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GUIDE TO PROTECTING 
NETWORKS 
ERIC VANDERBURG
OBJECTIVES 
2 
• Describe network security devices 
• Describe firewall technology 
• Describe intrusion detection systems 
• Describe honeypots
3 
UNDERSTANDING NETWORK 
SECURITY DEVICES 
• Network security devices 
• Routers 
• Firewalls 
• Intrusion detection systems 
• Honeypots
4 
UNDERSTANDING ROUTERS 
• Routers are hardware devices used on a network to 
send packets to different network segments 
• Operate at the network layer of the OSI model 
• Routing protocols used by routers 
• Link-state routing protocol 
• Router advertises link-state to identify network topology and 
any changes on paths 
• Distance-vector routing protocol 
• Router passes its routing table to all routers participating on 
the network
5 
UNDERSTANDING BASIC 
HARDWARE ROUTERS 
• Cisco routers are widely used in the networking 
community 
• More than one million Cisco 2500 series routers are 
currently being used by companies around the world 
• Vulnerabilities exist in Cisco as they do in any 
operating system 
• Security professionals must consider these vulnerabilities 
when conducting a security test
6 
CISCO ROUTER COMPONENTS 
• A Cisco router uses the Cisco Internetwork 
Operating System (IOS) to function 
• Components 
• Random access memory (RAM) 
• Holds the router’s running configuration, routing tables, and 
buffers 
• If you turn off the router, the contents stored in RAM are 
wiped out 
• Nonvolatile RAM (NVRAM) 
• Holds the router’s configuration file, but the information is 
not lost if the router is turned off
7 
CISCO ROUTER COMPONENTS 
(CONTINUED) 
• Components (continued) 
• Flash memory 
• Holds the IOS the router is using 
• Is rewritable memory, so you can upgrade the IOS 
• Read-only memory (ROM) 
• Contains a minimal version of the IOS used to boot the router 
if flash memory gets corrupted 
• Interfaces 
• Hardware connectivity points 
• Example: an Ethernet port is an interface that connects to a 
LAN
8 
CISCO ROUTER CONFIGURATION 
• Configuration modes: 
• User mode 
• Administrator can perform basic troubleshooting tests and list 
information stored on the router 
• Router-name>, indicates that you are in user mode 
• Privileged mode 
• Administrator can perform full router configuration tasks 
• Router-name#, indicates that you are in privileged mode 
• By default, you are in user mode 
• Type “enable” or “en” to change to privileged mode
9 
CISCO ROUTER CONFIGURATION 
(CONTINUED) 
• Once in privileged mode, you can change to two 
more configuration modes 
• Global configuration mode 
• Administrator can configure router settings that affect overall 
router operation 
• To use this mode, you enter the command config t at the 
Router-name# prompt 
• Router-name (config)# tells the user she is in global 
configuration mode
10 
CISCO ROUTER CONFIGURATION 
(CONTINUED) 
• Once in privileged mode, you can change to two 
more configuration modes (continued) 
• Interface configuration mode 
• Administrator can configure an interface on the router 
• To use this mode, you enter global configuration mode first 
• Next, you enter the command for interface configuration 
mode and the interface name you want to configure 
• Router-name(config-if)# indicates you are in interface 
configuration mode
11 
UNDERSTANDING ACCESS 
CONTROL LISTS 
• There are several types of access control lists 
• We will focus on IP access lists 
• IP access lists 
• Lists of IP addresses, subnets, or networks that are allowed 
or denied access through a router’s interface 
• Two different types of access lists on Cisco router 
• Standard IP access lists 
• Extended IP access lists
12 
STANDARD IP ACCESS LISTS 
• Can restrict IP traffic entering or leaving a router’s 
interface based on source IP address 
• The syntax of a standard access list is as follows: 
access-list [list #] [permit|deny] [source address] 
[source wildcard mask] 
• [list #] is a number in the range of 1 to 99 
• permit | deny] are keywords to permit or deny traffic 
• [source address] specifies the IP address of the source host 
• [source wildcard mask] signifies which bits of the source 
address are significant
13 
STANDARD IP ACCESS LISTS 
(CONTINUED) 
• Example: 
access-list 1 deny 173.110.0.0 0.0.255.255 
access-list permit any 
• A wildcard mask is similar to a subnet mask 
• Example: access-list 1 deny 10.10.1.112 0.0.0.0 
• The 0s used after the IP address signify that every octet in 
