Sean WoolfreySADC Ambassadors Meeting Brussels, 1 November 2017

1. Post Cotonou, EU-Africa
and the EU-SADC EPA
Key issues and debates
Sean Woolfrey
SADC Ambassadors Meeting, Brussels
1 November 2017

2. 1.ECDPM
2.The Post Cotonou debate
3.The EU-Africa Partnership
4.The EU-SADC EPA
Structure of presentation
ECDPM Page 2

3. • Independent, non-partisan “think and do tank”
• Neutral knowledge broker and dialogue facilitator
• Evidence-based analysis to understand how things
work out in practice and why
• Focus on “what is feasible” in the given context
rather than on “what should be done” (avoiding
normative approaches)
• Identify realistic & effective scenarios e.g. for
Post Cotonou that serve the interests of European,
African, Caribbean and Pacific states and citizens
Role of ECDPM in ACP-EU
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4. • Highly political and polarised debate in EU and ACP
• Poor knowledge and interest beyond formal ACP-EU
institutions
• Contradicting messages between ACP Brussels and
ACP regions/national capitals
• Time is short to strike an innovative deal involving
79 ACP and 27 (28?) EU countries!
• Risk to stick to conservative and defensive attitudes
while global, EU and ACP contextual changes call for
more fundamental reform
The Post Cotonou debate: Context
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5. • Relevance and effectiveness of partnership in
question – limited track record on delivering on
core objectives (beyond aid)
• Gradual marginalisation of partnership
1. Changing geopolitical realities
2. Globalisation and regionalisation dynamics
3. Growing heterogeneity in ACP
4. Changes within EU
5. 2030 Agenda and focus on global challenges
• Current added value of ACP is unclear and
business as usual will not suffice
The Post Cotonou debate: Context
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6. Safeguarding ACP-EU acquis through umbrella while
deepening regional partnerships
• Common umbrella:
(1) values, principles, essential elements and
interests
(2) global agendas
• 3 regional partnerships that build on existing ones
(e.g. JAES)
• Geographic outreach beyond ACP where needed
• Multi-layered and flexible institutional architecture
(based on subsidiarity and complementarity)
• Preserve legally binding status
• Preferred scenario DEVCO/EEAS
ACP umbrella with 3 regional
partnerships: building blocks
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7. • Continuity in volatile times in Europe and at global level
• Preserve longstanding “political capital” in times where the
EU needs allies to defend its interests and to pursue global
agendas
• Avoiding delicate discussions with ACP Group
• Adapting to regionalisation dynamics and the need for more
differentiated approaches
• Preserve legally binding agreement
• ON PAPER: A typical European compromise: trying to
combine “the best of two worlds”
• IN PRACTICE: Difficult to make this work and to (1)
combine renewed political partnership with the ACP, (2)
deepen regionalisation and (3) collectively manage global
priorities
Why is this scenario favoured by
the EU institutions?
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8. ECDPM Page 8

