sites the blocking of Facebook and several
tested by ONI were found to be blocked in opposition party Web sites, brought
Iran. ONI testing also found significant renewed attention to the role of filtering in
blocking of content related to Iran.
homosexuality, particularly if it had any
connection to Iran. A number of Web sites
related to drugs, alcohol and gambling are
blocked in Iran, although many remain
unblocked.
Web sites that offer tools and techniques
for circumventing filters are also heavily
filtered. Just as new Web sites with
options for circumventing Internet filters
are regularly offered by Internet users
around the world, blocking lists in Iran are
frequently updated to include these new
Web sites. A great majority of Web sites
offering information about and access to
circumvention tools tested by ONI were
blocked.
The proxy server filtering strategy also
permits filtering by keyword. Web
searches that include the keyword
“women” are still blocked in Iran. The
word “sex” and a broad range of words
related to sexual activity both in English
and Farsi are blocked. The Farsi word for
“photograph” is also blocked.
10

11. NOTES
8 John Kelly and Bruce Etling, “Mapping Iran’s
Online Public: Politics and Culture in the
1 Peter Feuilherade, “Iran’s banned press Persian Blogosphere,” Berkman Center for
turns to the net,” BBC News, August 9, Internet and Society, April 5, 2008,
2002, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/not_in_websit /2008/Mapping_Irans_Online_Public.
e/syndication/monitoring/media_reports/ 9 Atieh Bahar Consulting, “Iran Telecom Brief,”
2183573.stm. October 20, 2008,
2 Human Rights Watch Report, “False http://www.atiehbahar.com/Resource.asp
Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle x?n=1000014.
East and North Africa: Iran,” November 10 BBC Persian, “Speed reduced for high
2005, speed Internet in Iran,” October 20, 2006,
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/ http://www.bbc.net.uk/persian/science/s
5.htm#_Toc119125727. See also Clark tory/2006/10/061020_fb_rsh_adsl.shtm
Boyd, “The price paid for blogging in Iran,” l.
BBC News, February 21, 2005, 11 Ibid.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4 12 Robert Tait, “Iran bans fast internet to cut
283231.stm. west's influence,” The Guardian, October
3 “‫ ”,ﺁﯼﻥﺩ ﻡﯼ ﻭﺏﻝﺍﮒ ﻩﺯﺍﺭ ۰۱ ﺏﺍ ﻩﺍ ﺏﺱﯼﺝﯼ‬BBC 18, 2006,
News (Persian), November 18, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/20
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2008 06/oct/18/news.iran.
/11/081119_mg_basij_filtering.shtml. 13 Telecommunication Company of Iran,
4 David Bandurski, “China’s Guerilla War for “Performance Report,” September 2008,
the Web,” Far Eastern Economic Review, http://irantelecom.ir/pdfs/amar/SEP_200
July 2008, 8.pdf.
http://www.feer.com/essays/2008/augus 14 Ibid.
t/chinas-guerrilla-war-for-the- 15 Mehr News, “Criticism of the minister of
web?searched=Bandurski&highlight=ajax communications’ statement in regards to
Search_highlight+ajaxSearch_highlight1. internet speed,” May 25, 2008,
5 International Telecommunications Union, http://www.mehrnews.ir/NewsPrint.aspx?
“ITU Internet Indicators 2000,” NewsID=689151.
http://www.itu.int/ITU- 16 Iran CSOs Training & Research Center, “A
D/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.as Report on the Status of the Internet in
px?ReportName=/WTI/InformationTechno Iran,” November 8, 2005,
logyPublic&RP_intYear=2000&RP_intLang http://www.genderit.org/upload/ad6d215
uageID=1. b74e2a8613f0cf5416c9f3865/A_Report
6 International Telecommunications Union, _on_Internet_Access_in_Iran_2_.pdf.
“ITU Internet Indicators 2008,” 17 Information Technology Company, Ministry
http://www.itu.int/ITU- of Information and Communication
D/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.as Technology,
px?ReportName=/WTI/InformationTechno http://www.itc.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.
logyPublic&RP_intYear=2008&RP_intLang aspx?Object=GENERALTEXT&CategoryID=
uageID=1. b518fb25-587d-4c16-9520-
7 International Telecommunications Union, 9d3f1d3a24ae&LayoutID=372f2627-
“ITU Internet Indicators 2008,” 7ccb-40fa-b30a-7a128ef777a5.
http://www.itu.int/ITU- 18 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
D/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.as translation at
px?ReportName=/WTI/InformationTechno http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.
logyPublic&RP_intYear=2008&RP_intLang html.
uageID=1.