the IP address must match the IP address being filtered 
• Another example: 
access-list 1 deny 192.168.10.0 0.0.0.255 
access-list 1 permit any
14 
STANDARD IP ACCESS LISTS 
(CONTINUED) 
• Cisco allows a shortcut for the mask 0.0.0.0 
access-list 1 deny host 192.168.10.112 
• Access lists always end with an implicit deny rule 
• To avoid this, you must add the “permit any” statement 
access-list 1 deny host 192.168.10.112 
access-list 1 permit any 
• Steps for applying the access list to an interface 
• Enter global configuration mode 
• Create the access list 
• Enter interface configuration mode 
• Use the ip access-group command
15 
STANDARD IP ACCESS LISTS 
(CONTINUED) 
• Example 
Router> en 
Password ****** 
Router# config t 
Router(config)# access-list 1 deny 172.16.5.0 0.0.0.255 
Router(config)# access-list 1 permit any 
Router(config)# int e0 
Router(config-if)# ip access-group 1 out 
Router(config-if) Ctrl+z [to save and exit global 
configuration mode] 
Router#
16 
EXTENDED IP ACCESS LISTS 
• Allow packet filtering based on 
• Source IP address 
• Destination IP address 
• Protocol type 
• Application port number 
• Syntax for extended IP access lists 
access-list [list #] [permit|deny] [protocol] [source IP 
address] [source wildcard mask] [destination IP address] 
[destination wildcard mask] [operator] [port] [log] 
• [list #] is a number in the range of 100 to 199 
• [permit | deny] are keywords to permit or deny traffic
17 
EXTENDED IP ACCESS LISTS 
(CONTINUED) 
• Syntax for extended IP access lists (continued) 
• [protocol] can be IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, and so on 
• [source IP address] is the IP address of the source 
• [source wildcard mask] determines significant bits of source 
IP address 
• [destination IP address] is the IP address of the destination 
• [destination wildcard mask] determines significant bits of 
destination IP address 
• [operator] can be lt, gt, eq, or neq
18 
EXTENDED IP ACCESS LISTS 
(CONTINUED) 
• Syntax for extended IP access lists (continued) 
• [port] port number of the protocol to be filtered 
• [log] logs all activity of the access list for the administrator 
• Example: 
access-list 100 deny tcp host 172.16.1.112 host 
172.30.1.100 eq www
19 
EXTENDED IP ACCESS LISTS 
(CONTINUED) 
• Applying an access list to an interface 
Router> en 
Password ****** 
Router# config t 
Router(config)# access-list 100 deny tcp host 
172.16.1.112 host 172.30.1.100 
Router(config)# access-list 100 permit any 
Router(config)# int e0 
Router(config-if)# ip access-group 100 in 
Router(config-if) Ctrl+z 
Router#
20 
UNDERSTANDING FIREWALLS 
• Firewalls are hardware devices or software installed 
on a system and have two purposes 
• Controlling access to all traffic that enters an internal 
network 
• Controlling all traffic that leaves an internal network 
• Advantages of hardware firewalls 
• They are usually faster than software firewalls 
• They can handle a larger throughput than software firewalls
21 
UNDERSTANDING FIREWALLS 
(CONTINUED) 
• Disadvantage of hardware firewalls 
• You are locked into the firewall’s hardware 
• Advantage of software firewalls 
• You can easily add NICs to the server running the firewall 
software 
• Disadvantage of software firewalls 
• You might have to worry about configuration problems 
• They rely on the OS on which they are running
22 
UNDERSTANDING FIREWALL 
TECHNOLOGY 
• Firewall technologies 
• Network address translation (NAT) 
• Access control lists 
• Packet filtering 
• Stateful packet inspection (SPI)
NETWORK ADDRESS TRANSLATION (NAT) 
• The most basic security feature of a firewall 
• With NAT, internal private IP addresses are mapped to public 
external IP addresses 
23 
• Hiding the internal infrastructure 
• Port Address Translation (PAT) 
• Technology derived from NAT 
• This allows thousands of internal IP addresses to be mapped to one 
external IP address
ACCESS CONTROL LISTS 
• Access lists are used to filter traffic based on source IP address, 
destination IP address, and ports or services 
• Firewalls also use this technology 
• Creating access control lists in a firewall is a similar process to 
creating them in a router 
24
PACKET FILTERING 
25 
• Packet filters screen packets based on information 
contained in the packet header 
• Protocol type 
• IP address 
• TCP/UDP port
STATEFUL PACKET INSPECTION (SPI) 
26 
• Stateful packet filters record session-specific 
information about a network connection 