9. WHAT ROLE FOR THE ACP UMBRELLA?
• Abundant evidence that ACP-EU partnership has limited
political value on the two issues that EC/EEAS want to put
under common umbrella (political partnership & global
challenges)
• Limited track record and unclear role and value added of
the ACP umbrella to undertake collective action on global
public goods (major heterogeneity within ACP Group)
• De facto on strategic political issues (migration, security,
fight against terrorism) the EU works with the AU and African
RECs (The EU Global Strategy of 2016 hardly refers to the
ACP-EU partnership)
Umbrella scenario: reality check
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10. WHAT ROLE DIVISION BETWEEN UMBRELLA
AND REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS?
• Risk of unclear governance architecture
• Several questions:
Putting ACP or regions first?
Who will be in command in terms of decision making and
management including on the management of financial
flows (centralisation versus decentralisation)?
Role of ACP and joint ACP-EU institutions vis-a vis regional
institutions?
• Potential for conflicts on mandates,
duplication of roles and increased transaction
costs
Umbrella scenario: reality check
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11. HOW TO ENSURE GEOGRAPHIC EXTENSION
BEYOND ACP?
• Associate other interested countries beyond
ACP Group ”when needed”
• Several questions:
 What will be the status of non-ACP countries? Observers
or members?
 What incentives do non-ACP countries have to join a
heavy structure that has not performed well in concluding
global deals?
Umbrella scenario: reality check
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12. 1. Umbrella attractive in terms of ensuring continuity
and stability in the EU-ACP relationship
2. Umbrella based on questionable assumptions that
do not correspond with past & current ACP-EU
cooperation experiences
3. Need to build stronger interest driven cooperation
arrangements that can ensure effective outcomes
in global negotiations for both EU and countries
from A,C,P
Major doubts whether this scenario will serve
interests of EU and A, C, P states and citizens
beyond vested interests of ACP-EU institutions
In summary…
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13. 1. 5th Africa-EU Summit + 10th anniversary of Joint
Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) = Good time for
reflection on EU-Africa partnership
2. EEAS/EC Joint Communication for a renewed
impetus on the EU-Africa Partnership – aim “to lift
the political relationship to a higher strategic
stage”
3. But have we learned from past failure of JAES to
move beyond good intentions and deliver on
political aspirations?
EU-Africa Partnership: Context
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14. On the EU side
1. Not a ‘partnership of equals’ in practice - EU defining
agenda and rules of the game
2. EU double standards on value agendas
3. Europe’s difficulty in speaking with one voice
4. EU not always explicit in spelling out strategic interests
On the African side
1. Diversity of interests and lack of willingness to hand
responsibility to AU/RECs
2. Weak institutional capacity of AU and lack of African
strategic vision
3. Continued reliance on aid
EU-Africa partnership: Why has JAES
not delivered on political aspirations?
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15. 1. Foster a more coherent European foreign policy in practice
2. Build stronger and self-sufficient pan-African and regional
institutions
3. Be clear about interests
4. Work towards a real people-centred partnership
5. Strengthen the knowledge base of the Europe-Africa
partnership
6. Organise high-level political dialogue between summits
7. Make good use of the negotiations for a new EU multiannual
financial framework
8. Bold confidence restoring measures would be welcome
EU-Africa Partnership: how to make it
work better in practice
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16. 1. RECIPROCAL but ASSYMETRIC trade in goods agreement
between EU and 6 SADC MS (Botswana, Lesotho,
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland)
2. A ‘development-oriented’ agreement – e.g. assymetric
liberalisation, safeguards, flexible RoO, protection for infant
industries, provisions for development cooperation, etc.
3. Commits parties to CPA principles – respect for human
rights, rule of law, democracy – and to to respect
international environmental and labour standards
4. Meant to support regional integration in SADC
5. Creates joint institutions (Joint Council, Trade & Dev Comm)
for implementation, monitoring, etc.
EU-SADC EPA: The Agreement
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17. 1. MFN clause  limited to ‘major trading
economies’
2. Export taxes  allowable in ‘exceptional
circumstances’
3. Rules of origin  flexible RoOs allowing for
regional cumulation
4. Agricultural safeguards  a menu of relatively
generous/flexible safeguards (incl. agri) available
5. Trade in services  BLMS agree to continue
negotiations, but no commitment on
EU-SADC EPA: Have contentious
issues been resolved?
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18. How can the EPA support sustainable economic growth and
regional integration in Southern Africa?
• Support regional industrial development objectives (e.g.
through utilising flexible RoOs)
• Facilitate support for capacity building of institutions (e.g.
public authorities ability to use trade remedies) and
economic actors (e.g. to improve capacity of SMEs to meet
EU quality standards and increase their competitiveness)
• Ensure sufficient awareness among – and involvement (e.g.
monitoring) of – civil society, especially private sector
• Avoid undermining SADC integration (e.g. differentiated
approach to services negotiations, alignment with ESA EPA?)
Many provisions on cooperation and support contained in
EPA, but generally of the ‘best endeavour’ variety -
importance of TRF/EPA Window, etc.
EU-SADC EPA: Opportunities and
challenges
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19. Thank you!
www.ecdpm.org
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