SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 12
oil spill
Presented By
Dhanish Ahsen
What went wrong?
Deepwater Horizon
Rig operator
Cementing ContractorPrincipal Developer
Macondo Prospect
Largest accidental marine oil spill
Accused for
weaknesses in
cement design and
testing, quality
assurance and risk
assessment.
Nitrogen based
cement used was
blamed
Accused for
failure of BOP and
incorrect
evaluation of
negative pressure
test results
Accused for Cost
Savings, poor safety
operations , well
design and
decisions regarding
testing procedures
28°44′17.30″N
88°21′57.40″W
Mississippi Canyon Block 252
210mn
Gallons of
Crude Oil
11Killed
17Injured
20 April – 15 July 2010
87Days 5600m
Deep Well
1600m
Deep Water
The Deepwater Horizon
Semi-submersible, mobile, floating,
dynamically positioned drilling rig
9year
Old
3000m
Deep Water
Operation
Manufacturer
OwnerLessee
March ‘08-September ‘13
Upto
57 ft.
Tall
400tons
Weight
Manufacturer Lessee Owner
Blow out preventer
• BOP failed to activate
• Didn't test the blowout
preventer's individual safety
systems.
• BOP was powered by a battery
(Found to be dead one)
8:45 pm CDT- Unexpected burst of pressure from the
reservoir (kick)
9:45 pm CDT- High-pressure methane gas from the
well expanded into the drilling riser and rose into the
drilling rig
9:56 pm CDT- where it ignited and exploded, engulfing
the platform
What went wrong?
What went wrong?
• Blind shear rams failed to fully close and seal
due to a portion of drill pipe buckling
between the shearing blocks.
• Defective cement job
• failure to run a cement bond log test
• BOP had a hydraulic leak and a failed battery,
and therefore failed
• Installed just one third centralizers
• Faulty wiring in two places, a dead battery
and a bent pipe in the hulking device
Failed safety systems and
irresponsible behavior of
contractors had led to the
explosion, including claims that
Halliburton failed to properly use
modeling software to analyze
safe drilling conditions
“
”
BP blames contractors
• BP opted for a single long run of pipe rather
than an alternative approach that would
have increased the barriers to gas flow.
• BP failed to conduct a "cement bond log"
test to evaluate the integrity of the cement
at the bottom of the well, which was what
blocked gas and oil from emerging up the
production pipe.
• BP installed fewer than one-third of the
recommended number of centralizer
devices, which Transocean said had the
effect of "dramatically increasing the risk of
cement channeling and gas flow."
“
Contractors blames BP
Word War
BP spokesman Geoff Morrell said all of the
evidence "demonstrates that Transocean owned the
rig's blowout preventer and was responsible for its
maintenance".
Transocean spokesman Brian Kennedy said the
CSB report confirms the blowout preventer had been
tested properly and had activated during the accident,
“but was unable to seal the well because immense
pressure buckled the drill pipe and prevented the
blind shear ram from functioning as designed.”
“ ”
Conclusion
A complex and interlinked series of mechanical
failures, human judgments, engineering design,
operational implementation and team interfaces
BP is ultimately responsible for the spill,
and that Halliburton and Transocean share
some of the blame.
"a rush to completion"
Time & Money

More Related Content

What's hot

Deep water horizon oil spill
Deep water horizon oil spillDeep water horizon oil spill
Deep water horizon oil spill
virgo_az
 
Ongc mumbai high accident
Ongc mumbai high accidentOngc mumbai high accident
Ongc mumbai high accident
Muzahid Khan
 
Exxon Valdez
Exxon ValdezExxon Valdez
Exxon Valdez
Brad
 

What's hot (20)

Deepwater horizon oil spill | Gulf of mexico oil spill | The BP oil spill
Deepwater horizon oil spill | Gulf of mexico oil spill | The BP oil spillDeepwater horizon oil spill | Gulf of mexico oil spill | The BP oil spill
Deepwater horizon oil spill | Gulf of mexico oil spill | The BP oil spill
 
Bp oil spill case study
Bp oil spill case studyBp oil spill case study
Bp oil spill case study
 
Deep water horizon oil spill
Deep water horizon oil spillDeep water horizon oil spill
Deep water horizon oil spill
 
The Macondo blowout
The Macondo blowoutThe Macondo blowout
The Macondo blowout
 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Deepwater Horizon Oil SpillDeepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
 