• Create a state table 
• Can help reduce port scans that rely on spoofing or 
sending packets after a three-way handshake 
• Stateful packet filters recognize types of anomalies 
that most routers ignore 
• Stateless packet filters handle each packet on an 
individual basis 
• Spoofing or DoS attacks are more prevalent
IMPLEMENTING A FIREWALL 
• Placing a firewall between a company’s internal network and 
the Internet is dangerous 
27 
• It leaves the company open to attack if a hacker compromises the 
firewall 
• Use a demilitarized zone instead
DEMILITARIZED ZONE (DMZ) 
• DMZ is a small network containing resources available to 
Internet users 
28 
• Helps maintain security on the company’s internal network 
• Sits between the Internet and the internal network 
• It is sometimes referred to as a “perimeter network”
UNDERSTANDING THE PRIVATE INTERNET 
EXCHANGE (PIX) FIREWALL 
• Cisco PIX firewall 
29 
• One of the most popular firewalls on the market
CONFIGURATION OF THE PIX FIREWALL 
• Working with a PIX firewall is similar to working with any other Cisco router 
• Login prompt 
30 
If you are not authorized to be in this XYZ Hawaii network device, 
log out immediately! 
User Access Verification 
Password: 
• This banner serves a legal purpose 
• General prompt example: 
Type help or '?' for a list of available commands. 
xyz>
CONFIGURATION OF THE PIX FIREWALL 
(CONTINUED) 
• You should enter privileged mode to configure the PIX firewall 
• To enter configuration mode in PIX, you use the same command as 
on a Cisco router 
31 
xyz# configure terminal 
xyz(config)# ? 
• Nameif is a PIX command to name an interface 
• PIX allows the administrator to assign values to an interface that designate 
its security level 
• Values can be from 0 to 100
CONFIGURATION OF THE PIX FIREWALL 
(CONTINUED) 
• Access lists 
32 
• PIX enables an administrator to use descriptive names for the access list 
instead of numbers 
• PIX also uses the implicit deny rule
UNDERSTANDING MICROSOFT ISA 
33 
• Microsoft’s software approach to firewalls 
• Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration (ISA) 
Server 
• Functions as a software router, firewall, and IDS 
• ISA has the same functionality as any hardware 
router 
• Packet filtering to control incoming traffic 
• Application filtering through the examination of protocols 
• Intrusion detection filters 
• Access policies to control outgoing traffic
IP PACKET FILTERS 
34 
• ISA enables administrators to filter IP traffic based 
on the following: 
• Source and destination IP address 
• Network protocol, such as HTTP 
• Source port or destination port 
• ISA provides a GUI for these configurations 
• A network segment can be denied or allowed HTTP access 
in the Remote Computer tab
APPLICATION FILTERS 
• Can accept or deny data from specific applications or data containing 
specific content 
• SMTP filter can restrict 
35 
• E-mail with specific attachments 
• E-mail from a specific user or domain 
• E-mail containing specific keywords 
• SMTP commands 
• SMTP Filter Properties dialog box 
• Administrator can filter a specific e-mail attachment based on a rule he or 
she configures
APPLICATION FILTERS (CONTINUED) 
• Users/Domains tab in the SMTP Filter Properties dialog box 
36 
• Administrator can filter e-mail messages sent from a user or from 
specific domains 
• As a security professional, you might be asked to restrict e-mails 
containing certain keywords 
• SMTP Commands tab 
• Administrator can prevent a user from running SMTP commands
INTRUSION DETECTION FILTERS 
• Analyze all traffic for possible known intrusions 
37 
• DNS intrusion detection filter 
• POP intrusion detection filter 
• FTP Access filter 
• H.323 filter 
• HTTP Redirector filter 
• RPC filter 
• SMTP filter 
• SOCKSV4 filter 
• Streaming Media filter
ACCESS POLICIES 
• Allow administrators to control outgoing traffic 
• An access policy consists of the following 
38 
• Policy rules 
• Site and content rules 
• IP filter rules
UNDERSTANDING INTRUSION DETECTION 
SYSTEMS (IDSS) 
• Monitor network devices so that security administrators can 
identify attacks in progress and stop them 
• An IDS look at the traffic and compare it with known exploits 
39 
• Similar to virus software using a signature file to identify viruses 
• Types 
• Network-based IDSs 
• Host-based IDSs
NETWORK-BASED AND HOST-BASED IDSS 
• Network-based IDSs 
40 
• Monitor activity on network segments 
