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Iran pakistan gas pipeline project.

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Iran pakistan gas pipeline project.

  2. 2. SEQUENCE History of Project Solution of Energy Crisis. Prospects and Constraints Geo Politics of the Region and Pipeline Background of Sanctions Recent Progress Recommendations
  3. 3. BRIEF HISTORY Idea was first conceived by young Pakistani Engineer Malik Aftab Khan in 1950 where he proposed the current route and stationing of troops along the proposed line and also termed it as peace pipe line. Idea was conceptualized in 1989 and Iranian Government responded positively. 
  4. 4. Project Profile  Length. Total length is 2775 Km. 1172 km of length is in iran and known as Iran 7th Cross Country gas pipeline and remaining length in Pakistan.  Route. Starts from Asalouyeh, Bandar Abbas, khusdar, sui and Multan.  Diameter 56 in (1,422 mm)
  5. 5. TECHNICAL DETAILS Capacity. Initial capacity would be 8.7 billion cubic meter which is expected to be raised to 40 billion cubic meter Cost. Expected cost incurred on completion would be around 8 billion US Dollor.
  6. 6. Timeline Discussion started in 1994 and agreement signed in 1995 and it was agreed to construct pipeline from South Pars Gas field in Iran to Karachi. No progress till 2004 and project revived after UNDP report peace and prosperity Gas pipeline. In February 2007, India and Pak agreed to pay Iran US 4.93 Dollar per Million British Thermal unit. In April 2008, China shown interest in project and in 2010 Bangladesh also join the project 
  7. 7. In 2009 India withdrew from project over pricing and security issue after signing nuclear deal with US. On 30th January 2013, Pak approved deal with Iran for laying Pakistani segment of pipeline and on 11th March 2013 project was inaugurated by President Asif Ali Zardari PM Nawaz Sharif Assured that Pak is committed to Project.
  8. 8. Solution of Energy Crisis Due to energy crisis Annual Loss to industrial Sector is more than 240 Billion Supply and Demand gap is as under 8
  9. 9. Pakistan will import 750 mcft of natural gas daily for generation of approximately 4000 MW of electricity. Replacement of imported furnace oil by Iranian gas in our industries will result in estimated saving of billions of rupees 9
  10. 10. Prospective reality – Never ending dream 10
  11. 11. Prospects and Constraints Drivers ◦ Energy Security ◦ Peace Dividends ◦ Strategic Return Constraints ◦ Iran Pak Hostility ◦ Iran Under Sanction ◦ Strategic Constraints 11
  12. 12. Geo Politic of the IP Pipeline 12
  13. 13. Phases of IP Pipeline IP passed through three phases: Phase One: Energy security & Pak Iran differences. Phase Two: Energy Security and Peace dividend. Phase Three: Strategic returns/constraints and energy security. 13
  14. 14. IP: In the Strategic chess board Both regional players factor IP in their relations with USA. Iran promotes it to undermine US objective in the region. Pakistan finds in opportunity to underline its significance in the region. USA sees it detrimental to its policy objectives in the region. 14
  15. 15. Viewed From Tehran Triple win economic, political, and strategic Project Energy is vital component of Iranian foreign policy. Iranian regime intends to make maximalist gains. Iranian East ward energy moves are largely driven by difficulties in western market. Europe is Iran’s preferred option: Turkey Route. 15
  16. 16. The Strength The rich volume. The strategic location. The New Geopolitics of Gas: the rise of Gas opec 16
  17. 17. The Weakness Gas industry yet to develop. Foreign investment. Impact of sanctions on prospective engagement. 17
  18. 18. Trajectory Three Scenario Scenario One: Grand Bargain Scenario Two: Confrontation Scenario Three: Stalemate 18
  19. 19. The Grand Bargain Iranian Gas would be moving to Europe. In short run Iranian gas export to Asia would be not significant though in medium term prospects are better.. IPI would loose its strategic salience and would be dictated more by market economics. 19
  20. 20. Scenario Two: Confrontation Iran pursues more aggressive Energy diplomacy, better terms to Asia. Asia cannot make much gains due to Sanctions. IPI would remain in limbo. 20
  21. 21. Scenario Three: The Stalemate Energy will be high on Iran foreign policy agenda. Asia will be offered carrot and stick options. IPI will be kept alive project but the progress will be determined by foreign policy matrix of all the three stake holders. 21
  22. 22. CONTROVERSIES United States. Asked Pakistan to abandon the project and in return US will fund construction of liquefied natural gas terminal and importing electricity from Tajikistan through Afghanistan Wakhan Corridor. 29th January US Consulate General Michael Dodman threatened with Economic Sanction Saudi Arabia. Offering Alternative Package of cash loan and oil facility
  23. 23. Sanctions and Pipeline 23
  24. 24. Iran Pre-1979 Ruled by the Shah, Mohammad Raza Pahlavi Allies with U.S. during the Cold War Regime fell in the Iranian revolution of 1979 Source: http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761567300/Iran.html
  25. 25. Iranian Revolution After the overthrow of the Shah, Aytollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power ◦ Known as the Supreme Leader of Iran Established Islamic Republic of Iran Source: http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761567300/Iran.html
