This document summarizes Enrique Betancourt G.'s presentation on targeted interventions to reduce and prevent violence. Some key points: 1. Violence is largely urban, concentrated geographically, and perpetrated by young men in small groups. 2. Effective interventions require focusing efforts territorially, demographically, and on high-risk individuals and groups. 3. The strategic intervention framework involves direct engagement with core offenders by partnerships of community leaders, social services, and law enforcement using moral messages, enforcement threats, and social support offers to deter further violence.

1. Enrique
Betancourt
G.
twi$er:
@betancourt_e
La
An3gua,
Guatemala
Apr
29th,
2014
Intervenciones
focalizadas
para
reducción
y
prevención
de
violencia

2. Legi3midad
del
Estado
y
Contrato
Social

3. 3
cosas
que
sabemos
sobre
la
violencia
armada
en
la
región.

4. 1.
Es
urbana.
90%
sucede
fuera
de
contextos
de
conflicto
armado.

5. 2.
Se
concentra
geográficamente.
Asociada
a
otros
indicadores
de
vulnerabilidad
social.

6. 3.
Vic3mas
y
perpetradores:
• Varones
Jóvenes.
• Operando
en
grupos.
• Ejecutada
por
menos
del
5%
de
los
jóvenes
de
alto
riesgo
en
el
barrio
.

8. Homicidios
por
grupos
de
edad
y
género,
INEGI,
2010.

9. 3
conceptos
para
su
atención.
(lecciones
sobre
casos
de
implementación)

10. focalización
Focalización
• Territorial
• Demográfica
• Temporal
• Delic3va
y
de
comportamiento
social

12. Teoría
de
Cambio
Teoría de Cambio
ResultadosPre-condicionesEnfoques y
Herramientas programas
Premisas
12345

14. Impacto
Colec3vo
• Gerencia
Centralizada
• Agenda
Común
• Sistema
de
Evaluación
compar3do
• Ac3vidades
mutuamente
reforzantes

15. Center
for
Crime
Preven3on
and
Control
|
John
Jay
College
of
Criminal
Jus3ce
|
524
West
59th
Street
Suite
600,
New
York,
NY
10019
Ceasefire
University
GROUP
VIOLENCE
INTERVENTION
AN
OVERVIEW

16. Groups
drive
a
huge
share
of
the
ac3on
§ Around
0.5%
of
overall
popula3on
§ Regularly
associated
with
75%
of
serious
violence
in
a
city
§ Doesn’t
ma$er
if
they’re
“gangs,”
and
most
aren’t
In
most
dangerous
neighborhoods
§ About
5%
of
high-­‐risk
male
age
group
§ Only
about
10-­‐20%
of
those
are
impact
players
16
Core
offenders
are
group
involved,
small
in
number,
and
iden3fiable

17. 17
Street
group
members
face
extremely
high
risk
na3onal
homicide:
4
in
100,000
homicides
for
core
group-­‐involved
network:
1,500-­‐3,000
in
100,000
for
those
close
to
vic3ms
of
homicide
and
shoo3ng,
the
risk
increases
by
up
to
900%

18. 18
Connec3on
between
violence
&
groups
The
most
important
finding
here
is
simple:
there
is
a
profound
and
so
far
invariant
connec3on
between
serious
violence,
and
highly
ac3ve
criminal
groups.
Representa3on
in
popula3on
Representa3on
in
homicides
0.5%
50-­‐75%

19. Framework
19
Direct,
sustained
engagement
with
core
offenders
by
a
partnership
standing
and
ac3ng
together:
Community
leaders
Social
service
providers
Law
enforcement
Explicit
focus
on
homicide
and
serious
violence
Core
elements:
Moral
engagement
Offer
of
help
Swis,
certain,
legi3mate
consequences
An
approach,
not
a
program

20. STRATEGIC
INTERVENTION

21. Framework
21
Direct,
sustained
engagement
with
core
offenders
by
a
partnership
standing
and
ac3ng
together:
Community
leaders
Social
service
providers
Law
enforcement
Explicit
focus
on
homicide
and
serious
violence
Core
elements:
Moral
engagement
Offer
of
help
Swis,
certain,
legi3mate
consequences
An
approach,
not
a
program

22. 1
Focused
law
enforcement
22
Group
accountability
for
group
violence
by
any
legal
means:
“Pulling
levers”
Specifying
Enforcement
Trigger
“First
group/worst
group”
promise
First
homicide
aser
call-­‐in
Most
violent
group
Aser
each
call-­‐in,
if
no
group
wants
to
be
first
or
worst,
everybody
stops
Formal
no3ce
of
legal
exposure
Formal
no3ce
of
law
enforcement
intent

