SlideShare ist ein Scribd-Unternehmen logo
1 von 22
Downloaden Sie, um offline zu lesen
Using Threat Intelligence to
Focus ATT&CK Activities
October 29, 2019
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
2
• Andy Kettell
– 20+ years IT security experience
– 4+ years at Nationwide in Cyber Security
Operations Center
– CISSP, CCSP
The Nationwide MITRE ATT&CK Team
.
• David Westin
– 20+ years of Intelligence in U.S.
Marine Corps
– 4 years at U.S. Cyber Command
– 1 year at Nationwide
Others:
• Risk Leaders
• Business Area Leaders
• Infrastructure Personnel
• Columbus Collaboratory
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
3
This ATT&CK thing is cool! I want it!
In the beginning…
Okay…how do we do this?
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
“Project Squishee…”
• What we did
– Tried to analyze 240+ techniques, one technique at a time
– Techniques chosen based on group consensus
• Six months to get three mitigations
• No real movement towards operationalizing the
framework within the company
Our First Attempt (February 2017)
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
• Why it didn’t work:
– Tried to do everything (no focus)
– Unfocused choosing of technique for deep dive analysis (what is cool…)
– Tried to work technique from analysis to completing remediation issues
– Bogged down in minutiae (took too long…)
– No differentiation between basic and advanced techniques
– No idea what we will get from this
– Participation fatigue
– No Intel personnel
Our First Attempt (February 2017)
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
6
Bright Idea: Focus on the Threat!!
Who is targeting us?
What techniques do they use?
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
7
Nationwide MITRE ATT&CK Process Was Born
Threat Intel
Phase
Testing Phase
Assessment
Phase
Implementation
Phase
Leadership
Phase
Threat Intel provided the compass and map…
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
Should I Care About Everything?
• Started with Excel spreadsheet created by Florian Roth (@cyb3rops)
• Added capability/intent; simplified based on Nationwide needs
• Used simple aging out criteria based on last known reports
Prioritize…
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
Put It In a Pretty ChartCapabilityMaturity
Interest in Financial Sector
Adversaries to the Financial Sector
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
Focus on What Matters
CapabilityMaturity
Interest in Financial Sector
Adversaries to the Financial Sector
I Know ‘Who’, But Not ‘What’…
• 100+ threat actors down to 27
• Focus is on those threat actors
with capability and intent to go
after finance/insurance industry
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
11
Researching Threat Actor Techniques
• Intelligence collection tool of choice
• MITRE ATT&CK Site (of course…)
• ISAC/ISAO
• Security Researchers
• Twitter
• Top Techniques Reported
• Many others…
Collect All The Things…
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
• If used by threat actor,
add to chart
• More red = more threat
actors using that
technique
• Simple Excel
spreadsheet math…
Tying Research to ATT&CK Matrix
Still Messy…
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
13
Initial Access Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Collection Exfiltration Command and Control
Drive-by Compromise
Command-Line
Interface
Accessibility Features Access Token Manipulation Code Signing Account Manipulation Account Discovery
Application Deployment
Software
Data Staged Data Compressed Commonly Used Port
Spearphishing
Attachment
Mshta Application Shimming Accessibility Features Disabling Security Tools Brute Force
Application Window
Discovery
Exploitation of Remote
Services
Data from Local
System
Data Encrypted Connection Proxy
Spearphishing Link PowerShell Create Account Application Shimming File Deletion Credential Dumping
File and Directory
Discovery
Pass the Hash
Data from Network
Shared Drive
Exfiltration Over
Alternative Protocol
Data Encoding
Trusted Relationship Regsvr32
DLL Search Order
Hijacking
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Hidden Files and
Directories
Credentials in Files
Network Service
Scanning
Remote Desktop Protocol Email Collection
Exfiltration Over
Command and
Control Channel
Data Obfuscation
Valid Accounts Rundll32
Hidden Files and
Directories
Exploitation for Privilege
Escalation
Indicator Removal from
Tools
Input Capture
Permission Groups
Discovery
Remote File Copy Fallback Channels
Scheduled Task New Service New Service
Indicator Removal on
Host
Process Discovery Remote Services Multi-Stage Channels
Scripting
Registry Run Keys / Start
Folder
Process Injection Masquerading Query Registry Windows Admin Shares
Standard Application Layer
Protocol
User Execution Scheduled Task Scheduled Task Mshta
Remote System
Discovery
Standard Cyrptographic
Protocol
Windows
Management
Instrumentation
Shortcut Modification Valid Accounts
Obfuscated Files or
Information
System Information
Discovery
Standard Non-Application
Protocol
Web Shell Process Injection
System Network
Configuration Discovery
Uncommonly Used Port
Regsvr32
System Network
Connections Discovery
Rundll32
System Owner/User
Discovery
Software Packing
Timestomp
Valid Accounts
Web Service
• 91 techniques across 11 tactics
• Initial data necessary for
prioritization
Focusing Only On Identified Techniques…
Manageable Project…
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
14
“Knowing Is Half The Battle”
- G.I. Joe
“Victorious warriors win first and then
go to war, while defeated warriors go
to war first and then seek to win”
- Sun Tzu
Winning Quotes
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
Intel Driving Operations
Teams Involved: Threat Intelligence, Attack & Penetration, Infrastructure
Operations, Security Tool administrators, Incident Response, Security
Architecture, 2nd Line of Defense consultants, executive leadership
Everyone Involved…
Objective: Focus
project on most
likely adversary
techniques
Objective:
Determine
susceptibility to
prioritized
techniques
Objective:
Determine
recommended
detection &
mitigation
strategies
Objective:
Develop &
implement
detection and
mitigation actions
Objective:
Determine risk
associated with
non-implemented
strategies
Threat Intel
Phase
Testing Phase
Assessment
Phase
Implementation
Phase
Leadership
Phase
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
16
• Reduced tested techniques from 240+ to 91
• Clear understanding of our security posture related to MITRE
ATT&CK techniques associated with threat actors targeting the
finance/insurance industry
• Security focused recommendations vs. IT audit driven
• Enabled MITRE ATT&CK to gain a foothold in the organization
• Framework built to enable follow-on actions
Where Did We End Up?
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
17
Are we done yet?
What’s next?
Keep The Momentum Going
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
18
Constantly EvolvingCapabilityMaturity
Interest in Financial Sector
Adversaries to the Financial Sector
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
19
• Prioritization of techniques
– Third party research (Red Canary’s analysis of top techniques)
– Attack & Penetration test results
– Security expert input (FS-ISAC, Columbus Collaboratory, etc…)
– Analysis of recent breach reports (Ryuk, Emotet, Qakbot, Fin7, etc…)
– Analysis of Nationwide existing controls and effectiveness
Priority Tactic Technique
1 Execution PowerShell
2 Credential Access Credential Dumping
3 Execution Command-Line Interface
4 Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access Valid Accounts
5 Initial Access Spearphishing Attachment
6 Initial Access Spearphishing Link
7 Exfiltration Data Compressed
8 Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation Scheduled Task
9 Defense Evasion Masquerading
10 Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files
Intelligence Led Prioritization
*Not real results
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
20
Intelligence Driving Security
• “Anatomy of ATT&CK”
documents
• Use security research and
recent external events
• Break down scenario by
technique
• Used to confirm security
controls are in place
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
21
• Intel driven operations ensure clear focus and prioritization
• Focus on threat actors in your sector and techniques they use
• Don’t try to do it all…smaller chunks enable clearer understanding of final objectives
• Constantly evolve and iterate to increase coverage
Key Takeaways
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT
22
Contact us at:
sccthreatintel@nationwide.com
Andy Kettell
David Westin
Questions?

