You are more than welcome to participate in this English-spoken event. You can sign up by replying your name, including the name of your institute/company, to angelika.gaupp@fli.bund.de, or by fax: +49/5141-3846-117. We wanted this seminar to be accessible for all, and for that reason, the participation fee is € 70 only. Unfortunately, the number of participants is limited, so in case you’re interested, please let us know and respond before August 31, 2015. After you signed up, you will receive your detailed payment instructions. This international - English-language based - seminar is open for animal welfare specialists, veterinary specialists, and emergency response experts. The event takes place on the premises of FLI; starts at 9 AM; and closes at 4 PM, after the general discussion. In case you need more information or any assistance, please contact me on: 0046 761 731 779 or by mail on harm.kie@gmail.com. You are very welcome to pass this invitation to all of your colleagues, who may also be interested in the seminar.

1. Transmission
risks
within
the
poultry
industry
By:
Harm
Kiezebrink,
Principal
consultant
Applied
Veterinary
Technologies
AB
Large-scale response leads to further spreading
During
depopulation
viruses
are
easily
transmitted
to
responders
who
are
tasked
for
taking
layers
out
of
their
cages,
transport
them
through
the
narrow
walkways
between
the
cages
to
a
disposal
container
placed
outside
of
the
house.
Although
humans
are
supposed
to
be
less
susceptible,
they
can
become
carrier
of
the
virus.
Only
the
highest
level
of
biosecurity
could
prevent
the
transmission
through
the
humans
and
materials
that
have
been
in
direct
contact
with
infected
animals
and
materials.
New statistics on the 2003 outbreak in Holland
Before
introduction
of
the
ban
on
conventional
battery
cages
in
the
EU
from
January
2012,
battery
cages
were
still
common
in
the
Netherlands.
An
evaluation
of
the
statistics
of
the
Dutch
outbreak
(in
total
1.134
culling
operations
-­‐
more
than
29
million
birds)
shows
that
79.2%
of
all
the
infected/suspected
farms
H7N7
was
reintroduced
were
labor-­‐intensive
layers/parent
stock
farms;
8,7
%
were
turkey
farms.
Compared
to
the
production
of
broilers,
the
layer
industry
is
much
more
labor
intensive.
Specialized
agricultural
service
providers
are
contracted
to
supply
the
workforce
for
tasks
like
egg
collection,
depopulation,
cleaning
&
disinfection,
vaccination
etc.
The
same
service
providers
are
contracted
to
supply
the
workforce
to
depopulate
the
farms
during
outbreak
situations.
Because
this
labor
force
contains
of
staff
that
is
partly
contracted
on
short-­‐term
basis
(for
instance
seasonal
workers),
it
is
almost
impossible
keep
track
of
where
the
staff
is
coming
from
or
where
it
will
be
working
in
the
future.
Even
when
all
farm
workers
are
officially
registered,
it
is
very
difficult
to
guarantee
that
the
workforce
in
teams
that
only
carry
out
normal
farm
work
and
teams
that
strictly
work
as
responders
on
infected
farms.
This
makes
the
layer-­‐
and
turkey
industry
vulnerable
for
labor
related
risks
of
79.2%
12.0%
8.7%
Type
of
farms
infected
during
the
H7N7
outbreak
in
Holland
Labor-­‐intensive
farms
(Layers/parent
stock)
Labor-­‐extensive
farms
(broiler/
breeders)
Turkey
farms

2. Transmission
risks
within
the
poultry
industry
By:
Harm
Kiezebrink,
Principal
consultant
Applied
Veterinary
Technologies
AB
transmission.
It
was
possibly
one
of
the
main
reasons
why
the
outbreak
in
Holland
in
2003
was
so
difficult
to
control.
Specific risks related to layer- and turkey farms
Managing
simple
response
tasks
might
look
simple,
but
these
get
extremely
complicated:
most
responders
are
untrained
and
insufficiently
prepared
to
carry
out
heavy
labor
in
narrow
houses,
under
stressful
circumstances,
and
wearing
uncomfortable
protective
clothing.
Breaches
of
biosecurity
during
outbreaks
are
belonging
therefore
to
the
most
likely
routes
of
transmission.
What
happened
to
the
industry
The
veterinary
authorities
in
Iowa
and
Minnesota
face
huge
managerial
and
logistical
challenges
when
faced
with
depopulation
and
biosecurity
protection
on
the
highest
level
at
the
same
time.
The
labor
intensity
of
response
activities
–
and
the
number
of
people
needed
to
depopulate
layer
farms
with
an
average
size
per
farm
of
almost
1
million
layers
(compared
to
an
average
21,500
layers
on
Dutch
layer
farms)
and
-­‐in
average-­‐
51,800
turkeys
per
farm
(compared
to
13,250
turkeys
on
Dutch
turkey
farms).
The
enormous
size
of
farms
will
make
it
almost
impossible
to
prevent
transmission
outside
the
infected
areas.
The
size
of
the
U.S.
farms
is
one
of
the
most
complicating
factors
to
bring
the
outbreak
under
control.
Similar
to
the
situation
of
the
Dutch
outbreak
specialized
poultry
workers
are
used
simultaneously
as
responders
during
outbreak
situations.
And
because
of
that,
farm
activities
on
non-­‐infected
farms
and
response
activities
on
suspected/infected
farms
need
to
be
strictly
separated.
This
in
itself
causes
massive
pressure
on
the
veterinary
authorities
to
deploy
sufficient
responders.
For
that
reason,
responders
are
brought
in
from
different
parts
of
the
country,
opening
up
the
transmission
routes
to
uninfected
areas
and
causing
introduction
of
viruses
into
uninfected
areas.
Acute responder shortages and criminal opportunities
A
study
published
in
The
Lancet
(2004)i
noted
an
unexpectedly
high
number
of
transmissions
of
avian
influenza
A
virus
subtype
H7N7
in
people
directly
involved
in
handling
infected
poultry
during
the
2003
outbreak
in
the
Netherlands.
This
provides
23%
68%
9%
Infected
farm
type
Chickens
Turkeys
Mixed
poultry
85%
15%
Infected
poultry
species
Chickens
Turkeys