11

12. 19 Iran CSOs Training & Research Center, “A March 2, 2006,
Report on the Status of the Internet in http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,A
Iran,” November 8, 2005, RT19,,IRN,,475e4e270,0.html.
http://www.genderit.org/upload/ad6d215 30 Article 6, Press Law of the Islamic Republic
b74e2a8613f0cf5416c9f3865/A_Report of Iran,
_on_Internet_Access_in_Iran_2_.pdf. http://www.parstimes.com/law/press_law
20 Ibid. .html.
21 Ibid. 31 Articles 26 and 27, Press Law of the Islamic
22 Information Technology Company, “The Republic of Iran,
important events of communications http://www.parstimes.com/law/press_law
technology in 2008,” March 25, 2009, .html.
http://www.itc.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage. 32 Note 2 of Article 1 of Iran’s Press Law (as
aspx?Object=News&ID=52d93a02-e5ce- amended in on April 18, 2000) defines
4353-9ba6- electronic publications as “publications
50c4eb97eb34&LayoutID=db2099c4- regularly published under a permanent
7b41-414c-a965- name, specific date and serial number …
1b4ec4da6584&CategoryID=8e9c4343- on different subjects such as news,
3ea3-41f0-a025-0cca398f147f. commentary, as well as social, political,
23 Iranian Technology News Agency, economic, agricultural, cultural, religious,
http://www.itna.ir/archives/news/00991 scientific, technical, military, sports,
9.php. artistic matters, etc via electronic
24 OpenNet Initiative, “Internet Filtering in Iran vehicles.” Publications must also have
in 2004-2005: A Country Study,” obtained “publication licenses from the
http://opennet.net/studies/iran2005. Press Supervisory Board in the Ministry of
25 Ibid. Cultural and Islamic Guidance,” otherwise
26 Iran ICT News, “Study of some of the they “fall out of the scope of the Press law
shortcomings of the filtering system,” April and become subject to General Laws.”
7, 2006, 33 “‫ﻕﺍﻥﻭﻥ ﺍﺹﻝﺍﺡ ﺝﻥﺝﺍﻝﯼ ﻝﺍﯼﺡﻩ ﺕﺹﻭﯼﺏ‬
http://backdoor.iranictnews.ir/T_34469_ ‫( ﻡﺝﻝﺱ ﺩﺭ ﻡﻁﺏﻭﻉﺍﺕ‬Persian),” Deutsche
____%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AE%DB%8C- Welle, April 15, 2009, http://www.dw-
%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8 world.de/dw/article/0,,4178392,00.html.
%B5- 34 Ghalam News, “The new decision for the
%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9 internet media by the parliament,” April
%85- 15, 2009,
%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%AA%D8% http://www.ghalamnews.ir/news-
B1%DB%8C%D9%86%DA%AF- 6261.aspx.
%D8%B4%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%AA- 35 Ibid.
%D9%81%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D8 36 Article 19, “Memorandum on Regulation of
%B1%DB%8C- the Media in the Islamic Republic of Iran,”
%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8% March 2, 2006,
B9%D8%A7%D8%AA.htm. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,A
27 Akhbar Rooz, “The big companies blocking RT19,,IRN,,475e4e270,0.html.
the internet in Iran,” September 4, 2008, 37 Islamic Penal Code of Iran, May 22, 1996,
http://www.akhbar- unofficial translation at
rooz.com/news.jsp?essayId=16978. Also, http://mehr.org/index_islam.htm. Article
see, for example, 500 states that “anyone who undertakes
http://www.amnafzar.com. any form of propaganda against the state
28 Ibid. ... will be sentenced to between three
29 Article 19, “Memorandum on Regulation of months and one year in prison.”
the Media in the Islamic Republic of Iran,”
12

13. 38 Ghalam News, “The new decision for the /iran14824.htm. See also Human Rights
internet media by the parliament,” April Watch Report, “Like the Dead in Their
15, 2009, Coffins: Torture, Detention, and the
http://www.ghalamnews.ir/news- Crushing of Dissent in Iran,” June 7, 2004,
6261.aspx. http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/torture/ir
39 Human Rights Watch Report, “False an/.
Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle 48 Information Technology News Agency
East and North Africa: Iran,” November “Report of an ISP closure by judicial
2005, system agents,”
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/ http://www.itna.ir/archives/article/00066
5.htm. 5.php.
40 BBC Monitoring International Reports, citing 49 “Iran lifts ban on conservative web site,”
text of report by E’temad-e Melli, “Iran The Age, March 20, 2007,
press Iranian activists oppose regulation http://www.theage.com.au/news/Technol
of websites, weblogs,” January 2, 2007. ogy/Iran-lifts-ban-on-conservative-
See also Omid Memarian, “Bloggers rebel website/2007/03/20/1174153008276.
at new censorship,” Inter Press Service html.