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Was ist angesagt?

Mapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE Activities
Mapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE ActivitiesMapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE Activities
Mapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE ActivitiesMITRE ATT&CK
 
Bsides 2019 - Intelligent Threat Hunting
Bsides 2019 - Intelligent Threat HuntingBsides 2019 - Intelligent Threat Hunting
Bsides 2019 - Intelligent Threat HuntingDhruv Majumdar
 
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsHow MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsSergey Soldatov
 
Exploring how Students Map Social Engineering Techniques to the ATT&CK Framew...
Exploring how Students Map Social Engineering Techniques to the ATT&CK Framew...Exploring how Students Map Social Engineering Techniques to the ATT&CK Framew...
Exploring how Students Map Social Engineering Techniques to the ATT&CK Framew...MITRE ATT&CK
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITRE
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITREMITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITRE
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITREMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Automating the mundanity of technique IDs with ATT&CK Detections Collector
Automating the mundanity of technique IDs with ATT&CK Detections CollectorAutomating the mundanity of technique IDs with ATT&CK Detections Collector
Automating the mundanity of technique IDs with ATT&CK Detections CollectorMITRE ATT&CK
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...MITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On Lab
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On LabPHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On Lab
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On LabTeymur Kheirkhabarov
 
ATT&CK Updates- Campaigns
ATT&CK Updates- CampaignsATT&CK Updates- Campaigns
ATT&CK Updates- CampaignsMITRE ATT&CK
 
Would you Rather Have Telemetry into 2 Attacks or 20? An Insight Into Highly ...
Would you Rather Have Telemetry into 2 Attacks or 20? An Insight Into Highly ...Would you Rather Have Telemetry into 2 Attacks or 20? An Insight Into Highly ...
Would you Rather Have Telemetry into 2 Attacks or 20? An Insight Into Highly ...MITRE ATT&CK
 
ATTACKers Think in Graphs: Building Graphs for Threat Intelligence
ATTACKers Think in Graphs: Building Graphs for Threat IntelligenceATTACKers Think in Graphs: Building Graphs for Threat Intelligence
ATTACKers Think in Graphs: Building Graphs for Threat IntelligenceMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...
ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...
ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...JamieWilliams130
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,...MITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Cyber Threat Hunting Workshop
Cyber Threat Hunting WorkshopCyber Threat Hunting Workshop
Cyber Threat Hunting WorkshopDigit Oktavianto
 
Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK - Speaking the Common Language
Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK - Speaking the Common LanguageLeveraging MITRE ATT&CK - Speaking the Common Language
Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK - Speaking the Common LanguageErik Van Buggenhout
 
It's just a jump to the left (of boom): Prioritizing detection implementation...
It's just a jump to the left (of boom): Prioritizing detection implementation...It's just a jump to the left (of boom): Prioritizing detection implementation...
It's just a jump to the left (of boom): Prioritizing detection implementation...MITRE ATT&CK
 
Adversary Emulation and Red Team Exercises - EDUCAUSE
Adversary Emulation and Red Team Exercises - EDUCAUSEAdversary Emulation and Red Team Exercises - EDUCAUSE
Adversary Emulation and Red Team Exercises - EDUCAUSEJorge Orchilles
 
Cyber Threat hunting workshop
Cyber Threat hunting workshopCyber Threat hunting workshop
Cyber Threat hunting workshopArpan Raval
 
ATT&CK Metaverse - Exploring the Limitations of Applying ATT&CK
ATT&CK Metaverse - Exploring the Limitations of Applying ATT&CKATT&CK Metaverse - Exploring the Limitations of Applying ATT&CK
ATT&CK Metaverse - Exploring the Limitations of Applying ATT&CKMITRE ATT&CK
 

Was ist angesagt? (20)

Mapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE Activities
Mapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE ActivitiesMapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE Activities
Mapping ATT&CK Techniques to ENGAGE Activities
 
Bsides 2019 - Intelligent Threat Hunting
Bsides 2019 - Intelligent Threat HuntingBsides 2019 - Intelligent Threat Hunting
Bsides 2019 - Intelligent Threat Hunting
 
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsHow MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
 
Exploring how Students Map Social Engineering Techniques to the ATT&CK Framew...
Exploring how Students Map Social Engineering Techniques to the ATT&CK Framew...Exploring how Students Map Social Engineering Techniques to the ATT&CK Framew...
Exploring how Students Map Social Engineering Techniques to the ATT&CK Framew...
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITRE
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITREMITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITRE
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: State of the ATT&CK; Blake Strom, MITRE
 
Automating the mundanity of technique IDs with ATT&CK Detections Collector
Automating the mundanity of technique IDs with ATT&CK Detections CollectorAutomating the mundanity of technique IDs with ATT&CK Detections Collector
Automating the mundanity of technique IDs with ATT&CK Detections Collector
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Hunters ATT&CKing with the Data, Roberto Rodriguez, Spe...
 
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On Lab
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On LabPHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On Lab
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On Lab
 
ATT&CK Updates- Campaigns
ATT&CK Updates- CampaignsATT&CK Updates- Campaigns
ATT&CK Updates- Campaigns
 
Would you Rather Have Telemetry into 2 Attacks or 20? An Insight Into Highly ...
Would you Rather Have Telemetry into 2 Attacks or 20? An Insight Into Highly ...Would you Rather Have Telemetry into 2 Attacks or 20? An Insight Into Highly ...
Would you Rather Have Telemetry into 2 Attacks or 20? An Insight Into Highly ...
 
ATTACKers Think in Graphs: Building Graphs for Threat Intelligence
ATTACKers Think in Graphs: Building Graphs for Threat IntelligenceATTACKers Think in Graphs: Building Graphs for Threat Intelligence
ATTACKers Think in Graphs: Building Graphs for Threat Intelligence
 
ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...
ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...
ATT&CKing Your Adversaries - Operationalizing cyber intelligence in your own ...
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Summiting the Pyramid of Pain: Operationalizing ATT&CK,...
 
Cyber Threat Hunting Workshop
Cyber Threat Hunting WorkshopCyber Threat Hunting Workshop
Cyber Threat Hunting Workshop
 
Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK - Speaking the Common Language
Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK - Speaking the Common LanguageLeveraging MITRE ATT&CK - Speaking the Common Language
Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK - Speaking the Common Language
 
ATT&CKcon Intro
ATT&CKcon IntroATT&CKcon Intro
ATT&CKcon Intro
 
It's just a jump to the left (of boom): Prioritizing detection implementation...
It's just a jump to the left (of boom): Prioritizing detection implementation...It's just a jump to the left (of boom): Prioritizing detection implementation...
It's just a jump to the left (of boom): Prioritizing detection implementation...
 
Adversary Emulation and Red Team Exercises - EDUCAUSE
Adversary Emulation and Red Team Exercises - EDUCAUSEAdversary Emulation and Red Team Exercises - EDUCAUSE
Adversary Emulation and Red Team Exercises - EDUCAUSE
 
Cyber Threat hunting workshop
Cyber Threat hunting workshopCyber Threat hunting workshop
Cyber Threat hunting workshop
 
ATT&CK Metaverse - Exploring the Limitations of Applying ATT&CK
ATT&CK Metaverse - Exploring the Limitations of Applying ATT&CKATT&CK Metaverse - Exploring the Limitations of Applying ATT&CK
ATT&CK Metaverse - Exploring the Limitations of Applying ATT&CK
 