23. Deterrence
23
We
want
compliance,
not
arrests
and
sentences
Actual
enforcement
is
(mostly)
a
sign
of
failure
When
something
dras3c
is
about
to
happen,
it’s
in
everyone’s
interest
to
avoid
it
Goal:
make
consequences
so
clear
and
certain
that
nobody
wants
them
Keep
offenders
and
communi3es
safe
Provide
“honorable
exit”
not
enforcement

24. 2
Moral
engagement
with
offenders
24
Offenders
can
and
will
choose,
should
be
treated
as
responsible
human
beings
Challenge
the
street
code
There’s
right,
there’s
wrong:
no
gray
area
Ac3vates
agency:
offender
is
now
in
control
Treats
offender
with
respect:
procedural
jus3ce
Enhances
law
enforcement
legi3macy
Mobilizes
community
partners

25. Community
moral
voice
25
Clear,
direct
community
stand
from
respected
local
figures,
parents,
ministers,
mothers,
ac3vists:
“We
need
you
alive
and
out
of
prison.”
“You’re
be$er
than
this.”
“We
hate
the
violence.”
Offenders
and
ex-­‐offenders:
“Who
helped
your
mother
last
3me
you
were
locked
up?
“How
long
before
one
of
your
boys
sleeps
with
your
girlfriend?”
“Who
thinks
it’s
okay
for
li$le
kids
to
get
killed?”
Outreach
workers
are
among
the
very
best
at
all
of
this

26. Outreach
workers
26
Have
more
respect
on
the
street
than
just
about
anybody
else
Have
unques3onable
authen3city
Can
reach
the
core
group
popula3on
Can
say
things
that
nobody
else
can
say
Can
help
replace
the
toxic
street
code
with
something
alterna3ve
and
affirma3ve
Can
work
closely
with
other
partners
to
broker
help,
convey
law
enforcement
warnings,
defuse
disputes,
control
rumors,
help
save
face

27. 3
Help
as
a
moral
and
prac3cal
obliga3on
27
“We
are
here
to
keep
you
alive
and
out
of
prison.”
“You
have
been
targeted
–
to
be
saved.”
Address
trauma
Protect
from
enemies
Offer
“big
small
stuff”
–
crucial
real-­‐3me
needs
Save
havens
New
rela3onships
and
“sponsors”
New
ideas
to
replace
“street
code”
Links
to
tradi3onal
social
services
–
educa3on,
work,
etc.
Street
outreach
an
important
way
to
do
all
this

28. 28
Law
enforcement,
communi3es,
and
the
streets
all
want…
§ the
community
to
be
safe
§ the
most
dangerous
offenders
controlled
§ chao3c
crime
to
stop
(including
many
offenders)
§ ineffec3ve
enforcement
to
stop
§ community
standards
to
take
over
§ help
for
those
who
want
it
§ a
close,
respeczul
rela3onship
between
law
enforcement,
communi3es,
and
offenders
Common
ground

29. 29
Results
Group
Violence
Interven:on
A
recent
Campbell
Collabora:on
Systema:c
Review
of
the
strategies,
and
others
related
to
them,
concluded
that
there
is
now
“strong
empirical
evidence”
for
their
crime
preven3on
effec3veness.
63%
reduc3on
in
youth
homicide
Boston
(MA)
Opera0on
Ceasefire
42%
reduc3on
in
gun
homicide
Stockton
(CA)
Opera0on
Peacekeeper
37%
reduc3on
in
homicide
Chicago
(IL)
Project
Safe
Neighborhoods
44%
reduc3on
in
gun
assaults
Lowell
(MA)
Project
Safe
Neighborhoods
34%
reduc3on
in
homicide
Indianapolis
(IN)
Violence
Reduc0on
Partnership
41%
reduc3on
in
gang
member-­‐involved
homicide
Cincinna0
(OH)
Ini0a0ve
to
Reduce
Violence
Drug
Market
Interven:on
41-­‐56%
reduc3on
in
part
1
UCR
crime
in
3
out
of
4
DMI
neighborhoods;
4-­‐74%
reduc3on
in
drug
offenses
in
all
4
neighborhoods
High
Point
(NC)
DMIs
55%
reduc3on
in
drug
offenses
Nashville
(TN)
DMI
22%
reduc3on
in
non-­‐violent
offenses
Rockford
(IL)
DMI
26%
reduc3on
in
recidivism
Hawaii
Opportunity
Proba0on
with
Enforcement
(HOPE)
Related