2. INTRODUCTION
• Nuclear weapons program of
Pakistan
• Initially viewed as a threat to
regional and international
security.
• Because of grey marketing.
3. INTRODUCTION
• Itself was threatened later on
• Unstable domestic conditions
• Fears have grown that nuclear
weapons ,technology and materials
may fall into the hands of non state
actors.
4. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
VULNERABILITY! WHY?
• Pakistan overrun by radical
Islamist insurgency resulting in
a failed state with loose nukes.
• Example: kamra nuclear
airbase attack 10dec2007
5. CHALLENGES FOR NUCLEAR
SECURITY….
• Regional environment
• Ongoing internal instability
• Past record for support of
terrorism
• Active nuclear proliferation
6. “FOUR FACES” OF
NUCLEAR TERRORISM
• Acquisition of intact nuclear weapon
• Theft of HEU or PLUTONIUM
• Attack or sabotage of nuclear facilities
• Unauthorized acquisition of nuclear
material for making “dirty bomb”
7. ACQUISITION OF INTACT
NUCLEAR WEAPON
• Most difficult challenge for any terrorist organization.
• How it could be done?
• INSIDER COLLUSION: By the help of individuals
working inside a nuclear production organization.
8. HOW TO AVOID INSIDER COLLUSION:
• To cope with this threat, most advanced nuclear
weapons states such as the United States,
France, the United Kingdom, the Russian
Federation, and the People’s Republic of China
have instituted Personnel Reliability Programs
(PRP), which establishes a centralized set of
procedures designed to ensure that individuals
developing, managing, and guarding nuclear
weapons and related facilities are trustworthy.
9. • DIRECT TRANSFER: The direct transfer
scenario is difficult to imagine as it is almost
impossible to conceive of any national
government voluntarily gifting their “crown
jewels” to a terrorist group due to the likely
reprisals they would incur if the weapon were
used and the probability that the weapon would
be traced back to the state of origin
10. THEFT OF NUCLEAR
MATERIAL
• Refer to instances when small quantities of nuclear
material have been stolen.
• Collapse of a state with a nuclear arsenal would raise
the potential for nuclear weapons and material to be
diverted or stolen.
• Example : In Moldova smuggling gang attempted to
smuggle a small quantity of non weapon usable
uranium.(JUNE 2011)
11. SAFETY MEASURES
AGAINST THEFT
• (ESD) ENVIRONMENTAL SENSING DEVICES: block
arming system until prescribed environment is achieved
.
• (IHE)INSENSITIVE HIGH EXPLOSIVES: it makes
weapon resistant to detonate or explode by mechanical
shock.
• (PAL’S)PERMISIVE ACTION LINKS: electronic device
prevent arming of weapons unless correct codes are
inserted .
12. WEAPONS MADE FROM
THEFT NUCLEAR MATERIAL
IND’S
GUN TYPE WEAPON IMPLOSION TYPE WEAPON
SIMPLE AND ROBUST SMALL AMOUNT OF PLUTONIUM.
URANIUM IS USED IN LARGE AMOUNT
13. • PLUTONIUM IS DIFFICULT TO BE
OBTAINED BY TERRORISTS BECAUSE
OF TECHNICAL ADVANCEMENT AND
HEU IS LIKELY TO BE ACQUIRED
BECAUSE OF HIGH AMOUNT OF
URANIUM STOCKPILED AROUND THE
WORLD.
14. ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO MAKE
RDD OR DIRTY BOMB :
• DIRTY BOMB OR RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSIVE
DEVICE:
• Speculative bomb that combine radiological material
with conventional weapons to contaminate the area of
explosion.
• Psychological effect due to widespread fear of radiation
in public imagination.
15. • In dirty bomb cesium -137 and
cobalt -60 is used for industrial
purposes found in hospitals
,universities, and research
areas.
• These are perceived as “soft
targets” due to easy access for
terrorists .
16. ATTACK ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS
• Commercial power reactors are arguably
more attractive to terrorist groups at
dispersing radioactive material than
research reactors because they are more
numerous ,larger In size and contain more
radioactive spent fuel
17. • Terrorists targeting a reactor or
spent fuel pond could not ignite
explosive chain reaction but can
damage nuclear facility.
• Theft and acquisition is the least
likely possibility for terrorists.
18. MOST POSSIBLE WAYS OF
NUCLEAR TERRORISM:
• Disruption of nuclear arsenal and
fabrication of RDD because of level of
security around commercial and
research reactors.
20. C2 SYSTEM
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
• ENSURES USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
ACCORDING TO NUCLEAR DOCTRINE.
• PAKIISTANS NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND C2 SYSTEM
HAVE BEEN OF CONCERN DUE TO POTENTIAL
IMPACT ON STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA.
• ISLAMABAD HAS NEVER DECLARED A FORMAL
NUCLEAR DOCTRINE.
22. DELEGATIVE SYSTEM
• SUBORDINATE MILITARY COMMANDERS
ARE AUTHORIZED TO LAUNCH NUCLEAR
WAPONS.
• HIGH LEVEL OF AUTONOMY TO
COMMANDERS.
• LIMITED ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS.
• ARSENALS DEPLOYED HIGH STATE OF
READINESS.
23. PURPOSE OF DELEGATIVE AND ASSERTIVE
SYSTEM
• TO ENSURE THAT NUCLEAR DETTERENCE WORKS
NUCLEAR FIRT USE IF INDIA CROSS FOUR MAJOR
THRESHOLD
MILITARY THRESHOLD
SPACE THRESHOLD
DOMESTIC THRESHOLD
ECONOMIC THRESHOLD
24. SAFETY AND SECURITY OF NUCLEAR ARSENAL
AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES:
• LIKE RUSSIAAND USA PAKISTAN SHOULD
ALSO HAVE PALS ,ESD’S AND ISE’S.
• CONFLICTING REPORTS EITHER PAKISTAN
HAS THESE FACILITIES OR NOT.
• SAFETY AND SECURITY OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAR
FACILITIES
• 2 COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS
25. • KARACHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (KANNUP)
• CHASHMA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (CHASSHNUP)
• BOTH GENERATE 3.3PERCENT OF ELECTRICITY
• OPERATE UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARD
• PAKISTANS INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND NUCLEAR
TECHNOLOGY AT RAWALPINDI.(PINSTECH)
• ALSO OPERATE UNDER IAEA
26. • GRETAER CHANCES OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM
BECAUSE OF DISPERSED AND UNASSEMBLED
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACROSS THE COUNTRY
• PRP(PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRRAME)
INDIVIDUALS EMPLOYED TO GUARD AGAINST
LEAK OF INFORMATION ABOUT TECHNICAL AND
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE REGARDING NUCLEAR
ARSENALS.