Ähnlich wie MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; David Westin and Andy Kettell, Nationwide

CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)
CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)
CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)Sam Bowne
 
RMS Security Breakfast
RMS Security BreakfastRMS Security Breakfast
RMS Security BreakfastRackspace
 
CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)
CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)
CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)Sam Bowne
 
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)Shah Sheikh
 
Federal Cybersecurity: The latest challenges, initiatives and best practices
Federal Cybersecurity: The latest challenges, initiatives and best practicesFederal Cybersecurity: The latest challenges, initiatives and best practices
Federal Cybersecurity: The latest challenges, initiatives and best practicesJohn Gilligan
 
Outpost24 webinar - The new CISO imperative: connecting technical vulnerabili...
Outpost24 webinar - The new CISO imperative: connecting technical vulnerabili...Outpost24 webinar - The new CISO imperative: connecting technical vulnerabili...
Outpost24 webinar - The new CISO imperative: connecting technical vulnerabili...Outpost24
 
Building an Analytics - Enabled SOC Breakout Session
Building an Analytics - Enabled SOC Breakout Session Building an Analytics - Enabled SOC Breakout Session
Building an Analytics - Enabled SOC Breakout Session Splunk
 
Effective Cyber Defense Using CIS Critical Security Controls
Effective Cyber Defense Using CIS Critical Security ControlsEffective Cyber Defense Using CIS Critical Security Controls
Effective Cyber Defense Using CIS Critical Security ControlsBSides Delhi
 
How To Build An Incident Response Function
How To Build An Incident Response FunctionHow To Build An Incident Response Function
How To Build An Incident Response FunctionResilient Systems
 
TIC-TOC: Disrupt the Threat Management Conversation with Dominique Singer and...
TIC-TOC: Disrupt the Threat Management Conversation with Dominique Singer and...TIC-TOC: Disrupt the Threat Management Conversation with Dominique Singer and...
TIC-TOC: Disrupt the Threat Management Conversation with Dominique Singer and...SaraPia5
 
Cyber Risk Management in 2017: Challenges & Recommendations
Cyber Risk Management in 2017: Challenges & RecommendationsCyber Risk Management in 2017: Challenges & Recommendations
Cyber Risk Management in 2017: Challenges & RecommendationsUlf Mattsson
 
[Warsaw 26.06.2018] SDL Threat Modeling principles
[Warsaw 26.06.2018] SDL Threat Modeling principles[Warsaw 26.06.2018] SDL Threat Modeling principles
[Warsaw 26.06.2018] SDL Threat Modeling principlesOWASP
 
UNCOVER DATA SECURITY BLIND SPOTS IN YOUR CLOUD, BIG DATA & DEVOPS ENVIRONMENT
UNCOVER DATA SECURITY BLIND SPOTS IN YOUR CLOUD, BIG DATA & DEVOPS ENVIRONMENTUNCOVER DATA SECURITY BLIND SPOTS IN YOUR CLOUD, BIG DATA & DEVOPS ENVIRONMENT
UNCOVER DATA SECURITY BLIND SPOTS IN YOUR CLOUD, BIG DATA & DEVOPS ENVIRONMENTUlf Mattsson
 
Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017
Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017
Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017FRSecure
 
SLVA - Security monitoring and reporting itweb workshop
SLVA - Security monitoring and reporting   itweb workshopSLVA - Security monitoring and reporting   itweb workshop
SLVA - Security monitoring and reporting itweb workshopSLVA Information Security
 
Implementing An Automated Incident Response Architecture
Implementing An Automated Incident Response ArchitectureImplementing An Automated Incident Response Architecture
Implementing An Automated Incident Response ArchitecturePriyanka Aash
 
Virtual Gov Day - Security Breakout - Deloitte
Virtual Gov Day - Security Breakout - DeloitteVirtual Gov Day - Security Breakout - Deloitte
Virtual Gov Day - Security Breakout - DeloitteSplunk
 
Nist 800 53 deep dive 20210813
Nist 800 53 deep dive 20210813Nist 800 53 deep dive 20210813
Nist 800 53 deep dive 20210813Kinetic Potential
 

Ähnlich wie MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; David Westin and Andy Kettell, Nationwide (20)

CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)
CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)
CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)
 
RMS Security Breakfast
RMS Security BreakfastRMS Security Breakfast
RMS Security Breakfast
 
CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)
CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)
CNIT 160 4d Security Program Management (Part 4)
 
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)
 
Federal Cybersecurity: The latest challenges, initiatives and best practices
Federal Cybersecurity: The latest challenges, initiatives and best practicesFederal Cybersecurity: The latest challenges, initiatives and best practices
Federal Cybersecurity: The latest challenges, initiatives and best practices
 
Outpost24 webinar - The new CISO imperative: connecting technical vulnerabili...
Outpost24 webinar - The new CISO imperative: connecting technical vulnerabili...Outpost24 webinar - The new CISO imperative: connecting technical vulnerabili...
Outpost24 webinar - The new CISO imperative: connecting technical vulnerabili...
 
