Events is Crimea should serve as a warning about what could easily happen in the South China Sea. Russia & China will always focus on "national security"

1. Influence of South China Sea and Crimea on
“One Belt, One Road” (OBOR)
&
the US/Australia response
Lecture at
Beijing International Studies University
14 March, 2016
By
Jeff Schubert
Head/Director
"International Centre for Eurasian Research"
School of Public Policy, RANEPA, Moscow
www.shanghai-ifc.org
www.russianeconomicreform.ru
www.jeffschubert.com

2. Introduction (1)
The basic causes of Russia actions in Crimea and China’s actions in the South
China Sea are very similar:
• national security!
• US is seen as big threat
“Pivots” are now fashionable:
• the US military has been trying to do a “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region
away from Middle-East
• Russia is doing a “pivot” to the East away from Europe
• China’s “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative has aspects of a “pivot” in
a western direction
The “pivots” are driven by economic and national security concerns:
• but, the main driver of US “pivot” is desire to remain top-dog

3. Introduction (2)
Much discussion about China’s island building activity in the South China
Sea has referred to the “Thucydides Trap” and the possibility of conflict with
the US:
• while not exactly the same, the recent activities of Russia in Crimea (and
Eastern Ukraine) have many similarities to such a “Thucydides Trap” in
relation to NATO
• (Note: There are significant differences between Russian action in Crimea
and Syria)
Australia (following US actions) could find itself in military conflict with
China if the recommendations of its “security establishment” dominate
thinking in Australia:
• security concerns nearly always seem to trump economic issues (in any
country)

4. Thucydides Trap (1)
This refers to events about 2,500 years ago when the Peloponnesian
War occurred and was written about by a Greek named Thucydides:
• basic story is that the growing power of as Athens caused great
concern to Sparta which had for some time been the most powerful
state – and the end result was devastating war!
Rivalry between Germany and Britain in the lead up to the First
World War is another case often cited
The essential idea of the “Thucydides Trap” is:
• that a rising power (in terms of GDP and military capacity) will
always want more influence over the world around it, while the
existing dominant power will resent this and seek to prevent it
happening

5. Thucydides Trap (2)
Graham Allison at the Harvard Belfer Center has examined 16 cases of
“ruling” and “rising” powers over the last 500 years and says that in 12
cases “the result was war”
Allison wrote in regard to the US and China:
• what strategists need most at the moment is not a new strategy, but a
long pause for reflection.
• if the tectonic shift caused by China’s rise poses a challenge of genuinely
Thucydidean proportions, declarations about “rebalancing,” or revitalizing
“engage and hedge,” amount to little more than aspirin treating cancer
• future historians will compare such assertions to the reveries of British,
German, and Russian leaders as they sleepwalked into 1914
• managing this relationship without war will demand sustained attention,
week by week, at the highest level in both countries

6. General Attitudes to China (1)
Stephen Hadley, former US National Security Adviser has recently written
that conflict between China and the US might not occur because:
• there are no conflicting territorial claims; US has not tried to prevent
China’s emergence; and there was US support for China’s diplomatic entry
on to the world stage
• several factors in US-China relations are more prominent than between
major powers in the past: interdependent in trade, economically and
financially gives them an incentive to resolve disputes without the resort
to military conflict
• the biggest reason to be cautiously optimistic that these two countries can
break the traditional pattern is because it is in their interests to do so
But then Hadley adds:
• but to reach this new model, China must reconcile itself to a continued
active US role in the Asia-Pacific
• US military presence in Asia has been a stabilising force, reassuring China’s
neighbours that they need not feel threatened by China’s rising economic
and military power

7. General Attitudes to China (2)
Australia academics, Michael Heazle and Andrew O’Neil, call it “hubris”
that China might want to change things:
• “no regional economy has benefited more from the Asia-Pacific’s
liberal, rules-based order, made possible by US primacy, than China.
But in an odd and hubristic twist, Beijing now seems keen to risk the
stability of the status quo with its increasingly assertive behaviour in
the South China Sea.”
John Lee (Australian academic) and Paul Dibb (ex-Australian defence
official) say concessions should not be made to China because:
• China may soon be approaching the zenith of its power as its
economy encounters serious structural impediments and demographic
barriers to growth. Worsening domestic problems will take up an
increasing share of economic resources and national wealth. China’s
leadership will struggle to keep a lid on growing popular discontent
• planning for an era of Chinese dominance in the region—or even its
emergence as an American strategic peer in Asia—would be premature