News Agency, January 10, 2007, 50 Iranian Student News Agency (ISNA),
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnew Interview with Head of Iran Law Society,
s=36123, reporting that prohibited February 16, 2007,
content includes criticism of religious http://www.isna.ir/Main/NewsView.aspx?I
figures, sexual matters, content D=News-877388.
considered offensive to the Ayatollah 51 “Offices of website closed,” International
Khomeini, or content slanderous of Freedom of Expression Exchange,
Islamic law. September 24, 2007,
41 BBC Monitoring International Reports, citing http://www.ifex.org/iran/2007/09/24/off
text of report by E’temad-e Melli, “Iran ices_of_website_closed/.
press Iranian activists oppose regulation 52 Bill Samii, “Iran: Government strengthens
of websites, weblogs,” January 2, 2007. its control of the Internet,” Radio Free
42 One report puts the number of blog Europe, September 29, 2006,
registrations at 850. http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006
43 The status of draft legislation is reported in /09/e6ed377e-7618-479d-8e0e-
Farsi at b2917d6f9f92.html?napage=2.
http://tarh.majlis.ir/?Report&RegId=121. 53 Eli Lake, “Fed contractor, cell phone maker
44 Cybercrimes Bill, Chapter 6, Article 23, sold spy system to Iran,” The Washington
http://tarh.majlis.ir/?Download&Id=2288. Times, April 13, 2009,
45 Cybercrimes Bill, Chapter 6, Article 21, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2
http://tarh.majlis.ir/?Download&Id=2288. 009/apr/13/europe39s-telecoms-aid-
46 Cybercrimes Bill, Chapter 3: Articles 3 and with-spy-tech/print/.
4, 54 Ibid.
http://tarh.majlis.ir/?Download&Id=2288. 55 OpenNet Initiative, “Internet Filtering in Iran
47 Information Technology News Agency, in 2006-2007: A Country Study,” May 9,
“Report of an ISP closure by judicial 2007,
system agents,” http://opennet.net/studies/iran2007.
http://www.itna.ir/archives/article/00066 56 Najmeh Bozorgmehr, “Facebook sets tone
5.php (accessed April 30, 2007). See also in Iran’s electoral contest,” Financial
Human Rights Watch Press Release, “Iran: Times, May 13, 2009,
Prosecute Torturers, Not Bloggers,” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/da46ad4e-
December 12, 2006, 3f19-11de-ae4f-
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/12 00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1.
13

14. 57 “Ahmadinejad denies calling for Facebook Organizing in Iran,” June 15, 2009,
ban,” CNN, May 25, 2009, http://opennet.net/blog/2009/06/cracki
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meas ng-down-digital-communication-and-
t/05/25/iran.ahmadinejad.facebook/. political-organizing-iran.
58 Ghalam News, “Facebook Unblocked” May 67 Interview with Esma’il Radkani, Iranian
26, 2009, Communication and Information
http://www.ghalamnews.ir/news.aspx?id= Technology News Agency, September 11,
16014. 2006, http://citna.ir/435.html.
59 OpenNet Initiative, “Cracking Down on 68 “Two cyber-dissidents jailed, 5 million
Digital Communication and Political websites censored,” Reporters Without
Organizing in Iran,” June 15, 2009, Borders, November 20, 2008,
http://opennet.net/blog/2009/06/cracki http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article
ng-down-digital-communication-and- =29366.
political-organizing-iran.
60 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Why Did Iran Unblock
Facebook?,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, March 14, 2009,
http://www.rferl.org/content/Why_Did_Ira
n_Unblock_Facebook/1510005.html.
61 Aftab, “Sending the ‘not to do list’ to news,”
April 7, 2009,
http://www.aftab.ir/news/2009/apr/07/c
1c1239084884_politics_iran_election.ph
p.
62 OpenNet Initiative, “Cracking Down on
Digital Communication and Political
Organizing in Iran,” June 15, 2009,
http://opennet.net/blog/2009/06/cracki
ng-down-digital-communication-and-
political-organizing-iran.
63 “Iran blocks BBC Persian website,” BBC
News, January 24, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/
4644398.stm.
64 OpenNet Initiative, “Cracking Down on
Digital Communication and Political
Organizing in Iran,” June 15, 2009,
http://opennet.net/blog/2009/06/cracki
ng-down-digital-communication-and-
political-organizing-iran.
65 For a description of the Persian
blogosphere, see John Kelly and Bruce
Etling, “Mapping Iran’s Online Public:
Politics and Culture in the Persian
Blogosphere,” Berkman Center for
Internet and Society, April 5, 2008,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications
/2008/Mapping_Irans_Online_Public.
66 OpenNet Initiative, “Cracking Down on
Digital Communication and Political
14