Building an Analytics - Enabled SOC Breakout Session
Building an Analytics - Enabled SOC Breakout Session Building an Analytics - Enabled SOC Breakout Session
Building an Analytics - Enabled SOC Breakout Session
 
Effective Cyber Defense Using CIS Critical Security Controls
Effective Cyber Defense Using CIS Critical Security ControlsEffective Cyber Defense Using CIS Critical Security Controls
Effective Cyber Defense Using CIS Critical Security Controls
 
How To Build An Incident Response Function
How To Build An Incident Response FunctionHow To Build An Incident Response Function
How To Build An Incident Response Function
 
TIC-TOC: Disrupt the Threat Management Conversation with Dominique Singer and...
TIC-TOC: Disrupt the Threat Management Conversation with Dominique Singer and...TIC-TOC: Disrupt the Threat Management Conversation with Dominique Singer and...
TIC-TOC: Disrupt the Threat Management Conversation with Dominique Singer and...
 
Cyber Risk Management in 2017: Challenges & Recommendations
Cyber Risk Management in 2017: Challenges & RecommendationsCyber Risk Management in 2017: Challenges & Recommendations
Cyber Risk Management in 2017: Challenges & Recommendations
 
[Warsaw 26.06.2018] SDL Threat Modeling principles
[Warsaw 26.06.2018] SDL Threat Modeling principles[Warsaw 26.06.2018] SDL Threat Modeling principles
[Warsaw 26.06.2018] SDL Threat Modeling principles
 
chap18.ppt
chap18.pptchap18.ppt
chap18.ppt
 
UNCOVER DATA SECURITY BLIND SPOTS IN YOUR CLOUD, BIG DATA & DEVOPS ENVIRONMENT
UNCOVER DATA SECURITY BLIND SPOTS IN YOUR CLOUD, BIG DATA & DEVOPS ENVIRONMENTUNCOVER DATA SECURITY BLIND SPOTS IN YOUR CLOUD, BIG DATA & DEVOPS ENVIRONMENT
UNCOVER DATA SECURITY BLIND SPOTS IN YOUR CLOUD, BIG DATA & DEVOPS ENVIRONMENT
 
Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017
Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017
Slide Deck – Session 11 – FRSecure CISSP Mentor Program 2017
 
SLVA - Security monitoring and reporting itweb workshop
SLVA - Security monitoring and reporting   itweb workshopSLVA - Security monitoring and reporting   itweb workshop
SLVA - Security monitoring and reporting itweb workshop
 
Ctia course outline
Ctia course outlineCtia course outline
Ctia course outline
 
Implementing An Automated Incident Response Architecture
Implementing An Automated Incident Response ArchitectureImplementing An Automated Incident Response Architecture
Implementing An Automated Incident Response Architecture
 
Virtual Gov Day - Security Breakout - Deloitte
Virtual Gov Day - Security Breakout - DeloitteVirtual Gov Day - Security Breakout - Deloitte
Virtual Gov Day - Security Breakout - Deloitte
 
Nist 800 53 deep dive 20210813
Nist 800 53 deep dive 20210813Nist 800 53 deep dive 20210813
Nist 800 53 deep dive 20210813
 

Mehr von MITRE - ATT&CKcon

ATTACK-Onomics: Attacking the Economics Behind Techniques Used by Adversaries
ATTACK-Onomics: Attacking the Economics Behind Techniques Used by AdversariesATTACK-Onomics: Attacking the Economics Behind Techniques Used by Adversaries
ATTACK-Onomics: Attacking the Economics Behind Techniques Used by AdversariesMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R...
Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R...Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R...
Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R...MITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
MITRE ATTACKcon Power Hour - January
MITRE ATTACKcon Power Hour - JanuaryMITRE ATTACKcon Power Hour - January
MITRE ATTACKcon Power Hour - JanuaryMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Using ATTACK to Create Cyber DBTS for Nuclear Power Plants
Using ATTACK to Create Cyber DBTS for Nuclear Power PlantsUsing ATTACK to Create Cyber DBTS for Nuclear Power Plants
Using ATTACK to Create Cyber DBTS for Nuclear Power PlantsMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Sharpening your Threat-Hunting Program with ATTACK Framework
Sharpening your Threat-Hunting Program with ATTACK FrameworkSharpening your Threat-Hunting Program with ATTACK Framework
Sharpening your Threat-Hunting Program with ATTACK FrameworkMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Helping Small Companies Leverage CTI with an Open Source Threat Mapping
Helping Small Companies Leverage CTI with an Open Source Threat MappingHelping Small Companies Leverage CTI with an Open Source Threat Mapping
Helping Small Companies Leverage CTI with an Open Source Threat MappingMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
What's New with ATTACK for ICS?
What's New with ATTACK for ICS?What's New with ATTACK for ICS?
What's New with ATTACK for ICS?MITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
From Theory to Practice: How My ATTACK Perspectives Have Changed
From Theory to Practice: How My ATTACK Perspectives Have ChangedFrom Theory to Practice: How My ATTACK Perspectives Have Changed
From Theory to Practice: How My ATTACK Perspectives Have ChangedMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
What's a MITRE with your Security?
What's a MITRE with your Security?What's a MITRE with your Security?
What's a MITRE with your Security?MITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
ATTACKing the Cloud: Hopping Between the Matrices
ATTACKing the Cloud: Hopping Between the MatricesATTACKing the Cloud: Hopping Between the Matrices
ATTACKing the Cloud: Hopping Between the MatricesMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Mapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for Mobile
Mapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for MobileMapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for Mobile
Mapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for MobileMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Transforming Adversary Emulation Into a Data Analysis Question
Transforming Adversary Emulation Into a Data Analysis QuestionTransforming Adversary Emulation Into a Data Analysis Question
Transforming Adversary Emulation Into a Data Analysis QuestionMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020
TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020
TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020MITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Using MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and Research
Using MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and ResearchUsing MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and Research
Using MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and ResearchMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
What's New with ATTACK for Cloud?
What's New with ATTACK for Cloud?What's New with ATTACK for Cloud?
What's New with ATTACK for Cloud?MITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Starting Over with Sub-Techniques
Starting Over with Sub-TechniquesStarting Over with Sub-Techniques
Starting Over with Sub-TechniquesMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
MITRE ATTACKCon Power Hour - December
MITRE ATTACKCon Power Hour - DecemberMITRE ATTACKCon Power Hour - December
MITRE ATTACKCon Power Hour - DecemberMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - November
MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - NovemberMITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - November
MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - NovemberMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 

