CEE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS
1. Ukraine’s strategic course in foreign policy towards all-round European and Euro-Atlantic
integration was launched in the mid-1990s when US dominance was not in doubt, the
European states retained their traditional loyalty to Washington, and Moscow was in an
effort to join the global West.
This course had to ensure internal transformations and support the enhancement of all social
fields. At the same time, the realization of these priorities did not foresee any unnecessary
conflicts. On the contrary, the issue was about the establishment of a common European
home as stipulated in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990).
2. One of the prerequisites for this course was Ukraine’s renunciation from the USSR nuclear
heritage – the third strategic arms arsenal in the world. The decision taken by Kyiv was
fixed in the Budapest Memorandum, signed by US, UK, RF and Ukrainian representatives
on December 5, 1994. This political and legal document certified independence, territorial
integrity as well as proclaimed the refusal of the signing states from power politics, in
particular, economic pressure towards Ukraine. The Budapest Memorandum stipulated a
consultancy mechanism in case of threats against Ukrainian security. France and China
made similar statements.
3. During 1995-2008, Ukraine succeeded in achieving significant foreign policy progress. In
particular, in 1994 an agreement between Ukraine and the EU was signed, and in 1997 the
Ukraine-NATO Charter on a Distinctive Partnership was drawn. After the Orange
Revolution, state authorities tried to use the positive concourse of circumstances to intensify
diplomatic steps in the European and Euro-Atlantic direction. In 2008, Ukraine’s right for
membership in the Alliance was certified by NATO at the Bucharest Summit. Ukraine’s
long-awaited accession to the WTO happened that year as well. Negotiations on the EU-
Ukraine Association providing for the establishment of open trade have started and been
actively developed.
4. However, since the second half of the last century, realization of Ukraine’s strategic foreign
policy and, above all, its Euro-Atlantic security component has been complicated, as
opposition from the RF side has been gradually growing. At the same time, Ukraine’s social
growth during President Yushchenko’s cadence led to the critical weakening of public
institutions and a decrease in their ability to implement the state strategy.

5. In late 2008, progress towards NATO actually slowed down, and numerous public events
and statements not only failed to strengthen Ukrainian security assurances, but also
worsened Ukraine-Russia relations, which were already extremely tense. The region faced a
sharp increase of conflicts in international relations, which reached its peak after the gas
wars of 2006 and 2009, and the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. At the same time, these
events proved the Kremlin’s decisiveness towards defending its interests by all means and
limited opportunities, and the EU’s and USA’s intentions to interfere with events in Eastern
Europe.
6. Destruction of the current legal framework expressed through self-proclamation of
Kosovo's, Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence complicates the situation.
Strategic instability in Central and Eastern Europe is recognized by important geopolitical
players. In particular, the Russian draft of the European Security Treaty and the gradual
change in the reaction of European states towards this draft. It is now obvious how Ukraine
found itself in an area of uncertainty between two powerful geopolitical blocs (the RF and
the EU-NATO) without any specific hope for the quick realization of its western
aspirations. Unfortunately, Kyiv’s evident vacuum of integral security which is primarily
expressed through a sharp growth of such threats as piracy, cybercrime, trans-border
organized crime, drug-trafficking, etc. Single signs of the region’s remilitarization are
evident. At the same time, the fundamental change in Kyiv’s foreign policy priorities,
realizing the harm to democratic Ukraine’s social progress, does not guarantee the
overcoming of this vacuum, as demonstrated by the example of Belarus and other post-
Soviet states. Moreover, these actions will lead to a fast accumulation in the potential for
conflict in relations with Ukraine’s western neighbors.
7. These factors result in the increased interest of Ukrainian experts in the Budapest
Memorandum as an important, though imperfect, legal and political tool for ensuring
Ukraine’s security, as well as the starting point for Kyiv’s European and Euro-Atlantic
course. In addition, throughout 2009, the USA, the RF and China additionally confirmed
their guarantees. At least, we have an opportunity to use the discussion of the Memorandum
in commencing the formation of internationally recognized guarantees for Ukrainian
security and the development of modern forms and methods of implementing Ukraine’s
strategic priority to join integration structures of the global West.