BP oil spill
BP oil spillBP oil spill
BP oil spill
 
BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill's impact on the us economy, Jonah Guo,Queen's MBA
BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill's impact on the us economy, Jonah Guo,Queen's MBABP Deepwater Horizon oil spill's impact on the us economy, Jonah Guo,Queen's MBA
BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill's impact on the us economy, Jonah Guo,Queen's MBA
 
The bp oil spill
The bp oil spillThe bp oil spill
The bp oil spill
 
CaseStudyFinalReport.docx
CaseStudyFinalReport.docxCaseStudyFinalReport.docx
CaseStudyFinalReport.docx
 
Deep Water Horizon Accident Investigation Lessons Learned
Deep Water Horizon Accident Investigation Lessons LearnedDeep Water Horizon Accident Investigation Lessons Learned
Deep Water Horizon Accident Investigation Lessons Learned
 
Piper alpha disaster 1988
Piper alpha disaster 1988Piper alpha disaster 1988
Piper alpha disaster 1988
 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: A Study of Behavioural Decision Making
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: A Study of Behavioural Decision MakingDeepwater Horizon Oil Spill: A Study of Behavioural Decision Making
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: A Study of Behavioural Decision Making
 
Deepwater horizon accident_investigation_static_presentation
Deepwater horizon accident_investigation_static_presentationDeepwater horizon accident_investigation_static_presentation
Deepwater horizon accident_investigation_static_presentation
 
Deepwater horizon
Deepwater horizonDeepwater horizon
Deepwater horizon
 
Ongc mumbai high accident
Ongc mumbai high accidentOngc mumbai high accident
Ongc mumbai high accident
 
BP Company Case Study
BP Company Case StudyBP Company Case Study
BP Company Case Study
 
Petronas drilling operations guideline
Petronas drilling operations guidelinePetronas drilling operations guideline
Petronas drilling operations guideline
 
Bermuda triangle
Bermuda triangle   Bermuda triangle
Bermuda triangle
 
Oil spill program black rev3 06 29-2010 md_klein
Oil spill program   black rev3 06 29-2010 md_kleinOil spill program   black rev3 06 29-2010 md_klein
Oil spill program black rev3 06 29-2010 md_klein
 
Exxon Valdez
Exxon ValdezExxon Valdez
Exxon Valdez
 

Viewers also liked

The BP oil spill
The BP oil spill The BP oil spill
The BP oil spill
Celinehuor
 
Operational Discipline - Deepwater Horizon Case Study
Operational Discipline - Deepwater Horizon Case StudyOperational Discipline - Deepwater Horizon Case Study
Operational Discipline - Deepwater Horizon Case Study
Wilson Perumal and Company
 
Bp powerpoint
Bp powerpoint Bp powerpoint
Bp powerpoint
maxless21
 
anadarko petroleum 1Q08 Operations Report
anadarko petroleum 1Q08 Operations Reportanadarko petroleum 1Q08 Operations Report
anadarko petroleum 1Q08 Operations Report
finance16
 
Mexico, Venezuela And Brazil
Mexico, Venezuela And BrazilMexico, Venezuela And Brazil
Mexico, Venezuela And Brazil
HeatherP
 
Changes to federal offshore drilling regulation after Deepwater Horizon (Dec ...
Changes to federal offshore drilling regulation after Deepwater Horizon (Dec ...Changes to federal offshore drilling regulation after Deepwater Horizon (Dec ...
Changes to federal offshore drilling regulation after Deepwater Horizon (Dec ...
Brad Keithley
 
Clean Water Act, Oil Spills Comparison Animated
Clean Water Act, Oil Spills Comparison AnimatedClean Water Act, Oil Spills Comparison Animated
Clean Water Act, Oil Spills Comparison Animated
Afonte4
 

Viewers also liked (17)

BP's Deepwater Oil Spill Case Study Analysis - Business Ethics
BP's Deepwater Oil Spill Case Study Analysis - Business EthicsBP's Deepwater Oil Spill Case Study Analysis - Business Ethics
BP's Deepwater Oil Spill Case Study Analysis - Business Ethics
 
Oil spills
Oil spillsOil spills
Oil spills
 
Macondo Feedback Event
Macondo Feedback EventMacondo Feedback Event
Macondo Feedback Event
 
The BP oil spill
The BP oil spill The BP oil spill
The BP oil spill
 
BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill April 20,2010
BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill April 20,2010BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill April 20,2010
BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill April 20,2010
 
Operational Discipline - Deepwater Horizon Case Study
Operational Discipline - Deepwater Horizon Case StudyOperational Discipline - Deepwater Horizon Case Study
Operational Discipline - Deepwater Horizon Case Study
 
Bp powerpoint
Bp powerpoint Bp powerpoint
Bp powerpoint
 
Oil spill final presentation.
Oil spill final presentation.Oil spill final presentation.
Oil spill final presentation.
 