Mehr von MITRE - ATT&CKcon (20)

State of the ATTACK
State of the ATTACKState of the ATTACK
State of the ATTACK
 
ATTACK-Onomics: Attacking the Economics Behind Techniques Used by Adversaries
ATTACK-Onomics: Attacking the Economics Behind Techniques Used by AdversariesATTACK-Onomics: Attacking the Economics Behind Techniques Used by Adversaries
ATTACK-Onomics: Attacking the Economics Behind Techniques Used by Adversaries
 
Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R...
Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R...Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R...
Measure What Matters: How to Use MITRE ATTACK to do the Right Things in the R...
 
MITRE ATTACKcon Power Hour - January
MITRE ATTACKcon Power Hour - JanuaryMITRE ATTACKcon Power Hour - January
MITRE ATTACKcon Power Hour - January
 
Using ATTACK to Create Cyber DBTS for Nuclear Power Plants
Using ATTACK to Create Cyber DBTS for Nuclear Power PlantsUsing ATTACK to Create Cyber DBTS for Nuclear Power Plants
Using ATTACK to Create Cyber DBTS for Nuclear Power Plants
 
Sharpening your Threat-Hunting Program with ATTACK Framework
Sharpening your Threat-Hunting Program with ATTACK FrameworkSharpening your Threat-Hunting Program with ATTACK Framework
Sharpening your Threat-Hunting Program with ATTACK Framework
 
Helping Small Companies Leverage CTI with an Open Source Threat Mapping
Helping Small Companies Leverage CTI with an Open Source Threat MappingHelping Small Companies Leverage CTI with an Open Source Threat Mapping
Helping Small Companies Leverage CTI with an Open Source Threat Mapping
 
What's New with ATTACK for ICS?
What's New with ATTACK for ICS?What's New with ATTACK for ICS?
What's New with ATTACK for ICS?
 
From Theory to Practice: How My ATTACK Perspectives Have Changed
From Theory to Practice: How My ATTACK Perspectives Have ChangedFrom Theory to Practice: How My ATTACK Perspectives Have Changed
From Theory to Practice: How My ATTACK Perspectives Have Changed
 
Putting the PRE into ATTACK
Putting the PRE into ATTACKPutting the PRE into ATTACK
Putting the PRE into ATTACK
 
What's a MITRE with your Security?
What's a MITRE with your Security?What's a MITRE with your Security?
What's a MITRE with your Security?
 
ATTACKing the Cloud: Hopping Between the Matrices
ATTACKing the Cloud: Hopping Between the MatricesATTACKing the Cloud: Hopping Between the Matrices
ATTACKing the Cloud: Hopping Between the Matrices
 
Mapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for Mobile
Mapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for MobileMapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for Mobile
Mapping the EventBot Mobile Banking Trojan with MITRE ATTACK for Mobile
 
Transforming Adversary Emulation Into a Data Analysis Question
Transforming Adversary Emulation Into a Data Analysis QuestionTransforming Adversary Emulation Into a Data Analysis Question
Transforming Adversary Emulation Into a Data Analysis Question
 
TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020
TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020
TA505: A Study of High End Big Game Hunting in 2020
 
Using MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and Research
Using MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and ResearchUsing MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and Research
Using MITRE PRE-ATTACK and ATTACK in Cybercrime Education and Research
 
What's New with ATTACK for Cloud?
What's New with ATTACK for Cloud?What's New with ATTACK for Cloud?
What's New with ATTACK for Cloud?
 