8. Crimea / Russia (1)
While Russia is not a “rising” power is the way that Allison would define it,
Russia has recovered a considerable amount of the power (particularly
military) that it lost in the years following the collapse of the USSR:
• despite the more recent economic difficulties (mostly associated with the
collapse in oil prices), many Russians (particularly in the ruling power elite)
now see Russia as a “rising” power
• Russia’s policies are based on long-standing threat perceptions, historical
grievances, and more recent humiliations (eg collapse of USSR etc)
• Putin is a Russian nationalist who wants to restore the greatness of Russia
after what he sees as humiliation under some of his predecessors
Now think about China !!
“rising power”; “historical grievances” and “humiliations”; “nationalist”
leadership

9. Crimea / Russia (2)
1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, signed by the US, UK, and
Russia:
• provided guarantees on Ukrainian territorial integrity in exchange for Ukraine
relinquishing its nuclear arsenal
There are conflicting claims on whether assurances were ever given to Russia
that NATO would not expand, but many in Russia believe that this was the case:
• this had important implication for Russia because it had proved easy for
Napoleon and Hitler to cross the flat land area to Russia’s west
• Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1999, and Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004
• at its 2008 summit, NATO considered admitting Georgia and Ukraine and
issued a statement declaring, “These countries will become members of
NATO.”
In 2008, the EU unveiled its Eastern Partnership economic initiative:
• many Russian policy makers regarded this as a indirect step to further NATO
expansion, with the inclusion of Ukraine

10. Crimea / Russia (3)
The Maidan Square protests in Kiev in early 2014 eventually led to President
Yanukovych fleeing Ukraine
Ukrainian parliament took various steps that demonstrated strong anti-
Russian sentiment:
• first it alarmed many Russian-speaking Ukrainians by seeking to repeal the
2012 language law allowing Ukrainian regions to make Russian a second
official language
• then, the parliament secretariat registered draft legislation which would
have reinstated the goal of joining NATO as Ukrainian national strategy
Ukraine is significant to Russia, but Crimea is critical:
• Sevastopol and is home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. The warm water port,
natural harbour and existing infrastructure make it one of Russia’s most
important naval bases

11. Crimea / Russia (4)
Moscow feared that the 2010 Kharkiv Agreements, which had extended the
Russian Navy’s lease of Sevastopol as a base for 25 years:
• in March 2014, three former Ukrainian Presidents called on the new
government to renounce the Kharkiv Agreements
Putin said:
• “We have already heard declarations from Kiev about Ukraine soon joining
NATO. What would this have meant for Crimea and Sevastopol in the
future? It would have meant that NATO’s navy would be right there in this
city of Russia’s military glory, and this would create not an illusory but a
perfectly real threat to the whole of southern Russia.”
Sir Tony Brenton (former UK ambassador to Russia) later said the
“securocrats” around Putin were:
• “intensely focused on Russian security to the exclusion, probably to the
disadvantage in the long term, of developing relations in other ways with
the West”

12. Security in South China Sea for China
China will have security fears about the South China Sea (and the US military “pivot”
to Asia) that are similar to Russian fears about Crimea (and NATO expansion):
Paul Dibb (ex-Australian Defence official):
• historically, land powers such as Russia (and the ex-USSR) and Germany have
repeatedly failed to secure maritime power. The best maritime strategy for a
continental power such as China is what is called access-denial capability to its
maritime approaches, which is precisely what China is undertaking.
• and like the former Soviet Union, China has limited geographical access to open
seas, which can easily be constrained by superior Western detection and tracking
capabilities
Bates Gill (Australian academic):
• “China’s geo-strategic position is not particularly advantageous. Not only due to
the fact that four of its closest neighbors South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and
Thailand, are US treaty allies, but also because its sea-borne import and export
routes are vulnerable to attack or disruption”. China has territorial disputes with
the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei

13. Comparisons of Crimea and South China Sea
Summary (1)
Russia has a long history of being invaded from the western side (Hitler and
Napoleon):
• China has its own history of being invaded and / or bullied by foreign
powers
Geography means that Sevastopol is really the only possible home port for
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and it could not be allowed to fall into the hands of
NATO:
• South China Sea is strategically critical for China
Most of Russia smaller and less powerful neighbors are afraid of it, and
those that are not would like to be part of NATO and this reinforced Russia’s
fears:
• most of China’s smaller and less powerful neighbors are afraid of it, and
seek closer military relations with the US; and to the extent that this
occurs (plus the so-called US pivot to the Asia-Pacific), it will reinforce
China’s fears

