1. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Paying for ideal (discretion):
an experiment on working time arrangements
M. Smyk | J. Tyrowicz | L. van der Velde
Trier | IAAEU | Workshop on Performance Pay and Employee Outcomes
December 2022

2. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Motivation
The notion of ideal worker
(Batt and Valcour 2003, Kauffeld et al. 2004, McNall et al. 2009, Guillaume and Pochic 2009, Davies and Frink 2014)
Providing flexibility on demand is expected
(Williams 2001, Chung 2020)
Asking for flexibility is penalized (and gendered)
(Vandello et al. 2013, Blair-Loy et al. 2013, Brescoll et al. 2013)

3. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Motivation
The notion of ideal worker
(Batt and Valcour 2003, Kauffeld et al. 2004, McNall et al. 2009, Guillaume and Pochic 2009, Davies and Frink 2014)
Providing flexibility on demand is expected
(Williams 2001, Chung 2020)
Asking for flexibility is penalized (and gendered)
(Vandello et al. 2013, Blair-Loy et al. 2013, Brescoll et al. 2013)
Goldin (2014) conjecture
(Cortes and Pan 2019)

4. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Motivation
The notion of ideal worker
(Batt and Valcour 2003, Kauffeld et al. 2004, McNall et al. 2009, Guillaume and Pochic 2009, Davies and Frink 2014)
Providing flexibility on demand is expected
(Williams 2001, Chung 2020)
Asking for flexibility is penalized (and gendered)
(Vandello et al. 2013, Blair-Loy et al. 2013, Brescoll et al. 2013)
Goldin (2014) conjecture
(Cortes and Pan 2019)
Not a forgone conclusion: worker autonomy
(Hayman 2009, Peters et al. 2009, Shagvaliyeva and Yazdanifard 2014, Angelici and Profeta 2020)

5. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Our contribution
Put ideal worker to a litmus test of pay
We ask
Should ideal worker be rewarded for availability?
Is this premium gender-specific?

6. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Our contribution
Put ideal worker to a litmus test of pay
We ask
Should ideal worker be rewarded for availability?
Is this premium gender-specific?
Field vignette experiment (2 × 2 design) on a change in working time arrangements (WTA)
Vignettes for initiator of change in WTA: employer vs employee
Vignettes for workers: women vs men

7. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Our contribution
Put ideal worker to a litmus test of pay
We ask
Should ideal worker be rewarded for availability?
Is this premium gender-specific?
Field vignette experiment (2 × 2 design) on a change in working time arrangements (WTA)
Vignettes for initiator of change in WTA: employer vs employee
Vignettes for workers: women vs men
Incentivized experiment about own ability to supply flexibility
Inquire gender norms and FWC/WFC + preference for equality (overall & gender)

8. Paying for ideal (discretion):
The vignette experiment

9. Paying for ideal (discretion):
The vignette experiment
A worker currently works in a regular, fixed schedule, five days a week
Three occupations: hairdresser, lawyer, sales person
Two genders of workers: man or woman

10. Paying for ideal (discretion):
The vignette experiment
A worker currently works in a regular, fixed schedule, five days a week
Three occupations: hairdresser, lawyer, sales person
Two genders of workers: man or woman
A change to discretion over start / end hours at short notice
Employer OR employee initiate the change

11. Paying for ideal (discretion):
The vignette experiment
A worker currently works in a regular, fixed schedule, five days a week
Three occupations: hairdresser, lawyer, sales person
Two genders of workers: man or woman
A change to discretion over start / end hours at short notice
Employer OR employee initiate the change
Within subject: both gender and initiator vary
(all 3 occupations, at least 2 genders and at least 2 initiators)
Between subject: a specific combination out of all possible cases
(3 occupations × 2 genders × 2 initiators = 12)

12. Paying for ideal (discretion):
The vignette experiment
A worker currently works in a regular, fixed schedule, five days a week
Three occupations: hairdresser, lawyer, sales person
Two genders of workers: man or woman
A change to discretion over start / end hours at short notice
Employer OR employee initiate the change
Within subject: both gender and initiator vary
(all 3 occupations, at least 2 genders and at least 2 initiators)
Between subject: a specific combination out of all possible cases
(3 occupations × 2 genders × 2 initiators = 12)
Pay scheme:
small payment for participation
additional pay for completing a second, delayed part of the survey

13. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Elements of the survey
After they complete the vignettes, participants have more questions
Demographics, education, income, managerial experience
Family-work conflict and work-family conflict (Netemeyer et al. 1996)

14. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Elements of the survey
After they complete the vignettes, participants have more questions
Demographics, education, income, managerial experience
Family-work conflict and work-family conflict (Netemeyer et al. 1996)
Valuing own time availability: participants choose when to finish survey
the longer the window, the lower the pay
two choices: wait 5 minutes, or wait 30 minutes
wait time randomly assigned
paid only if compliant with the selected window for the assigned wait time

15. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Elements of the survey
After they complete the vignettes, participants have more questions
Demographics, education, income, managerial experience
Family-work conflict and work-family conflict (Netemeyer et al. 1996)
Valuing own time availability: participants choose when to finish survey
the longer the window, the lower the pay
two choices: wait 5 minutes, or wait 30 minutes
wait time randomly assigned
paid only if compliant with the selected window for the assigned wait time
Egalitarian gender beliefs
Aspirations and inequality aversion

16. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Results
The sample
963 vignettes from 321 subjects
49.84% were women, on average 38.5 years, 50% with tertiary education
40% has had managerial (wage barganing) experience

17. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Results
The sample
963 vignettes from 321 subjects
49.84% were women, on average 38.5 years, 50% with tertiary education
40% has had managerial (wage barganing) experience
Manipulation check questions (understanding vignettes)
40% of the subjects fail at least 1 of 9 questions
60% of those fail only 1 question (first)

18. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Results
Treatment effects: directions of recommended wage changes

19. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Results
Treatment effects: change in wage

20. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Results
Treatment effects: regression results
Preferred sample Full sample
in USD per month in % in USD per month in %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a)
T: employer = 1 17.20*** 18.05*** 2.95*** 2.87*** 22.04*** 25.35*** 3.13*** 3.40***
(4.85) (6.54) (0.56) (0.69) (6.80) (8.16) (0.93) (1.00)
T: woman= 1 -3.02 -0.11 0.15 0.44 -4.00 -2.16 0.04 0.35
(4.87) (5.30) (0.37) (0.54) (6.59) (8.60) (0.82) (1.05)
T: employer × woman 10.30* 8.96 0.10 -0.02 0.28 -3.02 -0.34 -0.75
(6.17) (7.43) (0.62) (0.93) (13.50) (19.74) (1.45) (1.98)
δXi Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
δv Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 570 570 570 570 963 963 963 963
R2
0.10 0.54 0.13 0.58 0.02 0.46 0.03 0.50

21. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Results
Robustness and extensions
Results are not heterogeneous across
Gender of the subjects
Education of the subjects
Managerial experience of the subjects
Social norms: own responses congruent with beliefs about others responses
More so in the employer treatment
Adjusting for social norms & gender beliefs changes nothing
Skin in the game: discretion over when to complete the task in experiment
Family-work conflict and Work-family conflict + importance of work
Egalitarian gender beliefs + preference for social equality

22. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Conclusions
Employers should pay for availability
Very robust effects for EMPLOYER treatment
No effects for the gender of the worker, regardless of initiator
No evidence for Goldin’s conjecture
These norms do not seem to be mediated by gender beliefs

23. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Conclusions
Employers should pay for availability
Very robust effects for EMPLOYER treatment
No effects for the gender of the worker, regardless of initiator
No evidence for Goldin’s conjecture
These norms do not seem to be mediated by gender beliefs
Effects, if present, are small (approx. 20$ per month, or 3%)
When they are insignificant, they are actually even smaller, so not a false null

24. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Conclusions
Questions or suggestions?
Thank you!
w: grape.org.pl
t: grape org
f: grape.org
e: j.tyrowicz@grape.org.pl

25. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Conclusions
References I
Angelici, M. and Profeta, P.: 2020, Smart-working: Work flexibility without constraints, CESifo Working Papers 8165, CESifo.
Batt, R. and Valcour, P. M.: 2003, Human resources practices as predictors of work-family outcomes and employee turnover,
Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 42(2), 189–220.
Blair-Loy, M., Williams, J. C. and Berdahl, J. L.: 2013, Cultural schemas, social class, and the flexibility stigma: Cultural
schemas and social class, Journal of Social Issues 69(2), 209–234.
Brescoll, V. L., Glass, J. and Sedlovskaya, A.: 2013, Ask and ye shall receive? the dynamics of employer-provided flexible work
options and the need for public policy, Journal of Social Issues 69(2), 367–388.
Chung, H.: 2020, Gender, flexibility stigma and the perceived negative consequences of flexible working in the UK, Social
Indicators Research 151(2), 521–545.
Cortes, P. and Pan, J.: 2019, When time binds: Substitutes for household production, returns to working long hours, and the
skilled gender wage gap, Journal of Labor Economics 37(2), 351–398.
Davies, A. R. and Frink, B. D.: 2014, The origins of the ideal worker: The separation of work and home in the United States
from the market revolution to 1950, Work and Occupations 41(1), 18–39.
Goldin, C.: 2014, A grand gender convergence: Its last chapter, American Economic Review 104(4), 1091–1119.
Guillaume, C. and Pochic, S.: 2009, What would you sacrifice? access to top management and the work–life balance, Gender,
Work & Organization 16(1), 14–36.
Hayman, J. R.: 2009, Flexible work arrangements: Exploring the linkages between perceived usability of flexible work schedules
and work/life balance, Community, work & family 12(3), 327–338.

26. Paying for ideal (discretion):
Conclusions
References II
Kauffeld, S., Jonas, E. and Frey, D.: 2004, Effects of a flexible work-time design on employee-and company-related aims,
European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 13(1), 79–100.
McNall, L. A., Masuda, A. D. and Nicklin, J. M.: 2009, Flexible work arrangements, job satisfaction, and turnover intentions:
The mediating role of work-to-family enrichment, Journal of Psychology 144(1), 61–81.
Netemeyer, R. G., Boles, J. S. and McMurrian, R.: 1996, Development and validation of work–family conflict and family–work
conflict scales., Journal of Applied Psychology 81(4), 400–410.
Peters, P., Den Dulk, L. and Van Der Lippe, T.: 2009, The effects of time-spatial flexibility and new working conditions on
employees’ work–life balance: The dutch case, Community, Work & Family 12(3), 279–297.
Shagvaliyeva, S. and Yazdanifard, R.: 2014, Impact of flexible working hours on work-life balance, American Journal of
Industrial and Business Management 2014.
Vandello, J. A., Hettinger, V. E., Bosson, J. K. and Siddiqi, J.: 2013, When equal isn’t really equal: The masculine dilemma of
seeking work flexibility, Journal of Social Issues 69(2), 303–321.
Williams, J.: 2001, Unbending gender: Why family and work conflict and what to do about it, Oxford University Press.