Starting Over with Sub-Techniques
Starting Over with Sub-TechniquesStarting Over with Sub-Techniques
Starting Over with Sub-Techniques
 
MITRE ATTACKCon Power Hour - December
MITRE ATTACKCon Power Hour - DecemberMITRE ATTACKCon Power Hour - December
MITRE ATTACKCon Power Hour - December
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - November
MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - NovemberMITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - November
MITRE ATT&CKcon Power Hour - November
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen

Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLDeveloper Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLScyllaDB
 
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!Manik S Magar
 
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .Alan Dix
 
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteTake control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteDianaGray10
 
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering Tips
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering TipsVertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering Tips
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering TipsMiki Katsuragi
 
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data PrivacyTrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data PrivacyTrustArc
 
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024Lorenzo Miniero
 
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024Lonnie McRorey
 
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easy
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easyCommit 2024 - Secret Management made easy
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easyAlfredo García Lavilla
 
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptxSAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptxNavinnSomaal
 
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.Curtis Poe
 
Story boards and shot lists for my a level piece
Story boards and shot lists for my a level pieceStory boards and shot lists for my a level piece
Story boards and shot lists for my a level piececharlottematthew16
 
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine Tuning
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine TuningDSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine Tuning
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine TuningLars Bell
 
Hyperautomation and AI/ML: A Strategy for Digital Transformation Success.pdf
Hyperautomation and AI/ML: A Strategy for Digital Transformation Success.pdfHyperautomation and AI/ML: A Strategy for Digital Transformation Success.pdf
Hyperautomation and AI/ML: A Strategy for Digital Transformation Success.pdfPrecisely
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platformsDevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platformsSergiu Bodiu
 
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck PresentationConnect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck PresentationSlibray Presentation
 
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdfSearch Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdfRankYa
 
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptxArtificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptxhariprasad279825
 
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding ClubUnleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding ClubKalema Edgar
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)

Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLDeveloper Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
 
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
 
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
 
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteTake control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
 
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering Tips
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering TipsVertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering Tips
Vertex AI Gemini Prompt Engineering Tips
 
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data PrivacyTrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
 
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
SIP trunking in Janus @ Kamailio World 2024
 
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
 
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easy
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easyCommit 2024 - Secret Management made easy
Commit 2024 - Secret Management made easy
 
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptxSAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
SAP Build Work Zone - Overview L2-L3.pptx
 
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.
 
Story boards and shot lists for my a level piece
Story boards and shot lists for my a level pieceStory boards and shot lists for my a level piece
Story boards and shot lists for my a level piece
 
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine Tuning
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine TuningDSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine Tuning
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine Tuning
 
Hyperautomation and AI/ML: A Strategy for Digital Transformation Success.pdf
Hyperautomation and AI/ML: A Strategy for Digital Transformation Success.pdfHyperautomation and AI/ML: A Strategy for Digital Transformation Success.pdf
Hyperautomation and AI/ML: A Strategy for Digital Transformation Success.pdf
 
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
 
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platformsDevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
DevEX - reference for building teams, processes, and platforms
 
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck PresentationConnect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
Connect Wave/ connectwave Pitch Deck Presentation
 
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdfSearch Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
 
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptxArtificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
 
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding ClubUnleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
 

MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; David Westin and Andy Kettell, Nationwide