14. Comparisons of Crimea and South China Sea
Summary (2)
As Russia’s power recovered (after the terrible 1990s) its leaders did not feel
that it was getting due respect:
• Chinese leaders do not feel that China is getting the respect due to it (for
example, in international financial institutions)
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine arose in spite of close economic
ties, although the economic consequences will have been worse than
expected
• effect of China’s economic ties for South China Sea ??
A 2015 UK House of Lords report concluded that the EU “sleepwalked” into
the Crimea crisis, partly because it “had not taken into account the
exceptional nature of Ukraine and its unique position in the shared
neighborhood”:
• is there an element of “sleepwalking” in the US expecting China to accept
all of the present order ??

15. Russia’s East “Pivot”
Russia has a natural orientation toward the “West”:
• most of population is in western Russia
• most of its history/culture is with “West”
Crimea (and Ukraine) have forced Russian to look to the “East” (especially
China):
• energy exports
• financing
• international political support
Results have been disappointing for Russia:
• China thinks that Russia needs China, more than China needs Russia
• Russian aspect of “OBOR” is not most important part of “OBOR” for China

16. “One Belt, One Road”
China’s reasons for “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR):
• develop western regions of China
• secure trade routes for energy imports
• provide markets for China’s infrastructure building
companies (eg rail) and other products
• secure China’s western “flank”, particularly because of
South China Sea national security issues on eastern “flank”
• China be seen as a “leader” on world issues

17. The future of Russian eastern “pivot” and China’s
“One Belt, One Road”
Russia and China as east-west partners?
In short/medium term they will be very good partners:
• they are useful to each other
• both are some difficult relations with US
Longer term conflicts may arise:
• countries of Central Asia (eg Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan) were in former-USSR and Russia not
want to give up political or economic influence
• China want increased economic (and eventual political) influence
over Central Asia and countries on OBOR

18. Australian (US) Views on South China Sea
Security Establishment “Concerns / Attitudes” (1)
Alan Dupont (Australian academic):
• Australia’s defence strategy has been based on two premises: it does not
have the population or resources to defend itself against a major security
threat on our own. So it makes strategic sense to align itself with a great-
power protector, preferably one that shares its values and interests
• Its chosen protectors — Britain and the US — shared not only its values
and most of its interests, but (by and large) they were able to keep the
regional peace because they were the preponderant military powers
except for the decade of Japanese expansionism that ended in 1945
John Lee (Australian academic) and Paul Dibb (Australian ex-Defence
official):
• it is in Australia's crucial strategic interests for Southeast Asia to avoid
being dominated by China geopolitically or becoming a Chinese security
domain
• Southeast Asia forms a strategic shield to Australia's vulnerable northern
approaches

19. Australian (US) Views on South China Sea
Security Establishment “Concerns / Attitudes” (2)
In 2014, ten Chinese soldiers together with 10 American and 10 Australian soldiers
took part in an Australian survival exercise “learning from indigenous people how to
find food, water and shelter in the outback (ie desert)”.
This tiny bit of military co-operation with little relevance to strategic issues became
an excuse for excessive (even desperate) claims aimed at bolstering the Australia-US
alliance:
• Dennis Richardson (Secretary of Australian Defence Department, and former
Secretary of Foreign Affairs) said the exercise gave the lie to claims that Australia
could not be close friends with both China and the US
• Rory Medcalf (Australian academic and member of the panel which wrote
Australia’s recent Defence White Paper) said the exercise challenged the
“simplistic” notion that the closer Australia got to its US ally, or indeed to Japan,
the more strained and mistrustful its relationship would become with China. “It
also undercuts the nonsensical view, that the alliance diminishes Australia’s
chances of doing constructive things with Asian partners.”