  26. 26. Iran Hostage Crisis U.S. Embassy in Tehran seized on 11/4/1979 63 American citizens taken hostage 50 hostages held prisoner for 444 days Supported by Khomeini under the slogan “America can’t do a damn thing” Source: http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761567300/Iran.html
  27. 27. Overview of sanctions against Iran Began after 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis ◦ Iranian Transactions Regulations - 31 C.F.R. § 560 ◦ Import embargo on Iranian-origin goods and services No direct trade with the U.S. since 1995, when the U.S. government banned all commercial and financial transactions between U.S. companies and Iranian public and private entities Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 Current Nuclear Standoff with Iran ◦ Could lead to additional sanctions by U.N.  Source: http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/iran/iran.pdf
  28. 28. How Much Energy Does Iran Have?  Possesses world’s 2nd largest natural gas reserves  ~10% of world’s known oil reserves (4th largest) ◦ 2nd largest oil producer in OPEC Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Background.html
  29. 29. Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) Allows the President to impose sanctions if a person has made an investment of more than $20 million “that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop petroleum resources of Iran.” Controversial because it allows the President to impose unilateral sanctions on foreign companies or entities Source: Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (1996)
  30. 30. ILSA Continued “Investment" defined as the entry into a contract that includes responsibility for the development of petroleum resources in Iran or Libya Statute silent as to whether the construction of energy transit routes from Iran might be considered an investment However, Clinton Administration position was that, under certain conditions, the construction of such routes could be a sanctionable investment Source: Kenneth Katzman, The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, update Apr. 26, 2006.
  31. 31. ILSA’s First Test The French oil company, Total SA, struck a $2 billion deal with Iran in September 1997, to develop natural gas reserves in Iran’s South Pars field This was the largest single foreign investment in Iran since the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was sacked in 1979 Clinton Adm. found that deal violated ILSA, but ultimately decided to waive sanctions Source: Kenneth Katzman, The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, update Apr. 26, 2006.
  32. 32. Would the Pipeline be an “investment” under ILSA? ◦ The Iranian side of the project will be financed entirely by Iran and a group of multi-national investors Iran will be required to put together ◦ Pakistan's investment in the project will start only after the pipeline reaches Pakistani territory Applying a plain-meaning interpretation of ILSA, Pakistan’s involvement could be interpreted as one that does not directly contribute “to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop petroleum resources of Iran.”
  33. 33. Comparing Total’s case with Pakistan’s ◦ $2 billion investment ◦ Direct development of oil fields within Iran      $7-10 billion proposed project Natural gas transit route No direct development by Pakistan Pakistani ownership of the pipeline would begin at its border However, deal would provide incentive and funding for Iran to develop its gas resources
  34. 34. Effects of Sanctions Continued  Since the Total waiver, ~ $11.5b in foreign investments in Iran’s energy sector have been agreed upon.  Iran’s natural gas sector, non-existent prior to the late 1990’s, is becoming an increasingly important factor in Iran’s energy future as a result of foreign investment.  E.U. threatened formal counter-action over ILSA in the WTO, and in April 1997, the U.S. and E.U. formally agreed to try to avoid a trade confrontation. Source: Kenneth Katzman, The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated Apr. 26, 2006.
  35. 35. Recent Progress Pakistan needs gas very badly," said Mr. Sharif." We have to run our power plants. We need gas for them. There is an acute shortage of gas in Pakistan, so we have to import gas from somewhere.“ He said that Pakistan would proceed "unless you give us the gas, or the $3 million a day." 35
  36. 36. Recommendations Pipeline does not bring peace but peace brings projects such as cross-border gas pipelines. Pakistan needs to move ahead, play its due role to complete the project.  constructive engagement and diplomatic reconciliation with US rather than confrontation should be our focus. The completion of IP Pipeline will be a test case of our diplomatic and political triumph in future. 36
  37. 37. This IP pipeline presents Pakistan with an opportunity to establish itself as a reliable energy corridor or energy transit hub thereby not only achieving energy security for itself but also earn substantial amount of foreign exchange in terms of transit fees and royalties from pipeline by luring India and China into the project. it is imperative to address the Baluchistan problem properly and justifiably as to removing this major bottle neck hindering this enormously vital project. 37
  38. 38. Keeping in view the projected increase in energy demand and expected short fall of around 10 bcf by 2025 (2500 MMSCFD by 2015), the above pipeline would be vital to meet the shortfall and trigger economic growth in Pakistan. 38
  39. 39. Thanks