Deepwater horizon revisited investigative insights
Deepwater horizon revisited   investigative insightsDeepwater horizon revisited   investigative insights
Deepwater horizon revisited investigative insights
 
Latest Trends in Oil/Gas Claims
Latest Trends in Oil/Gas ClaimsLatest Trends in Oil/Gas Claims
Latest Trends in Oil/Gas Claims
 
anadarko petroleum 1Q08 Operations Report
anadarko petroleum 1Q08 Operations Reportanadarko petroleum 1Q08 Operations Report
anadarko petroleum 1Q08 Operations Report
 
Mexico, Venezuela And Brazil
Mexico, Venezuela And BrazilMexico, Venezuela And Brazil
Mexico, Venezuela And Brazil
 
DAVOS GRF5 TSIG DEEPWATER HORIZON
DAVOS GRF5 TSIG DEEPWATER HORIZONDAVOS GRF5 TSIG DEEPWATER HORIZON
DAVOS GRF5 TSIG DEEPWATER HORIZON
 
Changes to federal offshore drilling regulation after Deepwater Horizon (Dec ...
Changes to federal offshore drilling regulation after Deepwater Horizon (Dec ...Changes to federal offshore drilling regulation after Deepwater Horizon (Dec ...
Changes to federal offshore drilling regulation after Deepwater Horizon (Dec ...
 
Deepwater horizon
Deepwater horizonDeepwater horizon
Deepwater horizon
 
Understanding the New BP Deepwater Horizon Settlement
Understanding the New BP Deepwater Horizon SettlementUnderstanding the New BP Deepwater Horizon Settlement
Understanding the New BP Deepwater Horizon Settlement
 
Clean Water Act, Oil Spills Comparison Animated
Clean Water Act, Oil Spills Comparison AnimatedClean Water Act, Oil Spills Comparison Animated
Clean Water Act, Oil Spills Comparison Animated
 

Similar to BP-Deepwater horizon-Macondo-Gulf Of Mexico Oil Spill

Brian Charles Hoskins
Brian Charles HoskinsBrian Charles Hoskins
Brian Charles Hoskins
Brian Hoskins
 
A quality management system is only as effective as management’s ded.docx
A quality management system is only as effective as management’s ded.docxA quality management system is only as effective as management’s ded.docx
A quality management system is only as effective as management’s ded.docx
JospehStull43
 
Bakken Artificial Lift & Production Optimization Congress 2014
Bakken Artificial Lift & Production Optimization Congress 2014 Bakken Artificial Lift & Production Optimization Congress 2014
Bakken Artificial Lift & Production Optimization Congress 2014
marketinglbcg
 
DEPLETED OIL FIELDS - Regeneration with Water_Shutoff - EUCO Group
DEPLETED OIL FIELDS - Regeneration with Water_Shutoff - EUCO GroupDEPLETED OIL FIELDS - Regeneration with Water_Shutoff - EUCO Group
DEPLETED OIL FIELDS - Regeneration with Water_Shutoff - EUCO Group
Boris Svasta
 
Depleted oil fields regeneration with water shutoff - euco group
Depleted oil fields   regeneration with water shutoff - euco groupDepleted oil fields   regeneration with water shutoff - euco group
Depleted oil fields regeneration with water shutoff - euco group
Boris Svasta
 
BOE+Brochure+-+Rotajet+150326
BOE+Brochure+-+Rotajet+150326BOE+Brochure+-+Rotajet+150326
BOE+Brochure+-+Rotajet+150326
Danny Flett
 
SPE171748 Surface Safety System for ZADCO (4).pdf
SPE171748 Surface Safety System for ZADCO (4).pdfSPE171748 Surface Safety System for ZADCO (4).pdf
SPE171748 Surface Safety System for ZADCO (4).pdf
Jalal Neshat
 
Deepwater horizon unfolded
Deepwater horizon unfoldedDeepwater horizon unfolded
Deepwater horizon unfolded
Pratap Chandra
 

Similar to BP-Deepwater horizon-Macondo-Gulf Of Mexico Oil Spill (20)