  • 1. Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities October 29, 2019
  • 2. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 2 • Andy Kettell – 20+ years IT security experience – 4+ years at Nationwide in Cyber Security Operations Center – CISSP, CCSP The Nationwide MITRE ATT&CK Team . • David Westin – 20+ years of Intelligence in U.S. Marine Corps – 4 years at U.S. Cyber Command – 1 year at Nationwide Others: • Risk Leaders • Business Area Leaders • Infrastructure Personnel • Columbus Collaboratory
  • 3. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 3 This ATT&CK thing is cool! I want it! In the beginning… Okay…how do we do this?
  • 4. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT “Project Squishee…” • What we did – Tried to analyze 240+ techniques, one technique at a time – Techniques chosen based on group consensus • Six months to get three mitigations • No real movement towards operationalizing the framework within the company Our First Attempt (February 2017)
  • 5. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT • Why it didn’t work: – Tried to do everything (no focus) – Unfocused choosing of technique for deep dive analysis (what is cool…) – Tried to work technique from analysis to completing remediation issues – Bogged down in minutiae (took too long…) – No differentiation between basic and advanced techniques – No idea what we will get from this – Participation fatigue – No Intel personnel Our First Attempt (February 2017)
  • 6. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 6 Bright Idea: Focus on the Threat!! Who is targeting us? What techniques do they use?
  • 7. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 7 Nationwide MITRE ATT&CK Process Was Born Threat Intel Phase Testing Phase Assessment Phase Implementation Phase Leadership Phase Threat Intel provided the compass and map…
  • 8. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT Should I Care About Everything? • Started with Excel spreadsheet created by Florian Roth (@cyb3rops) • Added capability/intent; simplified based on Nationwide needs • Used simple aging out criteria based on last known reports Prioritize…
  • 9. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT Put It In a Pretty ChartCapabilityMaturity Interest in Financial Sector Adversaries to the Financial Sector
  • 10. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT Focus on What Matters CapabilityMaturity Interest in Financial Sector Adversaries to the Financial Sector I Know ‘Who’, But Not ‘What’… • 100+ threat actors down to 27 • Focus is on those threat actors with capability and intent to go after finance/insurance industry
  • 11. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 11 Researching Threat Actor Techniques • Intelligence collection tool of choice • MITRE ATT&CK Site (of course…) • ISAC/ISAO • Security Researchers • Twitter • Top Techniques Reported • Many others… Collect All The Things…
  • 12. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT • If used by threat actor, add to chart • More red = more threat actors using that technique • Simple Excel spreadsheet math… Tying Research to ATT&CK Matrix Still Messy…
  • 13. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 13 Initial Access Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Collection Exfiltration Command and Control Drive-by Compromise Command-Line Interface Accessibility Features Access Token Manipulation Code Signing Account Manipulation Account Discovery Application Deployment Software Data Staged Data Compressed Commonly Used Port Spearphishing Attachment Mshta Application Shimming Accessibility Features Disabling Security Tools Brute Force Application Window Discovery Exploitation of Remote Services Data from Local System Data Encrypted Connection Proxy Spearphishing Link PowerShell Create Account Application Shimming File Deletion Credential Dumping File and Directory Discovery Pass the Hash Data from Network Shared Drive Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Data Encoding Trusted Relationship Regsvr32 DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Search Order Hijacking Hidden Files and Directories Credentials in Files Network Service Scanning Remote Desktop Protocol Email Collection Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Data Obfuscation Valid Accounts Rundll32 Hidden Files and Directories Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Indicator Removal from Tools Input Capture Permission Groups Discovery Remote File Copy Fallback Channels Scheduled Task New Service New Service Indicator Removal on Host Process Discovery Remote Services Multi-Stage Channels Scripting Registry Run Keys / Start Folder Process Injection Masquerading Query Registry Windows Admin Shares Standard Application Layer Protocol User Execution Scheduled Task Scheduled Task Mshta Remote System Discovery Standard Cyrptographic Protocol Windows Management Instrumentation Shortcut Modification Valid Accounts Obfuscated Files or Information System Information Discovery Standard Non-Application Protocol Web Shell Process Injection System Network Configuration Discovery Uncommonly Used Port Regsvr32 System Network Connections Discovery Rundll32 System Owner/User Discovery Software Packing Timestomp Valid Accounts Web Service • 91 techniques across 11 tactics • Initial data necessary for prioritization Focusing Only On Identified Techniques… Manageable Project…
  • 14. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 14 “Knowing Is Half The Battle” - G.I. Joe “Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win” - Sun Tzu Winning Quotes
  • 15. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT Intel Driving Operations Teams Involved: Threat Intelligence, Attack & Penetration, Infrastructure Operations, Security Tool administrators, Incident Response, Security Architecture, 2nd Line of Defense consultants, executive leadership Everyone Involved… Objective: Focus project on most likely adversary techniques Objective: Determine susceptibility to prioritized techniques Objective: Determine recommended detection & mitigation strategies Objective: Develop & implement detection and mitigation actions Objective: Determine risk associated with non-implemented strategies Threat Intel Phase Testing Phase Assessment Phase Implementation Phase Leadership Phase
  • 16. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 16 • Reduced tested techniques from 240+ to 91 • Clear understanding of our security posture related to MITRE ATT&CK techniques associated with threat actors targeting the finance/insurance industry • Security focused recommendations vs. IT audit driven • Enabled MITRE ATT&CK to gain a foothold in the organization • Framework built to enable follow-on actions Where Did We End Up?
  • 17. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 17 Are we done yet? What’s next? Keep The Momentum Going
  • 18. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 18 Constantly EvolvingCapabilityMaturity Interest in Financial Sector Adversaries to the Financial Sector
  • 19. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 19 • Prioritization of techniques – Third party research (Red Canary’s analysis of top techniques) – Attack & Penetration test results – Security expert input (FS-ISAC, Columbus Collaboratory, etc…) – Analysis of recent breach reports (Ryuk, Emotet, Qakbot, Fin7, etc…) – Analysis of Nationwide existing controls and effectiveness Priority Tactic Technique 1 Execution PowerShell 2 Credential Access Credential Dumping 3 Execution Command-Line Interface 4 Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access Valid Accounts 5 Initial Access Spearphishing Attachment 6 Initial Access Spearphishing Link 7 Exfiltration Data Compressed 8 Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation Scheduled Task 9 Defense Evasion Masquerading 10 Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files Intelligence Led Prioritization *Not real results
  • 20. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 20 Intelligence Driving Security • “Anatomy of ATT&CK” documents • Use security research and recent external events • Break down scenario by technique • Used to confirm security controls are in place
  • 21. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 21 • Intel driven operations ensure clear focus and prioritization • Focus on threat actors in your sector and techniques they use • Don’t try to do it all…smaller chunks enable clearer understanding of final objectives • Constantly evolve and iterate to increase coverage Key Takeaways
  • 22. INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT 22 Contact us at: sccthreatintel@nationwide.com Andy Kettell David Westin Questions?