• They sniff traffic and alert a security administrator when something 
suspicious occurs 
• Host-based IDSs 
• Used to protect a critical network server or database server 
• The software is installed on the server you’re attempting to protect
NETWORK-BASED AND HOST-BASED IDSS 
(CONTINUED) 
• IDSs are categorized by how they react when they detect 
suspicious behavior 
41 
• Passive systems 
• Send out an alert and log the activity 
• Active systems 
• Log events and send out alerts 
• Can also interoperate with routers and firewalls
UNDERSTANDING HONEYPOTS 
• Honeypot 
42 
• Computer placed on the perimeter of a network 
• Contains information intended to lure and then trap hackers 
• Computer is configured to have vulnerabilities 
• Goal 
• Keep hackers connected long enough so they can be traced back
HOW THEY WORK 
43 
• A honeypot appears to have important data or 
sensitive information stored on it 
• Could store fake financial data that tempts hackers to 
attempt browsing through the data 
• Hackers will spend time attacking the honeypot 
• And stop looking for real vulnerabilities in the company’s 
network 
• Honeypots also enable security professionals to 
collect data on attackers 
• Honeypots are available commercially and through 
open-source avenues
HOW THEY WORK (CONTINUED) 
• Virtual honeypots 
44 
• Honeypots created using software solutions instead of hardware devices 
• Example: Honeyd
SUMMARY 
45 
• Security devices 
• Routers 
• Firewalls 
• IDSs 
• Routers use access lists to accept or deny traffic 
through their interfaces 
• Firewalls can be hardware devices or software 
installed on computer systems 
• Firewalls use NAT, IP filtering, and access control lists to 
filter incoming and outgoing network traffic
SUMMARY (CONTINUED) 
46 
• Firewall examples 
• Cisco PIX (hardware) 
• Microsoft ISA (software) 
• Stateful packet filters vs. stateless packet filters 
• PGP is a free public key encryption program to 
encrypt e-mail messages 
• Demilitarized zones (DMZs) 
• Add a layer of defense between the Internet and a company’s 
internal network
SUMMARY (CONTINUED) 
47 
• Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) 
• Network-based IDSs 
• Host-based IDSs 
• Passive IDSs vs. active IDSs 
• Honeypots

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Guide to protecting networks - Eric Vanderburg

  • 1. GUIDE TO PROTECTING NETWORKS ERIC VANDERBURG
  • 2. OBJECTIVES 2 • Describe network security devices • Describe firewall technology • Describe intrusion detection systems • Describe honeypots
  • 3. 3 UNDERSTANDING NETWORK SECURITY DEVICES • Network security devices • Routers • Firewalls • Intrusion detection systems • Honeypots
  • 4. 4 UNDERSTANDING ROUTERS • Routers are hardware devices used on a network to send packets to different network segments • Operate at the network layer of the OSI model • Routing protocols used by routers • Link-state routing protocol • Router advertises link-state to identify network topology and any changes on paths • Distance-vector routing protocol • Router passes its routing table to all routers participating on the network
  • 5. 5 UNDERSTANDING BASIC HARDWARE ROUTERS • Cisco routers are widely used in the networking community • More than one million Cisco 2500 series routers are currently being used by companies around the world • Vulnerabilities exist in Cisco as they do in any operating system • Security professionals must consider these vulnerabilities when conducting a security test
  • 6. 6 CISCO ROUTER COMPONENTS • A Cisco router uses the Cisco Internetwork Operating System (IOS) to function • Components • Random access memory (RAM) • Holds the router’s running configuration, routing tables, and buffers • If you turn off the router, the contents stored in RAM are wiped out • Nonvolatile RAM (NVRAM) • Holds the router’s configuration file, but the information is not lost if the router is turned off
  • 7. 7 CISCO ROUTER COMPONENTS (CONTINUED) • Components (continued) • Flash memory • Holds the IOS the router is using • Is rewritable memory, so you can upgrade the IOS • Read-only memory (ROM) • Contains a minimal version of the IOS used to boot the router if flash memory gets corrupted • Interfaces • Hardware connectivity points • Example: an Ethernet port is an interface that connects to a LAN