Lessons Learnt from Root Cause Analysis of Gulf.pptx
Lessons Learnt from Root Cause Analysis of Gulf.pptxLessons Learnt from Root Cause Analysis of Gulf.pptx
Lessons Learnt from Root Cause Analysis of Gulf.pptx
 
Eegr400 group project
Eegr400 group projectEegr400 group project
Eegr400 group project
 
Alliance Internship Great Lakes Poster
Alliance Internship Great Lakes PosterAlliance Internship Great Lakes Poster
Alliance Internship Great Lakes Poster
 
Brian Charles Hoskins
Brian Charles HoskinsBrian Charles Hoskins
Brian Charles Hoskins
 
COMPL OF WORKS1
COMPL OF WORKS1COMPL OF WORKS1
COMPL OF WORKS1
 
A quality management system is only as effective as management’s ded.docx
A quality management system is only as effective as management’s ded.docxA quality management system is only as effective as management’s ded.docx
A quality management system is only as effective as management’s ded.docx
 
Bakken Artificial Lift & Production Optimization Congress 2014
Bakken Artificial Lift & Production Optimization Congress 2014 Bakken Artificial Lift & Production Optimization Congress 2014
Bakken Artificial Lift & Production Optimization Congress 2014
 
France bp oilspill final
France   bp oilspill finalFrance   bp oilspill final
France bp oilspill final
 
Deepwater horizon 2010
Deepwater horizon 2010Deepwater horizon 2010
Deepwater horizon 2010
 
Latest Trends in Oil/Gas Claims
Latest Trends in Oil/Gas ClaimsLatest Trends in Oil/Gas Claims
Latest Trends in Oil/Gas Claims
 
Dallas madson resume2
Dallas madson resume2Dallas madson resume2
Dallas madson resume2
 
DEPLETED OIL FIELDS - Regeneration with Water_Shutoff - EUCO Group
DEPLETED OIL FIELDS - Regeneration with Water_Shutoff - EUCO GroupDEPLETED OIL FIELDS - Regeneration with Water_Shutoff - EUCO Group
DEPLETED OIL FIELDS - Regeneration with Water_Shutoff - EUCO Group
 
Depleted oil fields regeneration with water shutoff - euco group
Depleted oil fields   regeneration with water shutoff - euco groupDepleted oil fields   regeneration with water shutoff - euco group
Depleted oil fields regeneration with water shutoff - euco group
 
First use of cesium formate LSOBM as well perforating fluid (2002)
First use of cesium formate LSOBM as well perforating fluid (2002) First use of cesium formate LSOBM as well perforating fluid (2002)
First use of cesium formate LSOBM as well perforating fluid (2002)
 
Site Report
Site ReportSite Report
Site Report
 
Spe 130376 Slides
Spe 130376 SlidesSpe 130376 Slides
Spe 130376 Slides
 
BOE+Brochure+-+Rotajet+150326
BOE+Brochure+-+Rotajet+150326BOE+Brochure+-+Rotajet+150326
BOE+Brochure+-+Rotajet+150326
 
SPE171748 Surface Safety System for ZADCO (4).pdf
SPE171748 Surface Safety System for ZADCO (4).pdfSPE171748 Surface Safety System for ZADCO (4).pdf
SPE171748 Surface Safety System for ZADCO (4).pdf
 
Corrocoat USA Lowers Costs and Increases Reliability at Chemical Plant
Corrocoat USA Lowers Costs and Increases Reliability at Chemical PlantCorrocoat USA Lowers Costs and Increases Reliability at Chemical Plant
Corrocoat USA Lowers Costs and Increases Reliability at Chemical Plant
 
Deepwater horizon unfolded
Deepwater horizon unfoldedDeepwater horizon unfolded
Deepwater horizon unfolded
 

Recently uploaded

1_Introduction + EAM Vocabulary + how to navigate in EAM.pdf
1_Introduction + EAM Vocabulary + how to navigate in EAM.pdf1_Introduction + EAM Vocabulary + how to navigate in EAM.pdf
1_Introduction + EAM Vocabulary + how to navigate in EAM.pdf
AldoGarca30
 
Kuwait City MTP kit ((+919101817206)) Buy Abortion Pills Kuwait
Kuwait City MTP kit ((+919101817206)) Buy Abortion Pills KuwaitKuwait City MTP kit ((+919101817206)) Buy Abortion Pills Kuwait
Kuwait City MTP kit ((+919101817206)) Buy Abortion Pills Kuwait
jaanualu31
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Double Revolving field theory-how the rotor develops torque
Double Revolving field theory-how the rotor develops torqueDouble Revolving field theory-how the rotor develops torque
Double Revolving field theory-how the rotor develops torque
 