3. Transmission
risks
within
the
poultry
industry
By:
Harm
Kiezebrink,
Principal
consultant
Applied
Veterinary
Technologies
AB
evidence
for
person-­‐to-­‐person
transmission
pathways.
Although
in
2003
the
Dutch
veterinary
authority
RVV
did
not
expect
that
the
risk
of
infection
of
responders
turned
out
to
be
50%,
it
created
a
directive
to
minimize
the
risks
that
the
virus
would
transmit
through
farm
workers
and
responders.
The
RVV
ruled
that
it
was
strictly
forbidden
for
farm
workers
and
responders
who
had
been
active
on
infected
farms
to
visit
and/or
work
on
non-­‐infected
farms
within
a
time
frame
of
72
hours.
Contractors
were
obliged
to
keep
a
strict
record
of
where
their
staff
has
been
working.
This
measure
complicated
the
task
of
finding
enough
staff
to
carry
out
response
activities.
RVV
took
a
bold
step
and
decided
to
deploy
asylum
seekers
through
a
specialized
agricultural
service
in
the
south
of
the
Netherlands
provider
because
of
the
urgency
and
the
acute
shortage
of
staff.
All
these
hundreds
of
asylum
seekers
were
subject
to
a
fake
registration
under
the
same
name
(F.
Vogelpest,
birdflu
in
Dutch),
born
on
April
14,
2003,
unmarried,
and
all
with
the
same
social
security
number
2494
88
039.
This
unfortunate
step
of
RVV
made
it
almost
impossible
to
reconstruct
the
transmission
route
through
this
group
of
responders.
These
emergency
responders
were
normaly
deployed
as
seasonal
laborers
to
harvest
asparagus.
With
the
support
of
a
local
tax
officer,
these
untrained
laborers
were
deployed
in
the
area
of
the
first
outbreak
in
the
center
of
the
Netherlands
to
collect
dead
chickens
after
stable
gassing.
One
month
later,
a
second
wave
of
outbreaks
took
place
in
the
direct
proximity
of
this
service
provider
in
the
south,
in
an
area
with
mainly
layer
farms
that
used
the
services
of
this
service
provider.
It
is
difficult
to
determine
where
his
fraudulent
activities
started
and
stopped,
so
it
is
also
difficult
to
find
out
what
the
role
his
staff
–
including
the
staff
he
normally
deployed
in
the
poultry
industry
in
the
southern
part
of
the
Netherlands
–
actually
was
in
terms
of
transmission
from
the
area
around
Barneveld
to
the
farms
in
the
southern
part
of
the
Netherlands
and
Belgium
(April
16,
2003
Meeuwen-­‐Gruitrode).
The
owner
of
the
service
provider
was
arrested
in
2003,
and
in
June
2007,
he
was
convicted
for
tempering
with
the
registration
of
responders
that
were
deployed
during
the
outbreak.
This
story
has
been
well
documented
in
the
Dutch
pressii
,
but
never
been
published
internationally.
Carcass disposal
A
similar
situation
is
occurring
within
the
U.S.
poultry
industry
at
this
moment,
but
even
on
a
larger
scale,
due
to
the
farming
infrastructure
and
the
staggering
numbers
of
birds
that
are
culled
-­‐
more
than
46
million/170
million
tons
of
carcasses
-­‐
and
need
to
be

4. Transmission
risks
within
the
poultry
industry
By:
Harm
Kiezebrink,
Principal
consultant
Applied
Veterinary
Technologies
AB
disposed
of.
In
an
article
published
in
Des
moines
Gazetteiii
Tom
Vilsack,
the
U.S.
secretary
of
agriculture
recently
stated
that
the
federal
government
is
addressing
the
outbreak
by
attempting
to
be
thorough,
safe
and
expedient,
but
that
process
was
slowed
by
a
lack
of
locations
to
dispose
of
the
destroyed
birds.
The
outbreak
in
the
U.S.
is
unprecedented
in
the
history
of
poultry
farming.
All
infected
birds
need
to
be
handled
at
the
farm,
transported
to
the
disposal
location
and
than
buried
or
incinerated.
Vilsack
pointed
out
that
the
disposal
process
has
been
holding
up
the
process
of
stamping
out.
He
said
the
government
has
reached
agreements
with
a
handful
of
landfills
and
incinerators,
so
he
hopes
disposal
will
begin
to
move
more
briskly.
He
said
finding
willing
partners
that
are
willing
to
dispose
the
carcasses
was
not
easy.
Some
facilities
expressed
willingness
to
take
destroyed
birds,
but
backed
off
after
hearing
concerns
from
neighbors.
i
Transmission
of
H7H7
avian
influenza
A
virus
to
human
beings
during
a
large
outbreak
in
commercial
poultry
farms
in
the
Netherlands,
published
in
the
Lancet
Volume
363,
February
21,
2004
ii
http://vorige.nrc.nl/binnenland/article1590983.ece
iii
http://thegazette.com/subject/news/business/vilsack-­‐help-­‐for-­‐bird-­‐flu-­‐on-­‐the-­‐way-­‐20150526