20. Australian (US) Views on South China Sea
Security Establishment “Recommendations” (1)
John Lee (Australian academic) and Paul Dibb (Australian ex-Defence official):
• US should not move to one side in Asia to make strategic space for China
• Australia should develop the military forces necessary to contribute to any US-
Allied conflict in the region, or where Australia needs to help resist Chinese
military adventurism
• Australia could make a contribution by having the capability to blockade the
straits of Southeast Asia in the event of a serious war in Northeast Asia involving
the United States
• Australia needs to place high priority on strengthening its defence relations with
Southeast Asian countries
Peter Jennings (Australian Strategic Policy Institute and ex-Defence official, and chair
of panel which wrote the recent Defence White Paper):
• critically important for US allies, including Australia, to support the Americans and
Australia’s other allies in the region by sending military units

21. Australian (US) Views on South China Sea
Security Establishment “Recommendations” (2)
Ben Schreer (Australian academic) and Tim Huxley (International Institute
for Strategic Studies):
• participating in joint regional patrols would send signal to China
• Australia should also support the Philippines in its arbitration case against
China and encourage ASEAN to take a united position against China’s
bullying
• signal to China that much closer strategic relations with Japan are on the
cards as well
Ben Schreer and Tim Huxley:
• Australia should signal to China that it would even be prepared to accept
economic costs
• would require explaining to the Australian public why the preservation
of a rules-based order is of greater importance than economic trade with
China

22. Security vis-à-vis Business (1)
As we have seen, many in the Australian “defence / security establishment”
(securocrats) strongly advocate that their “recommendations” on security
take precedence over Australia’s economic and business interests:
• (their concept of) rules-based international order is of greater importance
than Australia’s economic relations with China
• Australia should support the US and other “allies” in the region by sending
military units to help them in a conflict with China
• Australia should have a navy (submarines) powerful enough to blockade
the straits of Southeast Asia in the event of a serious war in Northeast Asia
involving the United States (and China)
In my view, while some of their “concerns / attitudes” are justified, all three
of these “recommendations” are extremist!

23. Security vis-à-vis Business (2)
The great majority of Australian (and US) businesspeople (and officials
dealing with economic issues) will say little about this issue because:
• they will generally not be people who have read history books or have any
real grasp about such more contemporary issues as Russia/Crimea
• they will generally be people who are much more comfortable in dealing
with current events than about possibilities or probabilities to which
numbers cannot be attached
• many will feel that it is not the place of business to engage in such
debates, particularly if it may upset some customers or shareholders
• many will fear upsetting the Australian (or US) Government
Instead, business-people and economists they will “put their heads in the
sand” and hope that the issue goes away, ignoring the words of Leon
Trotsky:
• “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.”

24. Likely Australian Response to US-China conflict (1)
Australia (like the US) has never been “invaded”:
• this lack of experience with an invading power (such as experienced by
both Russia and China) makes to hard for most Australians (and
Americans) to appreciate the sensitivities of China (and Russia)
Hugh White (an Australian academic and ex-Defence official who generally
argues that the US must concede some space to China) commented on Prime
Minister Turnbull’s late 2015 visit to the US:
• from everything Turnbull wrote and said about the issue before he
became Prime Minister, one would have judged that he agrees with every
word that Graham Allison wrote about the Thucydides Trap
• but that is very far from the impression from what Turnbull said in
Washington
• there he only spoke of what China has to do to avoid the Thucydides Trap
Of course, Turnbull would not be the first leader to be persuaded (scared
into) by “securocrats” to adopt a flawed policy

25. Likely Australian Response to US-China conflict (2)
Australia’s new Defence White Paper, released on 25 February, says:
• the US 'will remain the pre-eminent global military power and will
continue to be Australia's most important strategic partner'
• ‘the levels of security and stability we seek in the Indo-Pacific would not
be achievable without the United States‘
• warns of 'challenges to the stability of the rules-based global order,
including competition between countries and major powers trying to
promote their interests outside of the established rules‘
• the term 'rules-based' is repeated 56 times
• 'future operations could include contributing to security in North Asia and
helping to protect the extensive sea lines of communication that support
Australian trade‘
• 'Australia is particularly concerned by the unprecedented pace and scale
of China's land reclamation activities'

26. Conclusion
President Xi Jinping, during his 2015 visit to the US, said that “there is no
such thing as the so-called Thucydides Trap. But should major countries
time and time again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they
might create such traps for themselves”:
• Xi is unlikely to have in mind any change in China’s strategically critical
South China Sea policies (ie what China has to do)
• Xi is really sending a warning to the US
So, the stage is set for eventual China-US conflict:
• it may be this year, or 5 years time, or even more!
• and, we do not know what circumstance will light the fuse!
Modern economic inter-dependence will be trumped by security concerns
on all sides
• Australia, to its own economic cost, would likely support the US