Hostel management system project report..pdf
Hostel management system project report..pdfHostel management system project report..pdf
Hostel management system project report..pdf
 
COST-EFFETIVE and Energy Efficient BUILDINGS ptx
COST-EFFETIVE  and Energy Efficient BUILDINGS ptxCOST-EFFETIVE  and Energy Efficient BUILDINGS ptx
COST-EFFETIVE and Energy Efficient BUILDINGS ptx
 
Online food ordering system project report.pdf
Online food ordering system project report.pdfOnline food ordering system project report.pdf
Online food ordering system project report.pdf
 
Employee leave management system project.
Employee leave management system project.Employee leave management system project.
Employee leave management system project.
 
HAND TOOLS USED AT ELECTRONICS WORK PRESENTED BY KOUSTAV SARKAR
HAND TOOLS USED AT ELECTRONICS WORK PRESENTED BY KOUSTAV SARKARHAND TOOLS USED AT ELECTRONICS WORK PRESENTED BY KOUSTAV SARKAR
HAND TOOLS USED AT ELECTRONICS WORK PRESENTED BY KOUSTAV SARKAR
 
1_Introduction + EAM Vocabulary + how to navigate in EAM.pdf
1_Introduction + EAM Vocabulary + how to navigate in EAM.pdf1_Introduction + EAM Vocabulary + how to navigate in EAM.pdf
1_Introduction + EAM Vocabulary + how to navigate in EAM.pdf
 
Thermal Engineering Unit - I & II . ppt
Thermal Engineering  Unit - I & II . pptThermal Engineering  Unit - I & II . ppt
Thermal Engineering Unit - I & II . ppt
 
AIRCANVAS[1].pdf mini project for btech students
AIRCANVAS[1].pdf mini project for btech studentsAIRCANVAS[1].pdf mini project for btech students
AIRCANVAS[1].pdf mini project for btech students
 
Thermal Engineering -unit - III & IV.ppt
Thermal Engineering -unit - III & IV.pptThermal Engineering -unit - III & IV.ppt
Thermal Engineering -unit - III & IV.ppt
 
Unit 4_Part 1 CSE2001 Exception Handling and Function Template and Class Temp...
Unit 4_Part 1 CSE2001 Exception Handling and Function Template and Class Temp...Unit 4_Part 1 CSE2001 Exception Handling and Function Template and Class Temp...
Unit 4_Part 1 CSE2001 Exception Handling and Function Template and Class Temp...
 
NO1 Top No1 Amil Baba In Azad Kashmir, Kashmir Black Magic Specialist Expert ...
NO1 Top No1 Amil Baba In Azad Kashmir, Kashmir Black Magic Specialist Expert ...NO1 Top No1 Amil Baba In Azad Kashmir, Kashmir Black Magic Specialist Expert ...
NO1 Top No1 Amil Baba In Azad Kashmir, Kashmir Black Magic Specialist Expert ...
 
Kuwait City MTP kit ((+919101817206)) Buy Abortion Pills Kuwait
Kuwait City MTP kit ((+919101817206)) Buy Abortion Pills KuwaitKuwait City MTP kit ((+919101817206)) Buy Abortion Pills Kuwait
Kuwait City MTP kit ((+919101817206)) Buy Abortion Pills Kuwait
 
Thermal Engineering-R & A / C - unit - V
Thermal Engineering-R & A / C - unit - VThermal Engineering-R & A / C - unit - V
Thermal Engineering-R & A / C - unit - V
 
Generative AI or GenAI technology based PPT
Generative AI or GenAI technology based PPTGenerative AI or GenAI technology based PPT
Generative AI or GenAI technology based PPT
 
Computer Networks Basics of Network Devices
Computer Networks  Basics of Network DevicesComputer Networks  Basics of Network Devices
Computer Networks Basics of Network Devices
 
Introduction to Serverless with AWS Lambda
Introduction to Serverless with AWS LambdaIntroduction to Serverless with AWS Lambda
Introduction to Serverless with AWS Lambda
 
FEA Based Level 3 Assessment of Deformed Tanks with Fluid Induced Loads
FEA Based Level 3 Assessment of Deformed Tanks with Fluid Induced LoadsFEA Based Level 3 Assessment of Deformed Tanks with Fluid Induced Loads
FEA Based Level 3 Assessment of Deformed Tanks with Fluid Induced Loads
 