  • 8. 8 CISCO ROUTER CONFIGURATION • Configuration modes: • User mode • Administrator can perform basic troubleshooting tests and list information stored on the router • Router-name>, indicates that you are in user mode • Privileged mode • Administrator can perform full router configuration tasks • Router-name#, indicates that you are in privileged mode • By default, you are in user mode • Type “enable” or “en” to change to privileged mode
  • 9. 9 CISCO ROUTER CONFIGURATION (CONTINUED) • Once in privileged mode, you can change to two more configuration modes • Global configuration mode • Administrator can configure router settings that affect overall router operation • To use this mode, you enter the command config t at the Router-name# prompt • Router-name (config)# tells the user she is in global configuration mode
  • 10. 10 CISCO ROUTER CONFIGURATION (CONTINUED) • Once in privileged mode, you can change to two more configuration modes (continued) • Interface configuration mode • Administrator can configure an interface on the router • To use this mode, you enter global configuration mode first • Next, you enter the command for interface configuration mode and the interface name you want to configure • Router-name(config-if)# indicates you are in interface configuration mode
  • 11. 11 UNDERSTANDING ACCESS CONTROL LISTS • There are several types of access control lists • We will focus on IP access lists • IP access lists • Lists of IP addresses, subnets, or networks that are allowed or denied access through a router’s interface • Two different types of access lists on Cisco router • Standard IP access lists • Extended IP access lists
  • 12. 12 STANDARD IP ACCESS LISTS • Can restrict IP traffic entering or leaving a router’s interface based on source IP address • The syntax of a standard access list is as follows: access-list [list #] [permit|deny] [source address] [source wildcard mask] • [list #] is a number in the range of 1 to 99 • permit | deny] are keywords to permit or deny traffic • [source address] specifies the IP address of the source host • [source wildcard mask] signifies which bits of the source address are significant
  • 13. 13 STANDARD IP ACCESS LISTS (CONTINUED) • Example: access-list 1 deny 173.110.0.0 0.0.255.255 access-list permit any • A wildcard mask is similar to a subnet mask • Example: access-list 1 deny 10.10.1.112 0.0.0.0 • The 0s used after the IP address signify that every octet in the IP address must match the IP address being filtered • Another example: access-list 1 deny 192.168.10.0 0.0.0.255 access-list 1 permit any
  • 14. 14 STANDARD IP ACCESS LISTS (CONTINUED) • Cisco allows a shortcut for the mask 0.0.0.0 access-list 1 deny host 192.168.10.112 • Access lists always end with an implicit deny rule • To avoid this, you must add the “permit any” statement access-list 1 deny host 192.168.10.112 access-list 1 permit any • Steps for applying the access list to an interface • Enter global configuration mode • Create the access list • Enter interface configuration mode • Use the ip access-group command
  • 15. 15 STANDARD IP ACCESS LISTS (CONTINUED) • Example Router> en Password ****** Router# config t Router(config)# access-list 1 deny 172.16.5.0 0.0.0.255 Router(config)# access-list 1 permit any Router(config)# int e0 Router(config-if)# ip access-group 1 out Router(config-if) Ctrl+z [to save and exit global configuration mode] Router#
  • 16. 16 EXTENDED IP ACCESS LISTS • Allow packet filtering based on • Source IP address • Destination IP address • Protocol type • Application port number • Syntax for extended IP access lists access-list [list #] [permit|deny] [protocol] [source IP address] [source wildcard mask] [destination IP address] [destination wildcard mask] [operator] [port] [log] • [list #] is a number in the range of 100 to 199 • [permit | deny] are keywords to permit or deny traffic
  • 17. 17 EXTENDED IP ACCESS LISTS (CONTINUED) • Syntax for extended IP access lists (continued) • [protocol] can be IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, and so on • [source IP address] is the IP address of the source • [source wildcard mask] determines significant bits of source IP address • [destination IP address] is the IP address of the destination • [destination wildcard mask] determines significant bits of destination IP address • [operator] can be lt, gt, eq, or neq
  • 18. 18 EXTENDED IP ACCESS LISTS (CONTINUED) • Syntax for extended IP access lists (continued) • [port] port number of the protocol to be filtered • [log] logs all activity of the access list for the administrator • Example: access-list 100 deny tcp host 172.16.1.112 host 172.30.1.100 eq www
