1. Political Science 237
Political Theory and Philosophy I
Platonic Piety “Euthyphro”
Professor Philip J. Howe
Adrian College
Spring 2009
Josh Emington
Short Paper I
Plato’s view on piety’s form is unclear at best as it is discussed in the Socratic dialogue
Euthyphro. As is usually the case with Socrates no satisfactory definition is established; in this
particular case Socrates fails to illuminate much at all concerning piety’s characteristics (Plato,
Euthyphro 1a-c). Due to the social leniency toward historical accounts it is unclear to what
extent the dialogues of Socrates are historical records or illustrations of his own ideas (Reeve,
The Republic xi). We may learn something of his perspective by carefully reviewing the
dialogue he recorded between Euthyphro and Socrates, his mentor.

2. The word Euthyphro uses for piety is a Greek term, ‘hoision’ which can be defined as, the
knowledge of proper ritual in prayer and sacrifice and its performance (Cooper, Euthyphro 1 and
14b). Euthyphro and Socrates, however, are discussing a much wider and more general concept
equivalent to a sort of universal moral correctness or true righteousness. That is, a true definition
of piety would be perfect, given of the gods, and properly sort actions (Plato, Euthyphro 5d and
1d). As the ‘Socratic method”, currently understood in Greek ‘elenchus’ indicates, the majority
of knowledge acquired by an failed attempt at defining such a concept will consist of what the
term is not.
This investigation can be accomplished via a summarized review of the definitive points in the
discussion. When asked for a clear definition of piety Euthyphro first responds: “Piety is doing
what I’m doing here today, namely, prosecuting my father for murder (Plato, Euthyphro 5e).”
Socrates points out that Euthyphro has merely given an example of a pious action rather than
given a definition and he provides examples (Plato, Euthyphro 6d). This suggests that the form
of piety is not an example of a pious action.
Seeing his error Euthyphro quickly generates a second definition to mend the flaw: “Pious acts
are loved by the gods” (Plato, Euthyphro 7a). After analyzing the practical implications of the
definition, they agree that the gods disagree often enough that actions would be regularly defined
as both pious and impious (Plato, Euthyphro 7b,e). Socrates then reminds Euthyphro that a
satisfactory form would not yield contradictory results from the same example (Plato, Euthyphro
8a-b).” It is now clear that a proper definition of piety would have the ability to characterize
actions and measure them accurately.
Socrates suggests an amendment and Euthyphro proudly states it as his third attempt to define
piety (Plato, Euthyphro 9c-e): “Pious acts are loved by all the gods” (Plato, Euthyphro 9e). In
this case Socrates opts to pose an inherently different question causing the discussion to take a
philosophical turn: “Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious
because it is being loved by the gods” (Plato, Euthyphro 10a)? Once Euthyphro is made to
understand that a question of origin, causality, and direction is being presented, he comes to
realize that his argument is cyclical in nature and although it could very well be right, which
Socrates acknowledges, it relies on itself or an example of itself (11a-e). This portion suggests
that piety involves a relationship between a person and the gods. We also find that a true form of
piety would not describe itself but be, in itself, the standard for judging piousness.
Socrates again demands a definition of piety which explains the universal term in its essence
including its qualities and characteristics (Plato, Euthyphro 12d). Euthyphro then describes piety
as one of two parts of justice, “that is concerned with the care of the gods” (Plato, Euthyphro
12e). After a discussion of the term ‘care’ the men agree that piety must be: “a knowledge of
how to give to and beg from the gods” (Plato, Euthyphro 14d). Thus piety must involve divine
relationships, and can be characterized as a component of justice.
This definition is further clarified producing the fifth attempt: “Piety would then be a sort of
trading skill between the gods and men” (Plato, Euthyphro 14e)? Discussion reveals that men
can only offer intangible gifts “pleasing to the gods” (Plato, Euthyphro 14e-15b). Socrates then
points out that they have simply repeated the third definition (god-loved) and not addressed the
flaws in it (Plato, Euthyphro 15b-c). Having failed to establish satisfying conclusions about the
true form of piety, a very annoyed Euthyphro makes an excuse to leave.

3. Socrates is left, without a true form of piety, to contemplate what he has learned. Plato,
through Socrates, suggests the importance of avoiding methodological errors in seeking form.
He also suggests that the appetites and preferences of the gods are important to comprehending
what is pious (Plato, Euthyphro 7e and 11a-b). Most of all, it seems that an accurate
understanding of piety presupposes an absolute knowledge of the gods, their relationships, their
will, and even their particular tastes (Plato, Euthyphro 14e-15b).
Plato clarifies his view on piety in The Republic as it is one of the central concepts and a
great part of understanding justice, the book’s main aim (Plato, Euthyphro 12e). Plato suggests
that lying is impious, unless it corrects poetry, which is itself impious (Plato, The Republic
382c3-4 and 380c1-2). The book concludes with an afterlife which would reward piety while
punishing impiety (Plato, The Republic 615c1-5): “if they had done good deeds and become just
and pious, they received commensurate awards” (Plato, The Republic 15b6-7). It is somewhat
interesting that piety in its true form is never defined throughout either dialogue though it
remains a chief element of the discussions. Plato seems to accept the basic descriptions and label
actions pious or impious based on his perception of the gods and whether they must ‘love’ the
action in the abstract. His view remains indecisive and vague.