Computer Lecture 01.pptxIntroduction to Computers
Computer Lecture 01.pptxIntroduction to ComputersComputer Lecture 01.pptxIntroduction to Computers
Computer Lecture 01.pptxIntroduction to Computers
 
A CASE STUDY ON CERAMIC INDUSTRY OF BANGLADESH.pptx
A CASE STUDY ON CERAMIC INDUSTRY OF BANGLADESH.pptxA CASE STUDY ON CERAMIC INDUSTRY OF BANGLADESH.pptx
A CASE STUDY ON CERAMIC INDUSTRY OF BANGLADESH.pptx
 

BP-Deepwater horizon-Macondo-Gulf Of Mexico Oil Spill

  • 1. oil spill Presented By Dhanish Ahsen What went wrong?
  • 2. Deepwater Horizon Rig operator Cementing ContractorPrincipal Developer Macondo Prospect Largest accidental marine oil spill Accused for weaknesses in cement design and testing, quality assurance and risk assessment. Nitrogen based cement used was blamed Accused for failure of BOP and incorrect evaluation of negative pressure test results Accused for Cost Savings, poor safety operations , well design and decisions regarding testing procedures
  • 4. 210mn Gallons of Crude Oil 11Killed 17Injured 20 April – 15 July 2010 87Days 5600m Deep Well 1600m Deep Water
  • 5. The Deepwater Horizon Semi-submersible, mobile, floating, dynamically positioned drilling rig 9year Old 3000m Deep Water Operation Manufacturer OwnerLessee March ‘08-September ‘13 Upto 57 ft. Tall 400tons Weight
  • 6. Manufacturer Lessee Owner Blow out preventer • BOP failed to activate • Didn't test the blowout preventer's individual safety systems. • BOP was powered by a battery (Found to be dead one)
  • 7. 8:45 pm CDT- Unexpected burst of pressure from the reservoir (kick) 9:45 pm CDT- High-pressure methane gas from the well expanded into the drilling riser and rose into the drilling rig 9:56 pm CDT- where it ignited and exploded, engulfing the platform What went wrong?
  • 8. What went wrong? • Blind shear rams failed to fully close and seal due to a portion of drill pipe buckling between the shearing blocks. • Defective cement job • failure to run a cement bond log test • BOP had a hydraulic leak and a failed battery, and therefore failed • Installed just one third centralizers • Faulty wiring in two places, a dead battery and a bent pipe in the hulking device
  • 9. Failed safety systems and irresponsible behavior of contractors had led to the explosion, including claims that Halliburton failed to properly use modeling software to analyze safe drilling conditions “ ” BP blames contractors
  • 10. • BP opted for a single long run of pipe rather than an alternative approach that would have increased the barriers to gas flow. • BP failed to conduct a "cement bond log" test to evaluate the integrity of the cement at the bottom of the well, which was what blocked gas and oil from emerging up the production pipe. • BP installed fewer than one-third of the recommended number of centralizer devices, which Transocean said had the effect of "dramatically increasing the risk of cement channeling and gas flow." “ Contractors blames BP
  • 11. Word War BP spokesman Geoff Morrell said all of the evidence "demonstrates that Transocean owned the rig's blowout preventer and was responsible for its maintenance". Transocean spokesman Brian Kennedy said the CSB report confirms the blowout preventer had been tested properly and had activated during the accident, “but was unable to seal the well because immense pressure buckled the drill pipe and prevented the blind shear ram from functioning as designed.” “ ”
  • 12. Conclusion A complex and interlinked series of mechanical failures, human judgments, engineering design, operational implementation and team interfaces BP is ultimately responsible for the spill, and that Halliburton and Transocean share some of the blame. "a rush to completion" Time & Money

Editor's Notes

  1. BP was the operator and principal developer of the Macondo Prospect with a 65% share, while 25% was owned by Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, and 10% by MOEX Offshore 2007, a unit of Mitsui.
  2. Cameron agreed to pay a $250 million settlement to BP PLC to settle all claims related to the Deepwater Horizon without admitting responsibility
  3. At the same time,Transocean has attempted to limit its liability to just $27 million, citing a 159-year-old U.S. maritime law. This move caused a firestorm of new criticism. a lawyer acting for injured rig workers said: 'Transocean has accepted more than $430 million in insurance proceeds related to the deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill, but has asked a Houston federal court to limit its liability to only $27 million ... This is a despicable action