  • 19. 19 EXTENDED IP ACCESS LISTS (CONTINUED) • Applying an access list to an interface Router> en Password ****** Router# config t Router(config)# access-list 100 deny tcp host 172.16.1.112 host 172.30.1.100 Router(config)# access-list 100 permit any Router(config)# int e0 Router(config-if)# ip access-group 100 in Router(config-if) Ctrl+z Router#
  • 20. 20 UNDERSTANDING FIREWALLS • Firewalls are hardware devices or software installed on a system and have two purposes • Controlling access to all traffic that enters an internal network • Controlling all traffic that leaves an internal network • Advantages of hardware firewalls • They are usually faster than software firewalls • They can handle a larger throughput than software firewalls
  • 21. 21 UNDERSTANDING FIREWALLS (CONTINUED) • Disadvantage of hardware firewalls • You are locked into the firewall’s hardware • Advantage of software firewalls • You can easily add NICs to the server running the firewall software • Disadvantage of software firewalls • You might have to worry about configuration problems • They rely on the OS on which they are running
  • 22. 22 UNDERSTANDING FIREWALL TECHNOLOGY • Firewall technologies • Network address translation (NAT) • Access control lists • Packet filtering • Stateful packet inspection (SPI)
  • 23. NETWORK ADDRESS TRANSLATION (NAT) • The most basic security feature of a firewall • With NAT, internal private IP addresses are mapped to public external IP addresses 23 • Hiding the internal infrastructure • Port Address Translation (PAT) • Technology derived from NAT • This allows thousands of internal IP addresses to be mapped to one external IP address
  • 24. ACCESS CONTROL LISTS • Access lists are used to filter traffic based on source IP address, destination IP address, and ports or services • Firewalls also use this technology • Creating access control lists in a firewall is a similar process to creating them in a router 24
  • 25. PACKET FILTERING 25 • Packet filters screen packets based on information contained in the packet header • Protocol type • IP address • TCP/UDP port
  • 26. STATEFUL PACKET INSPECTION (SPI) 26 • Stateful packet filters record session-specific information about a network connection • Create a state table • Can help reduce port scans that rely on spoofing or sending packets after a three-way handshake • Stateful packet filters recognize types of anomalies that most routers ignore • Stateless packet filters handle each packet on an individual basis • Spoofing or DoS attacks are more prevalent
  • 27. IMPLEMENTING A FIREWALL • Placing a firewall between a company’s internal network and the Internet is dangerous 27 • It leaves the company open to attack if a hacker compromises the firewall • Use a demilitarized zone instead
  • 28. DEMILITARIZED ZONE (DMZ) • DMZ is a small network containing resources available to Internet users 28 • Helps maintain security on the company’s internal network • Sits between the Internet and the internal network • It is sometimes referred to as a “perimeter network”
  • 29. UNDERSTANDING THE PRIVATE INTERNET EXCHANGE (PIX) FIREWALL • Cisco PIX firewall 29 • One of the most popular firewalls on the market
  • 30. CONFIGURATION OF THE PIX FIREWALL • Working with a PIX firewall is similar to working with any other Cisco router • Login prompt 30 If you are not authorized to be in this XYZ Hawaii network device, log out immediately! User Access Verification Password: • This banner serves a legal purpose • General prompt example: Type help or '?' for a list of available commands. xyz>
  • 31. CONFIGURATION OF THE PIX FIREWALL (CONTINUED) • You should enter privileged mode to configure the PIX firewall • To enter configuration mode in PIX, you use the same command as on a Cisco router 31 xyz# configure terminal xyz(config)# ? • Nameif is a PIX command to name an interface • PIX allows the administrator to assign values to an interface that designate its security level • Values can be from 0 to 100
  • 32. CONFIGURATION OF THE PIX FIREWALL (CONTINUED) • Access lists 32 • PIX enables an administrator to use descriptive names for the access list instead of numbers • PIX also uses the implicit deny rule
  • 33. UNDERSTANDING MICROSOFT ISA 33 • Microsoft’s software approach to firewalls • Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration (ISA) Server • Functions as a software router, firewall, and IDS • ISA has the same functionality as any hardware router • Packet filtering to control incoming traffic • Application filtering through the examination of protocols • Intrusion detection filters • Access policies to control outgoing traffic
  • 34. IP PACKET FILTERS 34 • ISA enables administrators to filter IP traffic based on the following: • Source and destination IP address • Network protocol, such as HTTP • Source port or destination port • ISA provides a GUI for these configurations • A network segment can be denied or allowed HTTP access in the Remote Computer tab
  • 35. APPLICATION FILTERS • Can accept or deny data from specific applications or data containing specific content • SMTP filter can restrict 35 • E-mail with specific attachments • E-mail from a specific user or domain • E-mail containing specific keywords • SMTP commands • SMTP Filter Properties dialog box • Administrator can filter a specific e-mail attachment based on a rule he or she configures
  • 36. APPLICATION FILTERS (CONTINUED) • Users/Domains tab in the SMTP Filter Properties dialog box 36 • Administrator can filter e-mail messages sent from a user or from specific domains • As a security professional, you might be asked to restrict e-mails containing certain keywords • SMTP Commands tab • Administrator can prevent a user from running SMTP commands
  • 37. INTRUSION DETECTION FILTERS • Analyze all traffic for possible known intrusions 37 • DNS intrusion detection filter • POP intrusion detection filter • FTP Access filter • H.323 filter • HTTP Redirector filter • RPC filter • SMTP filter • SOCKSV4 filter • Streaming Media filter
  • 38. ACCESS POLICIES • Allow administrators to control outgoing traffic • An access policy consists of the following 38 • Policy rules • Site and content rules • IP filter rules
  • 39. UNDERSTANDING INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS (IDSS) • Monitor network devices so that security administrators can identify attacks in progress and stop them • An IDS look at the traffic and compare it with known exploits 39 • Similar to virus software using a signature file to identify viruses • Types • Network-based IDSs • Host-based IDSs
  • 40. NETWORK-BASED AND HOST-BASED IDSS • Network-based IDSs 40 • Monitor activity on network segments • They sniff traffic and alert a security administrator when something suspicious occurs • Host-based IDSs • Used to protect a critical network server or database server • The software is installed on the server you’re attempting to protect
  • 41. NETWORK-BASED AND HOST-BASED IDSS (CONTINUED) • IDSs are categorized by how they react when they detect suspicious behavior 41 • Passive systems • Send out an alert and log the activity • Active systems • Log events and send out alerts • Can also interoperate with routers and firewalls
  • 42. UNDERSTANDING HONEYPOTS • Honeypot 42 • Computer placed on the perimeter of a network • Contains information intended to lure and then trap hackers • Computer is configured to have vulnerabilities • Goal • Keep hackers connected long enough so they can be traced back
  • 43. HOW THEY WORK 43 • A honeypot appears to have important data or sensitive information stored on it • Could store fake financial data that tempts hackers to attempt browsing through the data • Hackers will spend time attacking the honeypot • And stop looking for real vulnerabilities in the company’s network • Honeypots also enable security professionals to collect data on attackers • Honeypots are available commercially and through open-source avenues
  • 44. HOW THEY WORK (CONTINUED) • Virtual honeypots 44 • Honeypots created using software solutions instead of hardware devices • Example: Honeyd
  • 45. SUMMARY 45 • Security devices • Routers • Firewalls • IDSs • Routers use access lists to accept or deny traffic through their interfaces • Firewalls can be hardware devices or software installed on computer systems • Firewalls use NAT, IP filtering, and access control lists to filter incoming and outgoing network traffic
  • 46. SUMMARY (CONTINUED) 46 • Firewall examples • Cisco PIX (hardware) • Microsoft ISA (software) • Stateful packet filters vs. stateless packet filters • PGP is a free public key encryption program to encrypt e-mail messages • Demilitarized zones (DMZs) • Add a layer of defense between the Internet and a company’s internal network
  • 47. SUMMARY (CONTINUED) 47 • Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) • Network-based IDSs • Host-based IDSs • Passive IDSs vs. active IDSs • Honeypots